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There is a long-held assumption that Outdoor Adventure Education (OAE) can 
develop character. However, little research has explored this belief. While many 
practitioners, and some scholars, remain committed to character development 
through OAE, the literature also reveals a growing body of discomfort and suspicion 
surrounding this assumption. This dissent centres on the vague nature of the term 
“character,” and the moral philosophical complexities surrounding the concept of 
character itself. Until “character” is more clearly explicated, any resolution to the 
current confusion is unlikely.  
 
This thesis employs Aristotle’s virtue theory, as espoused in his Nicomachean 
Ethics, to articulate an understanding of character. Although several scholars have 
used virtue ethics, commonly referred to as character ethics, to support their claims 
of character development through OAE, these treatments have been preliminary, 
warranting this more detailed account.  
 
When viewed from this virtue ethical perspective, the question, “Can character be 
developed through OAE?,” becomes problematic. For Aristotle cautions that 
different subjects of inquiry yield differing levels of accuracy, and with regard to 
ethical investigations, such as those into character, one must be content to “indicate 
the truth roughly and in outline” (I 3§4). Further complicating the matter, Aristotle 
asserts that virtue, a disposition, and the building block of character is gradually and 
arduously inculcated over long periods of time (I 7§16).  
 
While virtue theory implies that radical character transformation is, in any context, 
unlikely over brief stints of time, this does not mean that OAE programmes are of 
little moral worth. To the contrary, a detailed examination into a virtue ethical 
understanding of character suggests that certain elements of OAE programmes may 
 
 xii 
have strong moral relevance. This relevance is found in Aristotle’s three conditions 
that cultivate the development of virtue, conditions readily found within many OAE 
courses: moral reflection; moral practice; and sharing in the moral lives of others.  
 
Drawing on my own interest and experience within OAE, an expedition seemed an 
ideal setting to explore the presence and content of Aristotle’s three conditions. In 
hope of discovering this moral narrative, a qualitative case study was conducted on a 
two-week wilderness expedition in the Adirondack Mountains of New York. The 
expedition was a first-year transition experience for students attending a Christian 
liberal college in the United States. Utilising interviews as a primary method, and 
observations and texts as secondary methods, the research explored the participants’ 
expedition experience from a virtue ethical perspective. 
 
A thematic analysis revealed that participants reported reflecting on their moral lives 
in both formal (e.g. group reviews, solo, journals) and informal (e.g. while hiking 
and performing camp chores) settings. Similarly, whether through the mental and 
physical endurance required in off-trail navigation, or the care expressed through the 
acts of service and gracious tolerance necessitated by the social demands of 
expeditionary life, the participants viewed their wilderness travel as a constant 
opportunity for moral practice. Lastly, the participants identified the community 
formed on their expedition to be integral to their increased moral self-perception.  
 
Although a virtue ethical perspective precludes claiming anything definitive 
regarding the participants’ character development, at the least, the expedition can be 
said to have contributed to their moral journey in ways that are directly relevant to 






Like most young boys, I, too was fascinated with the “Knights of the Round Table” 
and often slew dragons in sleep and play. While I remember being attracted to the 
knights’ prowess, I now see that it was their character that captivated me. Ethics, 
morality and character have all been long-term interests of mine, and although never 
a knight, I have had adventures of a different kind.  
 
One such adventure occurred in 1999 when my wife and I took six months to walk 
the 2100-mile Appalachian Trail. During this expedition, through observation of 
myself and others, I began to see outdoor adventure as a means to moral growth. The 
physical challenges of traversing difficult terrain, the reflective space afforded by 
living at three miles an hour, and the profound revelations that come from being in a 
small community with others, seemed to provide a grooming ground for character.  
 
In the years since, while leading many others through the wilderness, my interest in 
the unique potential of expeditions for ethical formation has only increased. I now 
know that many others have also made similar connections, but like my own, their 
observations remained largely anecdotal. It was not until my exposure to Aristotle’s 
character-based virtue ethics that I contemplated a more academic treatment of 
character development through outdoor adventure education (OAE). The following 
thesis charts this investigation. 
Justification 
“Outdoor adventure education develops character.” Belief in this statement has a 
rather long and complicated history. The source most often credited with this idea is 
William James’ (1949, pp. 311-328) 1907 address, “The Moral Equivalent of War.” 
There, James praises the martial virtues (e.g. service and tenacity) war forms within 
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the soldier, but laments the moral loss that inevitably accompanies combat. Instead, 
he suggests a conscription of a different sort, one “against Nature …. where the 
military ideals of hardihood and discipline would be wrought into the growing fiber 
of the people” (1949, p. 325). By the 1940s, Kurt Hahn (1947), co-founder of 
Outward Bound, referenced James’ Moral Equivalent, and suggested that 
“conquering adversities on a sailing or mountaineering expedition” can “reveal, test 
and train character” (p. 4).  
 
This belief in OAE’s capacity to develop character persists anecdotally amongst 
many practitioners (e.g. Council of Ontario Outdoor Education, n.d.; Gookin & 
Leach, 2009, p. 5; Outward Bound International, n.d.). Scholars, however, appear 
more reticent to make these moral claims, possibly recognising the problematic 
nature of proving character’s development (e.g. Martin, 2010, p. 9). These 
difficulties are poignantly raised by Brookes (2003b, 2003c) in two seminal articles 
that trenchantly critique not only the possibility of character development through 
OAE, but the very idea of character itself.  
 
Yet, there are some scholars who are still convinced that OAE remains a viable 
means of developing character. These, decidedly American, scholars (e.g. Hunt, 
1996a; Martin, Bright, Cafaro, Mittelstaedt, & Bruyere, 2009; Martin, Cashel, 
Wagstaff & Breunig, 2006, p. 92) frequently cite virtue ethical theory to bolster their 
claims. However, these allusions to virtue ethics, sometimes referred to as character 
ethics, are often unnuanced and merely gloss any explanation of why OAE might 
develop virtue-based traits of character.  
 
Thus, the question of character development through OAE appears to be at an 
impasse. In sum, while scholars remain divided as to whether such ethical 
transformation is even possible, many practitioners hold on to the belief that they are 
fostering moral change within their participants. 
 
This thesis offers a way through the impasse. By providing a detailed account of 
virtue ethics, as principally espoused in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (Trans., 
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1999), I examine what relevance, if any, a virtue ethical account might have to 
character development through OAE. Further, in an effort to connect this theory with 
practice (Gass, 1992), to make the scholar relevant to the practitioner, I investigate 
the moral narratives of an expedition’s participants through a virtue ethical lens.  
 
While there are doubtless other approaches that might be taken, I believe that a virtue 
ethical perspective at once accounts for the practitioners’ conviction in character’s 
development, for some scholars’ reservations regarding it, and for the remaining 
scholars’ hope in OAE’s potential to inculcate virtue.  
Thesis at a Glance 
The following paragraphs describe each of the thesis’ chapters in brief, and explain 
how each one contributes to the document as a whole.  
Chapter 1 – Outdoor Adventure Education and Character 
The opening chapter frames the thesis within the broader discipline of Outdoor 
Education, and locates my specific interest in wilderness expeditions. The many 
sources that have led to the belief that character is developed through OAE are 
discussed, before introducing a growing body of scholarship that questions this long-
held claim. Since many of these scholarly reservations are philosophical in nature, I 
propose a philosophical examination of virtue ethical theory’s relevance to character 
development within OAE. Further, I propose a qualitative inquiry into the moral 
narratives of an expedition’s participants, analysed from a virtue ethical perspective.  
Chapter 2 – The Virtue of Character 
When one speaks of character, one generally is referring to “good” or “bad” 
character. However, to employ these terms is to use them in a moral sense. 
Discussions of character, therefore, quickly turn towards moral philosophy. This 
chapter thus opens detailing the relevance of virtue theory, over other ethical 
traditions found within Western Civilization, to this research into character 




A bulk of the chapter is given to an exegesis of Aristotle’s account of character as 
found within his Nicomachean Ethics (Trans. 1999). I justify this detailed account 
for several reasons. First, while character is, without question, a thread running 
throughout Aristotle’s argument, specific references to it are relatively infrequent. 
The reader is left to construct an understanding of character for him or herself. 
Second, it is this detailed account that has been missing within the OAE literature. 
Without such an account, it is difficult to foresee others becoming convinced of its 
merit.  
 
After putting forward Aristotle’s argument, including several conditions helpful to 
virtue inculcation (reflection, practice, and the shared life), I highlight the limitations 
of his theory, and more precisely locate this thesis within certain veins of the virtue 
tradition.  
Chapter 3 – Why Aristotle? The Character Education Movement 
One familiar with the literature available on “character” might ask why I did not 
reference the growing resources loosely grouped under the “character education 
movement”? This chapter examines many of the limitations found within the 
character education literature. Numerous examples, citing its often uncritical and 
non-theoretical treatment of character are given. These shortcomings are further 
exacerbated by a general lack of philosophical justification for its moral claims. This 
deficiency is particularly revealed in the recent efforts to find a psychologised 
morality. Utilising Dunne’s (1993) virtue ethical work, from which this thesis takes 
its title, the chapter closes with a final critique of the character education 
movement’s tendency to view the development of character as merely the acquisition 
of a skill. For these reasons, and others, I contend that an Aristotelian treatment of 
character is appropriate to this research.  
Chapter 4 – Methodology 
As the conclusion to the first chapter attests, on account of OAE’s strong orientation 
towards praxis, I feared that without contextualising virtue ethics’ relevance to an 
expedition, the full significance of Aristotle’s perspective on character might be lost. 
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This chapter, then, provides the methodology used during the qualitative case study 
into character development on a wilderness expedition. My guiding ontological and 
epistemological positions are described before recounting the processes of piloting 
and finding a case study to research: one of Gordon College’s (a small Christian 
Liberal Arts College in the Eastern US) wilderness expeditions. The methods used to 
collect (primarily two interviews with each participant) and thematically analyse the 
data are then discussed. The chapter closes with an appeal to the reader regarding my 
craftsmanship and trustworthiness as a researcher, and the reasons why I believe the 
findings may be generalisable beyond this specific case.  
Inter-chapter Section: Setting the Scene 
This brief section serves two purposes. First, it develops the context of the 
qualitatively investigated expedition for the reader. Issues such as history, 
demographics, curriculum, and the location of the journey are discussed. Second, the 
empirical part (Chapters 5-9) of the thesis is introduced. This section closes noting 
some of the challenges I encountered in rendering the participants’ perspectives into 
the analysis chapters.  
Chapter 5 – What is Character? 
This opening analysis chapter examines participant responses to the questions asked 
in the first interview: What is Character?; Can character be developed or 
undermined?; and How does one know what kind of character one wants? The 
purpose of these questions was two-fold. First, the participants’ responses to these 
general, non-OAE specific questions provided an interpretive context for their 
expedition-specific responses during the second interview (examined in Chapter 9). 
That is, whether the participants thought their character was developed on the 
expedition (a second interview question) was largely dependent on their 
understanding of character (a first interview question). Second, a supporting purpose 
for the questions in this chapter is their service as a moral educational example. For 
the conversation between researcher and participants, regarding these broad 
characterological questions, exemplifies a kind of dialogue that may be helpful for 
outdoor adventure educators interested in morally developing their students. Further, 
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as a case study, the participants’ moral perspectives contribute to the greater 
knowledge accumulation within OAE. 
Chapter 6 – Aristotle’s Conditions for Virtue 
This chapter examines the participant responses to virtue-ethically motivated 
questions asked in the first interview: What is the role of reflection in character 
development?; What is the role of practice in character development?; and What is 
the role of others in one’s character development? Like Chapter 5, these non-OAE 
specific questions provided an interpretive context for similar expedition-specific 
questions asked in interview two (and examined in Chapter 8): Did the expedition 
offer opportunities to reflect on your character?; Did the expedition offer 
opportunities to carry out actions related to your character?; and Did others make an 
impact on your character during this expedition?  
Chapter 7 – Expected Influences of the Expedition on Character 
There were several motivations for asking the participants, in the first interview, if 
they expected the expedition to have an impact on their character. Since a 
willingness to change has been identified as a condition for change (Gordon, 
Houghton, & Edwards, 1999, p. 16), the participants’ expectations provided an 
interpretive context for whether they thought their character was impacted by the 
expedition, a question asked in second interview, and examined in Chapter 9. This 
question also served to identify the elements of an expedition that the participants 
foresaw as relevant to character development. By exploring the moral relevance of 
such elements, I hoped to make recommendations for those interested in ethical 
formation through expeditions.  
Chapter 8 – Aristotle’s Conditions for Virtue on the Expedition 
This chapter explores the participants’ responses, given during the second interview, 
to whether the expedition afforded opportunities to exercise Aristotle’s conditions for 
virtue – reflection, practice, and the shared life with others. If the participants 
claimed to have experienced these conditions, then one might suggest, from an 
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Aristotelian perspective, that their character may have been impacted, even if only in 
a very small way, through participation on the expedition.  
Chapter 9 – Perceived Influences of the Expedition on Character 
This final analysis chapter answers the question that gave rise to this thesis: Was 
your character impacted by this expedition? To help answer this complicated 
question, asked during the second interview, character development in a qualified 
sense is differentiated from character development in a complete sense.  
Chapter 10 – Conclusion 
This chapter concludes the thesis. It begins by noting the limitations of the research. 
The central findings of the thesis are then highlighted, and recommendations made in 
light of them. Next, the thesis’ connections to broader issues within OAE are 
discussed. Finally, and in conclusion, an analogy is made by likening expeditions to 
“travelling monasteries.” For much like monasteries, expeditions provide sanctuary 
to a small community of people, in an austere wilderness environment, striving daily 
for moral growth, sometimes together, sometimes apart, but only through the 
accountability and encouragement of one another. Thus, in their likeness to travelling 
monasteries, expeditions can provide moral communities, and with them, the 
(qualified) development of virtue.  
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Abbreviations and Ancient Citation Conventions 
Abbreviations 
ACES – Affirmation/Appreciation, Challenge, Exhortation 
(A)LOD – (Assistant) Leader of the Day 
BSES – British Schools Exploring Society 
CAQDAS – Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software 
COEO – Council of Outdoor Educators of Ontario  
ICD – Informed Consent Document 
IEE – Integrative Ethical Education 
IRB – Institutional Review Board 
LEA – Local Education Authority 
MEW – Moral Equivalent of War 
NE – Nicomachean Ethics 
NOLS – National Outdoor Leadership School  
OAE – Outdoor Adventure Education 
SHERPPA – Service, Honesty, Encouragement, Respect, Patience, Positive Attitude 
WEA – Wilderness Education Association 
Citing Ancient Sources 
Within this thesis, several different types of notation are used to cite works of 
antiquity. The three most prominent styles are described below.  
 
Plato’s works use Stephanus (see introduction to Plato, trans. 1954, p. 16) 
pagination. For example, in Apology 38a, the work cited is Plato’s Apology. The 
number “38” is page 38 of the Stephanus edition. The letter “a” is section “a” on 




When citing Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (e.g. VI 5§2), I have used the notation 
employed by Irwin’s (1999, pp. xxv-xxvi) translation, which is based on the chapter 
sections found in Carl Zell’s 1820 edition. In the above example: the Roman numeral 
is the book within the Nicomachean Ethics (VI); the number after the Roman 
numeral (5) is the chapter within the book; and the number after the “§” symbol is 
the section within the chapter. 
 
On occasion, when quoting scholars, or referring to other works within Aristotle’s 
corpus, the Bekker notation (see Irwin, 1999, p. xxvi) system is used (e.g. 1094a10). 
Here, the “1094” refers to page 1094 of Bekker’s 1831 edition. The “a” signifies the 





Outdoor Adventure Education and Character 
This chapter has four aims, each given its own section. The first section describes the 
context of the study within the increasingly broad practice of Outdoor Education. 
The second section identifies a variety of influences, within in the literature, that 
have contributed to the assumption that participation in outdoor adventurous 
activities develops character. The third section airs both scholars and practitioners’ 
growing levels of discomfort and suspicion regarding these assumptions. The last 
section, by way of a virtue ethical perspective on character, suggests a philosophical 
resolution of this tension, emphasising outdoor adventure education’s potential to 
foster empathic aspects of character – a potential demonstrated by this research’s 
case study of a wilderness expedition.  
1.1 Framing the Thesis Within the Discipline of Outdoor Education 
This section frames the thesis within the broader field of Outdoor Education, and 
describes the holistic approach employed in the literature review.  
1.1.1 Outdoor Adventure Education 
The term “Outdoor Education” was first coined in the 1940s (Raiola & O’Keefe, 
1999, pp. 48-49). The practice is now more than 70 years old, but the bulk of its 
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development has occurred in the last 45 years (Higgins, Loynes & Crowther, 1997, 
p. 7). During this time, it has grown to incorporate a wide number of activities and 
foci. A general definition reads: 
Outdoor education is an experiential method of learning with the use of all senses. 
It takes place primarily, but not exclusively, through exposure to the natural 
environment. In outdoor education the emphasis for the subject of learning is placed 
on relationships concerning people and natural resources. (Priest, 1999, p. 11) 
The Outdoor Education Tree (Figure 1.1) is a helpful image that captures the breadth 
of this practice (Lund, 1997; see also Priest, 1986, pp. 14-15). Working from the 
bottom up, the roots of the tree show its theoretical groundings: Greek thought, Deep 
Ecology, John Dewey, Aldo Leopold and Kurt Hahn. Conspicuously missing from 
this list, and important to any discussion of character and Outdoor Education, is the 
British history of exploration, whose influence will be examined later in this chapter. 
Continuing with the description, the soil in which these ideas have taken root is the 
progressive education movement, and relevant to this thesis, the broad field of 
experiential learning. Outward Bound, Scouting, the Camping Movement, and 
Recreational Activities form the trunk of the tree. The main branches are divided into 
Environmental Education and, more pertinent to this thesis, Adventure Education. 
The finer branches of the Adventure Education section are named: Expeditionary 
Education, Wilderness Education, and Challenge Education. 
 
Similarly, Higgins, Loynes and Crowther (1997, p. 6) provide another visual 
description of Outdoor Education (Figure 1.2). Their image is a Venn diagram 
located within a box labelled “Safe and Professional Practice.” Three overlapping 
circles share a centre called Outdoor Education. The circles are named: Outdoor 
Pursuits, Personal and Social Development, and Environmental Education. 
 
Claims for character development within Outdoor Education are most often 
associated with the “branch” (see Figure 1.1) of Adventure Education. More 
specifically, this thesis focuses on the claims for character development within 
Wilderness Education and Expeditionary Education (see Figure 1.1). Comparably, 
the assumptions of character growth stem largely from the “circle” of Personal and 
Social Development (see Figure 1.2). However, as the conclusion of this thesis (see 
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subsection 10.4) will assert, character is not limited to “just one circle,” but is better 
seen as a “fabric” (Sherman, 1991) woven throughout the whole of a life. 






































Figure 1.1. The Outdoor Education Tree. This diagram visually displays the development 








In an effort to cope with the semantic range apparent within the Outdoor Education 
literature (e.g. Outdoor Education, Adventure Education, Expeditionary Learning, 
Challenge Education, Wilderness Education), I will consistently refer to this 
adventure-oriented wing of Outdoor Education as Outdoor Adventure Education 
(OAE), the term employed in two of the most relevant articles to this thesis 
(Brookes, 2003b, 2003c). In a few instances, intended meaning might have been 
misconstrued by substituting OAE for the particular term used by the author (e.g. 









Personal and Social 
Development
Safe and Professional Practice
Figure 1.2. The three circles of Outdoor Education. A Venn diagram showing Outdoor 




1.1.2 Outdoor Adventure Education Literature Review 
The three principal (listed below) OAE journals are published on three different 
continents. Debating whether to provide three different – British, American, and 
Australian – accounts of character development in OAE, or one combined and 
introductory account, I chose the latter. In this initial exploration of character and 
OAE, it seemed best to survey the literature more broadly, and then, if warranted, 
differentiate in future studies between the countries. In the few cases where I thought 
it helpful to differentiate the origins, I have done so. The following briefly outlines 
the methods and breadth of my OAE literature search.  
 
In hope of attaining greater rigour, I employed a variety of searching techniques. 
Utilising Dialog, an on-line database, I searched the three principal Education 
Indices: British, American, and Australian. I began by using each of the indices’ 
thesaurus feature to identify the appropriate keyword descriptors for this research 
into character development through OAE. I then cross-referenced the resultant 
descriptor list with the keywords listed for articles (e.g. Brookes, 2003b, 2003c) I 
already knew to be relevant to the thesis. This process led to the following Boolean 
search criterion:  
(experiential learning OR experiential education OR outdoor education OR outdoor 
activities OR outdoor leadership OR adventure education OR adventure learning 
OR discovery learning OR recreation leadership OR environmental education OR 
holistic approach) AND (character development OR character education OR 
character training OR character building OR character OR virtue OR virtues OR 
virtues in literature OR virtuous). 
I read through the titles, abstracts, and keywords produced in this initial search, 
looking for any resources that discussed, or made reference to, character within the 
broad field of Outdoor Education. Bibliographic citations from the relevant results 
were then downloaded into BookendsTM, a reference management software (see 
Appendix 2), and sorted into a variety of categories: to download; to photocopy; to 
inter-library loan. With the initial search completed, I then created a “scholar alert” 
in Dialog, which automatically ran my criterion over the indices each month, and 
emailed me any “hits.” In order to avoid missing any recently published articles that 
might be relevant to the research, I made use of this feature up to the submission of 




I also used the above criterion to search SportDiscus, a database specialising in sport, 
health, and fitness. Although this database yielded only a handful of articles, it 
significantly broadened the compass of my search, since SportDiscus includes a vast 
number of Recreation and Environmental Education journals.  
 
Finally, concerned that my criterion might have missed pertinent publications, I read 
through every article abstract from the three principal OAE journals: The Journal of 
Adventure Education and Outdoor Learning; The Journal of Experiential Education; 
and The Australian Journal of Outdoor Education. 
 
Having located the focus of this thesis within the field of Outdoor Education, and 
described the techniques used to search the OAE literature, I now turn to the 
assumption, within this literature, that OAE develops character.  
1.2 The Assumption That OAE Develops Character 
This subsection traces some of the historical influences that have led to the 
assumption of character development through OAE: antecedents to the assumption; 
OAE as a “Moral Equivalent of War”; and contemporary attempts to link 
adventurous activities with character formation. 
1.2.1 Antecedents to the Assumption of Character Development Within 
OAE Programmes 
I have identified five chief antecedents: the Classical Greeks; sport; the camping 
movement; Scouts; and the use of expeditions for moral educational purposes. Since 
each is a literature unto itself, only brief mention is given to show their relationship 
to character development and OAE. 
1.2.1.1 The Classical Greeks  
“Character is Destiny” reads Heraclitus’ famous dictum (Trans. 1923, Fragment 
121). The pre-Socratic dialectic between Parmenides’ “being” (everything stays the 
same) and Heraclitus’ “becoming” (everything is in a state of flux) seems to have 
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favoured the latter: it is commonly held that change (e.g. moral growth) is not only 
possible, but is a human responsibility (Jones, 1970, pp. 14-18, 21-25). Many 
philosophers of Classical Greece, such as Plato and Aristotle, believed that one’s 
character is not predetermined: one can choose to change it. Steeped in the classics, 
and interested in character formation, early outdoor adventure educators drew on 
Classical Greek thought for their inspiration. 
 
OAE’s debt to Plato is widely accepted (Hunt, 1996b, pp. 2-3, 1999, pp. 115-116; 
James, 1990, p. 7; Wurdinger, 1997, pp. 3-4). “Following a line of thought that 
probably goes back to Plato … not a few past educationalists … have regarded the 
outdoors as an important training ground for character” (Carr, 2004, p. 223). Most of 
these OAE references allude to the Republic (Plato, trans. 1987). In one instance, the 
foundations of an Outward Bound school are directly traced to Socrates and 
Thrasymachus’ conversation about right conduct (Hunt, 1996b, p. 2). Wurdinger 
(1997, pp. 1-4) also credits Plato with three foundational contributions to OAE, one 
of which is the building of moral character. In a key passage of the Republic, Plato 
articulates the educational philosophy that has undergirded OAE. He notes that the 
two branches of education, one philosophical (broadly meaning intellectual pursuits), 
and the other physical,  
are not intended the one to train body, the other mind, except incidentally, but to 
ensure a proper harmony between energy and initiative on the one hand and reason 
on the other … , so we may venture to assert that anyone who can produce the 
perfect blend of the physical and intellectual sides of education and apply them to 
the training of character, is producing … harmony of far more importance. (411e-
412a) 
Aristotle is another Classical Greek philosopher to whom OAE is indebted (Hunt, 
1999, pp. 116-117). Aristotle (trans. 1999, II 3§1-2), like Plato (Republic, Book V), 
believed moral virtue to be the key aim of education. He understood character to be a 
matter of virtuous habit: “we become just by doing just actions, temperate by doing 
temperate actions, brave by doing brave actions” (II 2§4). Outdoor adventure 
educators seem to have accepted Aristotle’s view, assuming that the moral actions 
performed in the field (e.g. bravery, loyalty, and service), would result in lasting 




Although much more could be written about the Classical Greek influence on OAE, 
the examples given suffice to show a Greek influence on the assumption of character 
development within OAE programmes. I now turn to the second antecedent: sport.  
1.2.1.2 Sport 
A “core belief” within OAE has been that “physical activities provide an effective 
means of building character” (Barrett & Greenaway, 1995, p. 23). This association 
has been reinforced by similar sentiments regarding sport (ibid., p. 23). For example, 
the original intent of the Olympic games was not merely physical contest, but the 
“improvement of the whole man” (Bannister, 1955, p. 74). Similarly, in his now 
famous aphorism, “mens sana in corpore sano,” a healthy mind in a healthy body, 
the Roman poet Juvenal associated physical health with mental well-being in his 
tenth Satire (Trans. 1982, 10.356).  
 
More pertinent to this research, Thomas Arnold, headmaster of Rugby School (1828-
42), seems to have believed in a similar connection when he introduced sport into his 
curriculum to produce not just the mental well-being Juvenal spoke of, but a morally 
disciplined, responsible and self-reliant Christian gentleman (Barrett & Greenaway, 
1995, p. 23). In the decades that followed, the public school message of mens sana in 
corpore sano spread throughout British society by way of recreational sport (ibid., 
1995, p. 23). “Organized sport was perceived to be the single most important factor 
in the moral education of the boy, and by the 1870s had come to dominate the ethos 
of the public schools” (Rosenthal, 1986, p. 95). This belief in the moral value of 
sport continued into the twentieth century with philosophers and theorists of physical 
education, such as Charles McCloy (English, 1983, p. 41), contending “that character 
education is a historical and fundamental objective of a sound physical education 
program” (McCloy as quoted in Miller & Jarman, 1988, p. 72). This time-honoured 
association of physical activities with character development was naturally extended 
to OAE during its genesis in the 1940s. 
 
Sport’s relationship to character development has one further significance for OAE. 
Since the character traits often associated with these sports were “physical prowess, 
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courage, strength, endurance and aggression” (Cook, 2001, p. 44), it is not difficult 
to see their possible extension to jingoism (Cook, 1999, p. 158). “The character 
training supplied by sports was seen to be the best possible preparation for that 
jolliest of all sports, war” (Rosenthal, 1986, p. 96). Or, as the Duke of Wellington is 
alleged to have put it, the victory at Waterloo could be credited to the playing fields 
of Eton (see Cook, 1999, p. 162). As subsection 1.2.2’s discussion of OAE as a 
Moral Equivalent of War will more clearly demonstrate, just as the character-
building activities of sport were viewed as pertinent to preparation for war, so too 
with the wilderness activities of OAE. Thus, one frequently finds a militarily-imbued 
understanding of character within the OAE literature (e.g. Loynes, 2002, p. 115).  
1.2.1.3 The Camping Movement 
The third antecedent of OAE’s assumption of character development is the camping 
movement. An association between camp and character can be seen in Australia, the 
US, and Britain.  
 
In an 1890 to the 1960s history of the New South Wales camping movement, 
Georgakis and Light (2010) claim “that socio-moral development has long been an 
aim of this form of education” (p. 10). By way of example, early in the 20th century, 
in an effort to address the increasing urbanisation that educators feared would have a 
“corrupting influence on youth” (ibid., p. 6), the NSW Department of Education 
established a rural camp for urban males. Later, in 1938, a National Fitness Camp 
was created (ibid, p. 7). Within a few years, all of the Australian states had national 
fitness camping programmes. Referring to their camps specifically, the 1948 annual 
report of the NSW Department of Education claimed that the “experienced 
supervision and ideally drafted curriculum, furnish most desirable settings for 
character development” (pp. 58-59 of the report as cited in Georgakis & Light 2010, 
p. 8). 
 
Similarly, issues of character appear to have also been an impetus behind the 
American camping movement. Eisner (2005) traces the movement’s beginnings to 
1861 when Frederick Gunn, a headmaster, took his pupils to the “Connecticut 
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wilderness with the idea that experience in nature and the outdoors … could lead to 
character building and emotional growth” (p. 10). Bond (2003, p. 15) credits Ernest 
Balch as starting the camping movement (1881) in part because of a US national 
interest to “toughen up its boys in the great outdoors in order to maintain its place in 
the world.” Similarly, Seton, founder of the Woodcraft League, established in 1902, 
was also concerned about the “softening of the American character” (Bond, 2003, p. 
16). Some time later, L. B. Sharp, who is credited with the first attempts to bring 
scholarly credibility to the educational value of camp experience (Raiola & O’Keefe, 
1999, pp. 48-49), described a main purpose of camp to be the formation of character 
(Knapp, 2000, p. 9). Comparably, Laura Mattoon, a pioneer in the American camp 
movement, also believed that camping was a means to character formation (Martin & 
Cashel & Wagstaff & Breunig, 2006, p. 17). Affirming these claims, Ron Kinnamon, 
chair of the Character Counts Coalition (www.charactercounts.org), notes that camps 
have been leaders in character education (2003, para. 13), and have “known the 
importance of developing character for well over a hundred years” (ibid., para. 4). 
Indeed, the assumption that camping builds character must have been well 
established by 1929, as psychologists Dimock and Hendry conducted a quantitative 
multi-year study (criticised by Guilford, 1931, p. 325), attempting to determine the 
changes in campers’ behaviour during a 6-week camp in Ahmek, Ontario, Canada. I 
will here refrain from commenting on their report, called Camping and Character, 
because a similar critique will be discussed in subsections 3.3.4, 4.2.3, and 4.2.3. 
 
These long-standing American interests in camping and character have apparently 
continued, for in 2001, Smith, CEO of the American Camp Association, called 
character one of the four “C’s” of camping (para. 7). Further evidence of this 
commitment to character is found in the American Camp Association (itself a 
member of the Character Counts Coalition) making character development the theme 
for its 2003 National Conference (Kinnamon, 2003, para. 1). Additionally, Baker 
(2008), in a comment pertinent to this research, and apparently cognisant of a 
common criticism directed at the camp industry, claims that even though most camps 
are of a short duration, they help develop positive character traits and can have 




Britain has also associated character with camp. Veevers and Allison (2011, p. 16) 
note that “in 1891, a demonstration camp was organised by the Board of Education 
… and by 1928, fifteen education authorities were organising school camps.” 
Further, the Camps Act of 1939 legislated that some 50 camps be permanently 
established (Cook, 1999, p. 167). Speaking of these “camp schools,” Skerrett (1944) 
said, “if character training and the formation of wholesome sentiments were more 
important than the accumulation of knowledge, then the camp school experiment had 
been worthwhile, for it undoubtedly provided unusual scope for the development of 
character” (p. 161). Thus, as Veevers and Allison (2011, p. 16) note, character 
education was, for some, a significant aim of the camp school movement in Britain. 
Cook (2001) highlights one reason for this interest in camp and character, observing 
that in the context of World War II, the Norwood Committee (discussed later) 
recommended “school camps” (p. 48) as a means to build character to prepare boys 
for war. However, others found moral use for camps in reaction to the effects of 
militarism. For it was, in part, a reaction to the militarism of World War I, that led 
the Woodcraft Movements to a “belief that ‘Nature’ was the great moral educator 
and … camp life … an antidote to the evils of industrialism” (Cook, 2001, p. 45).  
 
In all of its guises, the camping movement’s strong belief in character development – 
whether through physically challenging activities or the social demands of young 
people learning to live together in a camp’s rural setting (Knapp, 2000, pp. 9-10) – 
was readily accepted by OAE (see also Georgakis & Light, p. 5). 
1.2.1.4 The Scouting Movement 
Like the camping movement, Scouting, with its moral emphasis on the benefits of 
outdoor adventure activities, is an important precursor of the assumption that 
character can be developed through OAE. This association is significant to this 
thesis, because Scouting’s articulation and espousal of (a certain kind of) character 




Loynes (1999, p. 103) ascribes the genesis of OAE chiefly to two men – Baden-
Powell and Kurt Hahn (discussed later) – albeit of different interests. Both were 
concerned with the “moral fibre” of youth, and saw the challenges of competing 
against nature as providing a means to physical, social, moral and spiritual growth. 
Recently back from the Second Boer War (1899-1902), Badan-Powell was 
concerned about “Britain’s moral, physical, and military weakness - conditions that 
the Boer War seemed to announce” (Rosenthal, 1986, p. 3). He formed the Scouts to 
remedy this perceived weakness, and to build morally strong members of society 
(Martin et al., 2006, p. 18). Although Baden-Powell insisted on the Scouts’ non-
military agenda, the integrity of this conviction can be questioned (Brookes, 2003b, 
p. 56). The Scouting movement attempted to cultivate character traits (e.g. discipline 
and obedience) that were also qualities “appropriate to Edwardian militarism and 
empire” (Barratt & Greenaway, 1995, p. 34), a culture that equated “military might 
and moral worth” (Rosenthal, 1986, p. 192). Indeed, in the era of the Scouts’ 
founding, warfare was a legitimate test of moral fortitude (ibid., p. 192). It was the 
soldier, for Baden-Powell, who possessed the exemplary range of moral virtues 
(ibid., p. 196) .  
 
This military ideal seems to have coloured Baden-Powell’s moral vision, as Scout 
law can be seen as merely a “paean to the value of obedience” (Rosenthal, 1986, p. 
8; see also, p. 200), and as more character “initiation” (indoctrination) than character 
“training” (ibid., p. 106). Despite publicising itself as “peace scouts,” Scouting could 
be characterised as a “paramilitary organization,” with the agenda of “preparing 
Britain’s youth to fight ably in defense of the empire” (ibid., p. 191; see also p. 200).  
 
Pertinent to this research, the shared interests in character training and wilderness 
activities have inevitably resulted in the Scout movement subtly influencing the 
philosophy and development of OAE (Loynes, 1999, p. 103). This thesis contends 
that Baden-Powell’s militarily nuanced understanding of “character development” 
has adversely affected connotations of this phrase within OAE (e.g. Cook 1999, p. 
157; 2001, p. 43). Further, as subsection 1.2.2 will contend, this military patina – 
created particularly by OAE’s antecedents in sport, Scouting, and to a lesser degree, 
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the camp movement – on the association between OAE and character formation was 
again reinforced in the conceptualisation of OAE as a moral equivalent to war.  
1.2.1.5 Expeditions As Morals Means 
The moral educational use of expeditions represents the last antecedent to the 
assumption of character development through OAE. This moral use of expeditions 
can be charted through several historical veins. In 1925, two teachers from a private 
school in Salem, Germany, took 20 students on a four-week expedition to Finland 
(Veevers & Allison, 2011, p. 10). The school’s headmaster, Kurt Hahn, whose 
significant influence on OAE will be examined shortly (see subsection 1.2.2.3’s 
discussion of the founding of Outward Bound), deemed the expedition a success 
(Ewald, 1970, p. 34), and later came to see expeditions as “another way of 
developing the all round character of his pupils” (Veevers & Allison, 2011, p. 9). In 
another vein, in 1932, Surgeon Commander Murray Levick, a member of Scott’s 
1910 Antarctic expedition (Asby, p. 122), founded what is now called the British 
Schools Exploring Society (BSES). Recognising a need for boys “to be tested by 
practical experience,” Levick thought the “hardship and endurance and 
inconveniences” of an expedition, would provide this opportunity (Levick, n.d., pp. 
8, 7). Since 1932, BSES has “gone on to organise over 130 expeditions and visited 
all seven continents” (BSES History, n.d.). Although not specifically mentioning 
character in its mission, BSES does have a strong commitment to “Personal 
Development” (BSES Personal Development, n.d.), which, as discussed later (see 
subsection 1.2.3), can be seen to tacitly imply character development (Brookes, 
2003b, p. 51). This implication seems plausible given that BSES lists some nine 
virtues – including courage, discipline, and thoughtfulness – in its Personal 
Development statement (BSES Personal Development, n.d.; see also Stott & Hall, 
2003, p. 160).  
 
It is not surprising that Outward Bound, via Hahn, and BSES, via Levick, have 
utilised expeditions for moral means. Allison and Von Wald (2010) note that 
expedition experiences often occur at crucial times in young people’s lives, when 
“metaphysical … questions dominate” (p. 220). When coupled with the slower daily 
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rhythms (ibid., 222) and reflective space (Rea, 2006) often associated with  
expeditionary life,  this tendency towards “existential … transcendental, aesthetic 
and spiritual issues” (Allison & Von Wald, 2010, p. 220) allows expeditions to foster 
growth, develop awareness, and “explore values and choices as individuals and as 
groups” (ibid., p. 222). For these reasons, and others, several scholars have referred 
to expeditions as: a rite of passage (e.g. Beames, 2004c). 
 
Andrews (1999), in an article called Expedition as Rite of Passage, draws on the 
work of Gennep (1997) and Turner (1969), likening the process of an expedition to 
the three phases of a rite of passage: separation, transition, and aggregation (coming 
back home) (Andrews, 1999, p. 35). It is with the middle phase, transition, that 
Andrews makes the strongest parallel. Referring to Turner’s (1969/1995) work on 
liminality, which I discuss more fully in Chapter 7, Andrews (1999, p. 36) highlights 
the transformational capacity of the “liminal space” created on an expedition. 
Significant to issues of character and its formation, he notes that a “sense of ‘inward 
transformation’ often manifests itself through noticeably altered behaviours and 
dispositions – ‘outward change’ – during the latter part of the expedition and in the 
participants’ lives when they return to their regular surroundings” (ibid., p. 36).  
 
Other research similarly suggests the transformational capacity of expeditionary 
education. In 1992, Watts, Webster, Morley, and Cohen (1992) conducted research 
on 76 school-aged participants (aged 17-20) taking part in a “deliberately 
demanding” six-week expedition to India (p. 337). Using the Gordon Personal 
Profile Inventory, a pre/post test was administered. Results revealed that the 
expedition increased “ascendancy, emotional stability, sociability and responsibility” 
(ibid., p. 339) – all elements (as will be demonstrated) that can be related to 
character. 
 
In another example, Kennedy (1992), concerned by the moral decline in inner city 
youth, conducted mixed-method research on Saharan expeditions with participants 
from lower socio-economic areas of Liverpool. Analysing from a psycho-social 
perspective, he reports that a “moral development beyond that which would have 
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been possible in a similar time in the home environment” took place on the 
expeditions (ibid., p. 74). 
 
Allison (2002), also conducted research on a 6-week BSES expedition to Greenland. 
Using a hermeneutical approach to discover emerging themes, he interpreted letters 
written by 20 participants, at six, twelve, and eighteen months, after the expedition. 
His findings report that “youth expeditions can provide important developmental 
experiences” (ibid., p. x), which can contribute to the formation of moral values and 
identity (ibid., p. xx).  
 
Similarly performing research on a BSES expedition, Stott and Hall (2003) 
investigated a six-week journey to East Greenland. A pre/post questionnaire, 
measuring personal, social and technical skills, was administered to 60 participants 
(aged 16-20). In results that may be relevant to character, statistically significant 
personal and social changes were noted in the participants’ capacity to: endure 
difficult physical circumstances; maintain physical fitness; demonstrate confidence; 
control one’s emotions; and live in close proximity to others.  
 
In yet another example of expeditionary research, Beames (2004b) explored the key 
elements of a ten-week expedition to Ghana with Raleigh International. Conducting 
five rounds of interviews with 14 British participants, he used categorical 
aggregation to yield themes. Several aspects of his findings are relevant to issues of 
character and its development. The participants noted the social demands – a need 
for respect, courtesy, and tolerance – of communal life created by the expedition’s 
isolation (ibid., pp. 150-151). Second, the “physically demanding” nature of the 
expedition, with its constant test to endure, was also highlighted by the participants 
(ibid., pp. 153-154). 
 
A few years later, Beames (Pike & Beames, 2007) again examined this same 
expedition (above paragraph) to Ghana through the lens of Goffman’s interactional 
principles. The impetus behind this research was a need to “examine the rhetoric of 
expedition organisations, given the limited research available and the large numbers 
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of participants who ‘buy into’ the particular experience ‘sold’ by such organizations” 
(ibid., p. 148). One such element of Raleigh International’s (the expedition company) 
rhetoric is their belief that character can be developed through exposure to 
adventurous and challenging activities (Raleigh International, n.d.). Noting that 
many of the participants anticipated that their character would be changed, Pike and 
Beames (2007) investigated the participants’ comments made during and after the 
expedition to determine if Raleigh enabled or constrained such moral opportunities. 
Although seemingly open to the possibility of expeditions facilitating character 
growth, Pike and Beames (2007, p. 153) note that the high level of control and 
support, maintained by the Raleigh staff, precluded the participants from 
experiencing the freedom, risk, and self-reliance necessary for character’s growth.  
 
Raleigh International later commissioned its own research (Sheldon, Jones, Durante, 
& Platt, 2009) to determine its expeditions’ long-term influence on the personal 
development of participants from disadvantaged backgrounds. A survey was 
completed by 105 participants from the previous 25 years. The findings report that 
“83 percent of survey respondents said that Raleigh had a long-term impact on their 
personal development” (ibid., p. 39). Further, 94 percent of the respondents noted an 
increase in their confidence, and 87 percent an increased ability to work with others 
(ibid., p. 40).  
 
In summary, it seems that this review of expedition literature recommends four 
crucial elements that lend expeditions to character growth: a journey requiring 
prolonged physical exertion; the presence of uncertainty, risk and challenge; a social 
and communal dynamic; and that all these elements take place in an isolated 
environment, thus necessitating self-sufficiency (see Allison, 2002, pp. 51-55 and 
Pike & Beames, 2007, p. 152 for similar elements). As will be demonstrated, this 
thesis’ case study of a wilderness expedition (discussed in Chapters 5-9) affirms 
these four elements as pertinent aspects contributing to the participants’ perceived 




Having examined the five – the Classical Greeks, sport, the camping movement, 
Scouts, and expeditions – antecedents to the assumption of character development 
within OAE programmes, I now transition to the next subsection, OAE as a Moral 
Equivalent to War.  
1.2.2 OAE As a Moral Equivalent of War 
William James’ 1911 speech-turned-essay (1949), The Moral Equivalent of War 
(MEW), has informed the philosophy of OAE. To reveal this influence, I will 
discuss: the long-held association between war and character; the essay itself; OAE’s 
self-proclaimed fulfillment of the MEW; and OAE’s connotations of war. Although 
this current subsection will throw further light on the perceived relationship between 
OAE and character development, it serves a second purpose as well. It further 
explains, in addition to the details already provided through sport, Scouting, and the 
camp movement, why OAE’s concept of character development is fraught with 
military connotations, a problem more fully examined in subsection 1.3.2’s 
discussion of martial character’s incompatibility with OAE.  
1.2.2.1 War and Character 
Although the purpose of this study precludes any extensive foray into the connection 
between war and character, some examination of this alleged relation is necessary. 
The following are some salient claims concerning the character developing power of 
war.  
 
In The Peloponnesian War, Book. III, Chapter 32, Thucydides asserts: “War is a 
teacher who educates through violence; and he makes men’s characters fit their 
condition” (as quoted in Zimmern, 1924, p. 420). The culture surrounding the 
Peloponnesian War, in which Socrates fought, and during which Plato was raised, 
valued battle as an opportunity to demonstrate and develop character. Other Classical 
Greek connections to war and moral virtue can be made in Plato’s suggestion to 
educate for bravery through risky observation of war (The Republic, 466e-467e); and 




Nearer to modern times, Lawrence Chamberlain (1915/1994), fighting with the 20th 
Maine Regiment Volunteers in the American Civil War, wrote: 
In the privations and sufferings endured as well as in the strenuous action of battle, 
some of the highest qualities of manhood are called forth, - courage, self-command, 
sacrifice of self for the sake of something held higher … and on another side 
fortitude, patience, warmth of comradeship, and in the darkest hours tenderness of 
caring for the wounded and stricken. (pp. 385-386)  
However, it is Crane’s Red Badge of Courage (1895/1995) that associates war and 
character with particular poetic poignancy. Crane, again speaking of the American 
Civil War, uses the metaphor of a “red badge,” a bloody wound, as a symbol that 
publicly signifies bravery. The book opens with Henry, the young soon to be soldier, 
wondering if he would “run” in battle. Henry worries about his “unknown quality.” 
He compares his life to others, trying to honestly discern his moral worth (ibid., pp. 
15, 23). He has never been tested. When the trial arrives: “the youth perceived that 
the time had come. He was about to be measured. For a moment he felt in the face of 
his great trial like a babe, and the flesh over his heart seemed very thin” (ibid., p. 49). 
Through a series of cowardly and eventually courageous acts, Henry found “he was 
capable of profound sacrifices, a tremendous death” (ibid., p. 199). “He had been to 
touch the great death, and found … he was a man” (ibid, p. 211).  
 
These moving sections from Crane’s classic provide a ready link from war to OAE. 
Just as the red badge reveals an individual’s character in battle, so some early 
approaches of OAE sought to provide a testing ground without massacre, a badge 
(e.g. see Hahn’s badge schemes below) of courage without spilled blood.  
 
This connection between character and war is still made today in a literal badge: The 
Medal of Honor (similar to the Commonwealth’s Victoria Cross) is the highest 
award given in the American military forces. The award is “for extraordinary 
heroism and conspicuous gallantry in action above and beyond the call of duty” 
(Delan, 2003). The honour marks the recipient as the “bravest of the brave.” The 





Admiral Stockdale (1923-2005) is a contemporary recipient of the Medal of Honor. 
Shot down early in the American-Vietnam war, Stockdale reports the following 
while floating down to enemy territory in his ejected seat: “So help me, I whispered 
to myself: ‘Five years down there, at least. I’m leaving the world of technology and 
entering the world of Epictetus’” (Stockdale, 1993, p. 7). Stockdale had come into 
contact with the Discourses of Epictetus (Trans. 2000), a stoic philosopher, while 
taking graduate courses for the Navy. Epictetus is considered a soldier’s philosopher 
(Denise, White, & Peterfreund, 2005, p. 49; see also Sherman, 2002). For the stoics, 
physical harm held little threat in comparison to the devastating disgrace and shame 
which would result from a failure in their duty to themselves, others and God. Thus, 
Epictetus believed that humans have the power and responsibility to mould their 
character irrespective of external circumstances (Blackburn, 1996, p. 122). This view 
allowed Epictetus to derive wisdom rather than bitterness from his own exposure to 
cruelty (Stockdale, 1993, pp. 2-3).  
 
These few sources – Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, Chamberlain, Crane, Stockdale, 
and Epictetus – are sufficient to indicate the common association between military 
service and character formation. This association was extended to OAE in at least 
two ways. Physically, stoic resolve and Epictetian attitudes towards endurance and 
suffering had some influence on the early development of OAE via adventure 
education practitioners who had developed their outdoor skills while serving in the 
military forces (Nicol, 2002a, pp. 34-35; see also Cook, 2001, p. 49). Ideologically, 
in addition to the antecedents already mentioned, the coupling of military imagery 
and OAE was further reinforced by William James’ famous address (1949): The 
Moral Equivalent of War (MEW). 
1.2.2.2 The Essay: A Moral Equivalent of War 
In what was originally a 1911 baccalaureate address to educators, James (1949, pp. 
311-328) posed the finding of a moral equivalent for war as a main task for 20th 
century education. Although a pacifist, James recognised that war did appear to 
develop character within a soldier: 
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militarism is the great preserver of our ideals of hardihood, and human life with no 
use for hardihood would be contemptible. Without risks or prizes for the darer, 
history would be insipid indeed; and there is a type of military character which 
everyone feels that the race should never cease to breed, for everyone is sensitive to 
its superiority. (1949, pp. 316-17) 
Mentioning the military theorist Steinmetz, James named the “martial virtues” that a 
solider may gain through military service: heroism; patriotism; hardihood; risk-
taking; fidelity; tenacity; duty; intrepidity; contempt of softness; surrender of private 
interest; obedience to command; service, cooperation; unstinted devotion; self-
forgetfulness; and physical fitness (1949, pp. 314-327). James claimed that, “so far, 
war has been the only force that can discipline a whole community, and until an 
equivalent discipline is organised, I believe that war must have its way” (ibid., p. 
326). James deduced that it was risk, adventure, and feats of endurance that fostered 
character within the soldiers. Convinced that these elements were available 
elsewhere, he asked for a conscription of a different sort:  
If … there were, instead of military conscription a conscription of the whole 
youthful population to form for a certain number of years a part of the army enlisted 
against Nature, the injustice would tend to be evened out, and numerous goods to 
the commonwealth would follow. The military ideals of hardihood and discipline 
would be wrought into the growing fiber of the people. (1949, p. 325) 
This moral equivalent, nature as the battlefield for character, would allow for the 
moral development readily needed in youth, but avoid the atrocities of war, thereby 
allowing a pacifistic preservation of virtue (James, 1949, pp. 325-326). 
 
By the early 1940s a German educationalist named Kurt Hahn, a progenitor of OAE, 
cited James’ MEW in support of using the sea and mountains to develop character.  
1.2.2.3 OAE As a Moral Equivalent to War: Hahn and Outward Bound 
Kurt Hahn (1886-1974), a German Jew, who spoke out against the Potempa murders 
(Veevers & Allison, 2011, p. 5), was removed as headmaster of his progressive 
school in Salem, Germany, and imprisoned in 1933 (James, 1990, pp. 6-7). After his 
release, he was exiled from Badan, the region in which Salem resided, and with the 
help and encouragement of several friends, left for England to demonstrate his 




Within a year of his arrival in the UK, he established Gordonstoun, a school in the 
English (although located in Elgin, Scotland) progressive public tradition. The 
“system at Gordonstoun was designed to mirror and demonstrate the system at 
Salem” (Veevers & Allison, 2011, p. 19), and character education had been a major 
aim at Salem. Founded in 1920 by Hahn and Prince Max, the former Chancellor of 
Germany, Salem was established shortly after Germany’s defeat in the First World 
War, and thus during a state of “political, economic, and social turmoil” (ibid., p. 6). 
Experience both during the war and in the post-war period had left Hahn and Prince 
Max disillusioned by wise and educated people, who had not the moral resolve to act 
on what they believed (ibid., p. 6). “Consequently, to try to ensure this did not 
happen again in the future, for the sake of the nation, education should include the 
development of character” (ibid., p. 6). The curricular centrality of character to both 
institutions – Salem and Gordonstoun – can be seen in their report card assessment 
categories (Hahn, 1947, p. 4; Van Oord, 2010, p. 260; see also Veevers & Allison, 
2011, p. 7, for a comparative reproduction of these cards), which included a sense of 
justice, the ability to follow through with what one believes to be right, and a 
capacity for endurance (see also Hahn, 1947, p. 2; Prouty, Collinson, & Panicucci, 
2007, p. 6; Wurdinger, 1997, p. 13). A strong association between Hahn and 
character education continues to the present, and can be seen in Brookes’ (2003c) 
claim that the modern use of Hahn’s name is almost a “tacit endorsement of 
character building” (p. 128). Or, as MacArthur states it: “the most consistent thread 
of Kurt Hahn’s work, seen in all the programmes he launched, is character-training” 
(1995, p. 31; see also Martin et al., p. 89).  
 
One of the programmes that Hahn was instrumental in launching was Outward 
Bound. Hahn often used James’ MEW as justification for Outward Bound (1965a, p. 
7), saying that he refused to arrange a world war “to rescue the young from a 
depressing peace” (Hahn, 1947, p. 4; 1960b, p. 2; see also Van Oord, 2010, p. 257). 
Hahn (1943) felt that the risks provided by adventurous activity, such as those used 
within Outward Bound, slaked “the longing of young people to prove themselves in 
danger and in need, a longing that peace so often leaves unsatisfied” (p. 5; see also 
1960b, p. 1; 1947, p. 4). Thus, he believed that testing physical challenges, “moral 
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equivalents of war,” could develop the participants’ character (Skidelsky, 1969, p. 
194; see also Loynes, 1999, p. 104). Although Hahn employed a variety of such 
“tests” (e.g. various forms of athletics), it was the expedition that was of highest 
importance, because it provided the greatest amount of adversity to be overcome. As 
mentioned above, for Hahn, expeditions were a crucial means “of developing the all 
round character of his pupils” (Veevers & Allison, 2011, p. 9). Citing a 1941 
address, called The Badge, Veevers & Allison (2011, pp. 69-70) report that Hahn 
thought expeditionary education unique because it required planning and the 
endurance to follow through, a place were the individual was tested, and asked to 
find resources within him or herself that were hitherto unknown.  
 
A traditional reading, which will later be challenged (see subsection 1.4.2’s 
discussion of Hahn’s moral vision), of the genesis of Outward Bound states that its 
initial goal was to “strengthen the will of young men so that they could prevail 
against adversity as Great Britain faced staggering losses at sea during World War 
II” (James, 1990, p. 10). Price (1970), a Warden of the Eskdale Outward Bound 
School, seems to agree that the specific aim of Aberdovey Outward Bound, Outward 
Bound’s first school, was to train Merchant Navy cadets to survive at sea after being 
torpedoed: to fight the “enemies within - fear, defeatism, apathy, selfishness” (pp. 
81-2).  
 
These associations, even if historically questionable (see subsection 1.4.2), between 
Hahn, character, Outward Bound, and military intentions are significant. In a chapter 
called “The Creation of Outward Bound,” Miner (1999) delicately states that 
although OAE has no one “father,” if one was for some reason needed, Hahn would 
be a “likely candidate” (p. 55). Since Hahn and Outward Bound are considered part 
of the patrimony of OAE, then this is yet another example, beyond the many already 




1.2.2.4 OAE’s Connotations of War 
Prouty et al., (2007) also link OAE, character and war: “it is worth noting that a goal 
common to Plato, Aristotle, James, and Hahn is the teaching of virtue, and that each 
of their perspectives was somehow linked to the notion of war” (p. 65). This current 
research suggests that these persistent allusions to war, both directly and indirectly, 
in the development of OAE, have shaped the discipline’s perceptions of character. A 
discussion of this influence is therefore warranted. 
 
In the UK, Cook (2001) argues the case “that outdoor education was born out of a 
particular set of circumstances associated with war and the need for children to be 
made ‘fit for war’” (p. 47; see also p. 43). Further, OAE, character building and 
national needs have long been seen as related by supporters of public schools 
(Barrett & Greenaway, 1995, p. 23). It is therefore not surprising that in 1941, in the 
thick of the Second World War, the British Board of Education appointed a 
committee, which had many members with public school backgrounds (Cook, 1999, 
p. 157), to consider curricular changes in secondary school education (Veevers & 
Allison, 2011, p. 59). Their subsequent “Norwood” report, eponymously named after 
the committee chair, Cyril Norwood, was replete in allusions to character education 
(Cook, 1999, p. 157), and recommended that a variety of outdoor activities be added 
to the curriculum.  
 
The recommendations of the Norwood Report – character education through outdoor 
activities – significantly influenced a later piece of legislation, the Education Act of 
1944 (Cook, 2000, p. 3). This influence can been seen most directly in section 7, 
where Local Education Authorities (LEA) were to “contribute towards children’s 
‘spiritual, moral, mental and physical development’ (Cook, 1999, pp. 165-166), and 
section 53(1) where LEAs are given the “duty” to provide “both social and physical 
training,” which might be manifested in a variety of outdoor activities, including 
“expeditions” (Veevers & Allison, 2011, p. 62). Cook (2001, pp. 47-48) notes that in 
the parliamentary debates surrounding what was to become the Education Act of 
1944, it was the public school values of “‘fitness for war’ and character training” (p. 
47) that influenced the discussion. Veevers and Allison (2011, p. 62) thus suggest 
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that the outdoor activities promoted in the Act are ones “associated with physical 
challenges and character building (linked with public schools).”  
 
Noting first that relatively non-adventurous education in, through, and for the 
outdoors existed in schools before World War II, Cook (1999, pp. 158-159) suggests 
that individuals (e.g. Baden-Powell), movements (e.g. the Scouts), and particular 
public schools (e.g. Gordonstoun and Abbotsholme) affected post-war OAE in 
militarily significant ways (e.g. the post-1944 inclusion of rock climbing and caving 
general OAE practice).  
 
In summary, Greek associations between war and character, public school 
playgrounds as preparation for battlefields, the character traits cultivated at camp, the 
Scouts’ subtle conditioning for war through outdoor activity, the suggestions that 
OAE is a MEW, the traditional account of the militarily motivated origin of Outward 
Bound, and now finally an educational policy driven by defensive concern, have all 
contributed to a martial slant on the concept of character formation within OAE. 
Although the negative ramifications of this militaristic understanding of character 
development will be further examined in subsection 1.3.2, the discussion here 
demonstrates OAE’s historical association with a militaristic perspective on 
character development. Having provided the antecedents to the assumption of 
character development within OAE, and articulated how James’ MEW strengthened 
this assumption, I will next discuss the continued presence of the assumption within 
the OAE literature. 
1.2.3 The Continuing Connection Between Character Development and 
OAE 
As will be shown, post-war associations between OAE and character development 
persist to the present. Although commitment to this association has, in recent 
decades, considerably waned in the UK and Australia, character development 
appears to remain a central tenet of American OAE. I will discuss this continuing 
association chronologically, resulting in some movement back and forth between 




In the decades following the Second World War, the legislative power of the UK’s 
1944 Education act was used to promote outdoor activities associated with the 
“‘manly virtues’” of character (Cook, 2001, p. 43) emphasised in the Norwood 
Report (Cook, 1999, p. 169, 2001, p. 48). There are a number of reasons for this 
resurgence. First, in 1947, W. H. Murray, a World War II prisoner of war, published 
“Mountaineering in Scotland” (republished 1997). Credited with starting a post-war 
climbing renaissance, he believed that “the trials of mountaineering … awaken 
elements of character left dormant by professional life” (p. 213). Second, as alluded 
to above, ex-military teachers brought their outdoor skills to bear on their curriculum 
(Cook, 2001, p. 49). Third, Derbyshire’s White Hall Centre for Open Country 
Pursuits was established in 1950, in part to encourage the moral benefits of “hardship 
and physical challenges” (Cook, 1999, p. 169). The impact of White Hall was 
pervasive as a significant number of LEAs used its educational emphasis on 
character training as their model (ibid., p. 171). Lastly, Cook credits Hahn, through 
the proliferation of Outward Bound and his badge system, with promulgating this 
rugged character-based version of OAE (ibid., p. 169). 
 
Outward Bound came to the US in the1960s. The mission of the North West 
Outward Bound School was “character development through intense exposure to 
wilderness, relying heavily upon the philosophy of Kurt Hahn” (Hunt, 1996b, p. 14).  
 
Few references to character and OAE appear to have been made in the 1970s and 
1980s. In the UK, Drasdo (1973/1998) does note that “character development” was a 
commonly claimed outcome of OAE (p. 5). Less directly, an influential publication 
in 1984 by Mortlock, although not to my knowledge using the word “character,” is 
replete with ethical subtext always assuming that “frontier adventure” (pp. 38-40) 
builds moral fortitude (e.g. pp. 90-93). In the US, Bacon (1983) seems to have 
recognised an ebbing interest in character development and asserts that “while this 
aspect,” namely character formation, “is sometimes downplayed, it is still one of the 




Although I could find only two references to character and OAE within the UK 
literature, the 1990s seem to indicate a renewed effort to articulate this association in 
the US. In 1994, McCulloch described UK OAE as fundamentally interested in the 
moulding of behaviour, and associates this with character building (p. 94). Similarly, 
Barrett and Greenaway (1995), referencing a 1994 document from the UK Home 
Office, note that the traditional belief that “‘austere regimes’ and ‘demanding 
physical activities’ automatically develop improved character traits still has an 
influence in current rationales for adventure” (p. 34). In the US, an eminent author 
on character education, Thomas Lickona, gave an interview (Skawinski, 1995, p. 6), 
emphasising the potential of OAE to teach moral values. Similarly, in a publication 
entitled Character-Based Ethics (1996a), Hunt gives direct attention to the need for 
character development within the practice (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 187) of OAE, and 
suggests a list of necessary traits including: kindness, patience, firmness, 
intelligence, moral clarity, vision, ability to connect with others, justice and 
humility” (p. 13). Comparably, as mentioned, Wurdinger (1997, p. xi) lists “building 
moral character” as one of the three tenets of adventure education, and later (pp. 78-
80) subjects it to a critical treatment (discussed in the next section). Likewise, 
Holyfield and Fine, in their 1997 sociological study, maintain that leisure pursuits 
were often justified in terms of their positive effects on character (p. 343). In 1998, 
Outward Bound USA launched their Expedition Learning Schools with character 
growth as one of its five core practices (Campbell, Liebowitz, Mednick & Rugen, p. 
3; see also Expeditionary Learning Schools Outward Bound, n.d.). Finally, a 1999 
publication by Webb placed character formation at the pinnacle of possible 
developments for recreational activities (p. 5).  
 
Opening the new millennium, Brookes, an Australian, confirms the continued 
association of character formation through OAE. Brookes (2003b, 2003c) not only 
rejects this assumed association, describing it as a primarily American holdout 
(2003c, p. 127), but questions the concept of character itself. These two articles are 
central to this thesis and receive detailed attention below. Brookes’ conviction that it 
is chiefly an American version of OAE that has maintained the belief in character 
development can be verified by a brief survey of American OAE textbooks. For 
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example, in 2006, Martin et al., after listing the six pillars (trustworthiness, respect, 
fairness, responsibility, caring, citizenship) of the Josephson Institute of Ethics 
(www.charactercenter.com), state that these “conjure up what occurs on an extended 
outdoor trip” (p. 92). Similarly, Prouty et al. (2007, p. 10; see also p. 13) claim that 
OAE programmes can “powerfully and ably address the ancient issue of how to 
develop the morality of youth.” Further evidence can be found in Bunting’s (2006 p. 
17) textbook which surmises that “character development has natural connections 
with outdoor education activities,” although Pleasants (2007, pp. 53-54), in her 
review of Buntings’ work, took issue with this assumption, citing Brookes’ work 
(2003b, 2003c) in her critique. Lastly, the American commitment to character 
development through OAE is poignantly seen in the contrast between the present 
Outward Bound USA and UK websites. While the Outward Bound USA website 
lists “character development” in the first line of its mission statement (Outward 
Bound: About Outward Bound, n.d.), Outward Bound UK, in their new strategic plan 
(ironically) entitled Arriving Where We Started (n.d.), makes no mention of character 
whatsoever.  
 
It may be more accurate to call this vestigial commitment to character, a North 
American phenomenon, since COEO, the Council of Outdoor Educators of Ontario 
(Canada), marks “Education for Character” as one of its four values (Linney, 2004). 
Since 2007, Pathways, CEOE’s journal, has included a section called “Education for 
Character,” where articles (loosely) related to character and OAE are published (e.g. 
Elgie, MacLean, & Dykstra, 2007). In 2007, the CEOE commissioned the 
researchers Foster and Linney to conduct a meta-analysis into “the multiple, 
powerful and lasting outcomes produced through utilizing outdoor and experiential 
education” (Linney, 2007, p. 33). The findings were grouped under each of the four 
CEOE values. The executive summary of Foster and Linney’s meta-analysis claims 
that “many character traits are significantly enhanced as a result of OEE [Outdoor 
Experiential Education] experiences, including creativity, enthusiasm, self-
motivation, self-understanding, assertiveness, maturity, independence and self-
confidence” (Linney, 2007, p. 34). While their meta-analysis reveals that the 
assumption of character development through OAE continues, in certain factions, to 
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the present, I have some reservations regarding the methodology they used to 
determine that character traits can be “significantly enhanced.” Although space 
precludes a detailed assessment of Foster and Linney’s work, the concerns 
highlighted in Chapter 3’s critique of the character education movement could 
similarly be applied to the CEOE’s treatment of character and its development.  
 
Despite a decline in the use of the term “character development” outside of North 
American OAE contexts, Brookes (2003b) also notes that “tracking the idea of 
character building [within OAE] requires attention to its different guises” (p. 51; see 
also Rea, 2008, p. 45). As one such guise, Brookes suggests that the term “personal 
development,” prolific within the OAE literature, at least tacitly implies the idea for 
character development. If this is so, then issues of character development, in the form 
of personal development, are still very prominent, outside of North America, in OAE 
research today (e.g. Allison & Von Wald, 2010; Hill, 2010, pp. 34-35).  
 
This section began by examining the origins – Classical Greek philosophy, sport, 
camping, Scouting, and expeditions – of the assumption that character is formed 
through participation in OAE. The contributions of war and James’ MEW to OAE’s 
assumption of character development were then discussed. Finally, a range of 
references and quotations through the post-war decades to the present testified to the 
continued assumption that OAE can positively affect character growth. Having 
demonstrated that this assumption is widespread, I now turn to the growing number 
of dissenting voices in critique of this assumption. 
1.3 Character and OAE: Voices of Dissent 
Thus far, I have attempted to establish that OAE locates itself within a philosophical 
tradition, centred around character development, going all the way back to the 
Classical Greek philosophers. I have also shown the moral vision its progenitors had 
in seeking adventure as a moral equivalent of war. Lastly, I have demonstrated that 
the assumption of character development through OAE programmes is well-
established and represented throughout the OAE literature. However, one might 
complain that I have only listed references to a belief in character growth, and given 
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no account of what character is, how it is formed, or how one could know if it was 
developed. These are questions that the OAE literature does not appear to answer. 
This section highlights, within the OAE literature, a growing body of discomfort and 
suspicion surrounding the assumption that character is developed through OAE. I 
will first discuss how Hahn himself raised these concerns. Next, I will propose that 
neglect or avoidance of the term “character development,” particularly within UK 
OAE, can, to a significant extent, be attributed to disdain for a militaristic 
understanding of character. Then, as a further source of suspicion, I will call 
attention to the paucity of research supporting OAE as a means of character 
development. Lastly, a number of philosophical difficulties regarding OAE’s claims 
to develop character will be cited and explored.  
 
By way of introduction, these misgivings are of concern not just for those interested 
in moral formation, but for anyone more generally committed to personal and social 
growth through OAE programmes. The issue at stake here is transferability: that 
what is (personally or socially or morally) developed through the OAE activity 
somehow endures after the participant’s arrival back home and has application in the 
wider context of his or her life. While there is little doubt that behaviour is changed 
during OAE, the doubt surrounds whether this new behaviour persists once the 
motivating circumstances of the adventure situation are removed (Brookes, 2003c, p. 
119). Richards (1997) seems to share Brookes’ scepticism, noting that the “faith and 
conviction” in transfer is assumed by many to be “an automatic, natural and proper 
consequence of attending an OE [Outdoor Education] program” (p. 250). For 
something so crucial to the aims of OAE, it is surprising that transfer has received so 
little attention (ibid., p. 250). Hunt (1988, p. 10) believes the issue of transfer to be 
central in OAE. He pessimistically claims that without the possibility of participants 
transferring their development to other contexts, OAE is reduced to skills training 
(ibid., p. 10). If the transferability of the activity cannot be substantiated, then an 
“adventure experience can soon lapse into insignificance” (Hopkins & Putnam, 1993, 
p. 88).  
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1.3.1 Hahn and the Problem of Follow-up 
A need for post-course follow-up in discussion of character development highlights 
the possible temporary (personal, social, or moral) effects of OAE courses, and 
suggests that any moral change within a course is often short-lived thereafter.  
 
Hahn believed the educational ideas that worked in a residential setting such as 
Gordonstoun (e.g. physical training, commitments to projects, expeditions and 
service) would also work in a short-term environment like an Outward Bound course 
(Richards, 1981, p. 40). However, he understood that the course only introduced the 
participant to the ideas; the student would need to continue to pursue them on his or 
her own (Hahn, 1942). Without post-course practice and follow-up, any behavioural 
“resolutions [made] will in many cases evaporate, leaving no trace on future 
conduct” (Hahn, 1960b, p. 10, 1965b, p. 6). Unfortunately, this problem of follow-up 
is one that plagued both Hahn’s badge system and Outward Bound (Richards, 1981, 
p. 95). “To put it bluntly: the Outward Bound experience by itself does not go deep 
enough. It is the beginning of a great promise – but this promise will not be fulfilled 
unless the follow-up problem is solved. It is not solved today” (Hahn, 1960b, p. 10; 
see also 1960a and Richards, 1981, p. 158). Although “considerable thought was 
devoted to ways of extending the Outward Bound influence beyond the four-week” 
course” (Freeman, 2011, p. 34), in 1965, Hahn recognised the persistence of the 
follow-up problem and admitted that “Outward Bound can ignite - that is all - it is for 
others to keep the flame alive” (1965b, p. 9). If the need for follow-up was as 
pervasive as Hahn insisted, then ascribing “character development” to OAE 
programmes seems a misnomer. It would appear more accurate to credit these 
programmes with building “character-awareness,” which itself could be “developed” 
over time. 
 
Hahn’s reservations are echoed in Durgin and McEwen’s (1991) findings. Their 
research examines four case studies of troubled boys in a US correctional system 
who attended an OAE programme. They note that although the boys all left their 
programmes with better behaviour and intentions, these improvements soon faded. 
Two recommendations were longer courses and deliberate post-course follow-up 
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(ibid., p. 35). Barrett and Greenaway (1995) give a well-researched perspective on 
development within OAE programmes saying it is rarely a “quick fix” and more 
often a “kick start” requiring follow-up (p. 9). On the next page, they add, rather 
bleakly, that even with a follow-up strategy, there are no guarantees of transfer. In 
one of the first attempts to get at this “black box” (Ewert, 1983, p. 27) of transfer, 
Walsh and Golins (1976) characterised education as a process in which no one 
experience can stand alone “no matter how worthwhile” (p. 15). More positively, 
Brand’s longitudinal study (2001; see also Brand & Smith 1999) of a wilderness 
therapy programme reveals the power of follow-up to assist changes in thinking and 
behaviour. 
 
This thesis suggests that a lack of follow-up and the progressively shortened nature 
of OAE courses have made claims of character change increasingly problematic. The 
thesis further contends that instead of recognising that these problems (follow-up and 
duration) were curricular, and thus perhaps addressable, many scholars and 
practitioners, as the next section will reveal, have rejected the concept of character 
development, believing it to be incompatible with the aims of OAE. A recurrent 
reason for this rejection is the indelible association of character development with 
militarism, to be discussed next.  
1.3.2 Martial Character’s Incompatibility With OAE 
Understandably, many feel that military connotations of violence are incompatible 
with the aims of OAE. As theorists and practitioners have sought to filter all military 
insinuations out of OAE, character development, because of its conceptual 
attachment to martial endeavours, has been filtered out as well. This section first 
highlights the growing discontent with military associations within OAE. Then, in a 
short discussion on the morality of war, certain effects of combat are shown to be 
antagonistic not only to the aims of OAE, but to character itself.  
 
Before continuing with this critique, however, it is important to recognise that 
although the discussion here focuses on the morally compromising nature of 
militaristic combat, there is undoubtedly much within military service that is morally 
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commendable. This “other side” is attested to in Chamblerain’s (1915/1994) quote 
from above, again repeated here: “and on another side fortitude, patience, warmth of 
comradeship, and in the darkest hours tenderness of caring for the wounded and 
stricken” (p. 386). Yet, despite the opportunities for moral growth available through 
military service, many scholars and practitioners within OAE appear to have rejected 
all militaristic connotations outright.  
1.3.2.1 Marshalling the Martial Out of OAE 
As the outdoor skills of demobilised World War II troops were employed in OAE, 
and the same countryside once used for military practice was now being used for 
OAE, the tacit thought that OAE had something to do with militarism was 
reinforced, causing a military ethos to spread throughout the “embryonic profession” 
(Nicol, 2002a, pp. 34-35).  
 
Loynes (2002) lists the adverse effects of the militaristic tradition that continue to 
beset OAE: “hierarchical leadership, masculine benchmarks for success, 
performance and achievement and a team discipline” (p. 115). In this same article, 
Bowles, in personal communication with Loynes, claims that the military and 
masculine ideals are still very much accepted and practised within OAE – that Lord 
Hunt has followed James and Hahn up into the 1990s (ibid., p. 118). Bowles (ibid., p. 
118) asks for a moral equivalent to the present moral equivalent, by which I 
understand him to mean a moral justification for OAE that doesn’t rest on martial 
virtues. This thesis aims to provide this justification. 
 
Similarly, Hogan (1992, p. 27), troubled by a lack of environmental respect within 
many OAE programmes, suggests that the military language of challenge and 
conquest results in physically-oriented courses that distance participants’ from the 
natural world. Likewise, Drasdo (1973/1998) has concerns that OAE is conceived as 
little more than rugged physical activities. Even Hahn, a strong proponent of physical 
training, knew it did not necessarily follow “that a sound body … harbors a sound 
mind” (Hahn, 1965b, p. 4). He had his suspicions of Outward Bound, and was 
always concerned “lest it become a toughness cult” (Nold, p. 1995, 388). More 
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pertinent to this thesis, Barrett and Greenaway (1995) refer to the conviction that 
character is formed through physical activities as an “invalidated assumption” 
regularly favoured by those who support a militaristic method of rehabilitation (p. 
35).  
 
I am suggesting that as a faction of outdoor adventure educators began to reject the 
military overtones so long entwined with the foundations of OAE, they also rejected 
the concept of character development, because of its inextricable associations with 
militarism (see Freeman, 2011, pp. 32-33 who comes to a similar conclusion in his 
discussion of Outward Bound in particular). This dismissal of character’s relevance 
to OAE is understandable, since an articulation of character, without military 
connotations, has yet to be given within the field. To underline the importance of 
dissociating character from militarism, the next paragraphs call attention to the 
problematic nature of discussing morality in a context of violence.  
1.3.2.2 War, the Immoral Equivalent of Adventure 
This thesis claims that the military influence on OAE’s historical development has 
tainted both scholars and practitioners’ understanding of character. I will now briefly 
mention the inevitability of moral loss through combat, and war’s potential to 
contaminate character, thereby concluding that a broader understanding of character 
within OAE is needed.  
 
James’ (1949) pithy phrase, “the moral equivalent of war” (MEW), seems to assume 
that the martial virtues can be plucked from their context of combat without military 
remainder. However, scholars’ ongoing attempts (e.g. Cook 1999; Loynes, 2002; 
Nicol, 2002) to eliminate military influence on OAE, and their simultaneous 
dissatisfaction with the militaristically-laden concept of character, seem to indicate 
that these supposedly “morally equivalent” virtues (e.g. courage, loyalty, endurance) 
have offensively retained a pugnacious residue. This brief subsection explores why 
using militaristic metaphor to describe moral growth is problematic. It therefore 
questions whether MEW can continue to be a “serviceable” construct for OAE’s 
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perspective on character, which again points to the need for a broader understanding 
of character within the discipline. 
 
Passages quoted earlier (in subsection 1.2.2), celebrating the relationship between 
war and character, can also be seen in a less flattering light. As Thucydides 
suggested, character will match the conditions of war. Here is another passage from 
Thucydides’ The Peloponnesian War Vol. I Bk. V,  
Reckless daring was held to be loyal courage; prudent delay was the excuse of a 
coward; moderation was the disguise of unmanly weakness…. Frantic energy was 
the true quality of a man …. The lover of violence was always trusted, and his 
opponent suspected …. In a word, he who could outstrip another in a bad action 
was applauded, and so was he who encouraged to evil one who had no idea of it …. 
The seal of good faith was not divine law, but fellowship in crime …. The cause of 
all these evils was the love of power, originating in avarice and ambition. (Trans. in 
Godolphin, 1942, 72-77, 81-83; Jones, 1970, pp. 53-4) 
While this passage clearly demonstrates war’s morally corrupting tendencies, The 
Red Badge of Courage, does so more graphically: “he lost everything but his hate, 
his desire to smash into pulp the glittering smile of victory … upon the faces of his 
enemies” (Crane, 1895/1995, p. 154). Similarly, Chris Hedges, a war correspondent 
of some 20 years who has seen more combat than any soldier, offers another useful 
perspective. He contests what William James (1949, p. 323) calls martial virtues. 
Hedges (2002) calls war a myth propagated by the “allure of heroism” (p. 83): 
it is part of war’s perversity that we lionize those who make great warriors and 
excuse their excesses in the name of self-defence …. For even as war gives 
meaning to sterile lives, it also promotes killers and racists. (Hedges, 2002, pp. 8-9) 
Critiquing a morally romantic view of war, Hedges (2002, pp. 84-86) notes that the 
military peddles the myth of heroism, less and less relevant in modern distance-based 
warfare, making young boys believe that war is the only place to define their 
manhood and determine their worth.  
 
Post-traumatic stress disorder specialist Dr. Shay (1995) has built a medical practice 
out of treating the mental illness that often accompanies war’s “heroes.” He believes 
that a major reason for these illnesses is the destructive nature of war that often 




I am not questioning that acts of bravery and selflessness can occur in combat zones, 
they certainly do. I am suggesting that a militaristic connotation of character is 
inexorably bound to moral loss (Hursthouse, 2001, pp. 45-48). That is, in a context 
of war the best “moral” option is most often the “least worst” (Carr, 2003a, p. 225). 
Due to their seemingly inexorable connection with loss, I contend that militarily-
imbued moral metaphors for character have become limited in their value for OAE. 
Further, even if the martial virtues could be applied to OAE without military 
remainder, the martial virtues only account for a portion of virtue’s full expression. 
The physically rugged nature of these martial virtues represents only a part of 
virtue’s rich palette. This thesis aims to explore a different aspect of the virtue 
palette, emphasising character traits of care over those of combat.  
 
Again, it is important to note that these more empathic aspects of character could 
certainly be explored within military contexts (again Chamberlain’s quote is helpful 
here). However, the growing resistance towards militaristic associations, within the 
OAE literature, suggests that any efforts to reinstate character’s relevance to OAE 
would do well to limit allusions to militarism.  
1.3.3 “Character,” a Term of Disaffection 
Since both scholars and practitioners are attempting to envision OAE without its 
military trappings, and since OAE’s understanding of character has been historically 
connected to military constructs, it is no surprise to find, within the OAE literature, a 
growing uneasiness regarding the concept of character and its development.  
 
As early as 1970, Price objects to the term “character training,” supposing it to have 
indoctrinatory implications (p. 84; see also Richards, 1981, p. 120). Price (1970) 
regards the phrase “character training” as open to “grave misinterpretations” (p. 84), 
and “at once too imprecise and too narrow for our [Outward Bound’s] purposes” (p. 
87). Similarily, Drasdo, writing in the early 1970s, finds it difficult to take the 
“Outward Bound mystique seriously” noting something “wildly inflated” about the 




By 1979, American Ken Kalisch notes that “character-training” was rarely used to 
describe the outcomes of Outward Bound (p. 12). For example, Miner, an associate 
of Hahn, describes Hahn’s agenda to “build character” as an “old-fashioned phrase” 
(Miner & Bolt, 1981, pp. 41-42; Martin et al., p. 19). Hopkins and Putnam (1993), 
from a British context, agree, stating that by the 1980s “development training” had 
been substituted for “character training” (p. 52, italics added; see Freeman, 2011, pp. 
36-42 for a history of this transition). In Australia, Young (1987) too regards 
character-training as a dated middle class “ambiguous catch-phrase” (p. 4), 
something “accepted and pedaled uncritically by the Australian sail training 
movement” (Hogan, 1992, referring to Young’s paper, p. 28). Comparably, Brookes 
(2003b, p. 49) claims that “character-training” is a phrase now used ironically, 
symbolising pointless difficulties with little purpose. 
 
Another concern is that the vague nature of the word “character,” allows it to be 
intentionally exploited. MacLeod (1983, p. 29), critiquing the Scout movement, says 
the “character builders took refuge in [character’s] comprehensiveness, piling up 
plans and statements in muddled profusion,” but never giving a definition for this 
ambiguous word. Brookes (2003b, p. 50) says the same thing pithily: the Scout 
movement probably didn’t build character, but the belief in “character development” 
certainly built the Scout movement. Brookes (ibid.) calls this vague use of the term 
character “convenient” (p. 54), implying that it can be unaccountably claimed as an 
outcome of OAE programmes.  
 
“Character’s” nebulosity has contributed to its increasing rejection within OAE. An 
aim of this thesis is to provide an understanding of character and show its relevance 
to OAE. By doing so, some sense can also be made of the research which has 
questioned the efficacy of character development within OAE programmes, research 
to which I now turn.  
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1.3.4 Researching Character 
Although Chapter 3 on character education will take the character “trait debate” back 
to the 1920s, the two more recent studies I examine here are of particular interest to 
OAE. 
1.3.4.1 Roberts et al. and the Character Industry 
In their book The Character-Training Industry: Adventure-Training Schemes in 
Britain, Roberts, White and Parker (1974), all from the Sociology Department at 
Liverpool University, conducted an in-depth analysis of character-training 
institutions such as Outward Bound. One of their main questions was “Can 
character-training schemes exert a lasting influence upon young people?” (ibid., p. 
21). Comprehensively looking at the providers, financer’s motivations, and the 
trainers themselves, the researchers’ main focus was not on the views of the trainees, 
but on the measured effects derived from the application of their pre- and post- 
course instruments (ibid., p. 29-31). In their last chapter they write:  
Our conclusion, though open to dispute by further research but wholly consistent 
with all the evidence now available must therefore be that, whilst personalities may 
be affected, young lives are rarely re-shaped by the schemes under scrutiny …. The 
character-training industry is not liable to re-shape society, and though negative 
conclusions are never particularly exciting, the evidence makes them inescapable. 
(p. 150)  
This study, although seldom quoted in the literature reviewed for this thesis, has 
often been referenced in conversation by colleagues, and I suggest has had at least a 
tacit affect on the decline of character claims in OAE. Unfortunately, space does not 
warrant a critical treatment of Roberts et al.’s methodology. However, pertinent 
issues concerning the difficulties of empirically measuring moral growth will be 
addressed in Chapters 2-4. Thus, it will be sufficient here to note that the “difficulty 
or impossibility of measuring the impact of character-training” may have contributed 
to its gradual loss in favour within OAE (Freeman, 2011, pp. 35-34). 
 
1.3.4.2 Brookes and the Neo-Hahnian Critique 
In 2003, Brookes, a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Outdoor Education and 
Nature Tourism, at La Trobe University Bendigo, published two articles critiquing 
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not only character formation within OAE, but also character as such (2003b, 2003c). 
He claims that before these articles there were no OAE publications directly 
criticising trait theory, just a lot of “disquiet” (2003c, pp. 122-123). Since these two 
publications are highly pertinent to my thesis, they receive significant attention 
below. 
 
While these two articles were in press, Brookes (2003a) presented their results at a 
conference, tellingly entitled: “Character Building. Why It Doesn’t Happen, Why It 
Can’t Be Made to Happen, and Why the Myth of Character Building Is Hurting the 
Field of Outdoor Education.” Ultimately, throughout these articles, Brookes is 
critiquing transferability, an idea that is central to much OAE (2003b, p. 49). 
Specifically, he refers to the assumption that an OAE experience can change 
personal traits and enable these traits to persist long after the experience in different 
settings, as nothing but a widespread bias (ibid., p. 49). He argues that despite 
significant evidence to the contrary, this primarily American sector of OAE – that 
Brookes calls neo-Hahnian – doggedly hang on to their faith in character 
development. This faith is so strong, Brookes further maintains, that neo-Hahnians 
believe lasting behaviour change may follow from single or several episode OAE 
programmes (ibid., p. 52; see also 2003c, p. 119).  
 
Drawing on a review of literature in social psychology (Ross & Nisbett 1991), 
Brookes (2003b) questions the very tenability of trait theory, claiming that a person’s 
honesty in one situation tells us “very little” (p. 49) as to how they will act in another 
situation. He claims there is no evidence that character traits exist (2003b, p. 56). He 
highlights two experiments reinterpreted by Ross and Nisbett (1991). First, the 
Milgram (1963) experiments, where participants under perceived medical advice 
electrically shocked patients to dangerous levels, are explained not as absence of 
morality, but as situationally induced behaviour (Brookes, 2003b, p. 57-58). 
Secondly, the Darley and Batson experiments (1973), on seminarians’ (un-) 
willingness to stop and help a person in need, are explained in terms of situational 




Brookes claims that what neo-Hahnian OAE has called “character,” a situationist 
calls conformity (2003b, pp. 57-58). Just as the contrived experimental situations 
produce “shocking” behaviour, so neo-Hahnian OAE programmes, such as Project 
Adventure (www.pa.org), produce their situationally desired effects by artificial 
means (Brookes, 2003b, p. 59). For example, a ropes course initiative may elicit 
behaviour that is pre-determined by a facilitator (e.g. teamwork). Should participants 
refuse to conform in the situation, they may be deemed spoilsports (ibid., p. 59). 
Even if participants are extended “challenge by choice” they are pressured to 
comply: for “what kind of person would avoid a challenge?” (ibid., p. 59). 
 
For Brookes (2003b), character development has been “a remarkably persuasive and 
appealing slogan, but is flawed as a basis on which to base substantive claims for 
OAE” (p. 59). In conclusion to his first article, he says that the common tendency to 
prefer “big-bang” (single-episode) trait-based explanations of behavioural change to 
situational ones (ibid., pp.. 59-60) is called “the fundamental attribution error” (Ross 
& Nisbitt, 1991). 
 
In his second article, Brookes (2003c) claims that social psychological evidence has 
“demolished the idea that personal traits inferred from behaviour in one situation (for 
example an OAE situation) could be used to predict behaviour in a different situation 
(for example a workplace)” (p. 119). He claims that the wide currency of character 
development can be explained by a general belief that the reason for situational 
behavioural change is the development of traits, rather than situations soliciting 
certain behaviours (2003c, p. 122). This proclivity, he adds, has led to attribution 
theory (Kelley, 1967). 
 
Ross and Nisbett (1991, p. 147) claim that since, as individuals, we can only 
experience parts of others’ lives, what may appear to us as a trait in a friend, would 
more readily be understood as a situationally derived behaviour if we could have his 
or her life-as-a-whole in view. Brookes (2003c) notes that reviewing or processing 
exercises (e.g. Greenaway, 1990), common educational techniques used in OAE 
programmes, may actually enhance attribution bias by encouraging participants to 
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look for change within themselves. Evidence does seem to suggest that programmes 
and facilitators significantly influence the “reactions, sense-making … and … 
outcomes reported by participants” (Jones & Oswick, 2007, p. 327). Anticipating a 
likely response to his critique, Brookes (2003c) alludes to empirically-based OAE 
research that has found significant behavioural change (e.g. Lan, Sveen & Davidson, 
2004, p. 37) saying: “conceivably, in-house OAE research could be contaminated by 
attribution error (for example questionnaire results may report not actual behavioural 
change but changed beliefs)” (Brookes, 2003c, p. 122). He cites a remark from an 
eminent OAE meta-analysis that bolsters his claim: “we were struck by the number 
of research papers that read more like programme advertisements than research” 
(Hattie, Marsh, Neill, & Richards, 1997, p. 45).  
 
Brookes (2003c, p. 128) believes that the mythology of adventure (e.g. “Shackleton, 
Mallory, Scott and their ilk” (Nicol, 2002a, p. 38)) has obscured what actually 
happens. He suggests that the “yoke [of character building] … once cast off” can 
allow OAE to get on with “defensible theory, research and practice” (2003b, p. 50).  
 
Concluding this section on Brookes, it is astonishing that so trenchant and all-
encompassing a critique of personal development – a term he considers synonymous 
with character building (2003b, p. 51) and a concept that permeates the entire field of 
OAE – has received so little attention within the OAE literature since his 
publications (2003b, 2003c). Instead of the situationist perspective, offered by  
Brookes, this thesis suggests that a philosophical explanation of character may serve 
to better interpret the (lack of) development he refers to. 
1.3.5 Philosophical Problems With Character 
Within this small body of OAE literature that is questioning, dissenting, and even 
refuting character development, a number of questions related to character have been 
raised. For example, What is it? What ought it to consist of? Can it be taught? These 
questions point to an important reality: before any empirical work on character 
development within OAE can be done, if it can be done at all, what is meant by 
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“character” must first be clarified. This is the work of philosophy, rather than 
empirical or other science.  
 
Assuming that a position on character can be articulated, one may then proceed to 
ask whether OAE activities can encourage its development? As mentioned, Drasdo 
(1973/1998) shrewdly questions the high moral tone (e.g. the development of 
courage and self-sacrifice) of the character training language used to justify many 
OAE programmes. He observes that such terms are usually reserved for “situations 
or confrontations which have not been entered [into] voluntarily or for fun: yet these 
words are used here in a sphere which is not related to morality in any ordinary 
sense” (1973/1998, p. 28).  
 
Even if a sophisticated account of character can be given, and OAE is found to be a 
means to its formation, the moral substance of such character is far from decided (see 
MacIntyre, 1988). “By character we evidently mean good character …. Do we put 
honesty, probity, courage first, or tolerance, warmth, affection? As Christians we 
should perhaps say, ‘love and humility,’ but are ‘character-trainers’ really thinking of 
love and humility when they use the term?” (Price, 1970, p. 87).  
 
In other words, “who decides what are good habits and dispositions and what are 
not?” (Pleasants, 2007, p. 54). For example, should traits encompassing physical 
arduousness (e.g. endurance) play a privileged role in OAE character development 
(Leberman & Martin, 2003)? As Hogan (1992, p. 28) asks, do smaller mountains, 
gentler travel, and shorter expeditions necessarily result in less development?  
 
Lastly, Wurdinger skeptically questions if virtue can be taught (1987, p. 31)? Citing 
Aristotle’s conditions for virtue (II 4§3), Wurdinger (1987, pp. 31-32) suggests that 
the artificial and contrived nature of OAE programmes rules out the freedom 
necessary for truly moral acts. This lack of freedom and expression is echoed in 
Drasdo’s (1973/1998, p. 30) likening OAE participants to powerless clay moulded 




This section has noted the voices of dissent with regard to character formation on 
OAE programmes. It began with Hahn’s concerns over follow-up, and then explored 
the incompatibility of a military concept of character with the aims of OAE. The 
term “character” was then shown to be indeterminate, and philosophical quandaries 
and questions were ultimately raised. 
 
Having first framed this thesis within the expansive field of outdoor education, I then 
demonstrated the widespread nature of the assumption that character is developed 
through OAE. Contrarily, I further noted that this assumption is being questioned by 
a growing number of OAE academics and practitioners. I now turn to the final 
section of this chapter: a proposal for a way through this impasse.  
1.4 A Virtue Ethical Perspective on Character Within OAE 
This section opens by highlighting the call for philosophical analysis and critique 
within the OAE literature. As one such critique, I take up Bowles’ (see below) 
invitation for a “re-appraisal” of Hahn’s moral vision, using it as a steppingstone to a 
virtue ethical examination of character formation within OAE. Finally, in contrast 
with the rugged martial virtues, I suggest a gentler moral tone for this inquiry, and 
place it in a context of a wilderness expedition. 
1.4.1 A Call for Philosophical Inquiry Within OAE 
Stating the obvious, though it is a truth often forgotten in OAE, Crosby (1995, p. 3) 
says that all theories are based on epistemologies and ontologies. However, a review 
of the OAE literature reveals only a handful of scholars examining philosophical 
issues (Wurdinger, 1997, p. xiii). In 1997, Wurdinger asked for more philosophical 
analysis to investigate the “field’s commonly held assumptions” (p. xvi-xvii). Often 
attracting those drawn to action, so-called “doers,” the field of OAE has been labeled 
as theoretically lean (Gass, 1992, p. 6; Wurdinger, 1997, pp. xvii, 83), and in some 
need of philosophical attention. Before any empirical work can be done, if it is 
warranted at all, philosophical inquiry must lay the foundation for a concept of 
character. This sentiment is echoed in Wurdinger’s (1997) statement that “commonly 
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held beliefs about … morality should be examined on an ongoing basis so that 
theoretical ideas can be expanded and practices improved” (p. 86).  
 
Some five years after Wurdinger’s 1997 plea for philosophical perspectives, Nicol 
(2002a, p. 31; 2003, p. 11) is still asking for a philosophical treatment of OAE. Nicol 
worries (2002b) that without a philosophical framework, “one wonders at the means 
by which knowledge is produced, verified and transmitted” (p. 89). Without 
philosophical underpinnings, he continues, it is little wonder that OAE is often 
considered to be just a bunch of activities (ibid., p. 89).  
 
If to speak of character is to refer, in part, to right action, then character falls within 
the remit of ethics or moral philosophy, which is intimately connected to “every 
aspect of adventure education” (Hunt & Wurdinger, 1999, p. 123). Unfortunately, as 
Hunt (1994, p. 2) notes, within the field of OAE, very little writing has specifically 
addressed the ethical dimension. Hunt (1991, p. 14) asks that the study of ethics be 
given a rightfully central role in OAE practice. Although speaking chiefly of 
wilderness instructors, he notes that every hour of every day on expedition requires 
ethical decision-making (Hunt, 1994, p. 26). Despite the relevance of ethics to OAE, 
Hunt (1996a, p. 12) troublingly observes that talk of character has nearly ceased. He 
asserts that OAE is still a chief medium for character education (ibid., p. 15), and 
seems to be asking, like Bowles who is discussed next (Loynes, 2002, pp. 119-120), 
for something of a moral paradigm through which to understand moral formation 
within OAE.  
1.4.2 Moving Forward by Looking Back: Hahn’s Moral Vision 
By reassessing Hahn’s moral vision, a different, less-rugged, expression of character 
seems to emerge.  
 
Bowles, in personal communication with Loynes, remembers the overtly ethical 
agenda of the early Hahn, before his ideas were marketed, saying: “I firmly believe 
that the work of Kurt Hahn is waiting for an informed re-appraisal” (Loynes, 2002, 
p. 119). The ethical vision to which Bowles refers is Hahn’s hope that education 
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through service could instil a love and compassion for humanity (Richards, 1981, pp. 
22-23). Hahn’s principal interest was character development (Hunt, 1996b, p. 15; 
Richards, 1981, p. 183), and the means of his moral mission was facilitating 
development of compassion through service (Hahn, 1960b, p. 7; 1965b, p. 8; see also 
Hunt & Wurdinger, 1999, p. 127; Wurdinger, 1997, p. 13). The Samaritan ethic, 
derived from Jesus’ parable in Luke 10:25-37, where a compassionate passer-by 
whose selfless care to a person of different ethnicity extended the notion of 
neighbour to include all of humankind, provided Hahn’s ideal (Hahn, 1965a, p. 8). 
 
In subsection 1.2.2.3, I gave a “traditional” account of Outward Bound’s genesis. It 
appears that a more careful reading of the historical context shows the military 
motivations in the creation of Outward Bound to be more directly related to 
Lawrence Holt than Hahn. Holt, who contributed evidence in support of Hahn’s 
methods to the Norwood Committe (Cook, 1999, p. 162), owned the Blue Funnel 
merchant line, and gave both practical (e.g. staff and boats) and financial support to 
Aberdovey, Outward Bound’s first school (Richards, 1981, pp. 102-104). Holt 
apparently conducted a study of the death statistics of the 1940 war in the Atlantic, 
and concluded that young men were dying not from enemy fire, but from their 
inability to sail the lifeboats that they were forced to board after their (motorised) 
ships had been torpedoed (Cook, 1999, p. 163; Hogan, 1968, pp. 26-27; Veever & 
Allison, in press).  
 
For some time, Hahn (1958) had been trying to institute a badge scheme that would 
reward young people for resisting what he called the “decay of fitness” (p. 4). 
Although the badge underwent many evolutions (e.g. from the Gordonstoun Badge 
to the Moray Badge (see Veevers & Allison, 2011, pp. 37-42, for this account), it 
was eventually named the County Badge (Richards, 1981, pp. 91-95). This final form 
had four main components: athletics standards; an expedition test which Hahn 
considered the most important (1940a); life-style commitments (e.g. no smoking); 
and a service project (Richards, 1981, p. 96). Hahn’s interests in a badge system 
were to provide youngsters an opportunity to overcome their weaknesses, and to 
develop an “all-roundedness” with which they could serve their community (ibid., p. 
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92). At several points (1938-1940) in the badge’s evolution, Hahn, with others, 
experimented with short summer courses based on the Moray and County Badge 
syllabi (Veevers & Allison, 2011, p. 44). These courses were a harbinger of those 
that would soon be offered by Outward Bound (ibid., pp. 44, 66).  
 
The idea behind the “County” Badge was that each county of Britain would create its 
own particular badge requirements, while following the basic framework of Hahn’s 
scheme (Veevers & Allison, 2011, pp. 40-41). Although the County Badge had had 
modest success during 1939-1940, fears of unhealthy competition, comparison with 
the Hitler Youth movement, and war-time austerities, prevented it from becoming a 
nationwide phenomenon (ibid., pp. 59-60). Hahn, looking for a means to both 
finance and promulgate the County Badge, found it in Lawrence Holt, the owner of 
the Blue Funnel shipping line who was interested in training naval military to survive 
at sea. Through Holt’s financial backing, Hahn could propagate the values of his 
badge system (Hahn, 1949) in the form of this new sea school, Aberdovey Outward 
Bound. Although “the idea of a course to train seamen lest their ship be torpedoed” 
(Richards, 1981, p. 106; see also James, 1990, p. 12) appears to have been a 
significant incentive for Holt, and most likely one that Hahn supported, it does not 
seem to have played a significant role in Hahn motivation in co-founding the 
Outward Bound training school. While in Germany, Hahn had come to notoriety 
through a subversive act against the Nazi military regime (Richards, 1999, p. 65), 
and although he does not seem to have been a pacifist (Hahn, 1940b, pp. 10-11), his 
main educational interests never appear to have been a preparation for war (Richards, 
1981, p. 99). Any military associations with Hahn’s moral vision then, may be seen 
as a happenstance of Hahn’s expansionist aspirations for his badge system coinciding 
with an opportunity (Holt’s backing) that presented itself in the context the Second 
World War (ibid., p. 126). This interpretation helps to explain why Hahn’s vision 
equally appealed to the 1960s anti-Vietnam era of conscientious objection in which 
the first American Outward Bound schools originated (ibid., p. 126).  
 
For Hahn, the heart of character was compassion. He considered compassion in the 
form of service to be more than (1965a, p. 8) morally equivalent to any quality war 
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might generate. In fact, he was convinced that when given a chance to serve, 
participants would derive such meaning through these acts of compassion, that they 
would cultivate a love for humankind that could stave off war (1960b, p. 2; Richards, 
1981, pp. 109-110). His passion was the “art of lifesaving,” not the “art of killing” 
(Hahn, 1960b, p. 11). 
 
Often considered a proponent of Spartan toughness, Hahn’s physical methods were 
merely means to his moral ends (Richards, 1981, p. 86, 88). Using Holt’s pithy 
prepositional distinction, Hahn’s use of sea and mountains was not so much a 
training for them, as through them (Richards, 1981, p. 88). Hahn knew that physical 
training developed what Aristotle would call “moral virtues” (II 1-6), the discipline 
to carry out behaviourally what one’s mind deemed to be right action.  
 
As a final tribute to Hahn’s moral vision, the literature searches conducted in 
preparation for this thesis, routinely yielded the annually published Kurt Hahn 
address (e.g. MacArthur, 1995). Awarded by the Association of Experiential 
Education, the recipient must embody Hahn’s “tenacity and conviction in “helping 
young people develop into healthy, happy, ethical and compassionate adults” (Kurt 
Hahn Address, n.d). 
 
Hahn often referred to the seaman’s virtues, which for him included: endurance, 
vigilance, patience, decision-making and so on (Hahn, 1947, p. 3). Hunt (1999, p. 
118) observes that this educational aim of virtue through adventure is a theme that 
has run consistently throughout the history of OAE, from Plato, Aristotle, James, to 
Hahn. Prouty et al. (2007) echo Hunt’s claim, noting that the inculcation of virtue 
had been an “overriding concern for early proponents of adventure experiences,” a 
concern that is “just as important now as it was then” (p. 71). These observations are 
significant for this thesis, because virtue is often associated with character 
(Blackburn, 1996, p. 394). In fact, virtue ethics is sometimes referred to as an ethics 
of character. It is for these reasons, and others yet to be highlighted, that I propose to 
employ an Aristotelian virtue ethical perspective to explore the notion of character 
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and its relation to OAE. In doing so, I hope to provide the moral “re-appraisal” of 
Hahn’s original vision that Bowles has called for (Loynes, 2002, p. 119).  
1.4.3 A Virtue Ethical View of Character 
 Hunt and Wurdinger (1999, p. 123) suggest that virtue is inextricably bound to 
OAE. While virtue ethics does receive honourable mention in many contemporary 
OAE textbooks (e.g. Martin et al., 2006, p. 92; Priest & Gass, 2005, p. 13; Prouty et 
al., 2007, p. 65), Plato and Aristotle are (with few exceptions) allocated only a few 
paragraphs, often listed without references, or quoted from secondary sources (e.g. 
Barnes, 2004, p. 9). These token references to “the Greeks” are understandable, since 
a detailed interpretation of ancient morality is not these authors’ purpose. However, 
the field of OAE has yet to engage, with significant depth, this Classical Greek ideal 
of virtuous character. The present thesis aims to fill this gap.  
 
Several OAE scholars have used a virtue ethical perspective to elucidate the 
relationship between adventure education and moral formation (e.g. Allison 2002; 
Gass & Wurdinger, 1993; Hunt, 1988; 1991; 1994; 1996a; 1996b; 1999; Hunt & 
Wurdinger, 1999; Wurdinger 1987; 1997). Within OAE, Hunt’s work provides the 
most detailed exegetical examination of virtue. However, even his excellent 
publications are limited to the length of an article or chapter. 
1.4.4 A Vector for This Thesis 
This subsection identifies the theoretical perspective used throughout the rest of the 
thesis, and suggests the appropriateness of qualitatively investigating a wilderness 
expedition with it.  
1.4.4.1 A Softer-side of Character  
In conclusion to this chapter, I want to state more specifically the direction of this 
thesis. As just indicated, a detailed virtue ethical perspective on character in relation 
to OAE has yet to emerge. This thesis attempts to provide such an account. Drawing 
principally on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (Trans., 1999), and other sources 
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within the virtue ethical tradition, the exegesis of my second chapter attempts to 
provide a detailed philosophical explanation of character and its formation.  
 
In particular, the present thesis focuses on what might be called the “softer aspects of 
the virtue palette.” Having gone to significant lengths in this chapter to show the 
perceived negative military influence on OAE’s conceptual account of character, I 
aim to provide an understanding of character that encompasses a broader “repertoire 
of virtue” (Seaman & Coppens, 2006), thereby connecting traditionally divided hard 
(e.g. endurance) and soft (e.g. kindness) traits into one continuous fabric (Sherman, 
1991). In emphasising the softer aspects of virtue, I draw inspiration from Swanton’s 
(2003) pluralistic account of virtue ethics, which holds agapic (unconditionally 
given) love to be the ultimate motivation behind all virtuous action.  
 
In so far as I am convinced that a virtue ethical account of character provides a 
sounder platform than any other model from the character education movement, 
Chapter 3 critiques character education, and briefly shows its shortcomings vis-à-vis 
virtue theory, further substantiating a preference for Aristotle’s ethics. 
1.4.4.2 A Virtue Ethical Perspective on a Wilderness Expedition 
I chose to conduct fieldwork for both theoretical and practical reasons. Theoretically, 
Aristotle grounds moral wisdom and enquiry in experience. Practically, the broader 
field of experiential education, in which OAE exists, has recently petitioned 
qualitative “researchers to become partners with practitioners” (Pinch, 2009, pp. 
392), to connect theory with practice. Thus, it seemed prudent to include, as part of 
this research, a field experience viewed from a virtue ethical perspective.  
 
This decision to collect and analyse data, however, was also born out of a tension 
found in the OAE literature. In congruence with Brookes’ (2003b, 2003c) rather 
skeptical position, several studies have intimated the ephemeral effects of OAE 
programmes (e.g. Durgin & McEwen, 1991). OAE programmes are not behavioural 
“panaceas as evidenced by the fact that a number of evaluation studies reported 
negative outcomes” (Neill & Richards, 1998 p. 7). However, several studies indicate 
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that there are in fact lasting benefits to be gained from OAE courses. For example, in 
perhaps the most cited piece of recent OAE research, a meta-analysis drawing on 96 
studies, “immediate gains were followed by substantial additional gains” between the 
end of the programme and follow-up assessment (Hattie et al., 1997, p. 43, 70). 
Similarly, in their review of three OAE meta-analyses (one of which was Hattie et 
al., 1997) spanning roughly 12 000 students, Neill and Richards (1998) claim that 
OAE programmes can have a lasting “small to medium impact” on participants’ 
development of self-concept and self-confidence (p. 1). Another study found long-
term effects in self-actualisation and to a smaller degree existential wellbeing for 
those participants that attended a particular wilderness-based programme in Australia 
(Lan, Sveen & Davidson, 2004, p. 37). As a final example, six-months after 
attending a New Zealand wilderness programme, participants appear to have 
maintained the personal and social development apparently gained on the course 
(Martin & Legg, 2002, pp. 31-32).  
 
From my experience as an outdoor adventure educator, I resonate with Brookes’ 
cautious realism, but also know the hope of change reported in these other studies. I 
became curious about how an in-depth case study on character formation during an 
OAE programme, viewed from a virtue ethical perspective, might make sense of 
these conflicting results found within the OAE literature. Since, as noted in 
subsection 1.2.1.5, expeditions have often been related to character development (via 
personal and social development), and because my personal interest and expertise as 
an OAE practitioner lay in wilderness expeditions, I sought to find a wilderness 
course upon which to conduct research. Chapter 4 provides a full account of the case 
study, and the rationale and methods used in this research.  
 
In summary, this section opened with a clarion call for philosophical perspectives on 
OAE. Hahn’s moral mission was then reinterpreted in contrast to the traditional 
portrayal often recounted. A virtue ethical perspective was then proposed as a means 
to explore the softer aspects of character’s relationship to OAE. Finally I noted that 
in an effort to connect theory with practice, this virtue ethical perspective would be 




This chapter has had four aims. First, it has located this research in the field of OAE, 
with specific interest in wilderness expeditions. Second, it established the long-held 
assumption of character formation on OAE programmes, but, thirdly, noted a 
growing body of dissent regarding this assumption. Last, it has proposed to examine 
this issue of character formation within OAE through a virtue ethical perspective, 
both theoretically and in the praxis of an expedition.  
 





The Virtue of Character 
Although Aristotle’s virtue ethic is often referred to as a “character ethic” (Hunt, 
1996a), finding a description or theory of character within Aristotle’s main ethical 
text, the Nicomachean Ethics (Trans. 1999), proves difficult. For while character is, 
without question, a thread running throughout Aristotle’s argument, specific 
references to it are relatively infrequent. Aristotle’s concept of character is implicitly 
assumed throughout the text, rather than explicitly explained. It is left to the reader to 
extract a comprehensive theory of Aristotelian character, and despite my literature 
searches, I was unable to locate one. Thus, this chapter is an effort to articulate such 
a theory, and therefore requires significant exegetical examination. Once this 
philosophical theory of character development is articulated, its application to OAE 
will be explicated throughout the remainder of the thesis.  
 
The discussion opens with a brief defence of virtue theory’s particular relevance to 
character, over and against other ethical traditions. An introduction to Aristotle’s life 
and ethical writings will next provide the reader with a context for the chapter. 
Character, as understood from an Aristotelian standpoint, will then be defined 
through a detailed examination of the Nicomachean Ethics. The limitations of 
Aristotle’s ethic will then be addressed, and the chapter will conclude with a sketch 
of modern virtue scholarship beyond the “Ethics.” 
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2.1 Framing the Problem 
This section begins by connecting character and ethics. Next, the ancient question, 
“How shall we live?,” and the modern difficulty of the is/ought distinction convey 
the challenges to ethical systems. Western civilisation’s three moral traditions are 
then surveyed, with virtue ethics distinguishing itself as an ethic most clearly 
relevant to character, and hence to this research. 
2.1.1 No View From Nowhere 
As a young boy, I was taught that character is doing what is right when no one is 
looking. Since the “right” thing to do is a normative question, the study of character 
leads quickly to moral philosophy or ethics. “Ethics” is an English derivation from 
the Greek !thikos, often translated as “character.” Difficult ethical questions, such as, 
“How shall we live?,” have presumably preoccupied humankind long before 
Socrates’ defence of his conduct in Plato’s Crito (Trans. 2002). The modern period 
seems to have only complicated the discussion by clearly separating facts from 
values. This distinction, Hume’s Law, claims “there is no logical bridge over the gap 
between fact and value,” between an “is” and an “ought” (Blackburn, 1996, p. 180). 
Hursthouse (2001, p. 179; see also Nagel, 1986), recognising this ethical quandary, 
namely the struggle to justify our normative claims regarding how best to live, 
asserts that there can be no neutral point of view, “no view from nowhere.” Attempts 
to make sense of an ethic will necessarily require taking a view from somewhere, 
and starting from the presumptions of that position. Even the realist Aristotle, seems 
to recognise assumptions within his first principles (I 4§5-7). The human 
predicament, then, with regards to moral conduct, is to search for an ethical system 
that best elucidates how we are to live and make the normative decisions that shape 
our lives. With regard to such systems, Western civilisation provides three main 
ethical traditions: deontology, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics. 
2.1.2 The Three Traditions 
This thesis is not a defence of virtue ethics against other traditions, so little space is 
given to comparison. However, a brief outline of each will reveal the strengths of a 
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virtue ethical position, and highlight its obvious relevance to character theory, and 
thus this research. 
2.1.2.1 Deontological Ethics 
Deontological ethics, from the Greek word, deon, meaning “obligation” or “duty,” is 
an ethical system maintaining that moral acts are either good or evil in themselves, 
regardless of the consequences they bring. This differentiates deontology from other 
ethical systems (e.g. utilitarianism, discussed next), which hold that the 
consequences of an act determine its moral worth. Immanuel Kant is most often 
associated with a deontological ethic. Believing nothing in nature to be in vain, Kant 
is convinced our ability to reason has some noble function above the mere instinct 
displayed in lesser animals (Jones, 1975, pp. 70-71). He then posits that this human 
capacity for thought must be for the cultivation of a good will. Based on these 
convictions, he formulates his categorical imperative: “I am never to act otherwise 
than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law” (Kant, 
trans. 1927, p. 18). Believing it one’s duty to do what is right, Kant uses the 
categorical imperative to justify moral actions, and contends that the imperative must 
be followed, regardless of the consequences it may bring. By privileging duty, and 
not consequence, a deontological ethic is less concerned with the particulars of 
context. Sherman (1991, p. 26) considers this insensitivity to context a serious 
weakness since many moral decisions are complex, dilemma-prone situations, which 
resist blanket application of categorically universal principles. Another disadvantage 
of deontological ethics is the limited value placed on moral motivation. By 
overemphasising duty, issues of motivation, namely dispositions, attitudes and affect, 
are often neglected (Carr, 2005, p. 138).  
2.1.2.2 Utilitarian Ethics 
In utilitarian ethics, it is the utility, or happiness, resulting from an action that 
determines its moral worth. Here, moral actions are justified by the consequences 
they bring. Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, and his son, John Stuart Mill, were the 19th 
century architects of utilitarianism. Central to their ethical theories was “the greatest 
happiness principle” (Blackburn, 1996, p. 162), which holds that the morally correct 
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action is the one that “procures the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers” 
(ibid., p. 162). On Bentham’s rendition, perhaps its crudest form, what is needed is a 
“moral arithmetic” (Bentham, trans. 1914, p. 1-5), a means of uniformly determining 
which actions would bring more happiness. Bentham’s “felicific calculus” 
(Blackburn, 1996, p. 137) holds that “right” decision is calculable. Although J. S. 
Mill brings more sophistication and sensitivity to the theory, he still believes that the 
moral merit of an action is found in whether it increases the proportion of happiness 
(ibid., p. 388). The danger of determining moral worth solely on consequences is that 
any means can be permissible, provided the end is worthy (Crisp & Slote, 1997, p. 
3). For utilitarianism, it isn’t what is necessarily right but what is best for all (Carr, 
2008c) that justifies an action. That is, the ends can be used to justify immoral 
means. Anscombe (1958/1997, pp. 37-38), aware of these limitations, adds her 
poignant critique. She calls attention to utilitarianism’s lack of accountability for the 
unforeseen consequences that inevitably result from miscalculation, its deference to 
conventional values in borderline cases, and its deployment to justify horrific ends 
(e.g. atomic bombs). 
2.1.2.3 Virtue Ethics 
[Virtue ethics is an] epistemological claim about how we can best discover what 
living a good life requires of us. (Hughes, 2001, 219)  
Anscombe’s watershed article, Modern Moral Philosophy, first published in 1958, 
reinstated virtue into an ethical conversation that had been dominated by 
deontological and utilitarian systems. In the article, she claims that many of the 
logical difficulties plaguing modern ethics are located in the words “ought” and 
“obligation,” distinctly moral terms, and both advents of a Christian law-oriented era 
(1958/1997, p. 30). The Greeks never spoke of moral “obligation”; they did not even 
have a word for “illicit” (Ancombe, 1958/1997, p. 27, 31). The ethical idea of 
obligation developed through the Christian doctrine of divine command that required 
certain behaviour as a matter of law. She critiques Kant’s reasoning, claiming that 
his self-legislation towards duty appears illogical since the idea of morality as 
legislation is coherent only on the assumption of a divine or other authority; if no 
such authority established the law, how could anyone be obliged to do anything? 
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While the idea of morality as obligation might have worked in the Middle Ages, 
when theism was more broadly accepted, Anscombe, despite being a Christian 
herself, notes that in so far as few now believe in God, a deontic ethic makes little 
sense. After critiquing the deontological and utilitarian (see above) traditions, she 
enjoins a return to virtue theory.  
 
Instead of basing action on obligation, Classical Greek philosophers such as 
Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, look to a way of living that brings about a general 
well-being, or a flourishing life (e.g. Aristotle, trans. 1999, I 4§2). Aristotle, in 
particular, maintains that certain dispositions of character consistently seem to 
promote a flourishing life, and these dispositions are called virtues. If one wants to 
live well, it is then sensible to live a life of virtue. For these Greeks, judgments are 
informed not by what one ought to do, but by what kind of person, namely virtuous, 
one wants to be. By linking an ethical way of life with a desire for fulfillment, rather 
than dutiful obligation, these Greeks (anachronistically) provide a bridge over the 
modern gap between facts and values (Pakaluk, 2005, pp. x-xi). This revival of virtue 
theory, brought about through Anscombe’s article (1958/1997), has moved moral 
dialogue beyond ethics as a narrow realm that considers obligation and dilemmas, 
towards the more broadly Socratic question, “How shall one live? (Hauweras & 
Pinches, 1997, p. 56). 
 
For the virtue ethicist, virtuous dispositions of character provide the “moral” (from 
now on used in the Classical Greek sense, stripped of obligation) perspective through 
which life’s many choices are made (Hughes, 2001, p. 219; Schneewind, 1997, p. 
179). Evaluating the context and observing the morally salient aspects of a scene, a 
virtuous person decides on appropriate action. Based in experience (Sherman, 1991, 
p. 11), virtue ethics is renowned for being, “practical and, therefore, faithful to how 
human beings actually are” (Pakaluk, 2005, p. 279).  
 
Although efforts have been made to make connections between virtue ethics and the 
Kantian and utilitarian camps (e.g. Kilcullen, 1983; Louden, 1986), as Sherman 
(1991, p. 24) notes, they remain very distinct. Virtue ethics preserves many of the 
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key features of other ethical traditions while avoiding many of their weaknesses. For 
instance, contrary to popular belief, virtue isn’t simply a matter of doing what one 
wants. As with a deontic ethic, a virtuous person will observe certain proscriptions 
(e.g. envy, see II 6§18). However, unlike Kant’s ethic, affect plays a significant role 
in the moral perception and response of the virtuous. Acting, merely from duty, 
regardless of disposition and sentiment, would not meet Aristotle’s stringent 
requirements (II 4§3; see also Sherman, 1991, p. 26) for virtuous action (discussed 
later in more detail). Stocker (1997, pp. 75-78), recognising this minimal emphasis 
on motivation and affect to justify moral action in contemporary moral theories, 
claims that a virtue ethical perspective preserves the relationship between values, 
reasons and behaviour. Anscombe (1958/1997, p. 26) says it a slightly different way, 
noting that by incorporating belief, motivation, affect, and action, a virtue ethic is 
grounded in the human psychological dispositions of virtue, necessary to bring about 
human well-being (see also Crisp & Slote, 1997, p. xvii). Virtue ethics also clearly 
distinguishes itself from utilitarian approaches. Since acting with virtue requires 
appropriate motivation and deliberative processes that encompass both means and 
ends, virtue ethics avoid the limitations of consequentialist ethics, which takes the 
results of an action to be the sole criteria of moral worth.  
 
Virtue ethics is not without its detractors (e.g. Schneewind, 1997), whose main 
arguments will be discussed later in section 2.6, but its value, to which Hursthouse 
(2001, pp. 173, 187) draws attention, seems relevant to modern society. As an 
example of such relevance, Hursthouse (2001, p. 173) refers to a parent’s efforts to 
inculcate the virtues (e.g. honesty, generosity) into his or her child’s life. Simply, we 
praise people for virtue, blame them when they fall short of virtue, and hold them 
responsible for vice. 
 
This section discussed the inherent weakness of the deontological and utilitarian 




As mentioned above, both Socrates and Plato focused on moral virtue (e.g. Plato, 
trans. 1974), but it is with Aristotle that virtue receives its most thorough 
examination, and it is to his account that I now turn.  
2.2 Aristotelian Virtue Ethics: An Introduction 
This section begins with a brief biography of Aristotle. His main ethical texts are 
then introduced. Lastly, the basic argument of virtue ethics’ locus classicus, the 
Nicomachean Ethics, which because of its renown and influence on Western 
philosophy is known simply as the Ethics, will be surveyed in order to make the 
examination more accessible.  
2.2.1 The Life of Aristotle  
For the purposes of the thesis only a brief context is needed. Aristotle was born in the 
Greek colony of Stagira in 384 BCE. In 367 BCE, he was sent to Plato’s Academy in 
Athens where he spent the next 20 years, until Plato’s death (Crisp, 2000, p. vii). As 
will be seen, this time at the Academy, shaped his concept of a flourishing life: 
friends; leisure; peace; truth; and study (Pakaluk, 2005, p. 18). In 335 BCE, in 
Athens, Aristotle founded the Lyceum (which would last for eight centuries), where 
he taught and researched for 11 years (Hughes, 2001, p. 3). This decade is thought to 
have been his most prolific, the height of his mental powers (Denise et al., 2005, p. 
22). He died of a digestive illness on the island of Euboea in 322 BCE (Crisp, 2000, 
p. xxxvii).  
 
He is credited with one of the largest libraries in the Greek world (Denise et al., 
2005, p. 22), and he wrote more than 400 broadly ranging works –– with only a third 
surviving, alone requiring 1.5 million words to translate (Crisp, 2000, p. vii). “An 
account of Aristotle’s intellectual after-life would be little less than a history of 




2.2.2 Ethical Texts 
Aristotle had a reputation as a stylist, but, unfortunately, nearly all of his literary 
work in dialogical form is now lost (Hughes, 2001, p. 10). What does remain is 
mostly lecture notes that require elucidation by expositors (Pakaluk, 2005, pp. 39-
40).  
 
Four such sets of lecture notes associated with Aristotle are related to ethics: 
Eudemian Ethics, Nicomachean Ethics, Magna Moralia, and On Virtues and Vices. 
Much scholarly scepticism surrounds the authorial authenticity of the last two texts 
(Irwin, 1999, p. 15; Pakaluk, 2005, p. 22), so it is with the former that this discussion 
continues.  
 
The Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics share three sections, referred to as books, 
that are exactly the same. Scholars generally concur that the Nicomachean Ethics is 
the more mature work, possibly an edited (with Aristotle’s son, Nicomachus, editing) 
version of the Eudemian Ethics created circa 330 BCE (Crisp, 2000, p. vii; Hughes, 
2001, p. 9; Irwin, 1999, p. xv). This revision is thought to have been only partial 
since repeated material and other editorial mistakes are present within the text (Irwin, 
1999, p. xiv; Hughes, 2001, p. 10; Crisp, 2000, p. 70).  
 
The Ethics is now divided into ten books, each with many chapters, which in turn are 
divided into sections – none of which were present in the original text. Modern 
Greek texts, and therefore English translations, are based on Greek manuscripts 
copied during the Byzantine period, “derived indirectly from the edition of 
Aristotle’s works produced by Andronicus in the first century” BCE (Irwin, 1999, p. 
xxv). Within Western contexts, the Ethics has been widely read since the 12th century 
(Crisp, 2000, p. viii). If the definition of a fundamental text is that “it is what one 
should ideally read and master before going on to study and think about other things” 
(Pakaluk, 2005, p. xi), the Ethics is one of the fundamental texts of Western thought.  
 
Before transitioning to a detailed examination, a general outline of the Ethics’ 
argument will serve to make the philosophy more accessible.  
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2.2.3 The Basic Argument of the Ethics 
Although the Ethics is Western civilisation’s first systematic ethical treatise, its 
purpose was not to articulate an ethical system, but to provide an understanding of 
how individuals become good (II 2§1; X 9§1-2). A preliminary glance at the basic 
argument will provide entry into its main tenets and vocabulary, thereby making a 
fuller examination more lucid.  
 
Aristotle believed all animate objects to have a telos, a purpose they were created to 
fulfill. Eudaimonia, often translated as happiness, a flourishing life, fulfillment, or 
well-being is the telos that Aristotle identifies for humans (I 7§8). For Aristotle, a 
telos could only be attained through the function, the ergon, of the being (I 7§9). The 
ergon is related to how something is supposed to function, what is natural to it. A 
knife’s function is to cut; but what of a human? Like Socrates and Plato before him, 
Aristotle stressed the rational function of the human species (Denise et al., 2005, p. 
23). For humans to live eudaimonistically, they must live in accordance with orthos 
logos, right reason (VI 13§4-5). Further, to “excellently” live in harmony with our 
reason, is to live virtuously. For virtue is an English derivation of the Latin virtus, 
which in turn is a translation of the Greek aret!, meaning excellence. Thinking 
virtuously requires the intellectual virtues (found in Book VI), while acting 
virtuously requires what are called the moral virtues (found in Books II-IV). 
Together, for they can’t operate without one another (X 8§3), they make up an 
agent’s virtue. For Aristotle, the sum of this virtue, or lack thereof (vice), over a life-
time, forms a person’s character (I 10§11). After providing this initial argument, the 
remainder of the Ethics expounds Aristotle’s understanding of virtuous right reason.  
 
Having briefly introduced Aristotle and his ethical texts, and traced the general 
argument within the Nicomachean Ethics, a more detailed examination of the Ethics’ 
relationship to character will now be undertaken.  
 
 60 
2.3 An Ethics for Character: The Ethics 
This large section will provide a more thorough exegesis of Aristotle’s character 
ethics. This section aims to provide the field of OAE with a clear articulation and 
justification of a virtue ethical understanding of character. Attention will be given to 
how Aristotle arrived at eudaimonia as humankind’s chief aim, and how he 
employed the function argument to deduce reason as our ergon. Two different types 
of virtue, moral and intellectual, will then be distinguished, with particular emphasis 
on their relation to character formation. The distinctive roles of friendship and 
contemplation in moral development will be highlighted, before discussing three 
principal ways, indicated by Aristotle, to develop virtue.  
2.3.1 The Search for Happiness 
So we must exercise ourselves in the things which bring happiness, since, if that be 
present, we have everything, and, if that be absent, all our actions are directed 
toward attaining it. (Epicurus, trans. 1925, para. 1) 
“All men naturally desire knowledge,” claims the first line of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 
(Trans., 1933, 980a21). Similarly, he opens the Ethics with “every line of inquiry, 
and likewise every action and decision, seems to seek some good; that is why some 
people were right to describe the good as what everything seeks” (I 1§1). The Ethics, 
then, is Aristotle’s attempt (I 13§4) to provide a “knowledge” of the “good,” which 
informs our “action” (I 3§7), so that we too may become good (II 2§1; X 9§1-2).  
 
If everything an agent does is for some purpose or for some good, then knowing the 
highest good for which one strives is essential for making life’s decisions (I 2§2). 
What then is this highest good? What is the ultimate goal? “The ultimate goal in life 
is something toward which we would do well to direct everything else that we do” 
(Pakaluk, 2005, p. 1). Aristotle identifies three attributes that this highest good 
should embody: ultimacy (I 7§3-4) – that for the sake of which all else is done; self-
sufficiency (I 7§6) – no end beyond itself; and preferability (I 7§8) – it would always 
be chosen against some other good. Aristotle is looking for what humankind most 





Recognising the complexity of his endeavor, the search for the good, he 
acknowledges that the exacting theoretical demands of other disciplines (e.g. 
mathematics), should never be expected from the field of ethics (I 3§1-4). When 
inquiring into moral matters, “we shall be satisfied to indicate the truth roughly and 
in outline” (1 3§4; see also I 7§18 and IX 2§2, 6). Or similarly, “our account will be 
adequate if its clarity is in line with the subject-matter, because the same degree of 
precision is not to be sought in all discussions” (Aristotle, trans. 2000, 1094b11-13). 
Aristotle believed that it was the “mark of an educated person to look in each area for 
only that degree of accuracy that the nature of the subject permits” (Aristotle, trans. 
2000, 1094b22-25). Since “the spheres of what is noble and what is just,” which 
ethics examines, “admit of a good deal of diversity and variation” (Aristotle, trans. 
2000, 1094b14-17), an ethical inquiry will have no fixed answers. Aristotle is 
cautioning the reader not to expect from ethics what other more precise disciplines 
can provide (I 7§20). “Moral principles are not scientific laws” (Hughes, 2001, p. 
16). If accepted, this ethical caveat significantly delimits the methodological 
approaches appropriate to ethical research, a topic discussed in Chapter 4 on 
methodology.  
 
Continuing with his search for the highest good, Aristotle employs a technique 
commonly used by Socrates. Aristotle elicits the opinion of others, the endoxa, and 
uses their common and wisely held opinions (see VI 11§6 and VII 1§5) as a starting 
point for the dialectic. Aristotle notes that most people agree that the highest good is 
eudaimonia, a flourishing life, but that the masses disagree as to what eudaimonia 
exactly is (I 4§2). For Aristotle, whatever one does should always be explicable in 
terms of its contribution to a fulfilled life; eudaimonistic living is “the best possible 
life” (Ackrill, 1980, p. 24). Some say it is pleasure, others wealth or honor (I 4§3). 
Aristotle eventually decides eudaimonia is a life consistent with right reason (I 
1§13), and does so by way of the function argument.  
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2.3.2 The Function Argument 
In a passage elucidating eudaimonia (I 7§10), Arisotle says: “Perhaps, then, we shall 
find … [more specifically what human eudaimonia is] if we first grasp the function 
of a human being.” Aristotle’s description of the function (ergon) of a human being 
assumes that his listeners/readers have had exposure to his theory of the soul. Before 
the search for eudaimonia can continue, a brief mention of Aristotle’s account of the 
soul is necessary to the present argument.  
2.3.2.1 The Psuch! – The Soul 
For Aristotle, living and non-living entities can be differentiated by the presence of a 
soul (psuch!) in an animate being. He used this term, soul, in a far broader sense than 
is used today. His understanding of the soul is related to his biological taxonomy. 
Each level of life (e.g. plant, lower animal, human) can be understood in terms of its 
“matter” and “form.” The matter of an organism is that of which it is made. An 
organism’s form is related to its intended function and explains why it is put together 
the way it is, why it is organised in its given fashion. A creature’s form is its soul. 
The “soul is the characteristic functions and activities that are essential to the 
organism” (Irwin, 1999, p. 348). The soul (psuch!) establishes the function (ergon), 
which in turn serves the end (telos), the purpose or aim, of the being – in the case of 
humankind, eudaimonia. This function (ergon), determined by the soul, is the 
characteristic activity of the organism, that which makes it distinctly itself. The 
different levels of life (e.g. plant, animal and human) all have different souls and thus 
different functions (Jones 1975, p. 235).  
 
In Aristotle’s De Anima (Trans. 1931), translated On the Soul, he provides an 
account of three different souls (psuch!): nutritive; sensitive; and rational souls 
(412a-ff, 427a18-ff). He notes that humans, like plants, posses the ability to nourish 
themselves, a nutritive soul; and also that humans, like less developed animals, are 
able to use their senses, via a sensitive soul. What is it then that makes a human soul 
distinct from plants and other animals (I 7§13)? Aristotle understands the human 
capacity to reason, our rational soul (427a18 – ff), as that which sets us apart from 
other creatures. He means that “what is most characteristically human is the way in 
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which thought colours all our lives - not just our intellectual pursuits, but also our 
feelings and emotions, our choices and relationships” (Hughes, 20001, p. 11). Said 
another way, our characteristic way “is to do what we can rightly see we have reason 
to do” (Hursthouse, 2001, p. 223). 
 
Referring to his discussion of the soul in De Anima (Aristotle, trans. 1931), Aristotle, 
in the Ethics, notes that the human soul has: a non-rational part, containing the 
nutritive and sensitive sub-parts of a soul that the human shares with plants and 
animals (I 7§12); and a rational or thinking part (I 13§11-14). But there is another 
sub-part of the non-rational part of the soul exclusive to humans: the non-rational but 
responding to, being persuaded by, and obeying reason sub-part of the non-rational 
part of the soul (I 13§15, 18). This reason-responsive sub-part of the non-rational 
soul contains the appetites and general desires (I 13§18), and listens, like a child to a 
father, to the rational part of the soul (I 13§19). In a sense, this sub-part of the non-
rational soul that responds to reason is intermediate between the rational and non-
rational parts of the soul and will be henceforth referred to as the “intermediate part 
of the soul” (see Figure 2.1).  
 
Similarly, the rational part of the soul is divided into two sub-parts: the scientific 
sub-part, which studies “beings whose principles do not admit of being otherwise 
[e.g. mathematics] than they are” (VI 1§5); and the calculating sub-part, which deals 
with the deliberations and decisions of human action (VI 1§5-6).  
 
This will become clearer in due course, but a diagram may be helpful to visualise 
these relationships (see Figure 2.1). 
2.3.2.2 From Soul to Function to Virtue to Eudaimonia 
Borrowing Plato’s (Republic, 352e) function argument, Aristotle claims an “activity 
of the soul in accord with reason or requiring reason” (I 7§14) to be the function 
(ergon) of humankind. His next step is to connect function with virtue. “Now each 
function is completed well by being completed in accord with the virtue proper [to 
that kind of thing]” (I 7§15). Virtue (aret!), in a non-moral sense means excellence; 
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a knife is virtuous if it cuts well. To perform a function well, is to do it “excellently,” 
that is virtuously. A person that functions with excellence has developed the traits or 
dispositions to do so. These traits or dispositions are virtues (II 6§2). Virtuous 
actions fulfill the function, which leads to eudaimonia. 
 
Here is the argument in summary: the highest good for a human is its telos, 
eudaimonia; eudaimonia is best pursued through the function, or characteristic 
activity conducive to a human’s well-being, which is related to its soul; functioning 
well (aret!), which for humans is reasoning well, is performing the function with 
virtue; living virtuously, therefore, fullfils the function, which results in eudaimonia. 
The function argument logically connects eudaimonia, the soul, and virtue. To this 
argument, Aristotle adds the condition “in a complete life” (I 7§16). One’s function 
can only be performed well, and thus achieve eudaimonia, by prolonged virtuous 
living throughout one’s life.  
 
Since a species’ function (ergon) determines its values relative to its end (telos), it 
could be said that nature impels each species to pursue its “good,” namely that which 
will bring about its end. Here “we can begin to see how values are central to the 
behaviour of living things” (Hughes, 2001, p. 6). Thus, for humans, as with other 
The Human Soul
Rational Part Non-rational Part
Scientific Calculating Not responding 
to reason
Intermediate Part – 
Responding to reason
Figure 2.1. Aristotleʼs human soul. The diagram divides the human soul into its rational 
and non-rational parts, which in turn are further subdivided. 
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species, biologically built-in values prompt them towards an ethic for behaviour. 
Some ways of living lead to flourishing, others to harm (Carr, 2003a, p. 220). 
2.3.2.3 Ethical Naturalism 
Ethical naturalism is a form of ethical objectivism. Just as a botanist might name a 
list of traits possessed by a “good” example of some plant species, so too with the 
human virtues. “I am, quite seriously likening the basis of moral evaluation to that of 
the evaluation of behaviour in [plants and] animals” (Foot, 1995, p. 9). Ethical 
naturalism simply extends evaluations of natural kinds (e.g. an owl can have good or 
bad sight for its species) to human conduct. Just as humans have a set number of 
teeth, not an average but a “normal” number, perhaps when “regarded not just 
biologically, but from the point of view of the activity of thought and choice in 
regard to the various departments of life,” a similar, granted less precise, moral 
normalcy can be found (Anscombe, 1958/1997, p. 40). Notice that within the 
argument it is nature that has decided the virtues for humankind. Nature has provided 
eudaimonia as a skopos (I 2§2), a target, and similarly imparted certain virtuous 
behaviours, as means to reach it. For Aristotle, that which we “aim at,” to achieve 
our end, is associated with “the good” (Pakaluk, 2005, p. 6).  
 
The above reasoning allowed Aristotle to reject conventionalism (see I 3§2-3; V 
7§1), believing, via the function argument that humans share a common nature and 
therefore that they have a similar ultimate goal. “We have the virtues neither by nor 
contrary to [our] nature, we are fitted by [our] nature to receive them” (II 1§3). 
Ethical naturalism, therefore, narrows the gap between facts and values, thus 
providing a shared rationale for ethical behaviour.  
 
Ethical naturalism, based on the needs, desires and interests of a species, suggests 
that some character traits are virtues; it does not establish moral or natural law. Foot 
(1972) speaks in terms of a virtue being a “hypothetical” imperative, not justified in 
itself, but only as a means to our telos. Since reasoning inevitably involves more 
individuality than one’s number of teeth, the application of these virtues will always 
 
 66 
be case by case, leaving room for, “within reason,” individual expression 
(Hursthouse, 2001, pp. 211-212, 219-220).  
2.3.3 The Moral Virtues 
This subsection will define moral virtue, indicate the role of affect within virtue, and 
introduce Aristotle’s criteria of virtuous action. 
 
Human virtue, like the soul, has two parts (I 13§19). The rational part of the soul 
governs the intellectual virtues, discussed in book VI of the Ethics. The intermediate 
part of the soul governs the moral virtues, discussed in books III-V of the Ethics. The 
“moral” in moral virtues comes from a play on words that Aristotle introduces in II 
1§1. Good habits (ethos) develop moral virtue, and the term “moral” (!thikos) comes 
from a slight Greek derivation of the word habit (ethos). “The moral virtues concern 
the habitual choice of actions in accordance with rational principles” (Denise et al., 
2005, p. 24). Since a flourishing life (eudaimonia), our chief end, is an activity in 
accordance with virtue, we must know what virtue is in order to bring it about (I 
13§1).  
2.3.3.1 A Definition of Virtue (II 6§15) 
Aristotle defines moral virtue as: “a state that decides, consisting in a mean, the mean 
relative to us, which is defined by reference to reason, that is to say, to the reason by 
reference to which the prudent person would define it” (II 6§15). Working through 
this definition, phrase by phrase, one first encounters “a state” (hexis), literally “a 
having” or a possession. For an action to be virtuous, it must be committed from a 
fixed state or disposition, a state of character. These “states of virtue” allow an agent 
to perform their function well (II 6§2).  
 
Continuing with the definition is the word “decides” (prohairesis), which Crisp 
translates as “rational choice” (2000, p. 207). Prohairesis receives its own chapter 
(III 2) in the Ethics, and will be examined in subsection 2.3.5.4. It is a choice for 
action informed by rational desire and deliberation, all of which Aristotle relates to a 




Following prohairesis is Aristotle’s renowned concept of the golden mean. The 
mean is the virtuous act lying between two extremes, a vice of excess and a vice of 
deficiency (II 8§1). For example, a courageous act is virtuous. To err towards the 
vice of deficiency is cowardice; to err towards the vice of excess is rashness (III 7).  
 
However, this mean must be “relative to us,” that is, contextualised to both the 
situation at hand, and to the particularities of a person, given his or her capability, 
current state of virtue, and predispositions to error (II 9§4-5). For instance, the mean 
(virtuous) amount of food temperate for Milo, the famous Greek athlete (II 6§7), 
would be the vice of overindulgence for a sedentary PhD student (see IV 1§19 for 
another example). Aristotle recognises (II 9§7-8) how difficult it is to decide on the 
mean for a given situation. This decision requires “seeing” the situation properly, and 
for Aristotle, this ability to see is part of a person’s character (Sherman, 1991, pp. 3-
4). Thus, striking the mean requires acting with the right feelings (II 6§11) “at the 
right times, about the right things, toward the right people, for the right end, and in 
the right way” (II 6§10). This ability to perceive rightly is central to Aristotle’s 
understanding of character, and occurs throughout the text: II 6§1; II 9§2; II 9§2, 7; 
III 7§5, 10; III 12§9; IV 1§12, 22; IV 5§3, 7, 8, 13-14.  
 
Progressing through the definition of moral virtue, the mean is set by how “the 
prudent person would define it” (II 6§15). Here, Aristotle introduces the intellectual 
virtue of prudence, or practical wisdom (phron!sis), a virtue implicated in 
perception, desire, deliberation, and rational choice. It is phron!sis, by way of right 
reason, that suggests the appropriate action for the intermediate part of the soul. 
Since the phronimos, the person with practical wisdom, decides on a correct moral 
response, “virtues are to be defined in terms of a judgement” (Hughes, 2001, p. 64). 




2.3.3.2 Virtue and Affect 
Although phron!sis is an intellectual virtue that establishes the mean, the Classical 
Greeks did not, as the modern period has since Descartes and Hume, strictly 
differentiate cognition from affect (Carr, 2005, p. 141). For Aristotle, striking the 
mean requires not just acting on reason, but doing so with appropriate feelings (II 
3§3, 6§10-12, 9§1; III 1§1; X 8§2). Discussing feelings broadly, Aristotle refers to 
Plato’s belief that a proper moral education is an upbringing that teaches one to feel 
correctly towards pleasure and pain, for this is an index of virtue (II 3§1-2). In II 5§2, 
Aristotle further defines these feelings as: emotions (e.g. anger) and desires (e.g. 
appetite). Emotions, unlike feelings, are “cognitive states … involving some kind of 
beliefs … [about] how the world is” (Hughes, 2001, p. 58). Hursthouse (2001) 
provides the following examples: “our understanding of what will hurt, offend, 
damage, undermine, distress or reassure, help, succour, support, or please our fellow 
human being is at least as much emotional as it is theoretical” (pp. 107, 118). For 
Aristotle, emotions are part of the moral response (Sherman, 1991, p. 2). Desires 
(e.g. appetites), also mentioned in II 5§2, although not cognitive, are themselves 
trainable states that must answer to the virtues of moderation and temperance. In 
sum, although the mean is reached through intellectual activity, this in no way 
excludes affect, but to the contrary assumes its necessity for proper moral function. 
The moral virtues are states (hexis) or dispositions that involve the ordering of 
human emotions, desires, sentiments, sensibilities, feelings and appetites; character 
development is implicitly affective development (Carr, 2005, p. 148). 
 
Having examined Aristotle’s definition of moral virtue, I now turn to the conditions 
under which an action may be deemed virtuous.  
2.3.3.3 Three Prerequisites for Virtue 
II 4§3 sets out three conditions for a virtuous act: agents must know that they are 
doing a virtuous act; the act must be decided for its own sake; and the act must be 
done from a firm and established state (hexis). Taken in order, first, to know that an 
act is virtuous, is intentionally to perform what is good. For Aristotle, this precludes 
any form of disengaged “virtuous” behaviouralism; empty movements are not 
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enough, appropriate motivation is necessary for virtue. With the first condition 
requiring motivation, the second condition qualifies the object of the motivation. 
Here Aristotle’s position is different from a consequential utilitarian end. The 
virtuous act isn’t done to bring about the end of eudaimonia, the virtuous act is done 
because it is a noble (kalos), often translated as “fine,” thing to do (IV 2§7). Kalos is 
an “aesthetic notion, used in the Ethics … to refer to the good aimed at by the 
virtuous person” (Crisp, 2000, p. 207). This aiming for the noble or fine also 
exonerates Aristotle from the common charge of ethical egoism, because kalos 
“systematically promotes the good of others” (Irwin, 1999, p. xxii). The last requisite 
for a virtuous act is action from a fixed disposition (hexis). This rules out one-time, 
impulsive, arbitrary acts of “virtue.” Virtuous acts can only come from established 
character traits.  
 
Remembering that Aristotle’s definition for character is the sum of virtue and vice 
over a lifetime (I 10§11), these prerequisites for virtue reveal the depth of personal 
change – self-awareness, motivation, and established dispositions – necessary to 
claim that a person’s character has been developed. This fact alone begins to hint at 
the significance of the claim that OAE develops character.  
2.3.3.4 Closing Comments on Moral Virtue 
In all, Aristotle discusses 11 moral virtues: courage (III 6-9), temperance (III 10-12), 
generosity (IV 1), magnificence (IV 2), magnanimity (IV 3), virtue concerned with 
small honors (IV 4), mildness (IV 5), friendliness (IV 6), truthfulness (IV 7), wit (IV 
8), and justice (V 1-11). As the interest of this thesis is the formation of character, a 
detailed survey of these virtues is unnecessary. Having examined moral virtue, I will 
now discuss intellectual virtue.  
2.3.4 The Intellectual Virtues 
Since virtue is acting in accordance with reason (II 6§15), an account of right reason 
must be given (VI 1§1, 3). Right reason comes through deployment of the 
intellectual virtues: “the contemplation of theoretical truths and the discovery of the 
rational principles that ought to control everyday actions” (Denise et al., 2005, p. 24). 
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Aristotle names “five states in which the soul grasps the truth” (VI 3§1). These five 
intellectual virtues are distributed (see Figure 2.1) across the two parts of the rational 
soul, mentioned in subsection 2.3.2.1’s discussion of the psuch!. The scientific 
virtues, are concerned with studying that which can’t be otherwise; and the 
calculating virtues with decisions to be made (VI 1§5-6).  
 
The scientific virtues are: epist!m! (knowledge or science), which is exact and 
everlasting (VI 3); nous (understanding, intelligence), which is “the capacity for 
insight” (Hughes, 2001, p. 224) (VI 6); and sophia (wisdom), which is intellectual 
ability in theoretical matters (Hughes, 2001, p. 224), and is a composite of epist!m! 
and nous (VI 7).  
 
The calculating virtues are: techn! (skills, craft), which is concerned with production 
(VI 4); and phron!sis (practical wisdom, prudence, moral discernment (Hughes, 
2001, p. 224)), which amongst much else, is deliberating well (VI 5).  
 
II 1§1 distinguishes the moral virtues, which are built through good habit, especially 
from a young age, and the intellectual virtues, which are built through teaching and 
experience, and therefore require time for development. Aristotle believes that 
attaining full virtue is difficult for the young, because they are just establishing their 
habits (moral virtues), and have not yet had the time and experience to develop the 
intellectual virtues, particularly phron!sis (I 3§5-8). It is to four crucial aspects of 
phron!sis, what Irwin calls the “Preconditions of Virtue” (1999, p. vi), that the 
argument now turns.  
2.3.5 The Preconditions of Virtue 
Having just indicated the important role that phron!sis plays in deliberating about 
appropriate moral actions, I will now examine this deliberative process in detail. 
 
Following Nancy Sherman’s Fabric of Character (1991), an aim of this chapter is to 
show “that character is inseparable from the operations of practical reason 
[phron!sis]” (1991, p. vii). This section describes the deliberative process overseen 
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by phron!sis. This process, found in chapters III 1-5, and named the “preconditions 
of virtue” by Irwin (1999, p. vi), consists of: rational wish (boul!sis); perception; 
deliberation (bouleusis); and rational choice (prohairesis). These preconditions will 
now be defined and related to phron!sis, and thus character. 
 
For Aristotle, moral development is a gradual refinement of human sensitivity in any 
particular context (Carr, 2003c, p. 17). It is the preconditions of virtue that provide 
this morally contextual sensitivity. Looking again at the classic definition (see II 
6§15) of moral virtue, described in subsection 2.3.3.1, the preconditions of virtue, 
governed by phron!sis, can be seen as requisite to achieving a virtuous act. That an 
agent “decides” (prohairesis, III 2) is itself a judgment, presumably requiring some 
deliberation (bouleusis, III 3). That the mean is “relative to us,” implies it is pertinent 
to our context, necessarily requiring us to read the situation or perceive correctly. 
That a phronomos, a practically wise person, is the standard, assumes that an agent 
with phron!sis has knowledge of the proper ends (boul!sis, III 4). Now placed in 
their logical order, these preconditions of virtue – rationally wishing for the correct 
ends, perceiving circumstances relevant to the ends, deliberating on the options 
available, and then making a rationally informed decision – will be addressed 
respectively. 
2.3.5.1 Wish 
Wish, or rational desire (boul!sis) is about ends (III 4§1). Hughes (2001, p. 142) 
translates boul!sis as “want,” claiming that wanting can be for eudaimonia generally, 
or anything deemed worth having. III 4§2-4 distinguishes rationally desiring 
(boul!sis) the good, from the apparent good. Aristotle is noting that what appears to 
an agent to be a worthwhile end is ultimately a moral matter, related to the agent’s 
character. An agent with a flawed character will wish for base ends; an agent with 
good character, good ends (III 4§5). “But someone may say that everyone aims at the 
apparent good, and does not control how it appears, but, on the contrary his character 




Although perception is explicitly mentioned only a few times within the text, it is 
tacitly assumed throughout. Just as character determines the ends an agent pursues 
(boul!sis), so his or her character determines how circumstances are morally 
perceived (Sherman, 1991, p. 33). For example, if an agent wishes to be just, and 
perceives an injustice, an appropriate response may be anger, but what is the 
contextually appropriate mean of anger? Part of determining the appropriate mean is 
knowing “the way to be angry, with whom, about what, for how long. For sometimes 
… we … praise” a mild response, sometimes a vehement one (II 9§7). It is 
perception of one’s context that allows one to match a response to the circumstances. 
Since moral action depends on judgment, perception is crucial, for “judgment 
depends on perception” (II 9§8). 
 
In a notoriously opaque passage, Aristotle attributes the intellectual virtue nous, 
typically relegated to theoretical insight, to the practical role of perceiving salient 
particulars within a situation: “we must, therefore, have perception of these 
particulars, and this perception is understanding [nous]” (VI 11§5). VI 11§6 alludes 
to the development of perception through experience. The trials, errors and successes 
of past judgments continue to refine perception, through an ever-deepening 
understanding (nous), allowing the agent to “see correctly because experience has 
given them their eye” (VI 11§6). Therefore, nous is the active ability to understand, 
discover and formulate fundamental truths; but, as just noted, it also has the capacity 
to see these truths in context when circumstances present themselves (Pakaluk, 2005, 
p. 223). For these reasons, Aristotle says nous is involved in both directions, 
theoretical nous inductively garners truth from particular experiences, and practical 
nous deductively applies truths to particular contexts (VI 11§4). Nous, then, because 
it can refine one’s understanding of truth through experience, can also refine the ends 
one wishes for (boul!sis). “If we can change how things appear to us, then we are in 
a position to begin to reform our desires [boul!sis]” (Sherman, 1991, pp. 63-64). II 
11§2 indicates that a practically wise person (a phronimos) will have this 
understanding (nous). In sum, since our ability to perceive affects the moral truths 
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we glean from experience, and the moral saliency we find in particular cases, 
Aristotle considers perception to be a crucial component of character.  
McDowell’s (1997) virtue theory emphasises this necessity of “seeing” (perceiving) 
properly: “it is by virtue of his seeing this particular fact rather than that one as the 
salient fact about the situation that he is moved to act by this concern rather than that 
one” (p. 157). Crisp (2000) agrees: “VI.8, 1142a, makes it clear that practical 
wisdom is less a capacity to apply rules than an ability to see situations correctly” (p. 
xxiv). In line with her colleagues, Sherman (1991) notes that: “this process of ‘seeing 
as’ is a necessary prerequisite for action” (p. 40).  
 
Part of this “seeing” (perceiving) is emotional. For affect is sometimes alert to 
phenomena the intellect cannot access – particularly in empathetic relation to others’ 
pathos. As Pascal (Trans. 1960) says, “the heart has its reasons which reason knows 
nothing of” (iv. 277, p. 151). Emotions allow the moral agent to “see” in detail: “the 
solution is not to quiet the passions, as Plato might have suggested through his notion 
of a rationally ordered soul, but to appeal to them, to be aroused by their sensitivity, 
to see with the heart” (Sherman, 1991, p. 48). “Emotions are themselves evaluations 
or appraisals, ways of judging the world …. [W]hen we subtly shift … ways of 
thinking (i.e., stop thinking that something is an offense, loss, injury, or attraction), 
we shift our emotional states” (Sherman, 2002, p. 105-106). The emotions scrutinise 
and discriminate situational particulars; judgment should always consult reason and 
emotion. As section 2.3.3.2 discussed, emotion is intertwined with cognition. 
Feelings are not blind irrational impulses, but informed and guided states (II 5§2). 
How one thinks about something largely determines how one feels about it, just as 
how one feels in turn shapes one’s thinking. For this reason, emotions are educable, 
and therefore culpable.  
 
Through perception’s potential to be refined, “character is expressed in what one 
sees as much as what one does” (Sherman, 1991 p. 4; see also p. 29). Since moral 
salience is something perceived, failing to observe ethically relevant circumstances 




The third precondition of virtue is deliberation (bouleusis). “We deliberate about 
what is up to us, that is to say, about the actions we can do” (III 3§7). When things 
are unclear or undefined, they require deliberation (III 3§8, 10). Bouleusis 
(deliberation) literally means “taking counsel” (Pakaluk, 2005, p. 136). This counsel 
is most often within ourselves, but Aristotle does note that “we enlist partners in 
deliberation on large issues when we distrust our own ability to discern” (III 3§10). 
Given the ends established by an agent’s boul!sis, and his or her perception that an 
issue of moral salience has arisen, including all the details of the context, the agent 
must now deliberate regarding the means appropriate to bring about the relevant end. 
“If it appears that any of several [possible] means will reach it, we examine which of 
them will reach it most easily and most finely [kalos]” (III 3§11). Aristotle’s position 
is again different from a utilitarian one. It is not the most efficient or useful that is 
chosen, but the most noble or fine (see discussion of kalos in subsection 2.3.3.3). 
 
III 3§16 notes that deliberation depends on perception: “good deliberation must 
include good perception” (Irwin, 1999, p. 245). Similarly, as discussed, perception 
depends on and can influence one’s ends (boul!sis). Aristotle is setting up something 
of a chain here. The moral agent starts from a rational end, perceives an instance 
where the end is manifest, deliberates about the means by which the end can most 
nobly, given the perceived context, be achieved, then forms a “moral conclusion” 
(prohairesis). 
2.3.5.4 Moral Conclusions 
“What has been decided [prohairesis] is what has been previously deliberated” (III 
2§17). The term prohairesis, etymologically, speaks for itself: what is decided 
(prohairesis) is chosen (haireton) before all else (pro). Hughes (2001) translates 
prohairesis as “moral conclusions” or “the conclusion of moral deliberation” (p. 129, 
224), and Crisp translates it as “rational choice” (2000, p. 207). Such moral 
conclusions are the decisions that best promote the ends (boul!sis) (III 2§9). 
Prohairesis “is a rational ability; it operates from an ‘all things considered’ 




A moral conclusion may well be a decision not to act, for example, refraining from 
retaliatory speech in an argument with a friend. Moral conclusions can also have 
future intentions, for example, after debating whether to disclose all income when 
filing taxes, an agent decides that come April, he or she will (Sherman, 1991, p. 58).  
 
Prohairesis concludes what might be called the deliberative process of the 
preconditions of virtue. Perhaps because prohairesis rests on rationally wishing for 
the appropriate ends (boul!sis), perceiving moral salience, and deliberating over 
moral means, Aristotle says moral conclusions are proper for the virtuous and 
“distinguish characters from one another better than actions do” (II 2§1; see also III 
2§11).  
2.3.5.5 Concluding Comments on the Preconditions of Virtue 
Any effort to synthesise Aristotle’s ethical theory, runs the risk of providing a rather 
mechanistic account. In reality, his virtue ethics play out much more organically. 
Although the preconditions have been explained in simple linear fashion – one end, 
one perception of that end, the deliberation of only a few means, and one moral 
conclusion – life offers a far more complex predicament. Multiple ends vie, 
perceptions conflict, labyrinthine deliberations ensue, sometimes achieving only 
muddled moral conclusions.  
 
It is important to note that Aristotle is not suggesting that every moral decision 
requires this kind of procedural analysis. In fact, in crisis situations (e.g. the courage 
required to risk one’s own safety by grabbing a child from the path of a moving bus), 
too much deliberation, because time is of the essence, may be a defect of character. 
Aristotle claims that at critical moments, actions proceed from a state of character 
(III 8§15). 
 
Wishing, perceiving, deliberating and making moral conclusions are not actions 
limited to those with virtuous character. That is, they are neutral terms, implicated in 
voluntary action (III 5§1). For Aristotle, a good character will fulfill the 
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preconditions virtuously (III 5§2), or as a person with practical wisdom would fulfill 
them (II 6§15). Much like the prerequisites for virtue described above, the 
preconditions of virtue reveal the broad scope of character – wishing for the right 
things, perceiving the right things, deliberating well, and making the right moral 
conclusions – and depict what may be involved, from an Aristotelian perspective, in 
OAE’s claims to develop character.  
 
Again, at the risk of sounding too mechanistic, these preconditions of virtue can be 
considered the scaffolding on which the intellectual virtues rest. Once the rational 
part of the soul reaches its moral conclusion, the intermediate part of the soul, the 
part in control of the appetites and desire, provides the discipline to see the moral 
conclusion through.  
 
I now turn to phron!sis, the key virtue of character, and its role as orchestrator 
between the preconditions of virtue, the intellectual virtues, and the moral virtues.  
2.3.6 Phron!sis 
Any attempt to put phron!sis neatly and clearly will inevitably result in 
oversimplification. (Hughes, 2001, p. 84) 
Irwin translates phron!sis as “prudence” (1999, p. 345), Crisp as “practical wisdom” 
(2000, p. xxiv), Pakaluk as “intelligence and foresight in action” or “sagacity” (2005, 
pp. 214, 215), and Hughes as “moral discernment” (2001, p. 224). Aristotle describes 
it as the “eye of the soul” (VI 12§10).  
 
II 6§15, discussed in subsection 2.2.3, notes that the mean of virtue is defined by 
reason, reason as a practically wise person (phronimos) would construe it. For 
Aristotle, it is phron!sis that allows one to reason correctly (IV 13§4-5), for 
phron!sis ultimately governs human moral judgment. Quoting from the Ethics, 
phron!sis concerns “what is just and what is fine, and what is good for a human 
being” (VI 12§1; see also VI 5§6). Since a fixed set of principles cannot possibly 
apply to all of life’s particulars, phron!sis, the ability to think well regarding one’s 
practical decisions, is needed. Thus phron!sis is better described as a sensitivity, 
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rather than an algorithm. Using phron!sis, the practically wise person is able to 
appropriately “aim” at the best achievable good for him or herself in the given 
circumstance (VI 7§6). “Aim” translates stochazomai, which has connotations of 
improvising, conjecture, even guessing, from experience (Sherman, 1991, p. 25). As 
an agent reflects on his or her experience, phron!sis develops and matures allowing 
the agent to “get it right” increasingly in all spheres of human interest (Crisp, 2000, 
p. xxiv). Thus, it is phron!sis that ultimately allows one to live a flourishing, 
eudaimonistic life.  
 
As noted, the conviction that “character is inseparable from the operations of 
practical reason [phron!sis]” (Sherman, 1991, p. vii) is crucial to my argument. Like 
Sherman, I take the preconditions of virtue to fall under the general jurisdiction of 
phron!sis (1991, p. 5), and to be therefore closely tied to character.  
2.3.6.1 Phron!sis and the Preconditions of Virtue 
Phron!sis is most often understood as contextualising judgment (V 5§1; VI 13§7; VI 
8§8) that promotes the means to a given end. However, VI 7§7 clearly links 
phron!sis with understanding the proper ends for humankind. This establishes a 
relationship between phron!sis and the preconditional wish (boul!sis) discussed in 
2.3.5.1. 
 
The precondition of perception is also under the administration of phron!sis (VI 
8§9). Irwin (1999) also makes this relationship clear, naming practical wisdom as “a 
sort of perception or intuitive understanding of the right aspects of particular 
situations” (p. xx).  
 
However, phron!sis is most strongly tied to the precondition of deliberation. VI 5§1 
says that practically wise people deliberate finely (kalos) about the good. Or more 
strongly, “deliberating well is the function of the prudent person more than anyone 
else” (VI 7§6). The possession of phron!sis allows an agent to deliberate well, a 





Finally, VI 13§7 cautions that moral conclusions (prohairesis), the ultimate outcome 
of the deliberative process, “will not be correct without prudence,” or phron!sis in 
the Greek (italics added). Therefore, as already articulated, since the quality of moral 
conclusions distinguishes a person’s character even more than their actions (III 2§1), 
phron!sis is requisite for fine character.  
 
In sum, phron!sis, the great administrative virtue (Pakaluk, 2005, p. 214), 
orchestrates rational desire (boul!sis), perception, deliberation and moral 
conclusions. After this deliberative process, a virtuous agent would now know the 
action required in a given context. However, Aristotle laments that “many … do not 
do these actions. They take refuge in arguments, thinking that they are doing 
philosophy, and that this is the way to become excellent people” (II 4§6). He 
emphasises that having judged the correct action, though this is crucial to having 
right character (as seen in II 2§1), the action must actually be executed to be 
considered virtuous. Immediately following II 4§6, Aristotle begins his discussion of 
the moral virtues, thereby indicating that performing reasoned actions is the task of 
the moral virtues. 
2.3.6.2 Phron!sis and the Moral Virtues 
“Someone is not prudent [acting with phron!sis] by simply knowing; he must also 
act on his knowledge” (VII 10§2). The moral virtues, as dispositions (II 6§15), 
dispose one towards right action. For example, a generous person (IV 1), through 
cognitive and physical habituation, has established a predisposition towards being 
generous. When phron!sis orchestrates the preconditions of virtue ending in a moral 
conclusion, telling the agent at what time, to what degree, for how long, and to 
whom to be generous (II 6§11), the intermediate part of the soul, which oversees the 
moral virtues, executes phron!sis’ moral conclusion and performs the generous 
action. Since moral virtue is the mean according to the phronimos’ reason (II 6§15; 
VI 13§4), attaining moral virtue, and therefore character, is impossible without 
phron!sis. However, it is important to emphasise that phron!sis alone does not 
constitute character. Phron!sis requires the moral virtues to carry out the moral 
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conclusion (VI 13§6; VI 12§6). Therefore, phron!sis and moral virtue are mutually 
dependent.  
2.3.6.3 Phron!sis, Experience and the Young 
Due to the complexity of the deliberative process, which necessitates perception of 
both contextual particulars and universal truths (VI 8§5), experience and maturity are 
required for virtuous action. However, since experience is precisely what youth lack, 
Aristotle notes that phron!sis among the young is uncommon (I 3§5). Compounding 
this difficulty is the adolescent’s tendency to follow whimsically his or her feelings 
and appetites (I 3§6), even when his or her phron!sis, if it is developed, counsels 
otherwise. When this tendency becomes a disposition (hexis) to follow errant desires 
and appetites, the moral virtues will not be sufficiently rooted within the character, 
thereby resulting in the youth’s inability to follow correct reason.  
 
This developmental delay in phron!sis has significant ramifications, discussed in the 
analysis chapters of this thesis, for OAE programmes that intend to develop character 
in the young. Presumably, phron!sis and the moral virtues develop in some gradual 
fashion as the young gain experience, for Aristotle provides some helpful categories 
that mark this growth towards virtue.  
2.3.7 Degrees of Character 
Socrates once asked how it was that a person could know the correct thing to do, yet 
do otherwise (Plato, trans. 1996, Protagoras 352-358)? He believed ignorance to be 
the cause; the person in question could not have known the correct action, for if he or 
she did, he or she would have done it. Aristotle was uncomfortable with Socrates’ 
solution. Experience shows that knowledge can be ignored (VII 3§2). Failing to act 
in accordance with knowledge is of significant interest in a study on character, for it 
suggests underdevelopment within a moral virtue. If character is the sum of virtue 
and vice over a life-time, and virtue is a mean on a continuum between two errant 
vices, then actions not striking the mean can be described by their proximity to the 
mean. Aristotle provides some helpful classifications for the deficiencies on either 
side of virtue’s mean. The following diagram (Figure 2.2) illustrates that virtue sits 
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in the “golden mean” between two vices, one of excess, the other of deficiency. 
Between virtue and vice, on each side of the diagram, lie two different 
classifications: continence and incontinence. For the sake of example, I will use the 
virtue of temperance to explain these stages between vice and virtue.  
2.3.7.1 Vice 
Vice destroys an agent’s ability to see the proper ends of an action. Here, the will is 
entirely oriented to vice, since viciousness acts without regret. In seeking non-
virtuous ends, the agent’s perception, deliberation and moral conclusions are then 
skewed (VI 5§6). Aristotle intimates that once a character becomes so depraved, it is 
nearly incurable (VII 8§1). The vice of excess for the virtue of temperance is 
licentiousness, and the vice of deficiency is insensitivity to pleasurable activity.  
2.3.7.2 Incontinence 
Akrasia, Greek for incontinence, means to be not in command. Alternate translations 
are: weakness, weakness of will, moral weakness, lack of control (Pakaluk, 2005, p. 
233). The incontinent, like the virtuous, go through the deliberative process ending in 
a virtuous conclusion, but unlike the virtuous, the incontinent acts “on appetite, not 
on decision [prohairesis]” (III 2§4). The incontinent are overcome by feelings or 
appetites to the point where their actions drift from reason, “but not so far as to make 
… [them] the sort of person to be persuaded that it is right to pursue such pleasures 
without restraint” (VII 8§5). Unlike the vicious, the incontinent regret performing 
non-virtuous actions (VII 8§1). Although incontinent acts may well be the same as 











vicious ones, they are considered incontinent because the agent wanted to do 
differently; “incontinents are not unjust, but will do injustice” (VII 8§3). Aristotle 
cautions that a lust for untimely pleasure can lead to incontinence, which is why 
Plato insisted that being brought up well, with regard to pleasure and pain, was 
essential for virtue (II 3§1-2; see also VII 4§1). 
 
With regard to an incontinence of excess relative to the virtue of temperance, here is 
an example. The incontinent know that the virtuous action is to have just one or two 
biscuits with their cup of tea, but they lose control, and eat a half-dozen before 
coming to their senses. Just what has happened here? Aristotle, both agreeing and 
disagreeing with Socrates’ answer of ignorance, offers four explanations. First, a 
person could know something and absentmindedly not use it (VII 3§5). For example, 
a mountaineer, despite knowing that a cumulonimbus cloud portends dangerous 
conditions, climbs on. Second, a person might well want for a proper end, but not 
perceive a given instance as relevant to this end (VII 3§6). For instance, a person 
who regularly obeys the speed limit, fails to perceive a speed zone change. Third, a 
person could “know” something, but not have fully assimilated it yet. In this case, a 
person recently convinced that virtuous action requires buying organic for the sake of 
the environment, purchases his or her groceries, and then realises he or she has 
purchased on the basis of price, not eco-stewardship. Fourth, a person might know a 
proper end, and also that a particular instance of this end is at hand, but be clouded 
with another truth that conflicts with this first end. The person may then become 
overwhelmed by desire for this other truth, and commit an action that transgresses 
the first end (VII 3§9-11). Here, despite knowing the danger of sweets, a diabetic 
sees a plate of dark chocolate covered macaroons, and thinks: “sweets are pleasant.” 
After ruminating on the pleasure sweets bring, the diabetic is overwhelmed with 
desire and eats them. Note that the incontinent do not deliberately become 
susceptible to their desires. Although the incontinent do ponder the “pleasure of 
sweets,” they are not “dwelling on its pleasantness in order to stir up an irresistible 
desire” (Pakaluk, 2005, p. 250) – which is why incontinence sits between virtue and 
vice. However, since focusing on the joys of chocolate and coconut is what stirred 
the desire, the incontinent person is culpable for his or her wayward thinking. It is as 
 
 82 
though desire temporarily incapacitates the proper knowing (Hughes, 2001, p. 163), 
making it inaccessible to the agent (VII 1§6).  
 
Since it is the moral virtues that have reign over the appetites, feelings and desires, 
once phron!sis determines the moral conclusion, a well-disciplined person will have 
the moral virtue to obey and respond.  
 
Although further examples of a deficient incontinence (see Figure 2.2.) of 
temperance could be given, for the sake of space, I will now describe continence.  
2.3.7.3 Continence 
Enkrasia, Greek for continence, is alternately translated: strength of character, moral 
strength, strength of will, or self-control (Pakaluk, 2005, p. 234). Here, continence 
follows reason despite the pull of wayward appetites (VII 1§6). “The [virtuously] 
temperate person [who strikes the mean] is the sort to find nothing pleasant against 
reason, but the continent is the sort to find such things pleasant but not to be led by 
them” (VII 10§6). In other words, the continent person holds on to the correct 
principles, but does so with less than perfect deliberation (Irwin, 1999, p. 266) – he 
or she is tempted to act unvirtuously, but through strength of will, performs the act 
required by the mean.  
 
Foot (1997) takes issue with Aristotle’s belief that virtuous behaviour precludes 
temptation to perform otherwise: the “fact is that some kinds of difficulties do indeed 
provide an occasion for much virtue, but that others rather show that virtue is 
incomplete” (p. 171). It is the circumstances that determine this difference. For 
example, Martin Luther King’s choice to respond pacifistically towards those who 
committed egregious acts of violence against his brethren required more virtue than 
my refraining from swearing at a taxi when it unintentionally cut me off. King’s 
actions could still be considered virtuous, even if he harbored retaliatory feelings 
while performing them. However, if I become flooded with rage, showed strong 
physical symptoms of increased heart rate and blood pressure, but in the end 
refrained from cursing a blue streak, all over a taxi driver’s inadvertently missing me 
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in his blind spot, my actions would be merely continent. A virtuous response would 
have been more patient and gracious: “He didn’t see me. It’s an easy mistake that I 
too have made before.”  
 
There is some debate as to whether Aristotle considered continent actions to be 
morally “good enough” (VII 8§5). The concept of the mean describes actions as 
more or less virtuous, not right or wrong – what Swanton (2003, p. 3) calls a 
threshold understanding of virtue. While obviously preferring virtue, Aristotle does 
concede that continence is a state of excellence (VII 8§5; VII 9§5).  
 
This section has provided an examination of Aristotle’s virtue ethics, and its 
relevance to character. It began by describing Aristotle’s search for the chief human 
end (telos), which resulted in a flourishing life of well-being (eudaimonia). A life of 
right reason, by way of the function argument, was then shown to be the path to this 
flourishing. Next, a description of how this function can be expressed with virtue, 
both moral and intellectual, was defined, with particular attention given to phron!sis’ 
orchestration of the deliberative process, which results in a moral choice. The section 
closed by noting that one can know the right moral action, but not perform it, and 
thus fall short of moral virtue. While this section has articulated an understanding of 
Aristotelian character, little has been said about how one might develop this kind of 
character, a subject which I will now address.  
2.4 Inculcating Phron!sis and the Other Virtues 
I have grouped Aristotle’s methods for inculcating virtue under three headings: 
reflection, practice, and the shared life (see Sherman, 1991 for similar categories). As 
will be seen in the methodology chapter, these “conditions for virtue” (not to be 
confused with the preconditions of virtue discussed above) played a significant role 
in this research’s data collection. Since character depends on the development of 
phron!sis, how one becomes practically wise is of paramount importance. 
Understanding phron!sis to be the foundation of character (VI 8§5), these conditions 
provide the broad categories in which phron!sis is developed. 
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2.4.1 Reflection  
Reflection is the broadest of Aristotle’s conditions for virtue. It encompasses much 
of this chapter’s discussion, and in a sense subsumes the other two conditions. 
Aristotle seems to suggest that two types of reflection are involved in character 
development: one general, and one specific. The general kind of reflection has 
already been described in subsection 2.3.5.2’s discussion of perception. Experience 
(through the other two conditions for virtue discussed shortly: practice; and the 
shared life) provides particulars, from which phron!sis (with theoretical nous VI 
8§8) extracts general truths. Similarly, as experience continues, phron!sis (with 
practical nous VI 11§3-5) perceives morally salient particulars to which these truths 
(gleaned from past experience) morally apply. This cyclic process of induction to 
deduction is the general reflective process. In this sense, reflection, what Socrates 
calls “writing in one’s soul” (Plato, trans. 1925, Philebus 39a), is an iterative activity 
that contributes increasingly to the sensitive moral judgment, so crucial to character.  
 
The other more specific type of reflection Aristotle identifies is contemplation 
(the"ria). 
2.4.1.1 Contemplation 
 In I 5§2, Aristotle asks what kind of life will most likely lead to flourishing? He 
suggests three different lives (pleasure, honor, and study), and after dismissing the 
first two, he announces (I 5§7) that the third will be taken up later (X 7). There, he 
says, “if happiness is activity in accord with virtue, it is reasonable for it to accord 
with the supreme virtue, which is virtue of the best thing” (X 7§1). He then claims 
the highest virtue to be the intellectual virtue of nous, the virtue that distinguishes the 
fine (kalos) (X 9§1), and discerns both universal truths (theoretical nous VI 8§8) and 
saliency in particulars (practical nous VI 11§3-5). 
 
Aristotle understands contemplation (the"ria) (X 7§1), which is “the cognition of the 
supreme truths about the universe” (Jones, 1970, p. 285), as the activity that most 
thoroughly exercises nous. Hughes describes the"ria as active consideration “of the 
understanding that one has achieved” (2001, p. 46). For Aristotle, it is contemplation 
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that leads to complete well-being (teleia eudaimonia) (X 7§1). Much confusion 
surrounds Aristotle’s suddenly offering a different, more complete, path to 
eudaimonia at the end of the Ethics. What of the path to eudaimonia, employing 
phron!sis and the moral virtues that was painstakingly developed over the previous 
nine books? While the many proposed reasons for Aristotle’s apparent last-minute 
change of mind are interesting (see Pakaluk, 2005, pp. 318-328), they do not advance 
the goals of this thesis. What is pertinent is that Aristotle understood the"ria to be 
necessary for complete happiness, thus implying that the practice of contemplation is 
critical in the cultivation of virtue, and therefore character.  
 
Aristotle continues by claiming that the virtuous life of action, described in the 
previous nine books, offers well-being in only a secondary (eudaimonia deuter"s) 
sense (X 8§1). While Aristotle privileges the life of contemplation, likening it to the 
divine within us (X8§8), he recognises that a human agent is unable to live on 
contemplation alone (X 8§9), and therefore “lives together with a number of other 
human beings … [and] chooses to do the actions that accord with virtue” (X 8§6). 
Although the"ria is the highest expression of humanity’s function (ergon), namely to 
reason, it must be balanced with a life of practice reinforced by this theoretical 
consideration (X 8§4). The Ethics itself exemplifies this as a practical ethics based 
on theoretical insights from biology and psychology (Hughes, 2001, p. 49).  
 
Although different, these two types of reflection – one general, one specific – are 
only distinct to a point. By exercising the"ria, one contemplatively considers the 
truths one has come to know (Hughes, 2001, p. 46), which will necessarily inform 
the reflective and deliberative processes governed by phron!sis. For example, as 
one’s perspective matures through contemplation, the ends (boul!sis), the rational 
desires that one wants and wishes for, are changed, thereby impacting the remaining 
preconditions of virtue, and thus producing a more refined moral conclusion, thereby 




I have attempted to capture these two types of reflection in a diagram explaining the 
concerns of phron!sis (see Figure 2.3), which pictorially represents the entire 
reflective process.  
 
In sum, developing virtue, and thus character, requires increasingly building one’s 
capacity for sensitive moral judgment. Reflection is indispensible to this process, 
both in the general and specific forms described here. Judgment is refined as one 
becomes more adept with the reflective process, a development that comes largely 
through practice, the next condition for virtue considered. 
2.4.2 Practice 
Habit, I say, is longtime training, my friend, and in the end training is nature for 
human beings. (VII 10§4)  
The association of habit and practice with virtue theory, has erroneously led some to 
regard Aristotle’s ethic as mere behaviourism. The confusion is between an action 
merely done, and the same action done virtuously. Subection 2.3.3.3 lists the criteria 
from II 4§3 that determine a virtuous act: acting knowingly, for the sake of the fine 
(kalos), from a fixed character. Although agent A may perform the same action as a 
virtuous agent B, if agent A’s action is not done with II 4§3’s requirements, the act, 
for Aristotle, is not virtuous. Mechanically repeated behaviour does not necessarily 
lead to virtue. The deliberative process, including all the preconditions of virtue, 
guided by the intellectual virtue of phron!sis, which informs the intermediate part of 
the soul regarding the proper moral response, is a far cry from Skinnerian or other 
conditioning. 
 
Yet, what is initially mere habitual action, can develop into virtue. For Aristotle 
believes that “we become just by doing just actions and become temperate by doing 
temperate actions” (II 4§1). Thus, the point of practice is: becoming just (virtuous), 
by at first doing (not yet virtuous but still) just actions (II 4§1). Practice therefore, is 
just as relevant to the intellectual virtues, as it is to the moral virtues, which are 
typically expressed through action: practice refines phron!sis, through refinement of 
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the reflective and deliberative processes (see Figure 2.3); practice trains the 
intermediate part of the soul to respond to reason’s edicts (II 1§7).  
 
Through practice, one gradually achieves right reason (according to the phronimos), 
and refines the moral virtues to heed such reason, thereby becoming predisposed to 
Figure 2.3. The province of phronēsis. Experience, through the virtue fostering conditions 
of the shared life and practice, provides theoretical nous with content from which to 
induce general truths. Theōria and the other intellectual virtues contribute and refine these 
general truths. Then, through the deliberative process, with the help of practical nous, 



























































strike the virtuous mean. These predispositions are states (hexis) of character. A hexis 
is a “having, or possession” from which the Latin habere, to have, provides the 
English “habit.” To posses a hexis is to operate from a firm, deep-rooted and 
enduring character trait. For Aristotle, habituation is not mindless, but a “cognitive 
shaping” through time, allowing the agent to act from his or her accrued states of 
character (Sherman, 1991, p. 7). Habits, then, are established patterns of judgment 
and action, towards or away from virtue; they are not robotic conditioning.  
 
Additionally, Aristotle makes it clear that for an action to be either intellectually or 
morally virtuous, the agent must act from these established dispositions (hexis). This 
can be seen in the definition of moral virtue (II 6§15): “Virtue, then, is a state [hexis] 
that decides [prohairesis].” Here, hexis is associated with the phron!sis-directed 
deliberative process that ends in a moral conclusion (prohairesis) – an intellectual 
virtue hexis. However, II 5§2 defines a hexis as “what we have when we are well or 
badly off in relation to feelings [e.g. appetites].” Here, hexis refers to a state in 
relation to the intermediate part of the soul, which controls the moral virtues – a 
moral virtue hexis. An Aristotelian understanding of character development 
therefore, will require both intellectual dispositions of virtue, and moral dispositions 
of virtue.  
 
These two senses of hexis have significant implications for educational practice. For 
although many moral education programmes try to teach about good character, 
Aristotle recognises that few will become virtuous through argument alone (X 9§3). 
In most cases, character development will be an attempt to undo “what has long been 
absorbed as a result of one’s habits” (X 9§5). These habits (hexis), in both senses of 
hexis, are in a constant state of flux (II 2§7-8), towards and away from virtue, even if 
only on a micro-level. That is, for Aristotle, all actions (III 7§6), no matter how 
small, are developing habits (hexis) of thinking and behaving either towards vice or 
virtue. It is for this reason that “the student needs to have been prepared by habits for 
enjoying and hating finely” (X 9§6; see also II 1§7-8). Developing these fine (kalos) 
habits will require intentional agency, what Sherman (1991) calls “critical practice” 
(p. 157). Therefore moral education must consist of both argument (theoretical 
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content) and practice. Yet, even once a virtuous state is attained, it must be 
maintained and refined through continued practice over a lifetime (II 2§9; X 9§9).  
 
This critical practice needs a context for expression, and our shared life with others 
provides this opportunity to grow in virtue through the cultivation of our dispositions 
(hexis).  
2.4.3 The Shared Life1 
The nurse, the mother, the tutor, and the father himself strive hard that the child 
may excel, and as each act and word occurs they teach and impress upon him that 
this is just, and that unjust, one thing noble, another base, one holy, another unholy 
…. After this they send them to school …. [H]ere they meet with many 
admonitions, many descriptions and praises and eulogies of good men in times past, 
that the boy in envy may imitate them and yearn to become even as they. (Plato, 
trans. 1977, Protagorus, 325c-326a) 
Virtue is learned through community: family, education, and friendship. The Ethics 
does not rely on a self-help approach, but instead recognises growth in phron!sis to 
be a community affair (Pakaluk, 2005, p. 98; X 9§14). Aristotle notes this debt to 
community for one’s moral upbringing, highlighting that “when we educate children, 
we steer them by pleasure and pain,” since “enjoying and hating the right things 
seems to be most important for virtue of character” (X 1§1; see also II 3§2 and Plato, 
Republic 401e-402a). As this quote intimates, the shared life is especially important 
for the young. Since phron!sis develops slowly over time through experience, youth 
“borrow phron!sis,” from the wise until they, themselves, are mature enough to loan 
theirs to others (VI 8§5). While the moral rearing of a child, for Aristotle, is certainly 
the responsibility of his or her family, he does believe that “it is best … if the 
community attends to upbringing” (X 9§14).  
 
Although a community focuses on teaching morality to its youth, moral education 
never ends. As Hursthouse (2001, p. 61) notes, no one has perfect judgment, and all 
need to ask others, watch others and defer to others on occasion. Indeed, Aristotle 
asserts that “partners in deliberation” (III 3§10) are needed to provide new ways “of 
reacting, seeing, and understanding” (Sherman, 1991, p. 181).  
                                                




These references to “real-life” ethical instruction are only part of Aristotle’s 
understanding of moral education through the shared life. For one can also share life 
(vicariously) through the arts and literature, which have long been known to enrich 
and inform moral sentiment (Carr, 2003c, p. 15, 2005, p. 149). Aristotle himself uses 
a combination of fiction and non-fiction appealing to such dramatists and tragedians 
as: Euripides (III 1§8), Aeschylus (III 1§17), and Homer (III 3§18; III 8§10; III 
11§1). Greek theatre portrayed the inevitabilities involved in following the vectors of 
either good or bad character. (For examples, see Heaney’s modern translations of 
Sophocles’ Antigone (Trans. 2004) and Philoctetes (Trans. 1991).) 
  
The humanities, in general, illuminate “people’s understanding of their humanity and 
in particular of the values through which that humanity is defined” (Pring, 2001a, p. 
105). Whether in classic works of fiction such as Mark Twain’s Adventures of 
Huckleberry Finn (1884/2003), which uses a clandestine trip down the Mississippi 
river as the setting for a young boy’s ethical journey towards abolitionism, or 
Dickens’ The Personal History of David Copperfield (1850/1987, p. 472), in which 
Mr. Peggotty, the paragon of grace, forgives his niece’s betrayal, or in contemporary 
short stories such as Canin’s (1994) The Palace Thief, which depicts poor character 
as the core cord of consistency through Sedgewick’s immoral life, literature provides 
a moral dialogue, calling into question one’s ethical positions, and inviting moral re-
evaluation (Carr, 2005, p. 148).  
 
Non-fictional works also serve as moral tutors, negatively as in Machiavelli’s The 
Prince (Trans. 2005), where it is recommended that a prince should not be 
constrained by morality if he wants to maintain his kingdom, or Arendt’s Eichmann 
in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (1963/1994), in which the reader is 
cautioned concerning the “Eichmann in every one of us” (p. 286), or more positively 
in Thoreau’s Walden (1854/1995), where the author extols the peaceful 




An artful combination of example, exhortation, dialogical deliberation and mimesis 
provide the constituent parts of the shared life through which virtue is inculcated. 
Hence, it is particularly through relationships that one learns to become good: the 
strength of this truth, for Aristotle, is seen in his dedicating nearly one fifth of the 
Ethics, a fact often overlooked by moral philosophers (Pakaluk, 2005, p. 257), to 
friendship. 
2.4.3.1 Friendship 
For no one would choose to live without friends even if he had all the other goods. 
(VIII 1§1) 
For Aristotle, friendship is the core of a flourishing life (eudaimonia). Through 
companionship, a lasting happiness is attained (IX 9§5-6). This is perhaps because 
“friendship both is a virtue, and involves the exercise of virtues” (Crisp, 2000, p. 
xxx; see also VIII 1§1, 5§5).  
 
Aristotle mentions three kinds of friendship: those of utility, pleasure, and character.  
The first two kinds of friendship are peripheral to this thesis, and accordingly receive 
short consideration. Friendships based in utility develop through friends’ usefulness 
to one another. Typically, once this has served its purpose, the friendship ends (VIII 
3§1-3). Friendships based solely on pleasure are similarly vulnerable, since they are 
rooted in appetites, which are often fickle (VIII 3§1-3).  
 
The third species of friendship is character friendship (IX 1§3). Here, the 
commonality shared between friends is virtue (VIII 3§6). The admiration of virtue in 
the other’s character is the basis for the attraction (Aristotle, 1952, p. 1244b15). This 
perfect or complete friendship (telia philia), because it is based in virtue, is only 
attained with character. Indeed, choosing a friend is, for Aristotle, prohairetic 
(Aristotle, trans. 1952, 1236b30-36), a reasoned moral conclusion stemming from 
character (Sherman, 1991, p. 131). Although rare, because virtue and character are 
themselves rare (VIII 3§8), these character friendships endure because of their 
foundation in stable virtuous dispositions (VIII 3§6; II 6§15). Aristotle presumes that 
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the time and emotion necessary for friendship of this depth limits them to a few 
during any lifetime (VIII 6§2; IX 10§3-4, 6).  
 
From a virtue ethical perspective, these friendships of character are crucial for 
character’s development. For observing a “character friend” is like gazing into a 
mirror (Aristotle, trans. 1990, 1213a22-24). By looking at someone morally similar 
to oneself, one learns about one’s own ethical self. This is helpful since our own self-
satisfaction often prevents us from honestly seeing ourselves, whereas “we are able 
to observe our neighbors more than ourselves, and to observe their actions more than 
our own” (IX 9§5). “We need ‘to live together with friends and share in argument 
and thought’ in order to be fully conscious of the sorts of lives we are leading (NE 
1170b11-12)” (Sherman, 1991, p. 27). For Aristotle, one cannot truly “know thyself” 
without friends. A friend’s reflective role in one’s self-knowledge led Aristotle to 
call a friend “another me” (Trans. 1990, 1213a22-24), another self (IX 9§10). This 
self-knowledge is crucial for the growth of virtuous character.  
 
The benefits of character friendship, however, are not limited to increased self-
knowledge. Character friends partner in the journey of life, choosing a shared vision 
of eudaimonia. In this shared vision, agent A’s values, hopes, ends, and desires are 
constrained through committing to agent B’s flourishing (eudaimonia). Similarly, 
agent B’s vision of flourishing is contrained by a commitment to agent A. However, 
together, through perfect friendship, teleia philia, a shared life, C, is conceived (see 
Robinson, 1998, Lecture 13). Sharing the virtuous life together, in turn, refines virtue 
“and they seem to become still better from their activities and their mutual 
correction” (IX 12§3). “For ‘when two go together … ,’ they are more capable of 
understanding and acting” (VIII 1§2). Committing to this character friendship means 
making decisions with the other’s flourishing in mind (Irwin, 1999, p. xxiii), and 
thus focuses on loving the other rather than on being loved (VIII 8§4). In this way, 
the two figuratively become “singleness of mind” (Aristotle, trans. 1952, 1240b2, 9-




In sum, friendship is central to community (IX 12§1). In living together with friends, 
for nothing is so proper to companions (VIII 5§3), conversation and thought is 
shared (IX 9§10), and virtue is cultivated (IX 9§7).  
 
This section discussed three conditions for virtue found within the Ethics: reflection, 
practice, and the shared life. I will now provide a summary section, attempting to 
synthesise Aristotle’s concept of character. 
2.5 Defining Character: Putting It All Together 
Ultimately, through an agent’s construal of her environment, through her choice of 
friends, through her selection of how and in what way to act on her commitments, 
she weaves a life that expresses her character and aims at her conception of 
happiness. (Sherman, 1991, p. 10) 
Having examined Aristotle’s ethic in detail, I will now more directly identify its 
relevance to character. 
2.5.1 Character Is … ? 
For Aristotle, living thoughtfully is necessarily connected to living well. A life 
oriented towards excellently (aret!) acting in congruence with right reason, which 
also encompasses appropriate affect, is just what seems to enable a human to 
flourish. Aristotle calls this kind of life “ethical,” because it depends on traits of 
character (!thik!) (I 10§11). 
 
Good traits, or states (hexis) of character, are woven from continuously good 
reasoning and acting. Good reasoning, by way of the preconditions of virtue 
(requiring nous and phron!sis) and contemplation (the"ria), depends on the 
deliberative process, which culminates in a moral conclusion (prohairesis) all under 
the auspice of phron!sis. Good acting (acting on one’s moral conclusions), by way of 
moral virtue, requires acting in accordance with the prerequisites of virtue (II 4§3).  
 
For Aristotle, this entire process, described in detail throughout section 2.3, and very 
briefly in the above two paragraphs, when expressed over a lifetime, results in 
virtuous character.  
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2.5.2 The Fabric of Character2 
In her book, “The Fabric of Character,” Sherman (1991) uses a weaving metaphor 
to signify the way in which character is woven throughout the whole of one’s life. 
Hursthouse (2001, p. 12), quoting from Hudson’s 1986 Human Character and 
Morality, shows the appropriateness of Sherman’s metaphor by highlighting the all-
encompassing nature of Aristotelian character: “the unity of character is extremely 
labyrinthine. It couples systematically a person’s values, choices, desires, strength or 
weakness of will, emotions, feelings, perceptions, interests, expectations and 
sensibilities”; character expressed in all-pervading virtue “goes all the way down.” 
Since Aristotle understands ends, deliberation, moral conclusions, and actions all to 
be within the scope of human freedom, he holds humans responsible for their 
character (III 5§1-2; III 5§10).  
 
In closing this section, Aristotle’s pervasive understanding of character, as a fabric 
woven throughout the course of one’s life, brings deeper meaning to Heraclitus’ 
dictum, mentioned in the first chapter, “Character is destiny” (Trans. 1923, Fragment 
121). In other words, through exercising the judgment and action necessary for 
making life’s decisions, one makes oneself (Carr 2003a, p. 228). 
 
This concludes my articulation of Aristotle’s character ethics. The remaining part of 
the chapter examines virtue theory’s limitations, and virtue theory beyond the Ethics.  
2.6 Limitations 
There is so much in Aristotle that is original, that inevitably, much in Aristotle 
would undergo criticism in subsequent centuries. (Robinson, 1998, lecture 12) 
This section discusses a number of the principal arguments against virtue ethics. 
While this chapter’s purpose is not a defence of virtue theory, I would be remiss in 
not acknowledging some suggested faults in Aristotle’s account. Many of the 
criticisms are well-aimed and penetrate deeply. The short remarks given here reflect 
the limits of space, and are not meant to dismiss superficially these criticisms.  
                                                




2.6.1.1 Virtue Theory Is Too Difficult To Be Useful. 
Like many of the following criticisms, the difficulty complaint seems more like an 
objection to “how the world is set up,” than a fault within virtue theory itself. 
Aristotle, no less than any other moral theorist, is only responding to the world as we 
know it. That the ethical predicament humanity finds itself in is complex, suggests 
that any “simple” moral theory would not be wholly satisfactory. “Any ethical theory 
that makes it too easy always to know what to do or feel will seem to that extent 
flawed or even useless because [it is] untrue to our soberer sense of the wrenching 
complexity of moral phenomena” (Slote, 1997, p. 262). 
2.6.1.2 Isn’t Becoming Virtuous Largely a Matter of Luck?  
“Moral luck” is Williams’ (1981) term for the relation between one’s ability to be 
moral and one’s turn of circumstance. Some lives just have less temptation and 
tragedy thereby making a moral standard easier to attain (Blackburn, 1996, p. 251). 
In I 8§15-16 (see also VII 13§2), Aristotle notes that external goods such as friends, 
wealth (IV 3§19-20), power, good birth, good children, and beauty make the search 
for eudaimonia easier. However, later, in I 10§12-14, Aristotle, recognising the 
impact of a major misfortune on one’s eudaimonia, says that even in the midst of 
difficult circumstances, the virtuous agent can maintain nobility, and, although “in no 
short time,” can flourish again. Ultimately, virtue requires only modest resource and 
station (X 6§4; Crisp and Slote, 1997, p. xxi). For Aristotle, eudaimonia is living 
virtuously, which can be done without fortune.  
 
Interestingly, the participants in this research identified luck as playing a significant 
role in the development of one’s character (see subsection 5.2.5). 
2.6.1.3 Aristotle Never Really Tells Us What To Do! 
Loudon (1997) complains that virtue theory’s emphasis on what kind of person an 
agent should be, namely virtuous, rather than what the agent should do, results in a 
tendency to ignore applied ethics, and casuistic law. Since its renaissance in the 
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1950s, much of the work on virtue theory has emphasised its difference from other 
rival ethical theories. Loudon rightly notices that little literature on virtue has 
focused on practical application. However, the contribution of virtue theory is that it 
is not formulaic, or prescriptive. It is a theory that respects the individuality of the 
particular instance, and understands that who one is and aspires to be is directly 
related to the context one finds oneself in. 
 
An insight of Hursthouse’s (2001, pp. 11-12) is relevant here. In an effort to show 
that our concept of virtue is somewhat intuitive, she attempts to define what one 
might mean by the phrase “honest person.” After writing a 15-line uncontroversial 
description, she then contends, using her example of honesty, that if we are able to so 
easily and thoroughly articulate what a virtue looks like, then applying a virtue to a 
particular circumstance will be more straightforward than critics have claimed (ibid., 
pp. 11-12). That is, a person who has carefully considered what honesty entails will 
generally know what honesty requires in a given circumstance.  
 
Loudon’s (1997) complaint, however, which opened this subsection, is a helpful 
reminder that as virtue theory continues to mature, efforts must be made to include 
its practical applications – a reminder that Hursthouse herself has already heeded 
(Hursthouse, 1997).  
2.6.1.4 Virtue Theory Is Often Unable To Discover the Right Action.  
Both utilitarian and deontic ethics are able to find the “right” choice in any dilemma: 
utilitarians regardless of what the means require; and deontologists regardless of 
what the consequences might bring. By simplifying the dilemma, agents of these two 
ethical systems are able to walk away from an act without moral regret: “There were 
only two options, I choose the best one, what else can I do?” (Hursthouse, 2001, pp. 
44, 46-48). Unlike these two ethics, virtue theory recognises the concept of “moral 
loss.” For the virtue ethicist, dilemmas often offer no “right” resolution: all the 
available options are morally compromising. One is left to choose the “least worse 
option” (Carr, 2003a, p. 225), for these dilemmas have no right conclusion.  
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2.6.1.5 If the Phronimos Dictates the Mean, Isn’t Virtue Theory Relativist? 
Because virtue theory has a highest good, eudaimonia, it is sometimes taken to be a 
disguised utilitarianism. However, unlike an ethic of utility, Aristotle, in II 6§18, 
clearly lists prohibitions for the virtuous (e.g. adultery, theft, and murder). Similarly, 
as subsection 2.3.2.3 on ethical naturalism pointed out, what dictates right action for 
the virtuous are the biologically built-in values that lead to flourishing.  
 
However, there does appear to be some latitude here. In the classic definition of a 
virtue (II 6§15), Aristotle says that virtue’s mean is “relative to us.” “Us” can be 
understood in two senses: the individual or the community. For the individual, one’s 
personality preferences and tendencies can lead to what Carr (2003a) calls 
“dispositional priorities” or virtue’s “aesthetic dimension” (p. 230). Although this 
may be considered value pluralism, Carr continues, it does not appear to be morally 
relativist (ibid., p. 232). But this plurality has its limits. Two people emphasising 
different aspects of eudaimonia must still agree that the way the other is living also 
constitutes flourishing (Hursthouse, 1997, pp. 221-222). Regarding the mean as 
relative to community, MacIntyre’s (1984) work on narrative helps to illuminate this 
concept. He believes that human agents inherit traditions that embody time-honoured 
conceptions of virtue and value: “the narrative … history of each of our own lives is 
generally and characteristically embedded in and made intelligible in terms of the 
larger and longer histories of a number of traditions” (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 222). 
Communities, through their composite traditions, shape one’s moral outlook. 
However, here again, plurality has its limits (see MacIntyre’s Whose justice? Which 
Rationality? (1988)), for MacIntyre believes that while such traditions provide 
necessary moral starting points, “it is in moving forward from such particularity 
[within the traditions] that the search for the good, for the universal, consists” 
(MacIntyre, 1984, p. 221). 
 
In any discussion charging virtue theory with subjectivity, it is important to note that 
virtue theory relies no more on evaluative judgment than its rivals, whether it be the 
deontologist’s evaluation of duty or the utilitarian’s “greatest good” (Hursthouse, 
2001, p. 26-28, 36).  
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2.6.1.6 What if I Don’t Find Aristotle’s Function Argument Convincing?  
In Principia Ethica, G. E. Moore (1903, p. 176) accuses Aristotle’s ethics of 
committing the naturalistic fallacy, a fallacy claiming that naturalistic description 
cannot lead to ethical prescription, for this merely defines an evaluative term “as 
equivalent to the features you use as a standard for applying it ” (Blackburn, 1996, p. 
270, 255). The question, “Is it good to do what we naturally do well?,” remains 
unanswerable for Moore.  
 
Moore’s concern here seems to be over inferring an “ought” from an “is.” As 
Anscombe (1958/1997) suggests, agreeing with Moore, the concept of obligation is 
problematic in ethical discussion. For this reason, she suggests returning to the 
ancient question, “How shall we live?,” as an alternative way to approach ethics. 
However, this alternative requires a different kind of motivation. Instead of “ought” 
Anscombe suggests that we might focus on “want” (Anscombe, 1958/1997, p. 32). 
Virtue ethical agents are not obliged to strive for eudaimonia; they are rather 
persuaded that living in harmony with their biologically-based capabilities brings 
about the highest degree of well-being for themselves and others. It is because of this 
conviction that they want to live virtuously.  
 
Although I don’t know whether Moore would have been satisfied with Anscombe’s 
response, it does make clear that virtue ethical theory will appeal most to those 
convinced that describing ethics in terms of obligation is an impossibility.  
2.6.1.7 Aristotle Is Sexist and Elitist.  
Rosalind Hursthouse, herself a virtue ethicist, candidly admits that Aristotle was just 
plain wrong in his pejorative view of women (e.g. Aristotle, trans. 1998, 1260a13) 
and slaves (VIII 11§7), and in no way limits herself to his list of virtues. For these 
and other reasons she calls herself “neo-Aristotelian” (2001, p. 8).  
 
The advent of Christianity’s agapic ethic, some 300 years after Aristotle, has so 
coloured even an atheist’s view of the good, that most modern readers find portions 
of Aristotle’s ethical outlook offensive (see V 5§4, VIII 7, IX 3§3, IX 11§4-5). For 
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example, aret! (virtue), derived from Ares, the God of war (Thomas, Thomas, & 
Lewis, 2001, Disc 1 track 19), implies heroic military notions of victory, conflict and 
challenge. This is continued in the Latin translation, virtus, which refers to the 
quality of manliness. These heroic values of honor, position and power are 
poignantly seen in Aristotle’s paragon of virtue, the magnanimous man who is 
ashamed to receive others’ beneficence, tries to have others in his debt, remembers 
the good he did but not what he received, likes to hear himself praised and display 
his greatness, and condescends to those below himself (IV 3§24-26; Milbank, 1990, 
p. 352). In contrast, the Judeo-Christian understanding of virtue, as captured in 
Aquinas’ work on Aristotle, is found in the chief theological virtue, caritas, meaning 
unconditional, self-sacrificing love (agap!) (Aquinas, trans. 1920, II-II 23-46). The 
ethical end point of these differing emphases on virtue is profound. The Aristotelian 
agent loves only what is virtuous, such as the virtuous agent him or herself, whereas 
Christians are called to love others impartially, regardless of their status or virtue.  
 
While these critiques of sexism and elitism are but two of the complaints lodged 
against Aristotle, as the neo-Aristotelians demonstrate, much of Aristotle’s ethic 
remains relevant to the modern condition. Additionally, Aristotle seems to anticipate 
a continual refinement to his theory by claiming that posterity will “fill in” his 
sketched “outline” as they “discover more” (I 7§17). 
2.6.1.8 Aristotle Is an Ethical Egoist. 
Indicting Aristotle as an egoist stems largely from a careless reading of IX 8 on self-
love. Aristotle understands self-love in two different senses. The more common 
manifestation indicates selfishness of which he is reproachful (IX 8§4). But, virtuous 
living requires a second type of self-love. Through fine and noble (kalos) action that 
obeys reason, the virtuous do what is best for themselves, and thus love themselves 
(IX 8§5-6). What is often forgotten is that Aristotle’s concept of kalos incorporates 
what is best for all: “the excellent person labors for his friends … and will die for 
them if he must; he will sacrifice money … [and] honors … in achieving the fine for 
himself” (IX 8§9). The fulfilled life (eudaimonia) never purports to be at the cost of 
others. In fact, virtuous behaviour “will take the good agent, far more often than the 
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defective agent, into situations in which the requirements of character conflict with 
the preservation of life itself” (Nussbaum, 1986, p. 336).  
 
Some versions of psychological egoism mandate that because all good actions 
benefit the doer, there is no such thing as altruism (Blackburn, 1996, p. 13, 115). 
Hauerwas and Pinches (1997, p. 40) call this tension between the ego and altruistic 
action a corrupted modern social construct. Altruism need only be “an action which 
the agent performs to benefit someone else without considering whether he will 
benefit or not” (Hughes, 2001, p. 172). That an action benefits the agent does not 
preclude the action’s being altruistic, for altruism is a matter of motivation, not 
benefit. The virtuous are motivated for the sake of what is noble or fine (kalos) (IV 
2§7; see also IV 12§7, II 4§3, and Irwin, 1999, p. 329).  
2.6.2 General Response 
The above criticisms appear to be more complaints about the human predicament 
than direct confrontations of Aristotle’s virtue-based solution. If one is convinced 
that there is no view from nowhere, the efforts of moral theory, as Chapter 4 will 
more clearly reveal, are to provide an account of ethics that best makes sense of our 
experiences. Thus far, I believe virtue ethics to be such an account.  
 
Although often subordinated to reason, experience, because ethics is a practical 
enterprise, is no small factor in legitimating moral theory. We intuitively celebrate 
virtue and blame vice (III 5§7-9). We reinforce virtuous behaviour in rearing of our 
children. We do speak of a compassionate hospice worker or an honest car mechanic, 
and although we may temporarily envy a crooked person’s economic gain, we do not 
aspire to live as he or she does. Simply, when the virtues are practised, we do appear 
to flourish.  
2.7 Beyond the Ethics 
This final section briefly mentions different traditions within virtue ethics.  
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2.7.1 Five Traditions 
Carr (2008b) lists five traditions within virtue theory, which provide the structure for 
this subsection.  
2.7.1.1 Ethical Naturalism 
My inquiry falls largely within this vein already described (see subsection 2.3.2.3). 
Some of its chief proponents are: Anscombe, Foot, and Hursthouse. 
2.7.1.2 Social-Cultural Virtue Ethics 
As mentioned, MacIntyre (e.g. 1984) champions this perspective emphasising the 
role of traditions, practices and narrative in shaping morality. 
2.7.1.3 Moral Realism 
Realism is here applied to values, obligations and rights (Blackburn, 1996, p. 251). 
For a moral realist, morality is within the fabric of reality, not subjectivity. 
McDowell (1997) and Murdoch (1997), although not herself a virtue ethicist, seem to 
hold views towards this end of the spectrum. Since virtue is embedded within reality, 
understanding right action is largely a matter of perceiving reality correctly.  
2.7.1.4 Agent-Based Virtue Ethics 
 Slote, an advocate for agent-based ethics, notes that this position “treats the moral or 
ethical status of acts as entirely derivative from independent and fundamental aretaic 
… ethical characterizations of motives, character traits, or individuals” (Slote, 1997 
p. 237). An agent-based ethic is radical because instead of making an “act’s rightness 
depend on what a hypothetical virtuous person would do, it insists that the rightness 
of someone’s action depends on the actual motivation that lies or lay behind it” 
(Crisp and Slote, 1997, p. 22). The level of motivation for the action is what is 
judged as virtuous, not the actions virtuousness as judged by another phronimos. 
Within this strain of virtue theory, virtue, because of its connection with purity of 
motivation, becomes identified with benevolence and care. As subsection 8.2.2 
attests, the case study participants identified the practice of care and benevolence as 
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integral to expeditionary life. Hence, Slote’s agent-based theory will receive further 
attention later in the thesis.  
2.7.1.5 A Pluralist Virtue Ethics 
I take more time with this last tradition because it is relevant both to my 
understanding of virtue qua agapic love, and to the potential life-pervading reach of 
a virtue ethical perspective.  
 
Christine Swanton’s Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (2003), so broadly expands the 
scope of virtue that nearly every response within one’s life may be said to hail from 
one’s character. She speaks (2003, p. 20) of a “field” of a virtue as the sphere of 
concern relevant to any given virtue. Items within these fields, inanimate or animate, 
make demands on the moral agent. Responding to these demands within the field of 
a virtue can take many forms to which she refers as the “modes of moral 
responsiveness” for a virtue (2003, p. 21). A virtue’s many modes make up what she 
names a virtue’s “profile” (2003, p. 22). “Different types of response are warranted 
by the different types of morally significant features of the items constituting the 
fields of the virtues” (2003, p. 23). She calls these features “bases of moral 
acknowledgment.” They are: value, status, good and bonds.  
 
In a particular instance, several bases of moral acknowledgment may be vying for 
priority, making moral expression a complicated endeavor. For example, responding 
to the situationist critique, introduced in Chapter 1 (see section 1.3.4.2), she notes the 
competition of several moral bases within the participants of Stanley Milgram’s 
(1963) experiments. On the one hand, the participants rightly feel a base of moral 
acknowledgement for status in the form of a proper (virtuous) respect and obedience 
towards the medical professional whom they are helping. On the other hand, a base 
of moral acknowledgement for bonding in the form of humanitarian compassion for 
the patient can be seen in the participants’ angst over their decisions. These 
experiments did reveal that the participants were surprisingly slow to resolve the 
dilemma in favour of benevolence, but they also revealed a deeper moral response 




In contrast to Aristotle’s often-criticised super-human expectations, Swanton 
provides a more human concept of virtue. “The standards for virtue should reflect the 
fact that the world is marred by the difficulty of attaining (full) virtue, and the all too 
frequent occurrence of catastrophe, scarcity, evil, and conflict” (2003, p.3). The 
standards for virtue, Swanton thinks, should be contextual, including the capabilities 
of the individual. She calls this a threshold view of virtue. The appropriate response, 
given the context, with all its competing bases of moral acknowledgment, will 
determine what she calls the “shape of the virtue” in any given instance (2003, p. 
26).  
 
In large part, what determines an act as “good enough” to be virtuous is that the 
action is done from “fine inner states” (2003, p. 26). For Swanton, each one of the 
modes of moral responsiveness that makes up a profile for a virtue must be an 
expression of the fine inner states within the scope of that given virtue.  
 
For Swanton, the basic mode of moral responsiveness, common to all the virtues is 
Universal Love (2003, p. 99). This love, modeled after the Christian agapé (e.g. 
Matt. 5:44), can be expressed either particularly or impartially, but always 
unconditionally. Agapé “does not love in virtue of properties of the beloved which 
then provide justifying grounds or reasons for the love” (2003, p. 121). This 
“unconditional love is an expression of the nature of the lover and is not grounded in 
reasons” (2003, p. 122). Since Universal Love is the mode of moral responsiveness 
that makes up at least some part of all the profiles of the virtues, it is the principle 
expression of the fine inner state of the virtuous agent. Since the case study 
participants described character in predominantly relational and care-based ways, 
Swanton’s pluralistic virtue theory significantly informs the analysis of their 
perspectives throughout Chapters 5-9.  
 
In conclusion, this chapter identified the advantages of virtue ethics over rival 
traditions as a philosophical explanation of character. Aristotle’s life, texts, and 
general argument were introduced. A detailed analysis of the Ethics was undertaken, 
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focusing on the function argument, moral virtues, intellectual virtues, preconditions 
of virtue, phron!sis, degrees of character, and the three conditions for the inculcation 
of phron!sis and moral virtue. The relevance of Aristotle’s ethic to character 
development was then reinforced, and the chapter closed with limitations of and 
different traditions within virtue theory.  
 
While I have given a philosophical account of why I believe virtue ethics to be a 
sound ethical system to address questions of character, scholars from within the 
psychological and moral educational disciplines might wonder why I have drawn so 
little from their theories and literature? This has been an intentional omission, and 







Why Aristotle? The Character Education Movement 
The previous chapter proposed virtue theory as the ethical system most relevant to 
character. However, one could ask why a philosophical approach is preferable to 
other contemporary character education schemes? Although the point of this thesis 
does not rest on establishing virtue ethics’ primacy over other approaches to 
character education, briefly contrasting them may reveal virtue theory’s practical 
significance for education. After a short introduction, a brief history of character 
education within the US and UK is given. Four criticisms of the character education 
movement are then provided, followed by an exploration of several specific character 
education theories. Next, philosophical concerns with the current interest in a 
“pyschologised morality” are raised, and, more generally, the prospect of discovering 
human traits of virtue through scientific investigation is then considered. Penultimate 
to the conclusion, the ancient question, “Can virtue be taught?,” resurfaces to 
confront some of character education’s perhaps insurmountable limitations.  
3.1 Introduction 
Character is in newspapers, magazines, and television shows; in political gatherings 
and in Congress; in school committees and classrooms, ethical character is praised 
and its absence lamented, programs designed to foster it are recommended and 
advanced as the solution to society’s ills. (Blasi, 2005, p. 67) 
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Attention to character education is particularly fervent in times of national crisis. In 
these trying periods, people of varying belief and conviction unite under one banner 
agreed that moral character is the way to avert tragedy (Cunningham, 2005, p. 166). 
Not for a century has there been such interest in educating for character (Blasi, 2005, 
p. 67). As of 2005, seventeen US states have character education in some form of 
legislation, and the US Department of Education is giving multi-millions in support 
of character programmes (Davidson, 2005, pp. 218-219). Many of these programmes 
and organisations entertain hopes of inculcating character into today’s youth (e.g. 
Character Counts, n.d.; Character Education Partnership, n.d.; Child Development 
Project, n.d.). Yet, while there has been talk of the “promise” and “prospect” of 
character education, there is also discussion of its “failings” (Lapsley & Power, 
2005b, p. 2). Although recognition of character education’s promise will be duly 
noted, it is principally with these failings that this chapter is concerned. However, 
before launching into critique, a brief history of character education in both the UK 
and US may help frame the discussion. 
3.2 A History of Character Education in the US and UK 
As this thesis is about an Aristotelian perspective on character, and not about the 
character education movement per se, this historical sketch will be brief, and draw 
heavily on two resources, a British book chapter by Arthur (2003), and a US book 
chapter by Cunningham (2005). This history provides a context for the criticisms of 
character education, which are provided later in the chapter.  
3.2.1 Character Education in the UK 
As will be seen, the UK has not had the enthusiasm for character education more 
characteristic of the US. Arthur (2003, p. x) suggests several reasons for British 
resistance towards educating for character: its association with religious and moral 
indoctrination; its equation with public-schools; and its connotations with fascism 




Yet, Hutchison (1976) claims that there is a history of British character education, 
noting as early as the 1700s, that British academics were interested in strengthening 
character. Many romantics (e.g. Coleridge and Ruskin) also accepted the goal of 
personal growth and development (Arthur, 2005, p. 12), which has been likened to 
the formation of character (Brookes, 2003c, p. 119).  
 
Such interest in character was also reflected within many institutions. Robert Owen’s 
1816 New Lanark school was called the “Institution of the Formation of Character” 
(Arthur, 2003, p. 11). Similarly, as noted in the first chapter of this thesis, Thomas 
Arnold, the renowned headmaster (1828 to 1841), used Rugby School to develop 
character in the boys (ibid., p. 14). Outside of education, the YMCA was formed in 
1844 to promote Christian character, and with decidedly non-religious aims, the 
“Moral Instruction League” was established in 1897 by a group of agnostics 
interested in character education (ibid., pp. 17-18). As a last example, also mentioned 
in Chapter 1, Baden Powell, in 1910, founded the Scout movement, among other 
things, to develop the moral fibre of youth.  
 
In addition to institutions promoting character, there were also publications on 
character. In 1871, Samuel Smiles published Character, attempting to make the 
virtues of a Victorian gentleman accessible to all. The early 1900s contained 
numerous theological attempts to link character to Christian belief (e.g. Watkinson, 
1904; Hull, 1911). The 1920s appear to have produced few publications on character, 
and fewer yet are found in the 1930s, in large part due to the perceived association 
between character training and German imperialist social engineering. An exception 
to this literary dearth was the Board of Education’s 1937 handbook, which made 
character formation the central task of education. Similarly, as Cook’s (1999) 
comments reveal, the 1944 Education Act also emphasised moral formation (Arthur, 
2003, p. 20). However, after the early 1950s, the government was nearly silent on 
issues pertaining to character until the September 5th, 2001, Governmental White 




The 1950s and 60s, through Outward Bound and the Duke of Edinburgh Award, 
emphasised character formation via extracurricular activities. However, the values 
clarification movement (Raths, Harmin, & Simon, 1966) was simultaneously sliding 
towards moral relativism, which resulted in a near multi-decade silence regarding 
character education. Although this “silence” was never complete (e.g. Peters, 1979; 
White, 1991), Arthur (2003, p. 23) suggests that another contributing factor was the 
rise of cognitive-psychology, and its emphasis on critical thinking (rather than 
merely accepting the traditional values of character), which better accommodated the 
liberal values of the culture at the time.  
3.2.2 Character Education in the US 
In the US, throughout the 1700s and early-1800s, Protestant religion was 
preoccupied with “original sin.” Consequently, “moral training” through regimented 
discipline was intended to bring about character change. By the 1850s-1880s, the 
plurality of values entering the US through immigration and the eroding of a divine 
moral foundation by the new theory of evolution questioned the moral values long 
taken for granted. With school now mandatory, and textual/religious support no 
longer permitted in the classroom, educators turned to the less provocative and more 
neutral term “character,” which had a “veneer of objectivity,” for their moral 
instruction (Cunningham, 2005, pp. 170-172).  
 
In America, much mystery surrounded the concept of developing character. 
Darwinian influence posited that one’s character traits might well be limited to one’s 
heredity. Those who were optimistic that character could be influenced were unsure 
as to how much effect one’s will could have (Cunningham, 2005, p. 173).  
 
In 1917, the Department of Superintendence of the National Education Association 
announced that a businessman, who preferred to remain anonymous, had offered a 
monetary reward for the development of a moral code for education. While his 
challenge revealed a lack of understanding regarding the education of character (see 
subsection 3.6.3.1’s discussion of the difference between moral virtue and techne), it 
also spawned much interest in it (Cunningham, 2005, p. 174). With scientific inquiry 
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gaining authority through new discoveries in biology and physiology (e.g. Louie 
Pasteur’s vaccinations against disease and Flemings’ discovery of antibiotics), many 
looked to the sciences as a way to understand not just character, but education as a 
whole (ibid., p. 176).  
 
At the turn of the century Thorndike, a psychologist, was conducting experiments 
(e.g. Thorndike & Woodworth, 1901) on intelligence. He claimed his findings 
revealed that there was little transfer of knowledge between subject areas 
(Cunningham, 2005, pp. 178-9). These results challenged the common assumption 
that the mind was a cohesive collection of discrete faculties. Instead, he claimed that 
the mind was an infinite collection of neurological pathways, each representing an 
individual element of learning. These results had significant ramifications for 
education. The long-held value of general education, which relied on the belief that 
learning from one discipline could be transferred and applied elsewhere, was now 
under scrutiny. Instead, Thorndike’s conclusions pointed to the value of specific and 
particularised education (ibid., pp. 178-9) that did not rely on the prospect of 
transfer. These findings cast significant suspicion on trait theory, and thus character 
education. If each individual neurological pathway was a specific piece of learning 
linked to a specific context, then the existence of some overarching trait that 
transferred learning from one context to another seemed unlikely.  
 
However, a rival view of mind was proposed by William Bagley, an educational 
theorist, who although supporting Thorndike’s findings, rejected their implications. 
He agreed that transfer did not occur under regular and uncontrolled situations; yet, 
he proposed that transfer could happen if the situations were educationally assisted 
(Bagley, 1934, pp. 89-90). Bagley believed that the educator, through discussion 
with his or her students, could draw out the key (e.g. moral or intellectual) factors 
leading to success in a given situation, then generalise such factors into a form that 
the students could apply in other situations.  
 
By the late 1920s, two opposing understandings of character had emerged. One 
position, in the tradition of Thorndike’s empirical psychology, claimed that 
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character, if it existed at all, was merely the accumulation of specific responses to 
specific situations. The other position, following Bagley, was mostly made up of 
“educators and university educationalists [who] were prone to see character as the 
sum total of traits that were progressively ‘integrated’ into a person’s personality” 
(Cunningham, 2005, p. 181).  
 
This disagreement led to the infamous “Character Education Inquiry,” whose 
implicit goal was to disprove the educator’s belief in the possibility of trait growth 
through education (Cunningham, 2005, pp. 181-182). Led by the eminent Yale 
researchers, Hartshorne and May, the study, conducted between 1925 and 1930, 
sought to determine finally whether behaviour proceeded from established traits or 
was shaped by elements of a given situation. The gist of the findings was: “That 
there is very little evidence of unified character traits. We have collected three main 
lines of data showing that there is no such thing as a unified trait of honesty residing 
within an individual” (Hartshorne & May, 1930, p.755). The specific elements of the 
circumstance were found to be more determinative of a participant’s behaviour than 
“any mysterious entity residing within the” participant (ibid., p. 755). Although 
neither purpose nor space warrant a detailed response to this study, Swanton’s (2003) 
virtue ethical explanation of the Milgram experiments, already discussed in 
subsection 2.7.1.5, can similarly be used to critique Hartshorne and May’s research.  
 
Continuing with the US history of character education, interest in morality declined 
in the war years, only to re-emerge during the post-war settlement as the public 
gradually learned of the Nazi atrocities (Cunningham, 2005, p. 189). However, 
increased US immigration continued to create value-plurality. The Cold War and the 
1957 launch of Sputnik competitively convinced American educators that their prime 
duty was developing the intellect (ibid., 190-191), rather than morality.  
 
The 1960s, 70s, and 80s saw the values clarification movement (Raths, Harmin, & 
Simon, 1966), and Kohlberg’s (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983) subsequent 
reaction to the relativism to which it led. The value clarification method encouraged 
young people to access, express, and explore their own “personal” values. 
 
 111 
Kohlberg’s concern was that although students were entering into a process of 
valuing, their values were only relative to themselves. That is, the value clarification 
method made no effort to anchor the values in any larger construct than the self. 
Influenced by Kant and Piaget, Kohlberg’s stage-theory of moral development 
(Kohlberg, Levine & Hewer, 1983) was, in part, a response to this method.  
 
In the 1990s, a number of factors seem to have contributed to a revived interest in the 
development of character: American concern to preserve the “American 
character/ethos” against the flood of immigration; an increase in school violence; the 
growing power of the Christian Right; and a renewed interest in virtue ethics 
(Cunningham, 2005, p. 193).  
 
Cunningham, somewhat sceptically, closes his chapter by predicting that the current 
obsession with character will most likely fade away until “another generation hits 
upon character education as a cure to the social and educational problems of the day” 
(2005, p. 194). 
 
This section provided a brief overview of the character education movement within 
the UK and US. This historical sketch provides a context for the prevailing criticisms 
of the character education movement, discussed next.  
3.3 Criticisms of Character Education 
McLaughlin and Halstead (1999) have described significant portions of the character 
education movement as “non-expansive,” a term they use to denote its often cursory 
and superficial treatment of character (see pp. 137-138). This section provides four 
criticisms relevant to these non-expansive character education programmes: a 
tendency to be uncritical; a focus on producing behavioural effects through authority; 
a lack of moral foundation; and character education’s appeal to empirical research. 
These criticisms will be respectively contrasted with an Aristotelian perspective. 
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3.3.1 Character Education: Uncritical and Non-theoretical 
Berkowitz (2002) acknowledges the disparity among definitions of character 
education. He notes that these definitions range from: traditional character education 
associated with conservative views; moral education, associated with liberal views; 
and values education, associated with a behavioural empirical emphasis (2002, p. 
44). After indicating this breadth of meaning and emphasis, Berkowitz says, “I will, 
from here on use the terms character development and character education to 
represent all these disparate points of view and you can now proceed to forget the 
confusion that I have just outlined for you” (2002, p. 44). Berkowitz’ gross 
simplification of complex moral matters appears paradigmatic of much of the 
character education literature.  
 
Carr and Steutel (1999) note that differences between concepts of moral education, 
differences that Berkowitz carelessly conflates under one term, are “nothing if not 
philosophical” (p. 3). Concerned with the often slipshod nature of character 
education programmes, they observe that although many character educators make 
quick reference to Aristotle’s virtue ethics, it isn’t clear that this “current interest in 
the virtue approach to moral education has been attended by widespread appreciation 
of the philosophical status … of virtue ethics” (ibid., p. 4). Arthur (2003, p. 6) 
agrees, noting that many character programmes are virtue ethical in name only (see 
e.g. Brooks & Goble, 1997). 
 
Cunningham (2005), also finding fault in the uncritical nature of many character 
education programmes, claims that since “character is difficult … to verbalize, to 
theorize, and to rationalize … it has been difficult to study” (p. 168). These 
difficulties have resulted in a “lack of scientific consensus” (ibid., p. 168) regarding 
character, which in turn has allowed the lay community (e.g. parents, youth groups, 
and philanthropists) to contribute to character education concepts and programmes 
without being subject to a critique by experts. Perhaps this is a reason why so many 
character programmes “heralding simplistic slogans such as ‘Honesty is the best 





A general lack of sophistication appears to pervade much of the character education 
literature. For example, Davidson (2005), sees Blasi’s work on moral identity (e.g. 
Blasi, 2005) as the “missing piece of the character education puzzle” (p. 226), 
claiming that surely one wouldn’t transgress one’s moral identity, for to “do 
otherwise would be to violate the essence of who they are.” Davidson, seemingly 
unaware, glosses over the significant psychological conundrum of knowing what to 
do and doing otherwise – a problem that has troubled thinkers since Socrates 
(Protagoras 352-358), Aristotle (Nicomachean ethics, book VII) and the Apostle 
Paul (Romans 7).  
 
Even in more sophisticated forms of character education (e.g. Lickona, 1992), which 
emphasise a reasoned deliberation, “the ethical basis of such reason and deliberation 
is far from well defined” (Carr, 2005, p. 9). Without a careful and reasoned 
philosophical foundation, character educators often regress to a form of character 
education “that focuses too narrowly on stamping out problem behaviours” (Bohlin, 
2005, p. 2), a topic to which this chapter now turns. 
3.3.2 Character Education, Authority and Behavioural Control 
Teachers and schools tend to mistake good behavior for good character. What they 
prize is docility, suggestibility; the child who will do what he is told; or even better, 
the child who will do what is wanted without even having to be told. (Holt, 1968, as 
quoted in Kohn 1997, para. 1) 
Two different but related problems within character education are relevant to this 
subsection: conformity and indoctrination; and the neglect of virtue – both 
intellectual and moral. 
3.3.2.1 Conformity, Indoctrination, and Behavioural Control  
Character education is a far broader enterprise than mere behavioural control 
(Arthur, 2003, p. 8). Much of what goes by the title “character education” today is a 
body of exhortations, and extrinsic motivators that get children to obey the authority 
of adults (Kohn, 1997, para. 5). Similarly, Brandenberger (2005, pp. 308-309) notes 
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that character education, because of its associations with values forced through 
authority and discipline, has been likened to a form of indoctrination.  
 
Further concern arises from character educators (e.g. Wynn & Ryan, 1997) who use 
positive (rewards) and negative (punishments) extrinsic motivation, which often lead 
to little more than behavioural conditioning. Echoes of this conformity and 
conditioning can be heard in Kilpatrick’s (1993) description of character education 
as being:  
 
based on the idea that there are traits of character that children ought to know, that 
they learn these by example, and that once they know them, they need to practice 
them until they become second nature. (p. 15) 
In a telling choice of metaphor that again speaks to this conformity, Berkowitz 
(2002, p. 47) likens the act of implementing character programmes before identifying 
what character is to constructing a mousetrap before knowing what a mouse is. 
3.3.2.2 What About Virtue? 
Kupperman’s (2005, p. 207) concern with character education is that by controlling 
behaviour with rewards and punishment, virtue is often precluded. I would add: it is 
precluded in two following ways.  
 
First, in providing the acceptable moral behaviour for the student, a character 
educator precludes opportunity to develop the intellectual virtues via the deliberative 
process, which results in moral decisions (see subsection 2.3.6). McLaughlin and 
Halstead (1999, p. 144, 146) echo this concern, criticising indoctrinatory character 
education, because it does not foster the moral reasoning necessary to make sound 
decisions in the midst of life’s vicissitudes. Curren (1999) shares these sentiments, 
noting that “habits formed under the guidance of others’ good judgement will not 
fully equip one to face life’s complexities” (p. 69). Of course, persuasion and 
exhortation have their place, but the goal of character education shouldn’t be to 
manipulate outcomes here and now, but rather to prepare the learner “for eventually 





An emphasis on telling students what character is, and what virtues to possess, leads 
to a “bumper-sticker morality … whose pithy phrases and eye-catching designs 
seemed patterned for quick consumption by passersby rather than being intended as a 
subject matter for reflection and discussion” (Jackon, Boostrom, & Hansen, 1993, p. 
9). Although general rules are helpful starting points in ethical reflection, Aristotle 
understood that there are no context-free decisions, and thus a reflective mean, not 
the universal prescriptions so often touted within character education, is necessary 
for right action (Kupperman 2005, p. 202). It is judgement based in phron!sis that 
informs the agent that a given situation may warrant transgression of a general rule 
(e.g. Socrates’ civil disobedience in the Apology 38c-e (Plato, trans. 2002)). Advising 
students what to do through character education may be necessary but not sufficient 
(Kupperman, 2005, p. 209; Noddings, 2002, pp. 1-2, 4). Good character is more 
about becoming a rational agent than learning or memorising a set of edicts 
(Kupperman, 2005, p. 216)  
 
Noddings (2002) offers a similar critique of character education programmes that 
disregard this saliency of context: “this on-the-spot correction [of undesirable 
behaviour by parents and teachers] is not atypical of character education. 
Programmes are planned in advance, and the virtues are taught out of context” (ibid., 
p. 4). McLaughlin and Halstead (1999) share Noddings’ concern: “often the virtues 
are presented as if they were distinct items on a list which can be tackled 
systematically and separately by educators” (p. 145). They note that this treats 
character like a “bag of virtues.” The goal of character education is not to promulgate 
prescriptions, but to facilitate perception of context and discernment for reflective 
response (Sherman, 1991, p. 172; see also McLaughlin & Halstead, 1999, p. 143).  
 
Second, by supplying the motivation for the student, in the form of rewards and 
punishments, virtuous motivation (the noble (kalos) for its own sake (IV 2§7)) is 
precluded. As examined in section 2.3.3.3, virtue for Aristotle is much more than 
simply mimicking right action. When character educators enforce behaviour through 
peremptory and extrinsic means, an agent’s motivation becomes the fear of 
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punishment or the desire for reward, rather than the kalos (IV 2§7) of moral virtue. 
Kohn (1992, 1993; see also Noddings, 2002, p.7) notes that when offered within a 
school culture, these rewards (which he refers to as bribes (1993, p. 15)) often make 
winners and losers and create negative competition whereby others become a barrier 
to one’s success. More harshly, Skillen (1997) calls this model a “morality through 
conformity,” which corrupts motivation leaving nothing but a “virtual morality” (p. 
377).  
 
Ultimately, the extrinsic motivational techniques often employed in character 
education prevent the development of a hexis, a disposition to act rightly with regard 
to a given virtue (see subsection 2.4.2 on practice). A programme that truly seeks to 
develop character must: willingly offer its students the opportunity to choose poorly; 
provide a caring environment in which the student suffers the consequences of the 
poor decision; facilitate conversation(s) to process the decision, and project better 
future judgement; and finally, make sure the student has other opportunities to try.  
 
Aristotelian virtue thus requires both intellectual and moral virtue (see subsection 
2.3.6.2). R. S. Peters (1963) seems to have understood the balance between these 
elements, that children “can and must enter the palace of reason through the 
courtyard of habit and tradition” (pp. 54-55).  
3.3.3 Character Education Without a Moral Platform 
The problem with most current approaches to character education … is that each 
attempts to advance a particular moral vocabulary and a set of preferred moral 
virtues, as if both of these were part and parcel of a “grand narrative” accepted by, 
and normative for, everyone. (Nash, 2005, pp. 260-261) 
Many character education programmes, even when aware of the importance of 
intrinsic motivation, provide weak moral foundations for their espoused values. For 
example, many character educators see no philosophical trouble in the concept of 
obligation (e.g. Lickona, 1996, p. 95), but as subsection 2.1.2.3 indicated, the fact-
value (see Carr, 2008a, pp. 174-175) divide has plagued modern moral philosophy 
since Hume. Further, character educators often seem to assume that values can be 
easily identified, agreed upon, and justified to the public. Without a morally 
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“comprehensive framework” that provides a reasoned source of values, non-
expansive (McLaughlin and Halstead’s (1999, pp. 137-138) term, mentioned above 
in the introduction to section 3.3, for cursory and superficial character education 
programmes) character educators have often associated neo-conservative political 
claims (e.g. patriotism, work ethic) with values of character (McLaughlin & 
Halstead, 1999, p. 143).  
 
Unlike much of the character education literature I have encountered, Aristotle, in his 
naturalised virtue ethic (see subsection 2.3.2.3), provides a sound philosophical 
rationale for ethical action.  
3.3.4 Research in Character Education 
The implications of lacking a morally comprehensive framework extend beyond the 
practical pedagogical matters just mentioned; they affect character education 
scholarship as well.  
 
For example, though apparently recognising many of the critiques offered throughout 
this chapter, Berkowitz (2002), noting that the “field of character education is rife 
with controversy,” and that these debates have “strong roots in theoretical and 
philosophical differences” (p. 43), glosses these quandaries claiming that “when … 
the dust settles … the bottom line of character education is not philosophical 
distinctions …. Rather, it is the development of children” (ibid., p. 43). As a means 
of moving the “development of children” forward, he implies that we must put aside 
our philosophical differences, and get on with “The Science of Character Education” 
(Berkowitz 2002; see also Berkowitz & Bier, 2005, p. 276). He seems to believe that 
“science,” perhaps because of its empirical nature, can somehow side-step these 
difficult philosophical problems, and provide an objective understanding of character 
and its formation. He speaks of the “anatomy” of morality (1997) as if ethics was 
something to be examined on a dissection table. After asking how best to “measure” 
character, and what the “dose response” of character education might be, he suggests 
“these are but a few important questions left for character scientists to answer” (1997, 




These attempts to quantify character are not limited to the character education 
literature. A recent publication within OAE endeavored to measure a hypothesised 
increase in environmental virtue over a 10-week period (Martin, Bright, Cafaro, 
Mittelstaedt, & Bruyere, 2009; see also 2008). Using a control group, the researchers 
administered the “Children’s Environmental Virtue Scale” before and after the 10-
week environmental curriculum. Although their hypothesis was that “the mean 
environmental virtue scores of students” in the treatment group would “increase 
significantly after participation in the school’s curriculum” (2009, p. 347), their 
findings revealed just the opposite. “Significant results indicated a decrease in the 
mean environmental virtue scores for students who participated in the expeditionary 
learning unit” (ibid., p. 341). Although the authors provide several possible 
explanations for their disappointing results, none of their considerations question the 
appropriateness of the quantitative approach they took. Their assumption that the 
development of virtue can be accessed on a 5-point likert scale (ibid., p. 348), belies 
the complexity and sophistication of Aristotle’s philosophical account, and highlights 
the need, within OAE, for a comprehensive virtue ethical exposition of character.  
 
Numerous problems surround the prospect of a scientific understanding of character. 
At a pragmatic level for researchers, “the pressure to prove effectiveness reduces a 
life-course process like character education into a tenuous time crunch” (Davidson, 
2005, p. 220; see also Martin et al., 2009, p. 354). More fundamentally, Carr (2006) 
notes: “what we regard as matter for moral empirical investigation will obviously be 
largely dependent on what we count (conceptually and/or normatively) as morally 
significant rather than vice versa” (p. 3). Wittgenstein (1963) expresses a similar 
concern, “the existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the 
means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and method pass 
one another by” (p. 232). 
 
These empirical concerns suggest that scientifically-oriented character educators 
might benefit from first considering Aristotle’s caution offered two millennia ago: 
“our discussion will be adequate if we make things perspicuous enough to accord 
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with the subject matter; for we would not seek the same degree of exactness in all 
sorts of arguments alike” (I 3§4). Thus, character educators with empirical 
aspirations might consider philosophically evaluating whether the topic of character 
warrants quantitative investigations in the first place. This consideration is given 
significant attention in the next chapter on methodology.  
 
This section has addressed a number of criticisms lodged against non-expansive 
character education. A significant portion of the character education literature was 
observed to be ungrounded theoretically and philosophically. Next, the behavioural 
control often associated with character education programmes was found to preclude 
virtue. More fundamentally, concerns were raised over the lack of comprehensive 
moral frameworks found in many character education programmes. Last, a few of the 
challenges surrounding the empirical investigation of character were introduced.  
 
Before moving to the next section, it is important to note that the critique here has 
targeted predominantly non-expansive character education. As McLaughlin and 
Halstead (1999, p. 146) have graciously noted, character educators “should not be 
lumped together too uncritically, nor should the nuance and sophistication of some of 
their views be overlooked” (as an example see Nash (2005), a self-acclaimed post-
modern, anti-realist, moral constructivist, character educator (pp. 246-252)). A few 
of these more nuanced perspectives on character will now be examined. 
3.4 Valiant Attempts at Character Education 
This section highlights several promising character education programmes. To call a 
character education programme “a valiant attempt” is to make an evaluative 
judgement. The “merits” of these programmes are here discussed in light of my 
having chosen a naturalised (see subsection 2.3.2.3) virtue ethical perspective on 
character. Since space prohibits any detailed analysis of these various character 
education programmes, only aspects directly relevant to the thesis are considered.  
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3.4.1 Narvaez’s Integrative Ethical Education 
Darcia Narvaez is a cognitive psychologist, with particular interests in moral 
cognition. She has developed a number of integrated theories, one of which will be 
examined here. Narvaez’s (2005) Integrative Ethical Education (IEE) brings together 
“traditional character education and rational moral education,” calling IEE, “a third 
way” (p. 703). She claims that these two modes of education fit “tolerably well” with 
the philosophies of Aristotle and Kant respectively (ibid., p. 703). By traditional 
character education she has in mind traditionalists, such as Wynne and Ryan (1997) 
who stress “the development of habits and dispositions consonant with the 
community traditions” (Narvaez, 2005, p. 710). By rational moral education she 
refers to Kohlberg’s work (e.g. Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983), which was 
influenced by Kant’s deontological perspective. 
 
While the attempt to couple dispositions and moral reasoning, so often separated in 
character education programmes, within one “integrated” system is commendable, to 
try to do so with two philosophically conflicting paradigms is problematic. Further, 
to understand Aristotle’s principal interest (see Narvaez, 2005, p. 711) to be habit 
formation is grossly to misunderstand and simplify his moral contribution.  
 
Yet, even if these philosophical incompatibilities could be mended, an equally 
troubling concern is Narvaez’s equation of morality and expertise: “according to this 
model, character is a set of component skills that can be cultivated to high levels of 
expertise” (Narvaez & Lapsley, 2005, p. 154). Narvaez explicitly draws on the 
ancient Greek concept of techne (Narvaez, 2005, p. 703), seemingly unaware of the 
Greek contrast between techne and the dispositions required for morality (VI 5§7; 
see discussion of Dunne’s work on phron!sis and techne in subsection 3.6.3.1). 
3.4.2 Lickona: Educating for Character 
Thomas Lickona, a developmental psychologist, has written a paper entitled Eleven 
Principles of Effective Character Education (1996). In Aristotelian fashion, he 
understands character to be a matter of thinking, feeling and behaving well (ibid., p. 
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95). He also recognises the need to practise appropriate moral response, and that this 
practice should come from the students’ own motivation (ibid., pp. 96-97).  
 
Yet, while acknowledging the importance of thinking and feeling, his approach to 
character assessment seems based on behavioural measurement (Lickona, 1996, p. 
99), which overlooks questions of intentionality and motivation. Additionally, his 
explanations of character do not account for potentially difficult moral dilemmas, 
and he rather naively seems to assume moral obligation and universal value 
agreement (ibid., p. 95).  
3.4.3 Noddings’ Ethic of Care 
Nel Noddings is an educational philosopher with particular interest in how care – 
both caring and being cared for – contributes to ethical development. In a work 
entitled A Caring Alternative to Character Education Noddings (2002) proposes an 
ethic that is relational, and contrasts it with what she believes to be the individual 
agent-based virtues of Aristotle’s account: “care ethicists depend more heavily on 
establishing the conditions and relations that support moral ways of life than on the 
inculcation of virtues in individuals” (ibid., p. xiii).  
 
Noddings places caring relationships at the centre of her ethic, because they best 
facilitate the conditions under which one becomes good (2002, p. 2). By modeling 
morality within a healthy caring relationship, the “conditions most likely to support 
moral life” are created (ibid., p. 9). For Noddings, feelings and affect are the true 
motivators of ethical action (ibid., p. 8). Therefore, since being cared-for so 
profoundly affects how one feels about him or herself, others, and the world, 
relationships become key to the moral life. In this way, “a thoroughly relational ethic 
emphasizes our ethical interdependence” (ibid., p. 9).  
 
Although Noddings goes to significant pains to distance her position from virtue 
ethics, a broad, more comprehensive understanding of virtue ethics (e.g. Swanton, 
2003; see subsection 2.7.1.5) could encompass care theory, and make a significant 




A further connection between care theory and virtue ethics comes in the scholarship 
of Slote’s (e.g. 2001, 2007, 2010a, 2010b) agent-based virtue ethics (described in 
subsection 2.7.1.4). The relevance of Slote’s agent-basing to this thesis will be 
explored in section 8.2’s discussion of moral practice on the case study’s expedition. 
For as subsection 8.2.2 will reveal, the case study participants identified moral 
opportunities to care for one another throughout the expedition, and OAE scholars 
have employed Noddings’ care theory as a helpful theoretical lens to examine such 
opportunities within outdoor adventure programmes (e.g. McKenzie & Blenkinsop, 
2006; Quay, Dickinson, & Nettleton, 2000, 2003; Seaman & Coppens, 2006).  
3.4.4 Bohlin’s Teaching Character Education Through Literature 
Karen Bohlin is a scholar working for the Center for the Advancement of Ethics and 
Character (n.d.). Bohlin’s work on character education through literature (2005) is an 
excellent example to non-expansive character education programmes. Bohlin’s hope 
is “to provide theoretical and practical insight into the way narrative literature can 
reveal moral growth and decline” (2005, p. 8). By examining fictional narratives, 
students are able to “consider and evaluate an individual’s motivations, aspirations, 
and choices” (ibid., p. 9). The fictional character’s struggles, mistakes, and triumphs 
become relevant to the students’ own journey, as they “make their own choices, and 
in doing so, give consideration to the kind of person they would like to become” 
(ibid., p. 9). Throughout her work, Bohlin shows philosophical sensitivity and an 
awareness of the limitations of her contribution. For example, she understands that 
character education must come from multiple fronts: “this book does not promise 
that an ethical inquiry into literature will transform the character of the reader. It 
does, however, aim to predispose the reader to moral attentiveness, ethical reflection, 
and refined judgments” (ibid., pp. 8-9).  
 
The last half of her book consists of a series of literary case studies on character. She 





This section applauded, any criticisms not withstanding, four character educators for 
their conscientious contributions to character theory.  
3.5 A Psychologised Morality 
Within the character education movement, many of the scholarly contributions are 
currently coming from the field of psychology. Since these efforts draw directly on 
the Aristotelian tradition of ethical naturalism, a more detailed examination of their 
tenets is warranted, and thus the discussion here receives its own section within the 
chapter. This section will open with a brief synopsis of the “psychologised morality” 
movement. Next, the concept of a psychologised morality will be philosophically 
criticised. However, following this critique, consideration will be given to the 
psychologically derived empirical findings that may aid philosophers in their search 
for characteristic moral activity. The section will close noting virtue ethicist 
Christine McKinnon’s efforts to employ these psychological findings in her 
understanding of character.  
3.5.1 The Movement 
Much scholastic interest in character education is currently located in the field of 
psychology (e.g. Lapsley & Power, 2005a). Complaining that for too long, moral 
psychology has depended on moral philosophy (e.g. Kohlberg’s drawing on Kant), a 
“moralised psychology,” it is alleged to be now time for psychology to take the 
leading role, a “psychologised morality” (Lapsley & Power, 2005b, p. 4). Drawing 
inspiration from the recent resurgence of ethical naturalism, which makes normative 
evaluations from more or less empirical realities about the flourishing human life, 
such psychologists want to ground ethical theory in sound empirical moral 
psychology (ibid., p. 3), believing that they can “use psychological resources to 
defeat ethical relativism” (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2005, p. 23). By empirically 
determining the kinds of activities that lead to human flourishing, these psychologists 
believe they can provide an objective morality. Blasi (1990, p. 55), asking for a 
psychologised morality freed from the philosophical trappings of Kohlberg’s work, 




Proponents of this new scientific field, dubbed “moralogy” by Japanese scientists 
(Berkowitz, 2002, p. 44), write that: “it is clear that the boundaries between 
philosophy and psychology are being renegotiated” (Power & Lapsley, 2005, p. 
336). 
3.5.2 Problems With a Psychologised Morality 
Although Lapsley & Narvaez (2005) call a psychologised morality a “meditation on 
the relationship between moral philosophy and moral psychology” (p. 21; italics 
added), their work actually attempts to circumvent the philosophical and provide an 
empirically grounded objective morality. 
 
Divorcing moral philosophy from moral psychology is fraught with difficulties. It is 
hard to see how modern psychology can attempt to justify morality on “quasi-
empirical research alone” without appealing “however covert[ly], to specific 
epistemological, [and] ethical ... considerations” (Steutel & Carr, 1999, p. 3).  
 
As noted above, proponents of a psychologised morality draw on ethical naturalism’s 
appeal to characteristic human nature. Just as a wild flower has features that reveal 
whether it is a “good” example of its species (size, shape, color, smell, duration, 
etc.), so too, ethical naturalists posit there may be consistent features of human 
nature that characteristically lead to a flourishing life. Advocates of a psychologised 
morality expand on this idea and claim that empirical investigation can determine 
these characteristics and therefore provide an objective morality.  
 
However, what is seemingly unrecognised by such psychologists, is that their 
empirical work is still dependant on normative claims. Carr (2007) puts it like this: 
“since the claim that ethics should start from the facts is not itself a fact, it is not the 
sort of claim that could itself be empirically decided in any non-question-begging 
way” (p. 399). Empirically determining such characteristic human features would 
merely provide the basis of an arguably contentious claim that these features should 
in some way be given moral priority.  
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3.5.3 Overlapping Data 
Scholars advocating a psychologised morality draw on social-cognitive research to 
build their case. If one accepts the research to which they appeal, as virtue ethicist 
Christine McKinnon recommends (2005, p. 36), several findings do appear to 
support the normative claims of ethical naturalists. That is, there appears to be some 
agreement between the empirical findings, and what Aristotle claimed so long ago.  
3.5.3.1 Dispositions of Perception 
Current social-cognitive research understands dispositions of character to be 
complex cognitive-affective units (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2005, p. 29; see also Shoda, 
Tiernan, & Mischel, 2002, p. 317). Such units may be explained as follows. A 
general principle for activating our knowledge is its accessibility, called chronicity. 
Since different people have different experiences, their accessibility to ideas, 
feelings, memories, and beliefs, are individual and unique. That which is easily 
accessible, which is what has been chronically accessed, influences “one’s 
impression of others and memory and interpretation of social events” (Lapsley & 
Narvaez, 2005, p. 29). That is, “the kind of social-cognitive structures that are easily 
primed, easily activated, and chronically accessible for making sense of our 
experience” (ibid., 2005, p. 32), largely shape our interpretation of experience.  
 
For such psychologists, the virtuous are those who have moral categories chronically 
available for perceiving and making sense of social reality; whereas, the vicious 
would have other schemas available. These findings accord with Aristotle’s concept 
of dispositional habit, a hexis (see 2.4.2). More specifically, the relationship between 
the accessibility of social-cognitive structures and one’s ability to perceive moral 
saliency, speaks to McDowell’s moral realist paradigm, whereby virtue is a matter of 
seeing correctly (Crisp, 2000, p. xxiv). 
3.5.3.2 Automaticity 
Drawing again from cognitive research, psychologised moralists empirically claim to 
understand how ethical judgment is refined. Taking issue with moral theory that 
demands conscious moral deliberation, cognitive scientists now believe that much of 
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our cognitive activity is “tacit, implicit, and automatic” (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2005, 
p.26; see also Bargh, 1989). This tacit knowing is often referred to as “intuition” 
(Narvaez & Lapsley, 2005, p. 147). However, scientists also maintain that this 
intuitive, tacit automaticity is educable. “Indeed, … the whole point of moral 
education is to educate moral intuitions so that moral action is not always 
beleaguered by moral deliberation” (ibid., p. 150). This education occurs through 
positive and negative experiences, where the person builds his or her understanding 
and “assumptions about the world that mould memories, perceptions, and 
judgments” (ibid., pp. 152-153).  
 
Similarly, the concept of automaticity is redolent of Aristotle’s claim (III 8§15) that 
at times virtue demands an instantaneous response (e.g. moving a child from the path 
of speeding car). For Aristotle, this ability to react automatically requires a state of 
virtue wherein the agent finds “nothing pleasant against reason” (VII 10§6), thus 
causing no need to pause for unnecessary deliberation.  
3.5.4 McKinnon – An Empirical Philosopher? 
As mentioned above, McKinnon (2005), a virtue ethicist in the naturalist tradition, 
believes cooperation from “biology, psychology, ethology, sociology, history, 
neurophysiology and cognitive sciences” will help us better understand human nature 
(p. 37), and thus illuminate more clearly what a flourishing life might look like. 
Thus, she is supportive of the efforts within much of the psychologised morality 
research.  
 
Although locating herself in the ethical naturalist tradition, McKinnon (2005, pp. 57-
59) proposes to give an account of character that does not rest on a telos of 
eudaimonia, nor an ergon of right reasoning, the two concepts most often rejected by 
the modern reader. Instead, she identifies character construction as a 
“quintessentially human activity …. A central human function grounded in facts of 
human nature” (ibid., p. 58). Her argument is as follows: since humans can reason, 
they tend to act on reasons; since humans are capable of self-reflectivity, they tend to 
think about different reasons for their actions; since this self-reflectivity provides a 
 
 127 
subjective perspective on themselves, and because humans tend to want to act on 
reasons of which they approve, they naturally, in their reasoning and acting, care for 
and attempt to build their character (ibid., p. 48). In other words, humans “aspire to a 
kind of unity of purpose as a way of providing coherence and meaning to their lives” 
(ibid., p. 54). McKinnon believes that by nature, humans care about their own 
character, and others’ views of their character (ibid., p. 56). We instinctively know 
that “character possession pays” (ibid., 2005, p. 62). 
 
Since humans will inevitably “evaluate desires, dispositions, motives, and reasons as 
ones that are good or bad for them” (McKinnon, 2005, p. 53), scientists may begin to 
observe patterns of action, skills and traits that lead to a flourishing life (ibid., pp, 41, 
43).  
 
McKinnon’s theory substitutes a distant eudaimonia of traditional virtue ethics – an 
imagined flourishing life that is struggled towards – for a more organically implicit 
motivation, nearly felt as an obligation, to care for one’s self. Although not 
appealing to Aristotle’s archaic language or psychology (psuch!), McKinnon’s 
argument appears to be fundamentally similar to a traditional virtue ethical account. 
However, by articulating the ethical naturalist’s position, without any reference to 
ancient Greece, the appeal of this ethic may be increased.  
 
In closing this section on a moralised psychology, my comments and critiques have 
assumed the possibility of empirically identifying morally relevant characteristic 
human features. However, this possibility is questioned by some: “the mind … 
perceives and feels as well as knows, and the three, along with other features of our 
mental lives, are combined in ways we haven’t the vaguest understanding of” (Egan, 
2002, p. 137). Whether or not virtue ethics receives the assistance of the sciences, 
Aristotle’s account has already made “things perspicuous enough to accord with the 
subject matter” (I 3§1). 
 
This section introduced and philosophically criticised a moralised psychology for 
putting the cart before the horse – for thinking that it could secure an objective 
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morality without any appeal to normative claims. However, the psychological-
empirical findings of cognitive-affective units and automaticity were found to 
support the normative claims of virtue ethics. Finally, McKinnon’s non-traditional 
account of character was offered as an example of how the sciences might contribute 
to an understanding of virtue, by identifying what activities are of morally relevant 
human interest.  
3.6 Can Virtue Be Taught? 
While the above critiques have targeted specific difficulties, I now move to more 
general concerns surrounding character education. Since so many character 
education programmes broadly claim their origin in Aristotle’s virtue ethics (Carr & 
Steutel, 1999, pp. 3-4), Meno’s question to Socrates, “Can virtue be taught?” (Plato, 
trans. 1977, Meno 70a), is an important one. This section discusses a variety of 
challenges facing a pedagogy of virtue. The first two subsections will examine the 
limited power and influence of schools, and the inexperience of children, which 
together create challenges for virtue development. More fundamentally, the third 
subsection will claim that since an ethics of virtue depends on moral judgement, 
understanding morality as a matter of achieving skill-based expertise (techne), a tenet 
of many character education programmes (e.g. Narvaez, 2005, p. 703), is extremely 
problematic. The section will close by asserting that experiential methods better 
serve the formation of phronetic judgement (phron!sis), and thus virtuous character. 
3.6.1 The Limitations of Schools 
For better or worse, … moral character … is shaped to a great extent by … 
families, by … culture .... It would be naive to think that public education can solve 
the moral crisis in our culture. It falls well beyond the competence of schools to 
eliminate the violence and drugs, the narcissism and psychopathology, of children 
raised in dysfunctional families and a corrupt culture. (Nord, 1995, p. 350) 
Others agree with Nord’s assessment. School is just “too constricted a moral arena” 
to facilitate the necessary reflective discussions on values (Skillen, 1997, p. 387). 
Although there is less research interest in the family’s role in moral formation, many 
believe that its influence greatly surpasses that of all others (Arthur, 2003, p. 8). 
“Schools are limited by democratic commitments and can only support certain values 
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and virtues of home and society when asked to do so” (ibid., pp. 119-120; see also 
Egan, 2002, p. 136).  
 
Such scholars suggest that the character education movement would do well to focus 
on the home as a place of character development, rather than the school, which so 
many of them actually target (e.g. Jackson, Boostrom & Hansen, 1993; Lickona, 
1992; Oakes, Quartz, Ryan & Lipton, 2005; Wynne & Ryan 1997). 
3.6.2 Are Children Too Young? 
Noddings (2002) notes that many character education programmes disregard 
Aristotle’s progression of moral development: a child should first acquire good 
behaviour through obedience; then come to feel appropriately towards the good; and 
finally to reason properly about the good (pp. 4-5).  
 
Aristotle claims that while “young people become accomplished in geometry and 
mathematics, and wise within these limits, prudent [acting in the light of phron!sis] 
young people do not seem to be found” (VI 8§5). If young people are precluded from 
the source of character, phron!sis, how can it be said that their character is developed 
through these character education programmes (Curren, 1999, p. 78-79)? In this 
regard, Elliott (2000) speaks of character development in 4-5 year olds (p. 3), and 
Berkowitz (2002, p. 50) even hints at the possibility of character formation in infants 
and prenatal foetuses. This optimism is questionable, since Narveaz (2001, p. 43), 
herself an advocate and architect of character education programmes for the young, 
has published research on comprehension and the reading of moral texts, a common 
method of teaching virtue, finding that many children did not at all understand the 
moral points of the stories.  
 
Kupperman (1991, p. 175), critiques the character education movement’s optimistic 
claims regarding character formation in the young. He loosely suggests three main 
developments within Aristotelian character: 1) one begins to learn what good and 
bad character is in general; 2) one starts to adopt an independent perspective, 
beginning to make one’s own judgements; and 3) one begins making decisions as to 
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who one is, reflectively evaluating on one’s own reasoning and character. He then 
equates these three developments roughly with elementary, secondary and university 
education respectively. If Kupperman and Noddings are correct, then the character 
education movement will need to create curricula that more accurately complement 
these developmental phases.  
 
On the surface, it may appear that non-expansive character education has been 
sensitive to the developmental needs of the young. For since the young do not have 
the experience or self-control required for virtuous action (I 3§5; I 4§6-7; II 3§2), 
they must rely on the judgement and authority of others (phronimai) – which seems 
to be exactly what the character educators have done. The difficulty, as subsection 
3.3.2 indicated, is the way in which this judgement and authority is communicated. 
As noted in the critique given earlier, while persuasion, exhortation, and obedience 
to moral rules are helpful starting points for the (very) young, they are not sufficient 
to develop character. Using punishment as an extrinsic motivator, expecting 
compliance without explanation and teaching virtues without context may actually 
delay moral development in the young. The necessary support provided by 
phronimai must also be accompanied by pedagogical efforts to develop gradually the 
independent moral reasoning necessary for virtuous character. While these efforts 
will range from the elementary to the complex, growth in phron!sis is a gradual 
refinement of human sensitivity, and not something to be left to adulthood. The 
upshot of this oversight is that non-expansive character education programmes 
provide the beginnings of character education, but fail to cultivate the judgment 
necessary for Aristotelian character. 
 
These developmental challenges help explain the next concern to be examined in this 
section, that of morality as expertise. Since the young are slow to develop the moral 
reasoning necessary for character development, it is not surprising that educators 
committed to character have looked for other pedagogical strategies to develop 
pupils morally. However, the strategies often employed reduce moral action to a skill 
or technique (a techne see VI 4), which Aristotle painstakingly differentiates from 
the phron!sis necessary for virtue.  
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3.6.3 Moral Virtue Is Not a Techne 
What this movement [back towards the rough ground of phron!sis] represents is 
philosophy’s ken"sis – its divesting itself of godlike notions and coming to accept 
that it cannot have and therefore must no longer aspire to a god’s-eye view of the 
human condition. (Dunne, 1993, p. 374) 
From an Aristotelian perspective, the most fundamental failure of non-expansive 
character education programmes is their tendency to confuse morality with skill, a 
techne.  
 
Dunne (1993), in Back to the Rough Ground: “Phron!sis” and “Techne” in Modern 
Philosophy and in Aristotle, the work from which this thesis takes its title, examines 
the differences between phron!sis and techne. Many character educators (e.g. 
Narvaez, 2005, p. 703) take moral education to be principally a matter of skill (what 
Aristotle refers to as techne) development, of attaining a kind of moral expertise. 
However, Aristotle claims that character depends, not on achieving expertise, but on 
cultivating practical wisdom (phron!sis). These two different goals, techne for the 
character education movement, and phron!sis for virtue ethics, require very different 
pedagogical approaches to the development of character. Through attention to 
Dunne’s (1993) analysis, I hope to bolster further the argument for taking virtue 
ethics as a lens through which to examine character.  
3.6.3.1 Techne 
Subsection 2.3.2.1 explained that Aristotle divided the rational part of the soul into 
two separate parts (see VI 1§5), one concerned with scientific reasoning, the other 
with “non-scientific rational calculation” (Irwin, 1999, p. 239). Both techne and 
phron!sis are intellectual virtues located within this non-scientific rationally 
calculating part of the rational soul. However, Aristotle notes that the kind of 
reasoning employed by each is very different (VI 4§1; see also VI 5§3). Techne (VI 
4), translated as “craft knowledge,” employs a type of reasoning most often 
associated with the artisan (e.g. sculptor), and concerns itself with producing 
(poi!sis) things from matter. Master craftsmen know the why, how, and with what of 
their material, and can give a rational account of their productive actions (Dunne, 
1993, p. 9). In contrast, phron!sis utilises a type of reasoning concerned with rational 
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action (praxis), action that is an end itself, and is done for its own sake (VI 5§4). 
Dunne further describes praxis as: 
conduct in a public space with others in which a person, without ulterior purpose 
and with a view to no object detachable from himself, acts in such a way as to 
realize excellences that he has come to appreciate in his community as constitutive 
of a worthwhile way of life. (Dunne, 1993, p. 9) 
Because praxis involves interaction with others, the circumstances under which it is 
practised are much more varied and unpredictable than the more controlled contexts 
of poi!sis. Praxis then, requires a type of knowing that is more relational, flexible, 
and experiential, and therefore less formulaic than the knowing (techne) required by 
poi!sis. Dunne (1993) considers Aristotle’s differentiation of the type of knowledge 
(phron!sis) necessary for praxis to be his “singular achievement” (p. 9). Through this 
insight, Aristotle initiated a tradition that views “the regulation of practice as 
something non-technical but not, however, non-rational” (ibid., pp. 9-10). 
3.6.3.2 Phron!sis 
To have phron!sis is to know how to live well. Phron!sis is a kind of sensitive 
knowledge that utilises perceptiveness of particulars as much as knowledge of 
universals. In fact, to speak of phron!sis as “knowledge,” is to some degree a 
misnomer, for it is really a “resourcefulness of mind” that can be brought to the 
particulars of a situation (Dunne, 1993, p. 273). This resourcefulness is put to 
practical matters, circumstances that require decision on how to proceed (VI 1§5). As 
mentioned in 2.3.6, phron!sis is both deployed and acquired through experience. 
That is, while phron!sis guides our actions, it also arises from them. It has the 
difficult task, “to discover a good that one must become” (ibid., p. 270). In this way, 
a person’s phron!sis is ultimately an expression of who they are (ibid., p. 244). It 
cannot be learned in isolation from the person one has become.  
 
Phron!sis – in the form of perceptions, interpretations, and judgements – is required 
to inform praxis, and its role in searching for the good is directly related to an 
agent’s moral integrity (Dunne, 1993, p. 358-359). The more developed phron!sis 
becomes, the more one becomes a phonimos, a person of practical wisdom. Seen in 
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this way, character then can be said to protect, maintain, and develop phron!sis 
(ibid., p. 277). 
3.6.3.3 Why Praxis Cannot Be Governed by Techne 
The judgement required to participate in a praxis, for example teaching, is so 
“multiform and heterogeneous” that it falls under no techne or set of skills (Dunne, 
1993, p. 258). Within praxis, there can be no pre-established right reason (orthos 
logos), but only the contextualised understanding of which a phronimos is solely 
capable. 
 
Unlike technical knowledge that can be put to instrumental means, phron!sis is not a 
cognitive capacity that can be manipulated. One cannot step outside of one’s 
phron!sis, in the same way one can with a skill (e.g. sculpting), for it very much 
expresses who a person is. Whereas a technician can stand outside of the material he 
works and objectively shape it, the phronimos “becomes and discovers ‘who’ he is 
through these actions” (Dunne, 1993, p. 263) – and never achieves sovereignty over 
this becoming. Action that flows from phron!sis “already has the full weight of 
ourselves behind it and so can [not] be instrumentalized” (ibid., p. 268; see VI 5§5-
8). In other words, one cannot learn to be moral (techne) without becoming moral 
(phron!sis). 
 
Although modern character educators, such as those mentioned in subsection 3.3.2.1, 
risk treating moral education as a technicised poi!sis, Aristotle recognised that ethics 
is an issue of praxis, and therefore an account of character can only be given in 
“rough” (II 2§3). One’s morality wholly depends on phron!sis, and phron!sis is not 
a body of knowledge that can be made the object of instruction”: it is not 
instrumentalisable (Dunne, 1993, p. 306). Phron!sis, with the help of moral virtue (II 
6§15), reckons appropriate action now, by finding a mean relative to both agent and 
circumstances. This process of determining the mean, a deliberative process which 
rests on perception, is “unspecifiable in advance” (ibid., 1993, p. 311). The 
variability of moral circumstances, and the range of responses possible in each, make 




One can speak of the mastery of craftsmen towards their chosen matter (e.g. stone), 
but when speaking of moral interactions with others (rather than matter), referring to 
mastery seems inappropriate (Dunne, 1993, p. 359). Ironically, in an effort to achieve 
expertise, a technicist approach actually supplants rather than develops intelligence 
(Dunne, 1993, p. 369). Humankind is bound to space and time, to the particulars of 
an instant. The modern attempts to technicise are an attempt to get beyond the 
particular, to supercede judgement, to become, as Dunne says referring to Habermas’ 
comment, “post-histoire” (ibid., p. 360). Within human affairs “there are no experts” 
(ibid., p. 376). We must suffer the “rough ground” of “finitude, contingency, and 
situatedness” (ibid., p. 374). However, this finitude is not a point of pessimism, for 
there is no a priori limit to the potential for development of phronetic reason (ibid., 
pp. 380-381).  
 
Character educators who claim that “moral education is developing expertise” 
(Narvaez, 2005, p. 716) are promoting a technicist view of morality, which Dunne 
(via Aristotle) has revealed to be incompatible with ethics. Worse, in framing 
character education as expertise, such educators imply that morality is a body of 
information, a repertoire of techniques, or a skill set. That character educators would 
be attracted to this technicist view of morality is understandable, since information 
and skills are far easier to teach than perception and judgement.  
3.6.4 Experiential Methods 
If, as Aristotle suggests, virtue is “a state that decides, consisting in a mean, the mean 
relative to us, which is defined by reference to reason, that is to say, to the reason by 
reference to which the prudent person would define it” (II 6§15), then becoming 
virtuous is really a matter of building perception and judgement. But, as Dunne’s 
treatise (1993) has questioned, can one teach judgement and perception? Such 
capacities seem to be developed through experience in the rather complex fashion 
described in the chapter on virtue (see subsection 2.3.6). For this reason, more 
philosophically oriented character educators recommend experiential approaches, 
such as guided reflection on one’s actions, providing opportunities for moral practice 
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and moral mentoring through the shared life with others (Arthur, 2003, p. 128; 
Noddings, 2002, p. 3; Williams, Yanchar, Jensen, & Lewis, 2003, p. 30). As will 
become evident, these experiential methods also play a prominent role in OAE (e.g. 
Greenaway, 1990).  
 
This section discussed several issues pertinent to the question: “Can virtue be 
taught?” The limitations (e.g. time and restriction to democratic values) of schools, 
suggested that character education programmes might begin to focus on the role of 
the family. With respect to curricula, the cognitively undeveloped nature of children, 
coupled with their inexperience, were found to make them unlikely candidates for 
the sophisticated reasoning required for character’s development. More 
fundamentally, the technicist view of morality as expertise, put forward by many 
character educators, was found to be at odds with the perception and judgement 
required for moral action. Finally, experiential methods, such as guided reflection, 
were suggested as means to develop perception and judgement.  
3.7 Conclusion: Why Aristotle? 
This chapter has revealed the many problems related to non-expansive character 
education. Throughout, I have suggested that Aristotle may provide a remedy for 
such difficulties. This section highlights virtue ethics’ comprehensive and synthetic 
nature. 
 
A virtue ethical perspective on character unites the disparate veins of the character 
education movement providing (see Carr & Steutel, 1999, pp. 252-254): a 
sophisticated account of moral reasoning via the deliberative process of phron!sis 
(see books III and VI); a dispositional appetitive discipline in the moral virtues (see 
books II-V); and a broad understanding of virtue that encompasses emotions and care 
ethics (see Swanton, 2003). 
 
Similarly, a virtue ethical approach to character satisfies Puka’s (1999, p. 31) 
challenge for the integration of competing character education approaches by 
providing: moral instruction in virtue through more experienced phronimai; moral 
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prohibitions (contrary to popular criticism, Aristotle does include these (II 6§18)); 
story and narrative as essential forms of teaching virtue; moral examples, both 
fictional and historical narratives as paragons of virtue and vice; and opportunities to 
practise virtue. 
 
Finally, Kohn (1997, para. 15) correspondingly suggests that any character education 
scheme should account for the following questions: What is the underlying theory of 
human nature?; What is the ultimate goal?; Which values are promoted?; and lastly, 
How is learning thought to take place? Aristotle, as seen in the chapter on virtue 
ethics, provides substantial support and detailed responses to these questions. Non-
expansive character education programmes are often criticised for having too little 
depth to answer Kohn’s questions adequately (Davidson, 2005, p. 219). Aristotle’s 
account, however, provides such depth, thereby laying a moral foundation, while 
also maintaining breadth, and thus providing an ethic for all human action. 
 
In conclusion, Aristotle provides no general principles of action “precisely because 
of the unavailability of any such principle” (Dunne, 1993, p. 312). Nor does he 
suggest a programme for character. Instead, he indicates (Book VI) the phronetic 
resources necessary to make informed moral judgements. It is perhaps, then, better to 
view character education as a process rather than a programme, something done with 
students rather than to them (Davidson, 2005, pp. 227, 233).  
 
I have now explored the assumption of character development within OAE, and 
proposed Aristotle’s virtue ethics as a lens through which to view character. The 
present chapter has provided a rationale for using virtue ethics instead of any model 
from the non-expansive character education movement. With the theoretical 
perspective of the thesis outlined, I now turn to its practical implications for OAE. 
The next chapter discusses the methodology and the methods I used to explore virtue 






This chapter contains six sections. It opens with a rationale for fieldwork, then 
locates the “views” – metaphysical, theoretical, and interpretive – through which the 
research was conducted. Reasons for the decision to use a case study approach are 
subsequently explained, as are the methods employed for generating data and the 
techniques utilised to analyse them. The chapter closes by offering descriptions of 
the means used to “validate” the research, namely the qualitative research standard of 
trustworthiness, and a discussion on the generalising potential of the this study.  
4.1 The Decision To Do Fieldwork 
In sympathy with Drasdo’s (1973/1998) critique that much research “grinds out a 
result which everyone foresaw at the beginning” (p. 25; see also p. 26), and aware of 
the opportunity to submit a philosophical thesis without an empirical component, I 
approached the possibility of fieldwork carefully. 
 
As the conclusion of the first chapter intimated, the reasons for doing fieldwork were 
directly related to the central aim of this research: to understand better a wilderness 
expedition’s relevance to character formation from a virtue ethical perspective. 
Although this goal could have been met through a philosophical thesis alone, strong 
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recommendations from within the research literature (e.g. Pinch, 2009; Pring, 2000, 
p. 8; Silverman, 2005, p. 327) encourage connecting theory with practice.  
 
Within the OAE-related literature, the same recommendation comes in the opposite 
direction: connect practice with theory (Gass, 1992; Wurdinger, 1997, pp. xvii, 83). 
Given OAE’s strong (possibly excessive) commitment to practice, I was concerned 
that the full significance of Aristotle’s perspective on character might be lost without 
its contextualisation on an expedition. Although relating theory to practice does not 
necessitate field research, to link them at anything more than a theoretical level does 
require engagement with others, preferably in situ, so that the events taking place on 
expedition can be observed, described, and better understood (Hobbs & Wright, 
2006, p. x; McCall, 2006, p. 3).  
 
One further and related reason for choosing to conduct fieldwork was the direct 
appeal from OAE scholars for participants’ perspective on adventure experiences 
(e.g. Allison & Pomeroy, 2000, p. 97; Barrett & Greenaway, 1995, pp. v, 53-54; 
Hattie et al., 1997, pp. 73-74; Nichols, 2000, p. 22).  
 
For these reasons, I decided to take part in an expedition, collect participants’ moral 
perspectives, and analyse them from a virtue ethical standpoint. By doing so, I hoped 
to reveal the potential relevance of a virtue ethical understanding of character to the 
field of OAE.  
 
Having decided to do fieldwork, I then faced the challenge of developing a 
methodology. However, Guba and Lincoln (1994) note that “questions of method are 
secondary to questions of paradigm” (p. 105). Thus, before introducing the research 
methods, I must first describe my philosophical stance, and its relevance to the 
research. 
4.2 Views From Somewhere 
Neurath’s Boat: The body of knowledge is compared to a boat that must be repaired 
at sea: “we are like sailors who on the open sea must reconstruct their ship but are 
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never able to start afresh from the bottom.” Any part can be replaced, provided 
there is enough of the rest on which to stand. (Blackburn, 1996, p. 259)  
Otto Neurath’s vivid metaphor expresses well that one cannot get beyond one’s own 
perspective and view the world (fix the boat) objectively (on dry land). That is, 
observers are not able to see beyond their own blinders and view the world 
independent of their own construction (Stake, 1995, p. 100), experience (Silverman, 
2000, p. 177) or consciousness (Polkinghorne, 1989, p. 45). Thus, there is no view 
from nowhere, and one must assume a position within a system, and from there 
attempt to “build” a credible ontology, epistemology, and ethics (Hursthouse, 2001, 
pp. 193, 240). Like all other researchers, I have tried, despite the inevitable limits of 
my personal viewpoint, to provide a sound rationale for my “views from 
somewhere.”  
 
Since taking a view from somewhere is an inevitable (Silverman, 2001, p. 2) part of 
the research process, this section briefly frames my ontological and epistemological 
positions. The methodological constraints of the theory I have chosen, virtue ethics, 
are subsequently shown to lead to a qualitative methodology. Then, the section 
closes describing my relationship, as interpreter, to the research.  
4.2.1 Ontology and Epistemology  
Since one’s metaphysical stance largely determines what one considers knowable, 
one’s ontological and epistemological positions necessarily shape one’s 
methodology, methods and analysis (Allison & Pomeroy, 2000, p. 92; Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2005, p. 21). 
 
Critical realism best expresses the ontological position of this thesis. Blackburn 
(1996) describes this stance as: “Any doctrine reconciling the real, independent, 
objective nature of the world (realism) with a due appreciation of the mind-
dependence of the sensory experiences whereby we know about it (hence, critical)” 
(p. 88). Critical realism is a middle ground between naive positivism, which 
supposes it can directly perceive the reality of the outside world (Blackburn, 1996, p. 
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254), and postmodernism, which denies any concept of reality or truth (Blackburn, 
1996, p. 295; see also Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 13).  
 
Although the critical realist finds observation fallible, theory revisable, and truth 
tentative, this does not mean that there is not a world “out there” (Wolcott, 2001, p. 
33), only that it cannot be fully known (Von Glaserfeld, 1991, p. 17). How closely a 
researcher can come to “fully knowing” is, as Aristotle suggests in the Ethics, 
dependant on the subject (I 3§1, 4). For example, while investigating the coefficient 
of thermal expansion of copper might yield precise results, inquiries involving 
increased dependence on communication, others’ experience, and interpretation, 
leave the researcher more (critically) distanced from what can be known.  
 
Epistemologically, OAE, through its association with Experiential Education, is most 
commonly identified with a constructivist paradigm, where knowledge is 
subjectively constructed rather than discovered by reference to the external world 
(Allison & Pomeroy, 2000, p. 97; DeLay, 1996, p. 81;). Constructivists take the 
“social provenance of meaning and knowledge” (Carr, 2003b, p. 133) and the 
impossibility of acquaintance with Kant’s noumena, the thing in itself (Blackburn, 
1996, p. 376), as “problematic consequences for the very idea of objective 
knowledge” (Carr, 2003b, p. 132).  
 
However, this subjective aspect of the social construction of meaning does not 
necessarily “require us to deny that there are facts that are objectively true” (Carr, 
2003b, p. 133). For example, Aristotle’s (Metaphysics, trans. 1933, 1011b25) 
minimal correspondence theory of truth, “to say of what is that it is, and of what is 
not that it is not,” reflects a realist paradigm (Carr, 2003b, pp. 130-131). This 
correspondence theory of truth may be illustrated by reference to concrete examples 
such as “the piano in my front room has one broken key” (ibid., p. 130), while less 
tangible questions that depend on participants’ subjectivity, such as “Was your 
character impacted on this expedition?,” make discerning “what is actually the case” 
significantly more difficult. Speaking to this difficulty, Solow, in Geertz’ chapter on 
“thick description” (1973), metaphorically says that although asepsis (complete 
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objective knowledge) is not possible, this does not mean one does surgery in sewers 
(give in to complete relativity) (Fontana & Frey, 2005, pp. 719-720). The gulf 
between objectivity and subjectivity is a continuum, not a dichotomy (Scruton, 1999, 
pp. 39-40). Even some constructivists believe that not all constructions are equally 
valuable, beneficial or tolerable (DeLay, 1996, p. 79; Kirk & Miller, 1986, p. 11). 
Through reason and experience, intuition and feelings, some accounts will be more 
coherent than others (Gregory, 2003, p. 3). For, although each individual has his or 
her own perspective, much that is experienced is held in common (Stake, 1995, pp. 
101-102).  
 
With regard to this thesis’ research, when I am able to point to “what is,” I do so. In 
more complex circumstances, that require elaborate interpretation and 
argumentation, I will attempt to provide a coherent (Blackburn, 1996, p. 67) 
justification for such conclusions. 
4.2.2 Theory Guiding Methodology 
The resurgence of “methodological fundamentalists” (Howe, 2004, p. 57) and the 
onslaught of “Bush Science” (Lather, 2004, p. 19) demonstrate the importance of 
matching theory, question, and method. Methodology refers not to a recipe of 
techniques, but to the underlying principles, the philosophical presuppositions, that 
inform a research project (Wolcott, 2001, p. 91). I will now consider the 
methodological implications of researching from a virtue ethical perspective.  
4.2.2.1 From Theory to Methodology 
Allison and Pomeroy (2000, p. 91) note that there has been a general lack of 
attention towards theoretical underpinnings in much OAE research (see also 
Richards, 1997, p. 243). This is problematic, because to ask informed research 
questions, one must know the “theoretical conversation” (Golden-Biddle & Locke, 
1997, p. 11) that surrounds one’s topic (Pring, 2000, p. 11). Further, Emerson, Fretz, 
and Shaw (1995, p. 167) claim that theory should inform all phases of research: from 




Rather than attempting to build a “grounded” (e.g. Glaser & Strauss, 1967) ethical 
theory from expeditionary data, or critique an existing theory (e.g. Burawoy, 1998; 
Nichols, 2000, pp. 24-25; Pawson & Tilley, 1997) through a study of multiple 
expeditions, I have used a theory, virtue ethics, to offer a view of the moral 
phenomena of an expedition.  
 
With virtue ethical theory guiding the data collection and analysis, the research’s 
findings reveal “what may be” or “what could be” (Schofield, 1993, pp. 102-106), 
when one chooses to view the expedition participants’ moral narratives from a virtue 
ethical perspective. In other words, I offer the discipline of OAE a careful virtue 
ethical analysis of a wilderness expedition as a possible way of interpreting ethical 
development on expeditions. 
4.2.2.2 Aristotle’s Caveats 
Aristotle offers several qualifiers for any inquiry into character, which is de facto a 
query into ethics. First, as mentioned earlier, 
our discussion will be adequate if we make things perspicuous enough to accord 
with the subject matter; for we would not seek the same degree of exactness in all 
sorts of arguments alike. (I 3§1) 
Aristotle considers it the mark of the educated to know the appropriate level of 
precision afforded by their analysis (I 3§4; see also I 6§13, I 7§18-20, II 2§3, IX 
2§2). Clearly, ethical inquiry will not have the level of precision found in 
quantifiable investigations (e.g. measuring the coefficient of thermal expansion of 
copper). Nevertheless, despite ethics’ imprecision relative to scientific investigation, 
by grounding his theory in natural dispositions that lead to well-being, Aristotle’s 
ethics is not relativist (Hughes, 2001, pp. 16-17). 
 
A second limitation can be found in Aristotle noting that a person’s character can 
only be wholly known in retrospect, at the end of one’s life (I 7§14-16). 
Consequently, studying character with significant depth suggests a longitudinal 
inquiry over a lifetime. An expedition, then, whether of a two-week or two-month 
duration, is only a snapshot of a process that lasts a lifetime. If this is indeed the case, 
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then one might expect any character development on an expedition, if it could even 
be identified, to be somewhat modest.  
 
These limitations made it difficult to isolate a research question. The most obvious 
question, “Was character developed on the expedition?,” is evidently problematic. 
For assessing character growth on an expedition would require determining a 
student’s dispositional movement towards or away from any given virtue, which 
seems epistemologically challenging to say the least. To name only one 
complication, how could a researcher access, with adequate detail, the intra-
subjective experience of a participant and determine to what extent the expedition 
alone had affected his or her phron!sis, the orchestrator of all the virtues, and thus 
the sine qua non of character and its development? The complexity of phron!sis, as 
Dunne (1993) was shown to suggest in subsection 3.6.3, cannot be empirically 
accessed. 
 
What did seem epistemologically appropriate was to ask the participants whether 
they thought the expedition had impacted their character and, more specifically, 
whether they thought the expedition provided opportunity for Aristotle’s conditions 
for virtue: moral reflection; practising moral actions; and sharing in the moral lives 
of others. If Aristotle’s conditions were present, then there would be reason to 
believe that this wilderness expedition was, even if only in a small way, morally 
significant for the participants. Just how significant, again, seemed epistemologically 
impossible to determine. Nichols (2000, pp. 23-24) notes the difficulty in attempting 
to isolate an OAE programmes affect on a participant. He contends that isolating 
benefits runs the risk of attributing causality to an OAE programme, when a variety 
of variables, including the powers of agency the participant brings to an expedition, 
may be in play. These complications, in addition to time restraints, deterred me from 
collecting any post-expedition data. 
 
Such limitations – the imprecision of moral characteristics and the lifetime span of 
character formation – drastically delimit the generalising power of this research. 
However unencouraging this might be, it is an honest treatment of a complex subject, 
 
 144 
and as Aristotle says of ethical matters: “we shall be satisfied to indicate the truth 
roughly and in outline” (I 3 §4). It may then be better to speak of this research as an 
exploration (Shutt, 2006, p. 14) of the participants’ moral narratives on a wilderness 
expedition from a virtue ethical perspective. I offer this exploration to the field of 
OAE: “not in the hope of proving anything, but rather in the hope of learning 
something” (Eysenck, 1976, p. 9). This exploration, then, offers a possible way of 
understanding how OAE expeditions can contribute to participants’ moral 
development.  
  
Just as virtue theory guided the intended outcome of this empirical research, I will 
now discuss how virtue theory guided the methods employed to conduct the 
research.  
4.2.3 Theoretically Constrained Methodology 
For reasons already mentioned, a statistical analysis of Aristotelian character 
formation on a wilderness expedition (no matter the length) would not have been 
methodologically appropriate. Since character is not numerically quantifiable, 
investigations into it are better suited to qualitative inquiry. Although Wolcott (2001, 
p. 29) believes that qualitative methods no longer need to be defended, this may not 
be the case in OAE. Many authors have complained of methodological confusion in 
significant amounts of OAE-related research (Allison, 2002, p. 84; Barrett & 
Greenaway, 1995, p. 53; Ewert, 1987, p. 16). Further, Bocarro and Richards (1998, 
p. 102, 106) claim that a “constant” concern and “criticism” of experiential learning 
is the “general acceptance” that programme evaluation efforts have been poor in 
quality, resulting in methodological abuse that has caused experiential research 
hypotheses to be “self-fulfilling prophecies.”  
 
As a result of inconsistent research quality, Barrett and Greenaway (1995) were 
commissioned to review the OAE research literature to determine the value of 
outdoor adventure on the development of young people. In their concluding 
comments, they make a strong appeal for qualitative research that includes 
participants’ perspectives and accounts of their adventure experiences (1995, pp. v, 
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53-54). Others within the field of OAE are also asking for qualitative accounts that 
focus on the processes taking place on adventure experiences (Cason & Gillis, 1994, 
p. 46; Hattie et al., 1997, pp. 73-74; Henderson, 1993, p. 51; Nichols, 2000, p. 22; 
Patterson, Watson, Williams, & Roggenbuck, 1998, p. 425).  
 
The methodological landscape within OAE does appear to be changing with several 
publications on expeditions utilising qualitative methods (Allison, 2002; Beames, 
2004a, 2004b; Brymer, 2002). I too found a variety of reasons that made qualitative 
methods appropriate to this research into character formation on a wilderness 
expedition. First, qualitative inquiries lend themselves to issues (e.g. character) that 
are not quantifiable (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 10). Second, and pertinent to 
Aristotle’s phron!sis-based virtue ethics, qualitative aspects of human expression 
(e.g. beliefs, feelings, and emotions) are increasingly seen as relevant in qualitative 
interpretation (Guba & Lincoln, 2005, p. 205). Third, and relevant to a wilderness-
based study, participants can be met and studied in the field (Allison, 2002, p. 100; 
McCall, 2006;). For example, a qualitative researcher can interact with participants 
in their world (e.g. on expedition) and turn these interactions into analysable 
representations (e.g. transcripts, fieldnotes). Fourth, by meeting participants in their 
world and on their terms, the researcher can, over time, develop rapport, thereby 
gathering aspects of the participants’ narratives that would otherwise remain 
inaccessible (Beames, 2004b, p. 80; Kvale, 1996, p. 116).  
 
Having explained the advantages of using qualitative methods for this research, I will 
now comment on some of the demands on qualitative researchers.  
4.2.4 The Researcher’s Relationship to the Research: Interpretivism 
Practically, the analogy of a bricoleur, a handy-man, is useful to describe the tools 
and skills required for qualitative research. Theoretically, the inevitably subjective 
nature of qualitative inquiry makes an interpretivist approach appropriate for the 




Research involving relationships with participants holds all of the mysteries, 
challenges and surprises of any human interaction. Due to the unpredictability of 
these human unknowns and the difficulty of preparing for them, the epithet bricoleur 
has been suggested for the qualitative researcher. A bricoleur is a “jack of all trades 
or a kind of professional do–it–yourself person” (Lévi-Strauss, 1966, p. 17).  
 
The bricoleur copes with the many vicissitudes of qualitative research, making 
informed judgements as they present themselves. Much like an artist, the bricoleur 
pieces together a “montage” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 5) of philosophical 
underpinnings, theoretical perspectives, methods for collection, and techniques for 
analysis. It requires flexibility, ingenuity, and the ability to use a resource for a 
purpose not initially foreseen. The analogy of a bricoleur conveys the process used in 
conducting this research, for without an established literature on virtue ethical 
character development on wilderness expeditions, I independently negotiated many 
decisions – such as, choosing a theoretical lens, a methodology, methods, and tools 
for analysis – doing my best to maintain trustworthiness (discussed later) as a 
researcher.  
 
“Bricoleur” also captures the many roles that a qualitative researcher is often asked 
to fulfil: advocate, evaluator, and interpreter (Stake, 1995, pp. 91-103). I struggled to 
balance the roles of instructor for the expedition, tutor (while on the expedition, I 
graded papers written by the participants for university credit), and researcher. 
Although discussed more fully in subsection 4.4.4, two specific challenges I 
encountered as a researcher included: 1) data collecting and storage techniques that 
could withstand the physical demands of an expedition (e.g. waterproof and impact 
resistant); and 2) identifying and mastering a qualitative software programme that 
permitted analysis (coding) directly onto the recorded audio file.  
 
Qualitative researcher as bricoleur has further pertinence to the skills and abilities 
necessary for interpretation. 
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4.2.4.2 Researcher As Interpreter? 
Qualitative research is distinctively interpretive. Lived experiences – through 
conversations with participants and observations of events – must be interpreted and 
rendered into a written form (Mason, 1996, p. 6). Since qualitative researchers are 
often participating or implicated in the phenomena they study (e.g. an expedition), 
their research is inevitably informed by their values. However, the very idea of 
value-free research, qualitative or otherwise, is generally held suspect (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2005, pp. 10, 21). Whether through the choice of topic, a context for the 
study, metaphysical convictions, theoretical lenses, or style of writing-up, values 
saturate qualitative research (Guba & Lincoln, 2005, p. 197, 200). Although 
admittedly value-based, the qualitative researcher attempts to be philosophically 
consistent, acknowledging that one sees through the darkened glass of one’s own 
experience, gender, class and ethnicity. 
 
Given the subjective nature of qualitative inquiry, it is to be expected that others 
analysing a similar (or even the same) case might obtain different findings. 
Midgley’s (1995/2002, p. 99) image of the different results gained by cutting a 
swiss-roll cross-sectionally or longitudinally is helpful. Both vantages, although 
different, are possible. 
 
An “interpretivist” stance is subjective in the sense that the research is conceived, 
conducted, and analysed through the filter of the researcher’s mind-dependent 
perception, what Kvale (1996, p. 287) calls a “perspectival-subjectivity.” This does 
not, however, mean that the research is simply a matter of a researcher’s tastes and 
whimsical opinion, what Kvale (1996, p. 287) calls a “biased-subjectivity.” 
Qualitative researchers privilege participants’ meanings (Emerson et al., 1995, p. 12) 
by providing a “thick description” (Geertz, 1973, pp. 5-6, 9-10) of the context 
surrounding the members’ comments and behaviours, thereby contextualising the 
interpretation for outside readers. Analyses oriented around the informants’ own 
words provide a check and limit to the range of interpretive options available to the 
researcher. This requires a reflexivity on behalf of the researcher (McCall, 2006, p. 
3), a constant moving from the researcher’s hermeneutical understanding to that of 
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the participants’. For the resultant interpretation to be accepted, it “must be publicly 
verifiable so that other researchers will agree that the transformed expression does 
describe a process that is, in fact, contained in the original expression” 
(Polkinghorne, 1989, p. 56).  
 
This section has presented the theoretical preliminaries necessary for thoughtful 
research design. Having indicated my metaphysical position, the theoretical 
constraints of a virtue ethical perspective, and the interpretive relationship to the 
data, I now turn to the chosen approach for this research: the case study. 
4.3 A Case? 
This section opens with an introduction to case study research. Next, the influential 
role of the pilot study will be discussed. The difficult process of finding a case will 
then be described. Lastly, the ethical dimensions of this research project will be 
explored.  
4.3.1 Case Study Research 
A strength (and weakness, see section 4.6.3 on the generalising potential of this 
thesis) of case study research is its capacity to probe the particulars and complexities 
of a single situation (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 219). Although the rich depth of case study 
description and analysis comes at the cost of generalising breadth (Creswell, 1998, p. 
61; Richards, 1997, p. 249), the detail achieved allows for more thorough theoretical 
exploration (Silverman, 2000, p. 43). 
 
With increasing importance given to understanding behaviour in context (McCall, 
2006), the holistic and naturalistic style of case study makes it especially useful for 
investigating human phenomena within bounded systems (Gillham, 2000a, p. 2). 
Since qualitative case study requires extensive field-time in personal contact with 
participants, capturing (e.g. through interviews or observations) their meanings as 
they share their narratives (Stake, 2005, p. 450; Yin, 2003, p. 94), it is a natural 




A given case study can include either a single case or multiple cases. I chose a single 
case because of time constraints and a desire to treat the case thoroughly (Yin, 2003, 
p. 47). Although cases can be studied for their intrinsic value, the purpose of this 
research was instrumental (Creswell, 1998, p. 62): to explore participants’ moral 
narratives on a wilderness expedition from an Aristotelian perspective.  
 
Having decided on the appropriateness of case study research for studying the 
complexity of character formation in the bounded system of a wilderness expedition, 
I then needed to refine the methods used.  
4.3.2 A Case of Simplifying: The Pilot Process (February – July 2006) 
The recommendation to pilot methods is ubiquitous throughout the qualitative 
literature (e.g. Drever, 2003, pp. 37, 57; Simpson & Tuson, 2003, p. 32). I piloted a 
number of methods during May 19th-26th of 2006 during a week-long OAE 
postgraduate bicycle expedition in North West Scotland. This trip proved 
transformational for the research design. 
 
Initially wanting to address multiple aspects of Aristotelian virtue theory, I piloted: 
semi-structured interviews to access participants’ moral narratives; critical incident 
questionnaires (Brookfield, 1996) in hopes of capturing participants’ feelings and 
emotions; observations of morally relevant actions; and dilemmas (Smith & Allison, 
2006) exploring the decision-making processes of the participants. 
 
The months previous to the pilot were spent constructing these methods. Special 
attention was given to developing interview questions that were relevant to a virtue 
ethical perspective. In preparation for the pilot, office colleagues graciously acted as 
“shredders” (Drever, 2003, p. 31), giving invaluable feedback through constructive 
critique. 
 
The pilot study revealed the impracticability of the initial research plan (Simpson & 
Tuson, 2003, p. 32). I found expeditionary field research to be exceptionally 
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demanding. A full itinerary resulted in fatigued participants (and researcher), leaving 
little time to implement the many methods I was piloting. 
 
Notably, though the questionnaires were given scant attention and no dilemma-
reflections were ever handed back, the interviews were very stimulating for both the 
informants and myself. Participants were willing to talk for an hour, but unwilling to 
give writing-dependant methods (e.g. questionnaires and dilemmas) more than a few 
minutes (Gillham, 2000b, pp. 13,15) of their attention. Observations were similarly 
fruitful, but the write-ups cost precious sleep-time during the expedition. 
 
While it was helpful and informative to explore a broad spectrum of methods (Yin, 
2003, p. 80), the pilot ultimately simplified the methods used (Silverman, 2000, p. 
50). The demands of fieldwork and the rigour of an expedition made depending on 
participants for quality written data imprudent. I, therefore, committed to interviews 
(see 4.4.1) and observations (see 4.4.2).  
 
In addition to determining the methods, the pilot study, as I have commented 
elsewhere (Stonehouse, 2007, pp. 4-5), afforded an opportunity to field-test (literally) 
the recording technology (discussed later). Yet, perhaps most importantly, the pilot 
instilled a confidence in the methods chosen, the equipment used, and the appropriate 
amount of research that could be competently sustained in the field (Simpson & 
Tuson, 2003, p. 32; see also Drever, 2003, p. 53). 
 
Having committed to the appropriate methods and technology, a period of “trialling” 
(Gillham, 2000b, p. 22), or method refinement, began. Friends, colleagues and 
students obliged at every turn as I trialled the questions on them. It was during this 
period that I realised the research would be better served by conducting two sets of 
interviews (discussed in subsection 4.4.1.2): one at the beginning of the expedition; 
the other at the end. Over the next several months I continued to hone the interview 
schedules and practice observation skills. This included a video-taped interview, 
which I (painfully) scrutinised in hopes of improving my craft (Kvale, 1996, p. 161). 
A fortuitous mid-summer work opportunity conducting interviews and observations 
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on a sailing vessel further developed my experience and ease with the methods. 
Through this refining period, a few interview questions were dropped, several added, 
and many improved (Stake, 2005, p. 453). By August 2006, I had two interview 
schedules (see Appendix 3) carefully constructed to collect participants’ perspectives 
on character from a virtue ethical perspective. 
4.3.3 Sampling: Finding a Case 
While developing the methods, I concomitantly searched for a case. I narrowed the 
broad scope of possible choices by “theoretical sampling,” which involved searching 
for cases particularly relevant to character development from an Aristotelian 
perspective (Creswell, 1998, p. 64; Drever, 2003, p. 35; Mason, 1996, pp. 93-94). 
There seemed to be a number of relevant criteria. Regarding age group, since 
Aristotle warns that youth are unsuited to moral reasoning, because they lack the life 
experience required for it (I 3§5), it was fitting to look for at least university-aged 
participants. With respect to duration, since virtue ethical character develops slowly, 
the longer the expedition the better: a 10-day expedition was considered a minimum. 
With particular research interests in wilderness expeditions, preference was given to 
a remote journey that would provide solitude and tranquillity for reflective travel. 
Concerning my status on the expedition, I was convinced that qualitative research 
works best when it is most natural and when participants are partners not subjects. I 
therefore searched for a case with regard to which I could be a contributing member 
of the expedition (Gillham, 2000a, p. 4). Further, theoretically relevant programmes 
that had character development articulated in their mission were prioritised. Lastly, I 
aspired to find an organisation that had positive interest in, not merely toleration of, 
the research. 
 
I maintained this “connoisseur’s appetite for the best” (Stake, 1995, p. 56), desiring a 
case that maximised learning potential. I systematically searched a Royal 
Geographical Society website (Expedition Providers, n.d.) that listed expedition 
providers. After scouring many providers’ websites, with the help of my supervisor, I 
attempted contact with numerous organisations. However, due to logistical 
challenges and timing conflicts, nothing materialised. Through my own associations 
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in North America I again contacted many programmes to no avail. Finally, through a 
PhD student colleague, I discovered Gordon College. 
 
Gordon College, located in Wenham, MA, met the case study criteria. This small, 
liberal arts, four-year degree-granting institution in the Christian tradition requires a 
two-week expedition, called La Vida, for all its students regardless of their degree 
specialisation. La Vida’s mission statement includes character development in its 
first line (La Vida, n.d.), and the college itself has received awards for character 
development from the Templeton Foundation. Additionally, as I had hoped, their 
expeditions take place in state-designated Wilderness areas. As I had also desired, 
the La Vida staff were eager and supportive of my research. I was offered a co-
instructor position on one of the August 2006 expeditions, leading ten first-year 
students, with a gender split of six females and four males. La Vida maintained their 
commitment to me throughout the entire process, and went out of their way to 
accommodate the research.  
4.3.4 Research Ethics 
Although La Vida had offered an instructorship, the research still had to be approved 
by Gordon College’s Institutional Review Board (IRB). In this subsection I describe 
the process of satisfying the IRB (Rudestam & Newton, 2001, p. 87) on issues of 
consent, confidentiality, and consequences. The subsection closes with some 
reflection on research ethics. 
4.3.4.1 Ethical Concerns While Conducting Research 
Gordon College’s IRB provided a 40-page PDF document specifying their research 
protocol. This included an extensive form requiring a rationale for the research, an 
Informed Consent Document (ICD), an explanation of how the methods would be 
used, and projections of possible harm. 
 
Customary research ethics require a researcher to be open and transparent when 
seeking the consent of participants (Fontana & Frey, 2005, p. 715). The ICD (see 
Appendix 4) provided information for an informed and voluntary decision to 
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participate (Gregory, 2003, pp. 37-38), but not enough detail to lead participants 
towards what I hoped to find (Kvale, 1996, p. 113). The ICDs were treated as 
friendly contracts (Stake, 2005, p. 459), signed and dated by the informants and 
myself. 
 
Confidentiality presents two difficulties for the researcher: data security precautions 
and protecting anonymity. Preserving confidentiality potentially saves participants 
from possible embarrassment, loss of credibility and or dignity (Stake, 2005, p. 459). 
I am convinced that the level of confidentiality I maintained through discreet 
professional behaviour on the expedition, and by promising to protect the collected 
data (e.g. by lock, key, passwords and codes), encouraged disclosure from the 
informants thereby providing more trustworthy data (Gregory, 2003, p. 50).  
 
Maintaining anonymity is a challenge with a group of only ten participants. 
Pseudonyms were chosen to reflect the gender of each student. Participants were 
consulted in any circumstances where I thought that inclusion of content might 
embarrass or threaten to disclose an informant’s identity (Christians, 2005, p. 145).  
 
The sensitive and vulnerable nature of moral discussion created the greatest risk 
encountered in this research: the threat of participant defamation, should anonymity 
be lost (Mason, 1996, pp. 166-167). Christians (2005, pp. 144-146) notes that most 
IRB’s use a utilitarian ethic to justify (or discredit) research. This ethic seeks merely 
to ensure, through a “value-free” calculation of means and ends, that greater benefit 
than harm is done to participants. Concerned that this crude calculation could lead to 
careless actions perpetrated against those researched, Christians (2005, p. 149-151) 
suggests that researchers adopt a “higher” ethic of caring for participants (e.g 
Noddings, 2003). More directly related to this current thesis, Lincoln & Denzin 
(2000, p. 1062) believe that all research should be oriented to help humans flourish: 
to reach Aristotle’s eudaimonia (I 4§2). As a researcher, I strove for this higher ethic, 
always trying to consider any potential negative ramifications that my actions and 




Related to an ethic of care is the tacit research principle of reciprocity (Guba & 
Lincoln, 2005, p. 209). I believe this research benefited La Vida in several ways. At 
a participant level, the interviews themselves were acts of moral reflection 
(Polkinghorne, 1989, p. 58), bringing self-confessed growth to many. Moreover, at 
an institutional level, I was able to meet with administrators and provide feedback on 
their programme from a virtue ethical perspective.  
4.3.4.2 My Ethics As a Researcher 
 “Good” research, to some degree, depends upon the researcher’s character (Gregory, 
2003, p. 22). Whether through a temptation to “cook the books,” consider all the 
evidence, report dishonestly when findings are uncomfortable, or neglect others’ 
well-being, research is an activity that requires both intellectual and moral virtue 
(Pring, 2001b, pp. 418-419). Pring (2001b, p. 418) believes that the complexity and 
contextual nature of a research environment makes prescriptive, rule-based research 
ethics of little use. Instead, he suggests virtue ethics, with its emphasis on an 
investigator’s dispositions, as better suited to the judgement inevitably required by 
researchers.  
 
Since the calibre of collected data is directly related to the participants’ trust in the 
researcher’s integrity (Drever, 2003, p. 50; Gregory, 2003, p. xi), a sound personal 
ethic is critical to good research. I have aspired to the ethics celebrated in this thesis 
both in my contact with the participants and throughout the research as a whole.  
 
In sum, this section has shown case-study methodology to be appropriate for the 
aims of this research. Through the influential role of the pilot study, methods were 
chosen, and the requirements for a particular case refined. The discovery of La Vida 
expeditions was then described, and the ethical precautions taken for the research 
examined. With the case study approach established, I now turn to a discussion of the 
data collection methods.  
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 4.4 Generating Data 
Research methods are the tools that best address an inquiry’s questions (Richards, 
1997, p. 244; Silverman, 2001, p. 25). Certain methods will be more or less helpful 
in answering the key questions (Allison & Pomeroy, 2000, p. 95). Conventionally, 
multiple methods have been used in case study research because they capture a 
broader palette of human expression (Yin, 2003, p. 98). This section explains how I 
collected the data. The research’s primary method of interviews will be described, 
and the secondary supporting role of observations and texts discussed. Lastly, I offer 
a brief synopsis of the technological decisions made for capturing the data.  
4.4.1 Inter Views 
Interviewing is rather like a marriage: Everybody knows what it is, an awful lot of 
people do it, and yet behind each closed front door there is a world of secrets. 
(Oakley, 1981, p. 41) 
Here I provide, first, a rationale for using interviews as the primary data source. I 
explain why interviews were chosen, how they were conducted, and address some of 
their limitations. Secondly, I provide a description of the two sets of interviews 
conducted during the expedition.  
4.4.1.1 Interviews: Access to Moral Narratives 
As a method of collecting participants’ views on character, interviews seemed most 
appropriate because of the complex, theoretical, and sensitive (moral) nature of the 
topic (Gillham, 2000b, p. 11). This complexity required an open and flexible method 
allowing for immediate clarification of statements. Since it has been claimed that up 
to 50% of communication is non-verbal (Drever, 2003, pp. 2, 15), I was committed 
to conducting the interviews in person. 
 
I decided on semi-structured interviews, a mean between completely open questions 
and a prescriptive verbal questionnaire. This compromise allowed for both the 
participants’ own perspectives and my theoretical (virtue ethical) interest, creating 
literally an “inter view”: “an inter-change of views between two persons conversing 
about a theme of mutual interest” (Kvale, 1996, p. 2; see also the recently released 
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2nd ed. of Kvale’s influential text in Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). In this way, I was 
able to draw out aspects of theoretical interest from the participants’ own life 
experience. 
 
Accessing participants’ experience through interviews reveals to researchers what 
they otherwise cannot see: thoughts, attitudes and feelings (Peräkylä , 2005, p. 869; 
Stake, 2005, p. 453). It is through such conversations (literally meaning “to wander 
with”) that the researcher learns of participants’ narratives. A narrative is “an 
organizing principle by which people organize their experience in, knowledge about, 
and transactions with the social world” (Bruner, 1990, p. 35). An individual’s sense 
of reality is “built by means of narratives …. Our knowledge is a composition of 
narratives, which is perpetually being constructed in the process of social 
interaction” (Heikkinen , 2002, p. 14). Narrative orders experience to make meaning 
and Polkinghorne (1988) calls the knowledge developed from this process, “narrative 
knowing.” As our understanding of narrative’s role in shaping knowledge increases, 
“narrative inquiry” is becoming a more accepted form of research (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2005, p. 651; Heikkinen , 2002, p. 14; Huttunen, Heikkinen, & Syrjälä, 
2002). 
 
Several moral philosophers have made a connection between a person’s narrative 
and his or her sense of morality. Taylor (1991, p. 3), although not directly 
mentioning “narrative,” speaks of one’s “moral horizons …. as part of a larger 
order,” a “background of intelligibility” that gives meaning “to the world and to the 
activities of social life” (p.3). It is out of these backgrounds of intelligibility, these 
contexts for understanding, that a narrative helps one to identify and articulate a 
concept of the good (Laitinen, 2002, pp. 61-62). Similarly, MacIntyre (1984) 
believes in the narrative shaping of morality. One’s narratives are embodied in 
traditions (ibid., p. 222) and practices (ibid., p. 188), both of which promote long 
established goods and enshrine values and virtues. As one engages with such 




Although these connections between narrative and morality made accessing 
participants’ narratives through interviews an obvious choice for data collection 
(Polkinghorne, 1988, p. 163), divulging these moral narratives required an openness 
from the participants. Consequently, the personal nature of the interviews’ ethical 
content affected the manner in which they were conducted. In asking the participants 
to speak of their values and morality, I was asking for access to their private lives. 
Their comfort in disclosing such details was in part dependant on their trust in me. 
Out of concern for this trust, I approached my interviews as a “methodology of 
friendship” (Kong, Mahoney & Plummer, 2002, p. 241). Thus, the longer I was with 
the participants, the more natural our conversations became (Kvale, 1996, p. 27). In 
order to create an open, secure, and comfortable atmosphere (Fontana & Frey, 2005, 
p. 713) throughout the interviews, I remained conscious of Gorden’s (1980, p. 335) 
warning that one communicates with far more than words. Slow and gentle speech, 
comfort with long silences, and relaxed body language, were just some of the ways I 
tried to put the participants at ease.  
 
Although interviews can be tremendously rewarding (Drever, 2003, p. 9) for both 
researcher and participant, they are not without their problems. Interview data are 
often considered suspect because of “leading questions.” By semi-structuring the 
interview, in the form of questions and clarifications, the researcher guides the 
content in a theoretically “self-interested” direction. In so doing, the researcher 
inevitably makes connections that the interviewee might not have otherwise made. 
However, the alternative, the open interview, which provides a topic and no more 
(e.g. “Tell me about character.”), risks wasting countless hours of little relevance to 
one’s theoretical interests. Certainly a devious researcher could manipulate 
interviewees towards what he or she wanted; but the art (Kvale, 1996, p. 8) of 
interviewing well is letting the participant lead, while the researcher gently steers. 
Although the researcher asks a question, the interviewees interpret the question and 
provide their own answers (Gillham, 2000b, pp. 40-41). In this way, interviews are 
negotiated (Fontana & Frey, 2005, p. 698), or created together. Although not totally 
objective (if there is such a thing), the semi-structured interview, when conducted 




Since an interviewee is usually expected to reveal his or her identity to the 
interviewer, this lack of anonymity is another potential limitation of interviews. 
Unlike the privacy of a questionnaire, interviewees’ identity disclosure could deter 
them from freely sharing. Interestingly, Gillham (2000b, pp. 15-16) rejects this 
criticism, believing that trust, not anonymity, determines an informants’ level of 
divulgence. My role as an expedition member, an instructor, gave me opportunity to 
develop a trusting relationship with the interviewees.  
 
I discovered a further interview limitation, one unmentioned in the literature sources 
used, namely, the luck of timing. That is, the quality, nature, and content of an 
interview are to some degree influenced by the states of the interviewer and 
interviewee at the time of the interview. Rather than getting the (only) perspective on 
character from each of the participants, I received their perspectives on character at 
that time, in that place. One of the participants, Samantha, alerted me to this when, 
during our second interview, she apologised for the poor quality (in her mind) of the 
first interview. As it turns out, she was battling home-sickness on the expedition and 
had had a particularly strong case of it just minutes before the first interview. In the 
twilight shadows I had not noticed her tear-swollen eyes. How might our interview 
have been different had it been conducted at another time?  
 
This limitation of “timing” highlights another concern surrounding interviews. Does 
an interview access the reality of an informant’s experience (Silverman, 2001, p. 
113)? For example, were Samantha’s distracted comments truly reflective of her 
understanding of character? Or, even more fundamentally, as Brookes’ (2003b, p. 
53) has questioned, a participant may believe (ibid., p. 53) that his or her character 
has been changed on an expedition, but does this necessarily mean that it has? 
Although some trust that the interview does access reality (Peräkylä, 1997, p. 201), I 
understand the interview to be a context-driven narrative construction between two 
people on a topic of shared interest: an “inter-view” (Kvale, 1996, p. 2). While this 
qualification places constraints on the generalising power of semi-structured 
interviews, it is epistemologically honest regarding the researcher’s limitations of 
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knowing others’ experience, and is consistent with this thesis’ ontological position of 
critical realism.  
 
Perhaps, the most limiting factor of an interview is its time-consuming nature. 
Gillham (2000b, p. 9) suggests that trialing questions, preparing the interview 
schedule, conducting the interview, transcription, analysis, and write-up equates to 
more than 50 hours of work for each hour interviewed. Yet, no other method so 
consistently brings rewards (Drever, 2003, p. 9). The participants, perhaps 
encouraged by a listening ear, often treat the interview as a formal almost reverent 
event, and thus give it their all (Gillham, 2000b, pp. 7, 10).  
4.4.1.2 The Interviews 
As intimated in subsection 4.2.2.2, the purposes of the interviews were twofold: 1) to 
inquire as to whether the participants believed their character to have been influenced 
by the expedition; and 2) to determine whether the expedition had provided the 
participants with opportunities to experience Aristotle’s conditions for virtue: moral 
reflection; practising moral actions; and sharing in the moral lives of others. The 
following discussion explains how I constructed the interviews to meet these 
purposes.  
 
I conducted two interviews with each participant during the expedition: the first 
interview was carried out during the first few days; and the second near to the end. 
The questions I asked during the two interviews (see interview schedules in 
Appendix 3) fall into four categories. First, I asked general questions about character 
that were not dependent on the expedition or theoretically motivated by a virtue 
ethical perspective. Second, I asked questions about character that were not 
dependent on the expedition, but were virtue ethically relevant. Third, I asked 
questions that were expedition dependent, but not virtue ethically generated. Fourth, 
I asked questions that were both expedition and virtue ethically dependent. I have 
structured the analysis chapters around these categories, and have provided a 
diagram listing the questions from each interview, the category into which each 
question falls, and an analysis chapter in which each question is addressed (see 
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Figure 4.1). It should be clearly noted that although there were two interviews 
conducted with each participant, this structure should in no way imply any pre/post 
analytical intentions; each interview played its own separate role.  
 
The first interview was conducted with each participant over a four-day period 
(August 13th – 16th) while traveling in the wilderness. The interviews took place 
either on the forest floor, or inside a supervised (co-instructor) tent if the bugs were 
biting or the rain falling. 
 
Using the metaphor of a funnel, the questions for the first interview started broadly, 
with open questions about character, and became increasingly theoretically focused, 
with questions pertinent to a virtue ethical perspective. Using Stake’s language 
(1995, p. 20), the interview flowed emically to etically – from the participants’ 
interests to my own theoretical concerns. I had various motivations for the questions 
I asked in the first interview. Most importantly, the first interview served as an 
interpretive context for the second interview. For example, if I wanted to know 
whether the participants believed their character to have been influenced by the 
expedition (a second interview question), I first had to understand what they meant 
by “character” and how they believed it might be developed (first interview 
questions). Similarly, if I wanted to know whether the participants thought they had 
had opportunity to exercise each of Aristotle’s conditions for virtue (although I never 
mentioned the words “Aristotle” or “virtue”) while on the expedition (second 
interview questions), I first had to know how they understood each of these 
conditions to be relevant to character (first interview questions).  
 
In addition to providing an interpretative context, the first interview serves as a moral 
educational example as well. Since a central tenet of experiential learning, an 
approach to learning commonly espoused in OAE literature, is for an instructor to be 
aware “of the capacities, needs, and past experiences” of the learner (Dewey, 
1938/1997, p. 71), an outdoor adventure educator sincerely interested in morally 
educating must start with the participants’ perceptions of morality. By asking general 
(non-theoretically guided) questions about character, the first interview exemplifies a 
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kind of dialogue that may be helpful for OAE instructors interested in morally 
developing their students, and struggling to access their students’ moral views. For 
Figure 4.1. An overview of the interview questions in the analysis chapters. The 
question(s) within each chapter are labelled as to whether they were expedition 
dependant and/or virtue ethical specific. 
Question(s) from Interview One Analysed in Chapter 5
What is character?
Can character be improved or 
undermined?
How do you know what kind of 
character you want to have?
Non-expedition dependent
Not virtue ethically specific{
Question(s) from Interview One Analysed in Chapter 6
Does reflection play a role of 
reflection in character development?
Does practice play a role of 
reflection in character development?




Question(s) from Interview One Analysed in Chapter 7
Do you think this wilderness 
expedition will affect your character?
Expedition dependent
Not virtue ethically specific {
Question(s) from Interview Two Analysed in Chapter 8
Did this expedition offer opportunities 
to reflect on your character?
Did this expedition offer opportunities 
to practice action related to character?
Did others on this expedition make an 
impact on your character?
Expedition dependent
Virtue ethically specific{
Question(s) from Interview Two Analysed in Chapter 9
Do you think this wilderness 
expedition affected your character?
Expedition dependent
Not virtue ethically specific {
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the conversation between researcher and participants, regarding these broad 
characterological questions, can be seen as an act of moral education itself. Further, 
for the moral educator interested in virtue, the first interview’s theoretically focused 
questions reveal to what degree the participants’ perspectives might be called virtue 
ethical. However, beyond this methodological example to moral educators, the 
participants’ perspectives from the first interview become testimonios (Beverly, 
2005; Chase, 2005, p. 668) of their experience, and, despite being only one case 
study and thus limited in generalisability, do contribute to the greater knowledge 
accumulation, thereby making them of interest to the discipline of OAE (Barrett & 
Greenaway, 1995, pp. 53-54; Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 242).  
 
The second interview, which pertained directly to the expedition, was conducted 
with each participant over a two-day period (August 23rd – 24th) on the La Vida 
property. Like the first interview, the second interview similarly moved in an emic to 
etic direction. Each participant was first asked whether he or she felt that his or her 
character had been influenced by the expedition. Then, each participant was asked 
whether he or she had had any opportunity to exercise the Aristotelian conditions for 
virtue (reflection, practice, and the shared life) during the expedition. 
 
Regarding the process of interviewing itself, my strategy was much the same for both 
sets of interview. Locations were chosen for comfort and auditory privacy (Peräkylä, 
1997, p. 206). Each interview began with a casual question (see Appendix 3 for 
examples) to put the interviewee at ease (Drever, 2003, p. 26). To ensure that I never 
cut participants short, I always finished a question with a “sweeper” such as: “Is 
there anything else … ” (Munn & Drever, 1999, pp. 27-28). To facilitate quality, 
prompts and probes were used where and when appropriate. Prompts were used to 
open-up the question for the participant, and probes were used to focus, extend, 
clarify, and explain the participants’ perspectives (Drever, 2003, p. 24). I concluded 
each interview asking if there was anything at all the interviewee would like to say. 
Finally, once each interview had finished, I thanked each informant for his or her 




Having described the primary data, the interviews, I will now turn to the secondary 
supporting forms of data collection: observations and texts respectively.  
4.4.2 Observations 
People are never more mistaken about themselves than when they are speaking 
sincerely and from the heart. (Gillham, 2000a, p. 13, paraphrasing Chesterton, 
1927, p. 240) 
Chesterton’s (1927, p. 240) comment highlights another limitation with interviews: 
the possible delusions of self-perception. This concern encouraged me to use 
observations as a secondary form of data collection. In the following paragraphs, I 
further develop the reasons for observing, describe my technique, and comment on 
the limits of using observation as a method. 
 
Observations, the secondary method of data collection, were made for two reasons. 
First, as a participant observer, I could come to know the case more thoroughly. 
Participant observation allows the researcher to study and experience phenomena in 
its natural context. The significance of participatory observation is epitomised in 
Pearson’s metaphor of the difference in knowing between a boxing commentator 
“talking a good fight” from the ring-side, versus the pugilist having fought a good 
fight from inside the ring (Pearson, 1993, p. xviii). The intensity and vulnerability 
occasioned by this moral/ethical research necessitated a relationship that could only 
be developed by living “in the ring” (Gregory, 2003, pp. 13-32). As a “member” of 
the expedition (Hobbs & Wright, 2006, p. x), I stood to gain a deeper understanding 
(Simpson & Tuson, 2003, p. 56) of the participants’ experience. This “living with 
and among” (McCall, 2006, pp. 4-5) increased the likelihood of accessing the tacit 
and inexplicit subtleties of their experiences (Monaghan, 2006, p. 238), and thus 
complemented the participants’ thoughts as shared in the interviews (Drever, 2003, 
p. 8). By being there, I became a living fieldnote (Jackson, 1990, p. 21). 
 
Secondly, observations were to serve as a source of method triangulation for the 
primary method, the interviews (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 305). If glaring 
inconsistencies developed between a participants account of themselves in an 
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interview and their actions on the expedition, the researcher could ask for 
clarification. 
 
In essence, all that was said and done outside the interviews was within the remit of 
observation. Like the rest of the research design, the observations centred around 
theoretical interests (Simpson & Tuson, 2003, p. 45), and were focused chiefly on 
Aristotle’s three conditions for virtue: reflection, practice, and the shared life.  
 
Few resources are available on making observations and converting them to 
fieldnotes. Thus, I depended heavily on Emerson et al. (1995) for my technique. 
While the main purpose of fieldnotes is to give descriptions, not impressions 
(Silverman, 2001, p. 68), the field notebook also serves as a reflection tool. Through 
observation a lived experience is turned into a written text (for an example see 
Appendix 5). 
 
There are essentially two kinds of notes taken in the field: those taken now and those 
taken later. “Jottings” were made during the moment in a small notepad and used to 
jog the memory for the evening’s write-up (Emerson et al., 1995, p. 20). 
Occasionally, taking notes in front of the participants seemed inappropriate, so I 
either tried to remember the instance to be written later, what Goffman calls “off-
phase” note-taking (1989, p. 131), or wandered off and scribed privately. This 
combination of jottings and “head-notes” (from Ottenberg in Jackson, 1990, p. 5) 
were converted to something of a running chronological log at the end of each day. 
The act of recording observations deepened my understanding of the case and 
provided a concrete record to stimulate further reflection and analysis upon my 
return home (Emerson et al., 1995, pp. 63, 71).  
 
As mentioned earlier, although fieldnotes are primarily descriptive, they also serve a 
reflective role. In order to keep these two functions separate, I attempted to use 
“asides” (explanatory or clarifying remarks set out in parentheses), “commentaries” 
(more elaborate reflections given their own paragraphs), and “in-process memos” 
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(even more sustained analysis set into its own paragraphs), when writing-up 
(Emerson et al., 1995, pp. 100-105).  
 
Like all methods, observation has its limitations. A common complaint against 
observation is its subjective nature. Writing fieldnotes from observations is itself a 
form of analysis through description (Silverman, 2000, p. 126), more like a filter 
than a mirror (Emerson et al., 1995, p. 66). Consequently, it has been argued that the 
unique perspective of each researcher’s viewpoint makes observations resistant to 
checks for reliability (Angrosino, 2005, p. 731). However, as mentioned in 
subsection 4.2.1, the gulf between objectivity and subjectivity is a continuum, not a 
dichotomy (Scruton, 1999, pp. 39-40). That observations are in part subjective, does 
not render them objectively irrelevant. Careful description (Geertz, 1973, pp. 5-6, 9-
10) of an event necessarily limits subjectivity, and increases the trustworthiness of 
the observation. 
 
In addition to the subjectivity attributed to making observations, observational data 
are often charged with the “Hawthorne effect” (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000, 
p. 127), where the subjects’ behaviour is altered through their awareness of being 
observed. Although a legitimate concern, I believe my two-week “dawn ‘til dusk” 
participation in the necessary capacity as the students’ instructor, made their 
behaviour more natural (Hargreaves, Moyles, & Robinson, 2002, p. 63).  
 
Perhaps the greatest limitation to the quality of my observations was the lack of sleep 
occasioned by expeditionary research (Emerson et al., 1995, p. 41). The dual 
responsibility of researcher and instructor made for extremely long and tiring days, 
which often truncated my nightly write-ups.  
4.4.3 Serendipitous Texts 
Since the La Vida programme was an academic requirement, two assignments were 
to be completed on the expedition: a journal and a reflection paper. As an instructor, 
I was asked to review these assignments while the participants were on their two-day 
solo experience (August 20th-21st). Although unaware of this opportunity during the 
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research planning, I quickly realised that these texts provided a reflective perspective 
that, like the observations, complemented the interviews as a form of triangulation 
(Stake, 2005, p. 454). I asked the participants’ permission to use any aspects of these 
assignments that were relevant to the research. Taking advantage of this 
serendipitous opportunity (Yin, 2003, p. 58) is a good example of the bricoleur art of 
qualitative research.  
 
Having explained why I used the chosen methods, and what these methods entailed, I 
will now briefly describe how data were collected, given the challenges of the 
wilderness environment.  
4.4.4 Technology Used in Data Collection 
As I have noted elsewhere (Stonehouse, 2007, p. 47), finding technology suitable to 
a two-week wilderness-based expedition was difficult. I had four concerns: a 
recording device for the interviews; a way to power the recording device without a 
mains; keeping a field notebook to capture observations; and a way to protect my 
instruments and paper in the field.  
  
Although Stake (1995, p. 66) suggests not recording interviews, I thought the 
complex theoretical nature of ethics and morality warranted an opportunity to re-
listen to interviews (Peräkylä, 1997, p. 203). Also, since the analysis strategy I hoped 
to employ, that of thematic analysis, depended on transcripts, I had a further motive 
to record. After deciding to record the interviews, I did so digitally for many reasons. 
Since up to 20% of taped recordings are incoherent, recording digitally promised to 
be more reliable (Patton, 2002, p. 381). Also, digital recordings made it possible to 
insert my interviews into a Computer Aided Qualitative Analysis Software 
(CAQDAS) programme, allowing the coding process (naming or describing 
phenomena for categorisation) to occur on the recorded file itself, rather than on a 
transcription of the interview. Other advantages of digital interview media were the 





The two main problems presented by digital recording in the field were volume 
(memory space) and power. Since the volume required for 24 hours of interviews 
would be significant, I needed a compressed format. I used an iPodTM with an 
iTalkTM, a small accessory that plugs into the top of the iPodTM. Although recorded as 
a WAV file (typically a large-volume format), at 8kHz mono-channel 16-bit, the 
result was only one Mb/minute, easily stored on my 20Gb device. Since an iPodTM 
battery lasts only eight hours and recording is especially taxing, I looked for an 
environmental recharging solution and found the SolioTM, an iPodTM solar charger, 
which I strapped to my rucksack for re-charging while on the expedition.  
 
Finding a solution for keeping a field notebook created similar difficulties. 
Challenged to keep detailed records of “incontestable description” (Stake, 1995, p. 
62), I judged a keyboard-based medium to be the most efficient means of recording 
my observations. Alphasmart’s NeoTM, a digital keypad, allows little more than text 
entry. Its strengths are its simplicity and durability. It helped increase typing speed 
and accuracy, ease of editing, and saved on later transcription (Emerson et al., 1995, 
p. 41). By head torch each evening, I wrote-up the day’s fieldnotes.  
 
I also faced the challenge of protecting my documents and equipment while in the 
field. I protected my documents (e.g. interview schedules) with Watchful Eye 
DesignsTM’s Navy Seal-grade plastic bags. I pneumatically protected my equipment 
(iPodTM and NeoTM) via an inflating valve on a Mountain EquipmentTM dry bag. 
 
In summary, this section presented the methods used for collecting data. Interviews 
were chosen as the primary method. Two sets of interviews were described and the 
limitations of the method articulated. Observations, and serendipitously, texts, were 
chosen as secondary sources. The content and techniques of observation were then 
described, followed by a discussion on observational limitations. Brief mention was 
given to the utilisation of serendipitous texts, before detailing the technology used to 
collect data. Having conveyed how data were collected, I will now explain the 
techniques used to analyse it. 
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4.5 Analysing Information 
In theory-motivated inquiry, analysis starts from the outset of the research project 
(Silverman, 2000, p. 120). Whether approaching a subject from a specific theoretical 
perspective, or choosing methods to probe a question, the research process requires 
analysis throughout. However, when interpreting data, it is appropriate to speak more 
formally of analysing. This section addresses analysis techniques used when 
interpreting the interviews, observations and texts. Special attention is given to the 
use of audio-coding in place of transcription when analysing the interviews.  
4.5.1 Interview Analysis 
Expedition-based interview research is, not surprisingly, a small literature (Beames, 
2004b, p. 97; Brymer, 2002, p. 54), providing little precedent for new researchers to 
follow. My interview analysis technique is an amalgamation of a variety of 
approaches.  
 
To speak of interview analysis is to refer to the entire interview process: theorising, 
designing, interviewing, transcribing, analysing, verifying, and reporting (Kvale, 
1996, p. 81). In order to inform the interview questions, I made a significant effort to 
understand a virtue-ethical perspective on character before designing my interview 
schedule. Since the quality of the interview determines the quality of the data, which 
inevitably impacts the quality of the analysis (ibid., p. 144), my efforts to practise 
interviewing techniques undergirded the analysis. Kvale (1996, p. 132) goes so far as 
to say that an expert interview is self-interpreting. That is, the interviewer should 
have so skillfully structured his or her questions, probes, and prompts throughout the 
interview that the interviewee has already confirmed in their own voice, the 
interpretation of the interviewer (ibid., p. 132; see also Polkinghorne, 1989, p. 49). 
As part of the analysis, I aimed to clarify and confirm participant meanings during 
the interviews themselves, thereby reducing some of the interpretive work required 
later.  
 
Typically, interviews are recorded and transcribed for analysis. However, 
transcription is a contentious subject. Although Stake (1995, p. 66) downplays the 
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need for the informants’ own words, many scholars see value in the process of 
transcription and consider it necessary for accuracy, particularly for a novice 
researcher (Bird, 2005, p. 226; Lapadat & Lindsay, 1999, p. 77). Transcripts are 
often associated with greater rigour, and the possibility of member-checking the 
transcript (having the participants check over the transcript for accuracy), a further 
aid to their trustworthiness (Drever, 2003, p. 61). I decided to transcribe a few 
interviews and then reevaluate whether transcription was a helpful technique in the 
analysis.  
 
Conscientious and consistent transcribing reduces unnecessary subjectivity. For 
example, the transcriber must find a consistent way to transcribe the paralinguistics 
(e.g. pauses, emotion, emphasis, and laughter) of his or her interviews (Silverman, 
2000, p. 187). I created a transcription key (see Appendix 6) to help maintain this 
consistency (Bird, 2005, p. 240; Peräkylä, 2005, p. 882), and then employed what 
DuBois, Schuetze-Coburn, Cumming, and Paolino call a “broad transcription,” 
described as follows (1993, p. 46). In addition to capturing the words verbatim, any 
pauses were estimated to be short, medium or long, and paralinguistic impressions 
(Lapadat & Lindsay, 1999, p. 67) were listed (e.g. emphasis, emotion). Backchannel 
noises (e.g. hmm, uh-huh) (DuBois et al., 1993, p. 50), and orthographic (Lapadat & 
Lindsay, 1999, p. 67) considerations (e.g. “nuculer”), however, were irrelevant to my 
purposes.  
 
I transcribed three interviews, one from the pilot and two from the La Vida 
expedition (see example in Appendix 6). After reevaluating, I decided that for a 
number of reasons transcription did not suit the needs of the analysis. Most 
importantly, I was not convinced that transcribing was improving the rigour of the 
interpretative process. A transcript can be considered a construct of a construct. That 
is, the interviewee first interprets the interviewer’s question, constructs a reply, and 
then the transcription becomes the interviewer’s construct of that reply. Analysing 
the transcripts seemed to distance me unnecessarily from the actual conversations 




A related reason not to transcribe was the relative subjectivity of the process. 
Regardless of a transcript’s quality, a transcriber cannot “get it all.” Subtle aspects of 
human conversation (e.g. paralinguistics – pitch, volume, intonation) alter meaning, 
convey emotion, and resist reduction to the page. Any attempt to transfer the 
complexity of vocal communication to a transcript necessarily and selectively 
decontextualises the conversation (Lapadat & Lindsay, 1999, p. 70). Regardless of 
intentions, a transcriber’s “fingerprints” are all over a transcript (Tilley, 2003, p. 
752). For these reasons Kvale calls the transcript “a bastard, it is a hybrid between an 
oral discourse … face to face … and a written text created for a general, distant, 
public” (Kvale, 1996, p. 182).  
 
The final reason for not transcribing was its tremendous drain on time. Generating 
roughly 18 pages (6000 words) of text per interview, and requiring five hours per 
one-hour interview, transcription needed to be carefully considered (Gillham, 2000a, 
p. 62).  
 
While transcribing the three interviews was a worthwhile learning experience (Bird, 
2005), its limited benefit did not justify the effort required. The rest of the interviews 
were not transcribed. Instead, the emerging technique of “audio-coding” (described 
below) was used.  
 
Coding directly from the recorded audio file is not without its critics. Lapadat and 
Lindsay (1999, pp. 66, 80), in their survey of transcription literature, conclude that 
transcription is still considered more rigorous, complete, and accurate – all aspects I 
refuted earlier – than alternative methods including audio-coding. Despite this 
reservation, there appears to be a growing confidence in the interpretive merit of 
audio-coding. For example, since audio-coding avoids the bastardisation of a 
transcript, Kvale supports it (1996, p. 174). Likewise, Gillham is also comfortable 
with the idea as long as it is peer-evaluated (2000b, p. 61). Further, Thomas (2007, p. 
104), listing many of the transcription problems I noted earlier, believes the choice 




Confident that my decision was defensible, instead of conducting my analysis on 
representational transcripts, I used the recorded interviews themselves. The strengths 
of “audio-coding” complement the weaknesses of transcription. By avoiding the 
creation of a transcript for each entire interview, and instead only transcribing that 
which was necessary for the analysis chapters, I removed a step in the process. 
Similarly, both the time saved not transcribing and the audio-coding process itself, 
which necessitates that the researcher go back to the original recording over and over 
again, allowed me to immerse myself more deeply in the actual interviews.  
 
Audio-coding requires a CAQDAS (software) programme. Although many accuse 
computers of taking the art out of interpretation, it should be emphasised that the 
computer does not think for the researcher (Friese, 2006, p. 311). Essentially, 
CAQDAS programmes are sophisticated filing systems. Unlike the traditional cut 
and tape method of coding where once one starts down a path it is hard to turn 
around, these “electronic scissors” (Kvale, 1996, p. 173) encourage evolutionary 
thinking because of the ease of changing one’s analytical direction (Friese, 2006, p. 
312), and thereby potentially increase the trustworthiness of the research. At the time 
of the analysis I knew of only one programme that supported audio-coding: 
ATLAS.tiTM (n.d.; see also Appendix 2). Instead of fixing codes to a text-based 
transcript, ATLAS.tiTM allowed me to code directly onto the recorded audio files 
themselves. The coding procedure utilised was a “thematic analysis.”  
 
Thematic analysis (Ezzy, 2002, pp. 86-94) is rather self-descriptive; the interpreter 
extracts themes from the interviews. “While the general [theoretical] issues that are 
of interest are determined prior to the analysis, the specific nature of the categories 
and themes to be explored are not predetermined” (Ezzy, 2002, p. 88). To draw out 
these themes, I began by selecting substantive sections from the interviews that were 
relevant to the theoretical aims of this study of character. Next, these substantive 
sections, essentially audio clips, were each assigned a descriptive phrase, a process 
called “open coding” (Ezzy, 2002, p. 88; see also Gillham, 2000b, pp. 63-66). While 
assigning these open codes, I also coded each substantive section with the interview 
question number it addressed (e.g. Interview 1, Question 4 or Interview 1, Question 
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6). Assigning this question-number code to each substantive section, allowed me 
quickly to group all the substantive sections and open codes relevant to each 
interview question. Audio-coding enabled the substantive material to be selected, the 
open codes to be described, and the relevant question code assigned all in one 
simultaneous step (see Appendix 7).  
 
With open codes now allocated, the next phase of the analysis consisted in assigning 
“axial codes” (Ezzy, 2002, p. 91), codes that group open-codes around central 
categories. For example, the third question in the second interview, “Did this 
expedition offer opportunities for reflection on your character?,” yielded “Informal 
Moral Reflection” as one of its axial codes. I was unable, in my research, to find a 
recommended number of open codes needed to constitute an axial code for my 
participant number of ten. I therefore determined that open codes from at least three 
participants, roughly a third of the total number, were needed to qualify as an axial 
code. The few exceptions to this rule are noted within the analysis chapters. 
Although many of my interview questions yielded no additional categorisation 
beyond the axial level, a few questions were further categorised into “selective 
codes” (Ezzy, 2002, p. 92), or core categories for a question. For example, under 
question five in the second interview, “Did other people make any impact on your 
character during this expedition?,” two axial codes, “The Group Experience” and 
“Community and Moral Self-Perception” were grouped under a larger selective code, 
“Community” (see Appendix 7).  
 
The many themes discussed throughout Chapters 5-9 represent these axial and 
selective codes, yielded from the analysis. The relative strengths of these themes can 
be seen in an ATLAS.tiTM output format that tabulates the open codes across the 
participant interviews (see Appendices 7-8).  
 
Although this coding/categorising process is, to a degree, subjective, it is not 
idiosyncratic. For while two researchers may identify different substantive sections 
or code the same substantive section differently, according to their theoretical 
interests, these researchers should be able to understand how and why the other 
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researcher arrived at his or her sections and codes (Gillham, 2000b, p. 70). To 
confirm the “sense” of my codes and categories I had a colleague perform an audit 
(described in subsection 4.6.2) and listen to some substantive sections from my 
interviews to check the intelligibility of my coding.  
4.5.2 “Analysis” of Observations and Serendipitous Texts 
As mentioned, the secondary data, the observations, were a form of method 
triangulation (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 306) for the interviews, as well as a way to 
chronicle the expedition, and preserve details that would soon be lost by the passage 
of time (Emerson et al., 1995, p. 14). Although indispensable to my research process, 
I did not deem the fieldnotes observations worthy of a full thematic analysis, as I was 
primarily interested in the participants’ perspectives. I did, however, find strong 
congruence between the themes discovered in the interview analysis and the 
observations made in the field. Within the analysis chapters, I periodically draw on 
my fieldnotes utilising a “fieldnote centered analytic commentary”: an analytic point 
is made, a descriptive excerpt with orienting context is provided; and the 
commentary that then follows develops the ideas grounded in the excerpt (Emerson 
et al., 1995, p. 182).  
 
Similarly, the serendipitous texts were used as another form of method triangulation 
(discussed shortly; see Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 306). As I read through them, I 
took observational notes on aspects of their content relevant to character and 
expeditions. As the texts’ content was only incidentally related to character and 
expeditions, I again saw no reason for a full thematic analysis. As with the 
observations, occasional mention of the texts is used within the analysis chapters. In 
defence of these decisions, Peräkylä (2005, p. 870) notes that this informal technique 
is very common with researchers using texts to supplement other core data. 
 
With the analysing techniques of the primary data (interviews) described, and the 
triangulating roles of the secondary data (observations and texts) explained, the last 
section of the chapter discusses the trustworthiness of the findings.  
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4.6 Craftsmanship, Trustworthiness, the Community, and 
Generalisations 
This section begins by showing “validity” and “reliability” to be inappropriate terms 
for this research. Ultimately, it is trustworthiness built through craftsmanship that 
may “validate” this thesis. Since generalisations are the culminating aim of many 
research projects, I end this chapter with some reflections on the generalisability of 
this research.  
4.6.1 Validity, Reliability and Naive Realism 
Internal validity assumes a naïve realism where the point of inquiry is to display: 
Isomorphism … with … reality. But the determination of such isomorphism is in 
principle impossible, for, in order to make it, the inquirer would need to know the 
nature of that ultimate tangible reality a priori. But it is precisely the nature of that 
reality that is at issue; if one already “knew” it there would be no need to mount an 
inquiry to determine it. (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, pp. 294-295) 
This statement alludes to the inevitability of never getting beyond one’s own filters. 
However, as mentioned before, the gulf between objectivity and subjectivity is a 
continuum, not a dichotomy (Scruton, 1999, pp. 39-40). While some inquiries permit 
more objective reckoning (e.g. determining the coefficient of thermal expansion of 
copper), others do not. There are two main concerns regarding the validity of this 
research: the validity of the participants’ narratives; and the validity of the thematic 
analysis. While the secondary methods helped to triangulate participants’ claims 
concerning the moral significance of the expedition on their character, ascertaining, 
with any specificity, the precise moral change in each participant is for reasons 
already given, impossible. Further, qualitative research privileges participants’ 
perspectives, which is a commitment I have tried to honour throughout the analysis. 
With regard to evaluating the thematic analysis, Guba and Lincoln (1989, p. 233) 
suggest that “validity,” a word often associated with the positivist paradigm, is less 
helpful in judging the quality of qualitative research, than other terms such as 
“trustworthiness.”  
 
Validity is in part demonstrated through “reliability,” which “refers to the degree of 
consistency with which instances are assigned to the same category by different 
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observers or by the same observer on different occasions” (Hammersley, 1992, p. 
67). Many qualitative researchers believe that “thick description” (Geertz, 1973, pp. 
5-6, 9-10) can help reveal this consistency for the reader (Bryman, 1988, pp. 77; 
Simpson & Tuson, 2003, p. 65). These same researchers point out that the qualitative 
community has to operate in a hard-science oriented era, so that if qualitative 
scientists want to be taken seriously they ought to show the reliability of their 
research (Kirk & Miller, 1986, p. 72; Silverman, 2005, pp. 220-223; Yin, 2003, p. 
34). The assumption behind this conviction is represented by Hammersley (1992): 
“the process of inquiry in science is the same whatever method is used, and the 
retreat into paradigms effectively stultifies debate and hampers progress” (p. 182). 
This ideology misses Aristotle’s insight that all subjects do not yield the same level 
of precision (I 2§1). If reliability requires that other scholars obtain the same results 
when they attempt the same piece of research, then what actually becomes validated 
is the “the lowest possible denominator,” which can “lead to a trivialization of the 
interpretations” (Kvale, 1996, p. 181). For similar reasons, Kvale questions the 
appropriateness of inter-rater checks within much qualitative research, because they 
depend on colleagues with expertise in other areas checking the reliability of a 
researcher’s codes (ibid., p. 182).  
4.6.2 Craftsmanship and Trustworthiness 
This section, drawing on the qualitative research literature, suggests that approaching 
one’s qualitative inquiry as a craftsman and aspiring to trustworthiness throughout 
the research process, fundamentally determine the “validity” of the findings.  
 
Kvale (1996, p. 240) uses the metaphor of craftsmanship to portray excellence within 
qualitative research. Throughout this thesis, I have tried to communicate the caring 
and conscientious craftsmanship (Kvale, 1996, p. 240) taken towards this research. 
Diligent record keeping, through comprehensive organisational schemes, has allowed 
me to manage the detailed nature of the investigation. To facilitate this research 
management, Ezzy recommends the use of a research journal (2002, pp. 71-72). By 
utilising NoteBookTM (n.d.) software, I was able to maintain an electronic research 
journal containing all the notes, ideas, reflections, difficulties and solutions 
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throughout the research process. Appendix 9 (see also Appendix 1) provides a URL 
to a navigable HTML version of the journal.  
 
I similarly approached both data collection and analysis as a craftsman. Time spent 
practising my interviews, taking observations, transcribing and analysing, all before 
the La Vida expedition, indicate my aim for quality throughout the inquiry.  
 
I have tried to remain rigorously disciplined (Stake, 1995, p. 15) during the research 
in the hope of producing trustworthy findings. Instead of the four traditional means 
of validating research (internal validity, external validity, reliability and objectivity), 
Guba and Lincoln (1989) suggest a tripartite method (see Figure 4.2) for conducting 
trustworthy qualitative research: four parallel criteria; the hermeneutic process itself; 
and authenticity. Both the parallel criteria, and the hermeneutic process are relevant 
to this research, and are discussed below.  
 
The “parallel criteria” parallel the four traditional means listed in Figure 4.2. As an 
alternative to internal validity, Guba and Lincoln (1989, pp. 236-237) offer 
credibility, where instead of comparing results with “reality,” the credibility of the 
findings are based on their faithfulness to the members’ perspectives. There are 
many ways to build credibility: prolonged engagement, persistent observation, peer-
debriefing, negative case analysis, member-checks and triangulation (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1989, pp. 231-237). Taking these in turn, I spent as much time with the 
participants as I was able. Two-weeks at 16 hours a day could be considered a 
prolonged engagement, and ample time to observe a range of behaviour. Peer-
debriefing occurred both during the expedition, with the co-instructor, a fellow PhD 
student, and after the expedition through contact with the La Vida administrators and 
colleagues at The University of Edinburgh. Any deviant cases were noted, and are 
highlighted in the analysis chapters. Member-checks for the first interview were built 
into the second interview, as the participant and I reflected on his or her responses in 
the first interview. Also, participants were contacted to check for their approval of 
the interpretations found in the analysis chapters. Last, although some qualitative 
research scholars (e.g. Guba & Lincoln, 1989, pp. 240-241) consider triangulation to  
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be a leftover from the positivist paradigm, it is still seen by many (e.g. Silverman, 
2005, p. 121) as a helpful way to corroborate findings and thus build credibility. In 
1985, Lincoln and Guba (pp. 305-306) suggested three types of triangulation that 
apply to qualitative research: source; method; and investigator. In this thesis, source 
triangulation was demonstrated by the consistency in responses within the first and 
Figure 4.2. Methods for assessing trustworthiness. Traditional means to validity (down 
the left of the diagram) are replaced by parallel criteria (down the right of the diagram) 
recommended by Guba and Lincoln (1989, pp. 236-237).  
 



















second interviews of each participant. For example, in Thomas’ second interview, he 
frequently referred back to his definition of character, given in his first interview. 
Method triangulation occurred through the observations and serendipitous texts 
confirming the credibility of the interview analysis findings. Finally, as my research 
journal attests, I intentionally met with a variety of qualitative researchers over the 
course of the research. By troubleshooting the methods, and critiquing the analysis 
technique, this triangulation improved the quality of this research. For example, On 
December 16, 2006, I met with University of Edinburgh Lecturer Ken McCulloch 
who alerted me to the notion that transcription was not an either/or decision – that I 
could transcribe a few interviews and then re-evaluate. Similarly, with regard to the 
virtue ethical content of this thesis, I met with two distinguished scholars to refine 
my understanding of character and its formation: Kristján Kristjánsson, and Gerry 
Hughes S.J..  
 
The second traditional validation is external validity (generalisability), which Guba 
and Lincoln (1989, p. 241; see also Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 316) parallel with 
“transferability.” Here, the “thick description” (Geertz, 1973, pp. 5-6, 9-10) provided 
by the researcher’s careful records builds the generalisability of the study (see 
subsection 4.6.3 for a discussion on the generalisability of the thesis). 
 
The third and fourth traditional means to validation, reliability and objectivity, are 
replaced with dependability and confirmability (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, pp. 242-243; 
see also Lincoln & Guba, 1985, pp. 316-317, 319). To address these means to 
validation, Guba and Lincoln suggest a two-part audit: dependability and 
confirmability. The dependability audit investigates the quality of the research 
process. As my references to craftsmanship attest, I have gone to great efforts to 
secure dependability. Confirmability makes up the second half of the audit 
introduced above. Drawing on Halpern’s work (1983), Guba and Lincoln suggest 
that any qualitative research project should undergo a comprehensive audit by a 
colleague. John Telford, a fellow PhD student performed this audit on my work. He 
looked at the theoretical sensitivity of the chosen methods, the construction of the 
methods themselves, signs of craftsmanship through piloting and method refinement, 
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the appropriateness of the analysis techniques, the coherence of the analysis, and 
evidence of a reflective process through a research journal (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 
319).  
 
The second method of Guba and Lincoln’s strategy to establish the trustworthiness of 
qualitative research is the hermeneutic, or interpretive process itself (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1989, p. 244). Peräkylä (1997, p. 209) notes that sustained communication 
(e.g. in an interview), depends on understanding one another. That is, during a 
conversation, if an interlocutor becomes confused, he or she can ask questions until 
lucidity is regained. By clarifying, analysing and confirming, all in the moment of 
the interview, I aimed at trustworthy interpretations.  
 
This section affirms that despite the interpretive nature of qualitative inquiry, rigour 
(Silverman, 2001, p. 40) should still be a hallmark that inspires trustworthiness. 
Ultimately, trustworthiness is about character (Kvale, 1996, p. 241). As a researcher, 
my aim has always been to strive for the virtue this thesis has examined (Pring, 
2001). “It is my integrity as a researcher that I beg to be recognized” (Stake, 1995, p. 
76).  
4.6.3 Generalising Potential 
Traditionally, qualitative researchers, most often anthropologists, took little interest 
in generalisation because of the uniqueness of their ethnographies. The exotic 
cultural and remote geographical particularities of their inquiries, made them largely 
ungeneralisable. However, now, within an educational context, cases are not bound 
by the exotic, and instead share any number of contextual similarities, which 
potentially increase their generalisability (Schofield, 1993, pp. 92-95). Despite this 
potential, it should be remembered that an inverse relationship essentially exists 
between the depth of an analysis and the power of its generalisability (Flyvbjerg, 
2006, p. 241). There may be some confusion over this relationship within OAE 
research. For example, Barrett and Greenaway (1995) highlight the subject-
dependent and individual nature of an adventure education experience (pp. 11, 53-
54), and note the “desperate need” (p. 53) for qualitative research that focuses on 
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participants’ individual accounts of their adventure experiences. However, on the 
same page, they claim that: “small local studies which cannot be generalised beyond 
the case in question are of limited value” (ibid., p. 53). These appeals seem rather 
contradictory. The time and resources required to capture and interpret participants’ 
accounts, necessarily preclude large sample sizes, thereby limiting generalisability 
(Silverman, 2000, p. 39). In addition to small sample sizes, the “perspectival-
subjectivity” (Kvale 1996, p. 287) mentioned above makes generalising beyond this 
specific case problematic. Nevertheless, while recognising these limitations, I do 
think the generalising potential of the single case more promising than commonly 
supposed.  
 
Although I do not claim any “grand generalizations” (Stake, 1995, p. 7), I do hope 
for “naturalistic generalizations” (Stake & Trumbull, 1982; Stake, 1995, pp. 42-43; 
Stake, 2005, p. 454; Chase, 2005, p. 668). By providing a “thick description” 
(Geertz, 1973, pp. 5-6, 9-10) of the participants’ perspectives, readers can naturally 
generalise from this detailed case to their own experiences.  
 
However, case study research is not relegated to naturalised generalisations alone. 
There are several other ways a single case can be generalised. Schofield (1993, pp. 
98-108; republished 2007) suggests three methods to increase case generalisability 
that are relevant to this research: typicality; what could be; and potential 
generalisations.  
 
Regarding the typicality of a case, although Allison (2002, pp. 114-115) notes that 
particular variables, such as the participants’ age, the geographical location, and a 
programme’s purpose, limit the generalisability of an expedition, expeditions can 
also have curricular similarities that may invite at least limited generalisability. As an 
“Outward Bound-type wilderness expedition” (a term used to describe a certain type 
of expedition, e.g. Daniels, Bobilya, & Kalisch, 2006, p. 12), the present case has 
many curricular components that are shared throughout North American expedition 
programmes. This common curriculum includes a “time-tested array of experiences” 
(What is an Outward Bound course?, n.d.): a method of wilderness travel; rock 
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climbing; a ropes course experience; a service project; finals (where students travel 
independently from instructors); a solo; an end of the expedition celebration; and a 
mini-marathon. These curricular similarities may increase the generalising potential 
of this case. For example, there appears to be no reason why the meaning derived 
from meeting the extreme physical challenges of the expedition, as attested to by the 
participants, should not be similarly derived by others on a different expedition (see 
subsection 8.2.1 for participants’ accounts).  
 
Also, related to case typicality, I was initially concerned that La Vida’s status as an 
orientation programme for first-year university students, would limit possible 
generalisations to other orientation programmes (e.g. Austin, Martin, Mittelstaedt, 
Schanning, & Ogle, 2009). Specifically, I was concerned that Gordon College’s 
intention for the La Vida course, as an orientation programme, would centre the 
expedition curriculum on issues of student retention, study skills, and registration 
techniques – the targets of many other American college outdoor orientation 
programmes (Davis-Berman & Berman, 1996, pp. 22-3). A La Vida administrator 
soon allayed my fears (Fieldnotes, August 13 th), noting that it was the participants’ 
claims concerning the transformational power of La Vida expeditions that had first 
impressed Gordon College to incorporate La Vida into its orientation programme. 
That is, La Vida expeditions were assimilated into the orientation programme “as 
they are” and maintain their Outward Bound-type curriculum, thereby making this 
case potentially relevant to a broader number of programmes.  
 
By studying what could be, Schofield’s (1993, pp. 102-103) second chosen method 
for increasing the generalisability of a case, a theoretically ideal case is chosen in 
hope of confirming the theory. Yin (2003) calls these “critical cases” “analytically 
generalizable” (pp. 32, 40; see also Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 226). La Vida was indeed 
theoretically ideal, and although not trying to prove or disprove virtue theory, I did 
find that an Aristotelian perspective on character fit well with the findings from this 
expedition. This research then could encourage others to adopt this virtue ethical 




One last generalisation category remains, that of potential (as in latent) 
generalisations (Scholfield, 1993, p. 108). Here, generalisations are dependant upon 
changes (e.g. ideological changes) within a field. For example, Allison (2006), 
drawing on Egan (2002, pp. 154-182) is concerned that OAE “research has become 
synonymous with empirical research … thus leaving … theoretical inquiry 
homeless” (p. 11). Citing the work of this thesis as an example, he then suggests that 
“careful consideration of focus and attention to philosophical inquiry can help to 
move the field forward – both in terms of practice and theoretical contributions” 
(Allison, 2006, p. 13). If the field of OAE heeds Allison’s recommendation, then the 
philosophical example of this thesis may have potential generalisations for future 
research. Additionally, Flyvbjerg (2006, pp, 222, 224-225) puts a different and 
broader spin on potential generalisations, claiming that any case study may be a 
small contribution to an eventual generalisation, once enough context-specific cases 
are amassed.  
 
In closing this section on generalisability, it is important to mention that simply 
because a set of findings “cannot be formally generalised does not mean that it 
cannot enter into the collective process of knowledge accumulation in a given field 
or in a society” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 227). Flyvbjerg (2006, p. 242) continues, 
drawing on Kuhn (1987), that for a discipline to be in any way effective, it must have 
a large number of case studies as exemplars. Even if this research yields few 
generalisations, it has contributed as a particular case to the field of OAE. 
 
Instead of validity, this section suggested craftsmanship and trustworthiness as 
means to building the credibility of the research. Guba and Lincoln’s (1989) parallel 
criteria and the hermeneutic process itself were used to reveal the efforts to achieve 
trustworthiness within this research. The section closed by positing the generalising 
potential of this case study.  
 
The chapter opened with a defence for the fieldwork. My ontological and 
epistemological positions were then described. Virtue theory was then argued to 
require a qualitative inquiry. Next, interpretivism was distinguished as the method of 
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interpretation used on the case study, the approach that was most appropriate for the 
phenomena being researched. Gordon College’s La Vida programme was then 
described as a theoretically ideal site for the case study. The methods, two interviews 
with each participant serving as primary data, and observations and texts playing a 
supportive triangulatory role, were subsequently introduced, followed by a 
discussion of audio-coding and thematical analysis, the techniques used to interpret 
the data and produce the findings. In defence of these findings, craftsmanship and 
trustworthiness were suggested as more appropriate justificatory grounds than 
traditional validity. The chapter closed by suggesting multiple avenues for enhancing 
the generalisability of this single case.  
 
Before launching into the analysis chapters, a brief inter-chapter section describes the 
scene of my research and thereby provides the reader with the broader context of the 
expedition. Further, this section introduces some of the challenges I faced in 
rendering the participants’ perspectives to text throughout the analysis chapters.  
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Inter-Chapter Section: Setting the Scene 
This brief inter-chapter section serves two purposes. First, building on the case 
details provided in subsection 4.3.3, the context of the expedition is more fully 
developed for the reader. Issues such as history, demographics, curriculum, and the 
location of the journey are discussed. Second, the empirical part of the thesis is 
introduced. Through the use of quotations, I reveal and applaud the effort given by 
the participants to articulate their ethical understandings, while also conveying the 
challenge their struggle to express presented for the writing-up of their perspectives.  
Setting the Scene 
After attending a Colorado Outward Bound course in the mid-1960s, two young 
men, working for an organisation called Young Life, created an alternative Christian 
programme that emphasised spiritual development through wilderness travel. 
Allegedly, one of their first participants claimed: “This is La Vida!,” the (real) life. 
 
The La Vida programme continued to operate under Young Life until Gordon 
College took ownership in 1982. By 1986, La Vida had become a requirement for all 
students physically able to participate. Since its origin, La Vida expeditions have 
taken place in the Adirondacks State Park, the largest publicly protected area in the 
contiguous USA. The park totals 27, 400 km2, roughly one third the size of Scotland. 
La Vida’s reputation as a respectful user and caretaker of the park is impeccable, 
earning them a seat on the Adirondack State Park Board for their ethical practice.  
 
Over the years, the La Vida programme has expanded its offerings, and now 
provides a variety of courses accommodating students from 11 years old to the 
university level. A “Base Camp,” in Lake Clear, NY, within the Adirondacks, 
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consisting of multiple buildings on .28 km2 of woodland, acts as the headquarters for 
La Vida’s summer programme. 
 
This research took place on a La Vida “College Expedition” course. The first-year 
Gordon College students arrived at Base Camp on August 13th 2006. After a few 
orientation games, they were divided into their individual “patrols” of 10 students 
plus two instructors. Backpacking equipment was then assigned and fitted and we 
made camp at a remote site on La Vida’s Base Camp property.  
 
Early on the morning of the 14th, we left for the Jay Mountain Wilderness, a 28.7 km2 
designated wilderness area. There, we spent the next four days navigating through 
trail-less forest. This “bush-whack” culminated on the 17th with an especially long 
and difficult segment that was recollected by all participants in their interviews. The 
first set of interviews was conducted during these four days (13th-17th). 
 
Each day of the expedition, two students volunteered to be leader of the day (LOD) 
and assistant leader of the day (ALOD). Their responsibilities were to orchestrate the 
many tasks involved in expeditionary travel: navigation, timing of breaks, tent-site 
selection, securing food from bears, finding suitable water supplies, and maintaining 
a Leave No Trace (www.lnt.org) camping ethic.  
 
On the morning of the 18th, the students left for their “Finals,” a circular route of 
extraordinary beauty called the Nandagao Ridge. Finals are a period where the 
students, using the skills they have just learned, separate from the instructors, and 
independently (although under instructor supervision from a distance) travel through 
the wilderness (see Sibthorp, Paisley, Gookin, & Furman, 2008 for more particulars). 
The co-instructor and I joined the group again on the afternoon of the 19th on the 
summit of Hurricane Mountain. That evening we made a group camp along Gulf 
Brook and discussed the impending solo experience. 
 
Early on the 20th, the students were assigned a demarcated area where they would 
camp alone while on their “solo.” Each student was allotted a 50m stretch of land 
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along the Gulf Brook that ran back into the forest some 100m. These individual areas 
were separated by sections of unoccupied forest to ensure that students did not 
disturb one another. For the next 48 hours, the students “soloed” taking only a tarp, 
sleeping mat, sleeping bag, pen, journal, Bible, and some water. Just before dark on 
the 20th, I collected their journals, read them through that night, and returned them on 
the morning of the 21st to enable further entries. Similarly, the students’ written 
assignment, a short essay addressing the question: “What experiences/learning will 
you be able to apply outside the program?” was collected, read, and assessed on the 
evening of the 21st, and returned on the morning of the 22nd when they finished their 
solo.  
 
After collecting the students from their solo areas, and returning to our group camp 
on Gulf Brook, we broke the fast with a post-solo community breakfast. We then 
backpacked out to a La Vida support vehicle, where a short drive took us to Owl’s 
Head crag for an afternoon of abseiling and rock climbing (22nd). That evening, now 
back at a remote site on the La Vida Base Camp property, we began ACES, a formal 
reviewing exercise in which students shared Appreciations, Challenges and 
Exhortations with regard to one another.  
 
The morning of the 23rd was spent on a ropes course. Early that afternoon I began the 
second set of interviews. This last evening was marked with a celebratory dinner and 
an address from the programme director, recognising the achievement of the 
students.  
 
We rose before dawn on the 24th to attempt the “mini-marathon,” a 10-mile run from 
a local lake back to the La Vida Base Camp. Strategically placed at the end of the 
course, the run is a symbol of the forthcoming endurance that will be required to put 
into practice, once the participants return to their native contexts, all that was learned 
on the expedition. After a short group interview and a quick brunch, the students 
loaded a bus and returned to Gordon College. 
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Introduction to the Empirical Section 
Although the purpose of this research’s empirical work seemed straight forward 
enough (an exploration of participants’ moral narratives on a wilderness expedition 
from a virtue ethical perspective), rendering the findings in a coherent and 
trustworthy manner proved difficult. The complex nature of moral matters made 
discussing issues related to character a strenuous and often perplexing task for the 
participants. While answering interview questions, participants frequently processed 
and revised their comments as they spoke. Their resultant perspectives, although 
easily intelligible within the context of a conversation, were oftentimes rather halting 
and stilted, making the transcription of longer statements problematic.  
 
By way of example, the participants’ struggles to give form to their ethical ideas 
were so prevalent within the interviews that this topic itself became a theme. The 
following are some of the participants’ comments regarding the difficulty of 
speaking about character.  
 
At one point in Duncan’s first interview, he claimed that his character was impacted 
by the encouragement he received from the group. I asked how he thought that had 
affected his character. He paused and then frustratedly said, “I can think it, but I 
don’t know how to say it.” He continued, “It’s like right there, … but I just don’t 
know how to … explain it in words. … Sorry. … I want to say … what I’m thinking, 
I just don’t know how to get it out.”  
 
Claire also struggled. The following quotation shows her wrestling with a circular 
definition. Defining a person’s character, she said, “It’s who they are.” When I asked 
for clarification, she explained her definition by calling it someone’s “character.” 
She then realised that she had just explained her definition of character by using the 
word “character.” She laughed and continued, “That doesn’t work. But like, it’s like, 
oh it’s hard! Let me think. Like … it’s who they are I guess,” again repeating her 




William, seeming almost embarrassed by his struggle to articulate why he thought 
character could be improved said, “It’s hard, I didn’t have time to think about this.” 
 
To the general question, “What is character?,” Samantha floundered for a while, and 
then with an air of resignation sighed, “I don’t know, it is complicated.” Later, 
Samantha stated that experience had taught her what kind of character she aspired to 
have. I again asked for clarification and she replied after a long pause, “I don’t know. 
… I’m not really sure.”  
 
In revealing these quotations, I mean no disrespect to the participants. To the 
contrary, I hope these excerpts reveal the effort that the participants gave to this 
research. Their struggles speak to the opaque nature of the topic, and suggest why it 
has received relatively little scholastic attention within OAE.  
 
Given the difficulty with which the participants expressed their moral views, I had to 
decide how best to represent their perspectives for the reader. On the one hand, I did 
not want to produce what Kvale calls “Tiresome Interview Findings” (1996, p. 326). 
Such findings “are often tedious to read ... [and] characterized by long, obtuse, 
verbatim quotes from the interview transcripts” (ibid., p. 254). Kvale considers this 
tiresome style to be victim of a “qualitative hyperempiricism,” where only directly 
quoted material can serve “as rock-bottom documentation of what was really said in 
the interviews” (ibid., p. 254; see also Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, p. 269). On the 
other hand, more coherently rephrasing participant responses or not making an effort 
to use the participants’ words at all (see this recommendation in Stake, 1995, p. 66) 
runs the risk of implying polished and fluid answers to difficult ethical questions. 
Worse, such paraphrasing may raise suspicions of misinterpretation through the 
spurious treatment of interview material for the sake of some theoretical agenda. For 
these conflicting reasons – the need for objectivity and readability – Kvale suggests 
that interview research findings must be depicted in a way that balances the “court 
room” with the “art gallery” (ibid., p. 258-259; see also Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, 




Such a balance recognises that what the qualitative researcher hears and sees in the 
field, must then be reconstructed in a way that engages the reader (Kvale, 1996, p. 5). 
Stake (1995, p. 40) has likened such reconstruction to the telling of a story. The 
researcher takes individual instances throughout the interviews, pulls them apart, and 
puts them “back together again more meaningfully” (Stake, 1995, p. 75; see also 
Stake, 2005, p. 456). The creativity and artistic expression required for such 
rendering caused Guba and Lincoln (2005, pp. 210-211) to describe qualitative 
researchers as storytellers, poets and playwrights. Indeed, some researchers claim 
that “fiction and fictional devices may in fact be more effective in conveying certain 
aspects of lived experience” (Rinehart, 1998, p. 201). Such researchers note that a 
strong commitment to verification through the qualitative hyperempiricism 
mentioned above can “actually marginalise interpretations of the findings” (Beames 
& Pike, 2008, p. 4). While my analysis does not employ such fictional techniques, it 
may be considered a “form of narration, … a continuation of the story told by the 
interviewee[s]…. , a story developing the themes of the original interview[s]” 
(Kvale, 1996, p. 199).  
 
Telling the participants’ story necessarily required condensing and editing their 
original narratives (Kvale, 1996, p. 170-171). It is common practice to perform 
minor edits on interview transcriptions, when doing so will alleviate confusion for 
the reader or better represent the participant’s view (Emerson et al., 1995, p. 193; 
Kvale, 1996, pp. 170-171). However, fearful that such editing might imply a refined 
familiarity within their responses, and fail to demonstrate the travail under which 
many of these responses were delivered, I chose to leave the transcriptions of 
participant quotations largely unedited. This decision allowed me to represent the 
participants’ story using as many of their (unedited) words as possible (Kvale’s 
courtroom). In instances where I felt that participants’ “expressed meaning” (what 
they actually said) confused their “intending meaning (what they actually meant) 
(Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, p. 212), I quoted from what portions of their words I 
could, and used these smaller quoted fragments within rephrased sentences that 
better communicated their intended meaning (Kvale’s art gallery). Unavoidably, this 
effort to tell the story in the participants’ words necessitated the frequent use of 
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ellipses. Within the participants’ responses, an ellipsis may indicate a variety of 
things: repeated words, unnecessary filler expressions often-used in conversation 
(e.g. like), re-started sentences, or material not relevant to the purpose at hand.  
 
In sum, when deciding how best to depict the participants’ story, my decisions were 
informed by three constant concerns: to remain faithful to the participants’ meanings; 
to capture their struggle to articulate their views on character; and to make the 
transcriptions legible for the reader. To legitimate not only the credibility of the 
above decisions but also the skill with which I carried them out, I again appeal to my 
craftsmanship and trustworthiness as a researcher. Although the discussion in 
subsection 4.6.2 suggested the multifaceted nature of this trustworthiness, it is 
perhaps worth repeating here that one such element of this trustworthiness was 
member checks. To ensure that my interpretation was reasonable, the research 
participants were given copies of the analysis chapters and invited to provide their 
critical feedback.  
 
In conclusion to this section, throughout the analysis, following Aristotle, I have 
tried to provide a level of precision appropriate to the ethical subject matter (I 2§1). I 
have done the best I can with the data I had, and as Stake (1995) suggests, “it is my 
integrity as a researcher that I beg to be recognized, that my interpretations be 
considered” (p. 76). 
 
Before turning to the first of five empirical chapters, a few explanatory comments 
may be helpful. Subsection 4.4.1 and Figure 4.1 gave a rationale for the order and 
content of these analysis chapters. This order is interpretively significant because in 
several places throughout the two sets of interviews similar themes emerged. Rather 
than viewing such similarities as redundant, and compressing them under one central 
theme, I have left them in their original context, and made every effort to build on, 
rather than repeat, the participants’ perspectives. In this way, these reiterated themes 
both triangulate the credibility of the participants’ accounts and more clearly express 




What Is Character? 
This chapter examines the responses to three questions asked in the first interview 
regarding participants’ general understanding of character: What is character?; Can 
character be improved or undermined?; How do you know what kind of character 
you want to have? Using the categories described in Figure 4.1, the questions 
examined here are non-expedition dependent and not virtue ethically specific. 
 
The chapter serves several purposes within the thesis. Pertinent to the analysis, the 
participants’ responses offered here, provide an interpretive context for the second 
interview. That is, the participants’ moral claims regarding the impact of the 
expedition on their character (a second interview question discussed in Chapter 9) 
can only be understood within a context of what they mean by “character” (a first 
interview question examined here).  
 
Beyond this interpretive need of the thesis however, this chapter serves a broader 
purpose. Like many researchers, I hope the findings of this study result in more than 
academic philosophising. With this in mind, the contents of this chapter may serve as 
a moral educational example to the many OAE programmes that aspire to develop 
character. By beginning with the participants’ understanding of character, this 
chapter provides a pedagogically promising approach to how a moral educator might 
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initiate ethical instruction. For, as Dewey (1938/1997, p. 71) has noted, education 
best proceeds from the boundary of the learner’s previous experience and 
understanding. My interpretation, affirmation and critique of the participants’ 
responses, all from a virtue ethical perspective, indicate any number of directions 
that might be pursued by an educator committed to the character growth of these 
participants. Further, the themes themselves, drawn from the participants’ responses, 
may also be of interest to moral educators both within and beyond OAE. While I am 
not suggesting that the findings here are grandly generalisable, this qualitative case 
study into character and its formation, may, as Schofield (2007) suggests, provide 
opportunity for some naturalistic and potential generalisations (see subsection 4.6.3). 
As will soon be seen, one such potential comes through the broadly Aristotelian 
nature of the participants’ responses. That is, since Aristotle’s account of character is 
intended to apply to all humanity, the participants’ many Aristotelian insights and, 
perhaps just as important, their several significant oversights, may have generalising 
power beyond this case. The chapter concludes by noting the various implications of 
these findings.  
5.1 What Is character? 
This question yielded three main themes. First, character was understood to be a 
major aspect of one’s identity. Second, the participants spoke of character as an 
ability to act in a particular way. Third, character was described as something that 
was revealed through a person’s actions. 
5.1.1 Character As Identity 
Many participants considered character to be a foundational aspect of identity. For 
example, Olivia, aphoristically referring to character said, “It’s … your sense of 
self.” Similarly, both Iris and Claire individually said that someone’s character is 
“What makes them who they are.” Employing more substantive language, Iris 
understood character to be “the core” of a person, the place “where their personality 
comes from.” In a like manner, definitionally referring to character, Claire said, “It’s 
the foundation of their being.” While these quotations represent character as 
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contributing to one’s own sense of identity, Thomas understood character also to be a 
source that others use to identify one another. Speaking of character, he said, “It’s 
what identifies you.” 
 
Moral philosopher Charles Taylor similarly makes these connections between the 
values one upholds and the identity one has. “I can define my identity only against 
the background of things that matter” (Taylor, 1991, p. 40). “To know who I am is a 
species of knowing where I stand” (Talyor,1989, p. 27). As Laitinen (2002) notes, 
for Taylor, “strong evaluations are the central issue in self-interpretations” (p. 59). 
 
In the above quotations, the participants seem to be giving character an ontologically 
real status as an actual quality or property of the whole of a person. Esther, 
recognising this pervading nature of character mused: “It’s kind of ironic in society 
when people say, ‘Oh he’s really showing his character’” as if character were an “on 
and off thing.” Esther clarified, noting that she thought one acted from character “all 
the time in every action.” Claire seemed to agree claiming that character “is what 
everything should be based on, …. It’s the foundation of who you are.” Hursthouse 
(2001), as a virtue ethicist, supports this all-encompassing view of character saying 
that the dispositions that make up our character go “all the way down” (pp. 12, 123, 
158-159) to the core of a person’s life. 
 
A variant within this theme of character and identity was seen in Samantha’s 
associations between identity, character and personality. She said that people’s 
character is the “different traits of their personality that they choose to show.” 
Viewed from a virtue ethical perspective, Samantha seems to be confusing 
dispositional character traits (II 2) with personality traits. Although perhaps not an 
absolutely clear-cut distinction, personality traits such as introversion or 
extroversion, are not necessarily moral characteristics, and are distinct from 
character, as Aristotle understands it.  
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5.1.2 Character As an Ability 
The second theme drawn from the question, “What is character?,” is that character 
seems to be an ability to act in a particular way. Or, as Saul generally stated, 
“Basically anything that you do has some founding in, at least some, in [your] 
character.” More specifically, the students noted three different kinds of ability: a 
general ability to maintain integrity; specific abilities derived from various character 
traits; and a deliberative capacity. 
5.1.2.1 Character As an Ability To Maintain Integrity 
Iris said, “Whenever someone mentions character, I always immediately … think of 
integrity.” Esther, comparably, seemed to indicate integrity when she spoke of 
character as “showing my values with my behaviours, and not changing myself to try 
and please anyone here …. So it’s more trying to maintain my character.” Gwen, 
similarly saw character as consistency between one’s values and behaviour. She used 
the example of “leading a pure lifestyle,” and said by “trying to constantly better 
yourself, and not let yourself fall into things” this “striving towards that particular 
value,” then “shows up in your character.”  
 
Describing character as integrity between values and action recalls Aristotle’s 
discussion of the continuum between virtue and vice (see subsection 2.3.7). For 
example, if Gwen holds the value of a “pure life,” but does not lead a life of purity, 
she is incontinent (VII 3-4). If Gwen is tempted to live impurely, but manages to live 
purely, she is continent (VII 10). Finally, if Gwen lives a pure life, and is not tempted 
to live otherwise, she has attained virtue (II 4§3) in her lifestyle.  
5.1.2.2 Character As an Ability To Exercise Traits 
A number of participants described character as an ability to act in a certain way. For 
instance, Iris equated character with a capacity to maintain “honesty” throughout 
one’s life. William said that possession of “perseverance … and patience” has “a lot 




In addition to these more conventional traits, several respondents described character 
as determining how one treated others. Duncan thought that character affected “how 
you talk to people.” Similarly, Olivia understood character to influence “the way that 
you choose to interact with others.”  
 
I confess to being pleasantly surprised by these more relational descriptions of 
character. Perhaps it was my familiarity with the martial understanding of character 
found in the OAE literature (e.g. Hunt, 1999, p. 117) that conditioned me to expect 
more physically “rugged” (Cook, 1999, p. 158) explanations of character. The 
respondents’ tendency to understand character in primarily social and interpersonal 
terms runs throughout the whole of this analysis. It was this more social 
understanding of character that shifted my focus from the traditional traits associated 
with OAE (e.g. endurance, hardihood, and intrepidity; see James, 1949, pp. 314-
327), to a more relational understanding of virtue in the vein of Swanton’s (2003, pp. 
115-127) agapically-based virtue ethic (discussed in subsection 2.7.1.5). 
5.1.2.3 Character As a Deliberative Capacity 
Although only a few of the ten participants mentioned the deliberative aspects of 
character, I have included their perspectives because of their relevance to 
Aristotelian theory. Saul connected values with deliberation and moral conclusions. 
He stated that character-based values influence both the “simple decisions” and 
“moral dilemmas” a person faces. As an example he said, “even simple things like 
choosing if you want to go play ultimate Frisbee” can have “some sort of moral 
standing.” For, he explained, even these small decisions have moral implications: 
“What do I need to do [right now]? What else could I be doing right now?” 
 
Correspondingly, Olivia described character’s deliberative capacity as “your moral 
sense, … [or] how you choose to … live your life, [and] get through certain 
experiences.” She continued that “your character reflects in a lot of your choices,” 




Saul and Olivia’s comments regarding the deliberative aspects of character may 
relate to what Irwin (1999, p. 30) calls “the preconditions of virtue” (see subsection 
2.3.5). He uses this term to introduce the first four chapters of the Ethics’ third book. 
Desiring (III 4) the right things, deliberating (III 3) about how best to strike the 
golden mean, and choosing the most virtuous option (III 2), are all dependant on a 
virtuous character. These preconditions can particularly be seen in Olivia’s 
understanding character as a guide that influences moral choices. 
5.1.3 Character Revealed 
The last theme identified character as something revealed through one’s actions and 
responses. As William, speaking of others, generally put it, “throughout their whole 
life, whatever situation comes,” “however they act, reflects their character.” In 
similar fashion, Thomas aphoristically said, “out of the mouth, the heart speaks.” He 
clarified that “if you have good character [traits] within you, those come out in your 
actions.”  
 
Gwen noted that this connection between actions and character is revealed not just in 
pivotal circumstances, but in the mundane details of life. She stated, “I think your 
character is something that is actually pretty tangible…. If you kind of sit back and 
observe you can tell a lot about a person’s character, especially [by] how they deal 
with little situations.” She then provided an example in the way that “people react to 
really small things, like if a little interruption came up, whether they get really upset 
about it? Or, do they just go with the flow and help the situation?”  
 
Esther also made the connection between actions revealing character. She said that 
someone is credited with good or bad character “based on their actions.” She 
expanded saying one must make a judgement “on how they acted, if it was good or 
bad character.” 
 
Without specifically using the word, William, Thomas, Gwen, and Esther, all appear 
to be referring to the dispositional nature of character, which Aristotle calls a “state” 
(see the discussion of hexis in subsection 2.4.2). The participants seem to be 
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implying that a person’s actions stem from his or her dispositions: therefore, by 
observing a person’s behaviour, his or her character will be revealed. The following 
quotes call attention more directly to the habituated nature of these dispositions. 
Duncan said, “your true character … comes from a whim, when you just … go and 
do something.” Thomas said the same thing in his own words: it is like “you don’t 
have to think about your actions. I think that your actions are just a by-product of 
your character.” In like manner, Samantha said that one’s character is revealed when 
“it’s not something they really have to think about. It’s just what happens.”  
 
While the participants’ understanding of character does address the virtue ethical 
emphasis on acting from cultivated dispositions (II 6§15), it also seems to imply that 
automatic, almost unconscious actions, are what reveal character. Although the 
Ethics notes that emergency situations, which depend on instantaneous action, 
preclude the time necessary to deliberate about appropriate action, and therefore 
depend on established dispositions (III 8§15), Aristotle does seem to suppose that the 
majority of virtuous actions will be deliberated upon. A further concern with any 
failure to recognise deliberation’s importance to character is that of one’s motivation 
for and affect towards an action. For Aristotle, an action is virtuous only if the agent 
aspires for what is noble (kalos; see IV 2§7) and acts with the appropriate sentiment 
(II 3§3). Since these elements of Aristotelian dispositions (hexis) – deliberation and 
proper motivation and affect – are examined more fully in subsection 6.2.2, I will 
leave a discussion of them until then. 
 
The question, “What is character?,” revealed three main themes. Participants 
reported that character was foundational to their identity. The students also 
understood character to provide certain capacities for action. Lastly, character was 
described as something revealed by one’s actions throughout the course of one’s life. 
Having articulated what they believed character to be, the participants were next 
asked if they thought it could be improved or undermined. 
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5.2 Can Character Be Improved or Undermined? 
Participants unanimously believed that character could be improved and undermined. 
This question generated five themes. The participants emphasised: the gradualness of 
character growth; the role of struggle in the development of character; the process of 
improving character; the influence of others on one’s character development; and 
luck’s impact on one’s inclination to be moral. 
5.2.1 The Gradual Nature of Character Change 
There seemed to be a general agreement regarding the difficulty of building 
character. For instance, Iris said, “On so many levels, character building is so hard.” 
Many participants claimed that part of what made character development so difficult, 
was that it was built gradually. As Claire said, “It’s definitely gradual, I don’t think 
it’s instantaneous.” Or, in the words of Gwen, “I think it’s an ongoing process; I 
don’t think it’s ever one that happens instantaneously, it just takes time and 
commitment.”  
 
Speaking of how her values first changed and then her behaviour eventually 
followed, Esther provided an example of gradually inculcating the value of 
volunteerism into her life. She said that “over the last couple of years,” volunteering 
had become “more important” to her. However, she noted that despite this change in 
her values, “behaviour changes … [were] very slow” in coming: for “it’s not like all 
of a sudden I started volunteering all over the place.” Iris’ comments resonated with 
Esther’s claim that character change is not instantaneous. She said, “I definitely see 
that it’s work” and that one has to “consciously spend time” developing it. Iris 
thought that a reason for the gradual nature of character improvement was 
humanity’s resistance to change. She suggested that change is incremental and that 
the road to improvement is paved with instances where “you will fail.” Duncan, also 
recognised that change is slow to come, and provided his own reasoning. He thought 
that with “work, you could probably improve your character,” but he didn’t think 
that character could “all of a sudden up and be totally different, because there are still 




Duncan’s insight that for change to occur, habits will need to be broken, again brings 
to mind Aristotle’s concept of a disposition or hexis (II 5). It should be emphasised 
that hexis is a neutral term. Every agent has a constellation of dispositions, whether 
they be virtuous, continent, incontinent or vicious (see Book VII). For Aristotle, 
character development is the gradual process of “breaking” unvirtuous habits and 
cultivating virtuous ones.  
 
This theme, the gradual nature of character change, is interpretively important to the 
thesis. For it makes the participants’ claims (in Chapter 9) that their character was 
influenced by the expedition, all the more remarkable. This tension between the 
gradual development of character, described in this chapter, and the claims of 
character change during the two-week expedition (in Chapter 9), will be further 
examined in subsection 9.1.1.1. 
 
Before moving to the next theme, I want to highlight a comment made by Esther, for 
it stands in contrast to the others. She gave an example of instantaneous change to 
her character. In her junior year of high school, she attended a Global Young Leaders 
conference. While at the conference, she realised how well she could “take care of” 
herself, and how that conference was the first time she really started “speaking up in 
groups.” She continued, 
after that conference I was a lot more confident, just self-confident within myself. 
So it wasn’t even necessarily, a conscious [thing] like, ‘Oh, this is what I want to 
change,’ it just kind of happened and it [has] stuck since then and that was two 
years ago. So, it was kind of just the experience and how it made me feel, I guess, 
[that] ended up changing my character.  
For two reasons, I am unclear as to whether this instantaneous development of self-
confidence is actually a development in character as Esther suggests. First, 
confidence’s relationship to character development is not obvious, a subject that is 
examined in subsection 9.1.1.2. Second, for Aristotle, acting virtuously is acting 
from established dispositions (II 6§15). Even if an agent is instantaneously able to 
perform the actions of a virtuous person, this agent’s actions would not be deemed 
virtuous until a disposition to act thus was cultivated (see II 4§3). This raises an 
interesting question. What kind of moral change must occur for an individual 




This difficult question is more broadly related to this theme: the gradual nature of 
character change. By claiming that character formation is a gradual process, the 
participants naturally delimit the potential impact of their (relatively) short 
expedition. However, as Chapter 9 will reveal, the participants unanimously claimed 
that their character had been impacted by the expedition. The next theme, 
particularly in comments made by Saul, may provide a way through this quandary.  
5.2.2 The Role of Struggle in Character Development 
The second theme identified from the question, “Can character be improved or 
undermined?,” is the necessity of struggle. Many students associated growth in 
character with encountering trials and challenges.  
 
Claire, referring to people in general, said that character is developed by “who they 
become in their trials in life,” but also that “bad character is developed when people 
… don’t succeed in trials.” When asked why such struggle is so significant, Claire 
said, “because it’s putting us in a different situation than we are used to … and it 
stretches us, it stretches who we are.” Later in the interview, she clarified that a trial 
“gives you a chance to become better, because it gives you a chance to push yourself 
harder than you’ve ever gone.” The language Claire employs seems almost athletic 
in nature – trials, stretches, push, harder – and relates well to the metaphor of 
character training found in Epictetus’ Enchiridion: 
And if you are confronted with a hard task or with something pleasant, or with 
something held in high repute or no repute, remember that the contest is now, and 
that the Olympic games are now, and that it is no longer possible to delay the 
match, and that progress is lost and saved as a result of one defeat and even one 
moment of giving in. (Trans. Boter, 1999, 51.2, p. 336) 
These moral “matches” that are constantly being won and lost, are the very actions 
building one’s dispositions (hexis) of character. Duncan, also convinced that 
character is developed through trials, provided an example of the ultimate trial, the 
giving of one’s life, as seen on September 11th. He noted that the selfless decisions to 
rescue “revealed character” in the “fire fighters and policemen in New York, because 
they didn’t really think” about their own well-being before rushing in to help, “they 
 
 201 
just acted in the good of the people.” Nusbaum (1986) concurs with Duncan’s 
assessment noting that the virtuous life can lead “into situations in which the 
requirements of character conflict with the preservation of life itself” (p. 336). 
 
Saul also associated struggle with character development saying, “I think it always 
takes a kind of challenge … to bring you to a better moral standing.” For Saul, part 
of this struggle was hardship: “I think a lot of the time my character grows when it’s 
put up against … some sort of hardship.” Although Saul clarified that these hardships 
need not be physical – “A lot of times I find my hardships and character growth to be 
somewhat philosophical.” – he provided an example of physical hardship from 
Chaim Potok’s The Chosen, where the protagonist’s values are radically changed 
through the trauma of almost losing his eye in a baseball accident. Saul claimed that 
the accident “changed the whole outlook” of the protagonist, generating a much 
“deeper” and “more meaningful” perspective on life and its value. During the 
interview Saul seemed to be equating the change in the protagonist’s values, wrought 
through the nearly catastrophic accident, with a change in the protagonist’s character. 
This could be seen as relating to Aristotle’s concept of boul!sis (III 4), discussed in 
subsection 2.3.5.1, where what a person wishes or desires both determines what he or 
she perceives as morally salient and sets the trajectory of the moral deliberation. 
Although wishing for the right things is only one of Aristotle’s rigorous requirements 
for virtuous character, it can be considered a keystone, for what one wishes for is 
directly related to one’s concept of what is good and noble (kalos) (see III 4§5). It 
does appear, as Saul has alluded, that boul!sis can be radically and quickly changed 
through a poignant life experience. This interpretation might also explain why so 
many participants, discussed in Chapter 9, believed their character to have been 
impacted on the expedition. That is, much like Potok’s protagonist, the morally 
significant experiences of the expedition may have, despite the shortness of the 
course (two weeks), changed the participants’ values, which they also equated as a 




5.2.3 The Process of Character Formation 
Most participants provided an account of how they understood character to be 
formed. William believed that a “change in your state of mind, … the way you 
think” was required to improve character. Saul extended William’s sentiments and 
said that merely thinking about a character trait that you want to improve was not 
enough: “I think you have to have it applied. You can look at it all day,” but “it has 
to be applied in your life for it to develop your character.” These two elements, 
thinking and doing, can be seen in a variety of participants’ theories that follow.  
 
Iris and Gwen both recognised the importance of intention when developing 
character. Iris said you first have to “expose yourself to yourself,” by which she 
meant you “actually have to look at yourself” and perform a moral evaluation. She 
provided a hypothetical example of the process: “Ideally this is not who I want to be, 
but this is who I am right now, and in order to get to where I want to go, … things 
have to change.” Gwen shared a similar perspective: “You have to start out with a 
certain goal. You identify something about yourself that you are not really that happy 
with,” and begin to work on it. She emphasised that character growth requires a 
“conscious decision …, I don’t think it’s something that usually happens by itself.” 
Similarly, Iris claimed, “I can’t … just say, ‘This is how I want to be.’” For she 
understood character change to require “consciously making an effort to … change a 
behaviour or thinking.” Iris then expanded on this process with strong Aristotelian 
language saying that when one encounters a situation of moral saliency “actually 
thinking about the choice and … deciding” which ends “point you more in the 
direction you want to go” is how one builds character. This quotation contains nearly 
all the preconditions of virtue identified in III 1-4 of the Ethics (see subsection 
2.3.5). In addition, Gwen and Iris’ emphasis on conscious decisions meets Aristotle’s 
requirement that an action must be done intentionally for it to be virtuous (II 4§3).  
 
Thomas described character development by referring to a poster on one of his 
classroom’s walls. The poster was a quote allegedly attributed to Frank Outlaw (Who 
is Frank Outlaw, n.d.). It reads: “Watch your thoughts; they become words. Watch 
your words; they become actions. Watch your actions; they become habits. Watch 
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your habits; they become character. Watch your character; it becomes your destiny.” 
After roughly putting this quote together from memory, Thomas suggested that 
character might be developed by working through this aphorism in reverse. He 
explained, first “look forward to your destiny.” He suggested asking questions which 
examine one’s moral trajectory: “What am I working towards in life here? What am I 
living for?... Am I living for myself? Am I living for [the sake of] other people?” 
Thomas continued, moving up the structure of the aphorism, suggesting that one look 
for any aspects of one’s character that may need improvement: “go back down that 
chain of things, … go back and … check your habits, check your actions, check your 
thoughts.” Thomas’ use of Outlaw’s quotation is interesting for several reasons. The 
quotation has many Aristotelian aspects (e.g. thoughts, actions, habits, character, 
destiny). Since Thomas referred to this progression throughout his interviews, he 
appeared to have a fairly Aristotelian perspective on character and its development. 
Additionally, it was of particular interest to me that Thomas’ understanding of 
character reflected the “simple slogan” type of character education, critiqued by 
Bohlin as “often superficial” (2005, p. 2). While it is not my place to judge, even if I 
was able, whether Thomas’ character was affected by this roughly Aristotelian 
construct, it did not appear that broadly knowing how character was formed made 
developing it any easier. Educating about character may not be synonymous with 
educating for character. Perhaps this is the point that Bohlin was trying to make.  
 
Esther, unlike the others, focused on how one’s character might be undermined. She 
explained,  
if your friends are pressuring you to do things that … your values will tell you ... 
you shouldn’t, but you give in anyways, … [and do so] more and more times until it 
doesn’t really mean anything to you anymore, …. then you’ve kind of lost that part 
of your character. 
Similarly, while Iris, like the others, thought character was slow to build, she also 
thought it was quick to erode. Iris’ insight may well explain why character is so 
difficult to build: hard won progress can be undone so suddenly.  
 
Before leaving this theme, Samantha’s description of how character is formed, 
although brief, is succinct. Character is developed by “becoming more wise” through 
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one’s “different experiences.” More perceptive than she perhaps realised, I suggest 
that Samantha’s comments reflect the development of phron!sis through life 
experience, which ultimately leads to growth in character (see subsection 2.3.6; see 
also Sherman, 1991, p. vii). 
 
This theme has strong relevance to Chapter 9, which addresses whether participants 
believed their character to have been influenced by the expedition. For since, as 
Chapter 9 attests, the participants were unanimous in their claims that the expedition 
did indeed impact their character, it is important to understand what they believed 
character change to consist of. As articulated here, the participants’ broadly 
Aristotelian perspective, that character development requires an intentional self-
examination of one’s thoughts and actions and an effort to implement new truths as 
they are encountered through one’s experience, demonstrates the strong moral 
influence they believe the expedition to have had on their character.  
5.2.4 Others’ Influence on One’s Character 
“What role, if any, do others play in your character development?” was a question 
asked during the first interview, and discussed further in section 6.3. It is important 
to note that the responses to this present theme were all given early in the first 
interview, before I had asked directly about others’ influence on character. At this 
stage, the participants, without prompting, spoke of the role others played in their 
character development. This is significant for this research, because the role of others 
(that of The Shared Life), one of the three Aristotelian conditions for virtue 
cultivation examined, seemed intuitively understood by the participants.  
 
Gwen thought that any person encountered could have an effect on one’s character. 
She suggested that “ you … watch what other people do,” and compare it “to what 
you do already,” and then see “if there’s room for improvement, or [any] warning 
signs to look out for in yourself.” Since it is within interaction with others that many 
moral decisions are made, Claire stated that “everyone around you really,” even 
those one doesn’t know, can “develop your character.” As an example, she spoke of 
encountering someone very rude who upset her. Claire proceeded to say that how she 
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reacted to this unpleasant encounter – graciously or wrongly – would impact her 
character in some way.  
 
More specifically, many participants identified friends as playing a significant role in 
the development of their character. Saul said, “Obviously, you’re like who you hang 
out around.” He continued: “so I think the way to become a better moral person is 
obviously to be around people who are … [going] to bring you to a better moral 
standing.” In a statement referring to character, Claire echoed Saul, saying, “I think it 
can be improved a lot by your friends…. I think you really are who your friends are.” 
With a more cautious tone, Gwen said,  
It’s almost kind of scary how much our friends can influence us, and how we can 
pick up our friend’s traits, and how the friends that you keep really kind of … end 
up reflecting on who you are as a person. 
She explained how “you start off with a set base of values,” then through such 
friendships, either strengthen or weaken these moral commitments.  
 
Esther, who had recently been making efforts to define her values, was conscious of 
friends’ potential to undermine character. She believed that if people found their 
character being negatively influenced by their friends, they should “put themselves in 
a different situation,” and “find people who will build them up and support them in 
their endeavour for positive character.” Reflecting Esther’s sentiments, Iris also 
believed peer pressure to be a significant cause of the undermining of character. She 
affirmed the peer-related decline in character when she said, “I have definitely seen it 
happen.” She continued, saying, “people that I’ve known” since kindergarten, upon 
reaching high school, come under harmful influences that create “major changes [for 
the negative] in … their character.” 
 
 Olivia also saw positive reinforcement, achieved through “encouragement from 
others,” as central in character formation. As an example she reported that “guidance 
through a mentor has been really important” in her character development.  
 
This theme of others’ influence on one’s character will be more fully developed and 
analysed in Chapters 6 and 8. I have included it here to note the intuitive Aristotelian 
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understanding participants had of how others, positively and negatively, affect their 
character.  
5.2.5 “Moral Luck” and Character 
Participants identified luck, or seemingly chance happenings, as significantly 
impacting one’s development of character. 
 
Thomas, for example, seemed to be suggesting that ability to control one’s will is, to 
a degree, genetic. He claimed that ability to “change your character” is “definitely 
part of what you’re born with.” “It’s like some people have been given more than 
other people.” “I think naturally, some people actually do have just better character 
than others.” Thomas’ comments may be seen as relating to Aristotle’s concept of 
“natural virtue”: “for each of us seems to possess his type of character to some extent 
by nature; for in fact we are just, brave, prone to temperance, … immediately from 
birth” (VI 13§1).  
 
Other participants saw life circumstances, particularly tragedy, as truncating one’s 
potential for moral growth. Samantha noted that when “someone treats you really 
bad,” the destructive results of such abuse can affect “how you view yourself”; it is 
as if “your perception is almost warped.” The emotional wounds that result from 
such abuse may then prevent a person from either extending forgiveness to those 
who inflicted the harm, or expressing care to those in need.  
 
In another example, Duncan and Claire both referred to the crippling effect of grief 
on one’s ability to respond morally. Duncan said that “to lose a loved one” can “put 
you into depression.” From then on it is as if “[you always] have something hanging 
over your head, which can affect your … everyday life.” Claire noted that after 
loosing someone “close to them,” some people never come out of the “grief period,” 
and the pain of grief becomes a defining aspect of who they are, resulting in a 




In sympathy with these comments, Iris expressed a central tenet of care theory 
(Noddings, 2002, p. 6) when she suggested that a decline in a person’s character 
could “partly be due to the fact that no one said anything,” or that no one had made 
any positive “intervention in that person’s life.” Iris thought that this person would 
need someone to say to them caringly: “Well, hey, you know, you [might] want to 
think about that before you do that.” She concluded that unless someone is “investing 
in them,” it is unlikely that they’ll preserve their character. Iris’ ethic, in part, places 
the development of others’ character in the hands of us all. 
 
As mentioned in subsection 2.6.1.2, moral luck concerns itself with the relation 
between one’s potential to be moral and one’s turn of circumstance (Williams, 1981). 
Aristotle recognised that “the results of good fortune” contribute to the attainment of 
virtue (IV 3§19). Likewise, Hursthouse (2001, p. 116) provides an example of 
misfortune making virtue difficult to attain, in the morally unlucky child who grows 
up in a racist home and develops the unnatural emotions associated with race hatred.  
 
While the participants recognised the role of moral luck at a theoretical level, it also 
had an effect on their practice. La Vida has a tradition of sharing life stories. One by 
one throughout the expedition, each member had a chance to share his or her life 
story. One participant in particular, William, who had either positioned himself 
outside the group or been positioned outside by the group, shared his story during the 
participants’ “Finals,” a part of the expedition where students travel independently 
from the instructors (Fieldnote, August 19th). Whatever it was that he shared in his 
story, it enhanced the group’s care for him. From that evening onwards, they 
included him, befriended him, sought his opinion, and came to revere him by the 
expedition’s end. It appeared to me that upon learning of his poor moral luck, the 
group was stirred to care for him. While the group’s extension of grace to William 
was pronounced, it was evident, to at least some degree, that all benefited. That is, 
once we shared from our own stories, particularly if the stories contained hurt or 
pain, the group came to a better understanding of “why we are the way we are.” It 
was remarkable to me to see the growth of group compassion, story by story, 
throughout the expedition. Participants communicated more respectfully with one 
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another (e.g. in contrast to angry confrontations in the early part of the expedition 
(Fieldnotes, August 16th)), acts of kindness such as Thomas’ pumping water (a 
dreaded task for many) for the entire group (Fieldnotes, August 19th) became more 
common, and verbal affirmation was widespread (e.g. the groups naming a place 
“encouragement rock” because of the kind words spoken there in encouragement to 
one another (Fieldnotes, August 22nd)). Henri Nouwen (1990, p. 87) suggests, using 
the Jungian archetype of a Wounded Healer, that the sharing of hurt can become a 
source of encouragement, for in hearing of others’ hurt, one feels less alone with 
one’s own. Prouty (2001), an outdoor adventure educator, says something similar, 
claiming that dialogues build empathy, and that through community, we discover 
“we are they. No man is an island” (p. 11). In this way, the expedition members 
became wounded healers of each other as we recognised how similarly fragile we 
are, and how much we depend on each other for our well-being.  
 
In this section, participants noted that character is something gradually built through 
struggle, under the influence of others and luck. The next section analyses how 
participants decided what kind of character they wished to pursue.  
5.3 How Does One Know What Character One Wants To Have? 
This section explores the sources from which participants drew to determine the kind 
of character they aspired to have. Most generally, participants identified experience 
itself as a way to develop morality. Part of this experience was their Christian 
worldview, which informed so many of their values. As a further source of value, 
other people were again observed to play an instrumental role in determining the 
character sought. Lastly, and perhaps most interestingly, a number of students 
pointed to the arts as sources of inspiration for their ideals of character.  
5.3.1 Learning About Character Through Experience 
Many participants noted that experience taught them about character. Esther said 
experiences “kind of show me … the person that I want to be or changes that I want 
to make within myself.” She explained that experiences create “a change in values,” 
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from which “my character … slowly will build up.” Similarly, though unable to 
articulate precisely why, Samantha said that “experiences” teach the kind of 
character one would aspire toward. William’s simple, but profound, explanation of 
the role of experience in character formation, captures what Samantha may have 
been trying to say: through experience one discovers “whatever works best in the 
situation you’re in. I think you’ll have to think different ways and act different ways 
depending on what situation you’re in.” Although William’s explanation has a 
pragmatic or even relativist air, his comments in the next subsection reveal that 
“whatever works” must always fall within the purview of his Christian worldview.  
 
From an Aristotelian perspective, participants’ acknowledgement of the role of 
experience in shaping one’s understanding of good character seems reminiscent of 
the inductive role (via nous) of phron!sis’ (see subsection 2.4.1) in garnering general 
truths from particular experiences, and developing the discernment to apply (via 
nous) these truths in appropriate contexts. 
 
Since a major aspect of participants’ experience was the development of their 
Christian worldview, it is not surprising that they would also identify their Christian 
beliefs as a source for determining the kind of character towards which they strived.  
5.3.2 Character and a Christian Worldview 
A comment by Gwen’s serves well as an introduction to this section: “How we act in 
our own life is reflected in what we believe about … why we’re … here.” Consistent 
with the Christian tradition, within which Gordon College locates itself, it was 
perhaps to be expected that most of the participants would claim their Christian faith 
to be a defining source for their concept of character. 
 
Saul said character is “something that’s based in your worldview, and it’s the 
decision’s that are based off of that worldview.” For him, “different types of 
worldviews are going to affect what type of morals” are represented in a person’s 
character. Thus, Saul thought that character is really “your worldview lived out.” 
Many of these protestant students named the Bible as their principal source for 
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determining the values of their Christian worldview. For example, Saul said, as a 
Christian, the Bible “definitely has your morals set out in front of you.” 
Correspondingly, when asked for her source of good character, Esther replied 
succinctly, “Definitely the Bible.” William agreed saying that: “God set out a bunch 
of rules that … he wants us to follow, so if we follow those rules, then … that’d be a 
change in our character.” The Bible was also the source Claire used to define good 
character, saying furthermore, that character is “what God created you to be.” 
 
Within the biblical narrative, many participants highlighted the moral example of the 
life of Christ. Gwen said that “as Christians, it’s our responsibility to try to model 
ourselves after Jesus,” to look to the “character of Christ, and use that as our base.” 
Thomas expressed himself in like manner by saying that to determine what character 
traits to pursue: “I look at the life of Christ.” Saul similarly exclaimed, “I think he’s 
the ultimate character.” This use of the life of Christ as their character exemplar, in 
part, explains participants’ emphasis on the role of care in their understanding of 
character, a theme developed further in Chapter 8’s discussion of practice.  
 
Duncan, however, had a different, albeit Christian, perspective. Rather than appeal to 
a sacred text to explain one’s concept of character, he said, “I think it’s in your 
conscience.” He expanded clarifying that conscience reveals “how you want to be, 
and how you want to live your life.” He summed up his idea saying, “Your [sense of] 
character is from God, but [from him] speaking to you through your conscience.” 
Duncan’s understanding of conscience as something that God prompts may be a 
reference to Jeremiah 31:33, which speaks of God placing moral law within the heart 
of humankind. 
 
Iris wrestled deeply with this question about her source for right character. She noted 
that the Christian faith influenced her “values, … choice, and conduct.” However, 
she then realised that “you can have faith without character, and character without 
faith.” Pursuing this vein, I asked if faith influenced the kind of character a person 
pursued? She at first answered yes, but then showed some hesitancy. Labouring in 
her thoughts, she asserted that the culture at large, “maybe beyond that,” perhaps 
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humanity itself, always seems to “list the same [moral] characteristics whether or not 
they have faith.” Iris seems to be considering the possibility of an objective morality 
accessible without biblical revelation. Her position, albeit simplified, may be similar 
to the ethical naturalism espoused in this thesis. 
 
While other responses, within this theme, seemed to understand good character to be 
something fixed and generally applicable for all, Claire appeared to view it more 
individually. From her differing perspective, what character one pursued, was 
“something that you have to go to God” to understand. She elaborated, that you have 
to “die to self and depend on God, and see what he wants you to be and be willing to 
get through trials that he gives you, so that your character improves in the way that 
he wants to improve it.” 
 
The participants’ Christian worldview may help to explain why their understanding 
of character reflected so many Aristotelian aspects. For as noted throughout 
Hauerwas and Pinches’ (1997) book, Christians Among the Virtues, Thomas Aquinas 
was greatly influenced by Aristotle, and Western Christianity has been very much 
impacted by Thomas Aquinas. This Thomistic tradition has therefore contributed to 
Western Christianity’s moral narrative, one that still retains an Aristotelian residue in 
its understanding of character. In this research, the pronounced differences between 
the La Vida interviews and those of the pilot study suggest that the influence of this 
Christian narrative may be significant. For although the Gordon College students 
presumably attended their private school in large part because of its worldview, this 
worldview presumably played little or no part in the pilot study participants’ 
decisions to attend a graduate programme at The University of Edinburgh (although 
by no means non-Christian, not a Christian institution in the same sense). Difference 
of worldview, then, might, in part, explain why the uniformity and depth of 
articulation afforded by the Gordon College students, despite their youth, contrasted 
with the pilot study participants, whose moral narratives, with the exception of one 
overt Christian, were much more disparate, and not nearly as developed. While such 
dissimilarities can also be explained by cultural differences, one might argue that 
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part of such cultural difference is the prominence of a conservative Christian 
worldview within the United States.  
5.3.3 Others’ Influence on the Character One Pursues 
As with subsection 5.2.4, before I had reached my pre-determined first interview 
question on the influence of others on one’s character, the participants here again 
spoke of others’ impact on their character. This time, however, their reference was to 
the role of others in determining what kind of character they pursued. Since others’ 
affect on character is a question analysed in Chapters 6 and 8, I have included 
participants’ responses here to illustrate that this aspect of Aristotle’s theory 
accorded with their intuitions. 
 
Participants identified a number of ways, directly and indirectly, in which others 
influenced the character to which they aspired.  
5.3.3.1 Others’ Direct Influence on the Character One Pursues 
This theme identified participants’ belief that others have a purposeful, intentional, 
and direct influence on their character. Nearly all participants spoke of their families 
as playing a significant role in their moral formation. Gwen recognised that “family 
values” come from traditions “passed down from generation to generation.” “If you 
come from a Christian family, then you’re taught about the Ten Commandments and 
how Jesus wants us to live.” Whereas, “if you come from a Buddhist family, then 
you have some very different perspectives on life, and what it means to be human 
and here in this world.”  
 
Iris, more generally, saw one’s “upbringing … or the teaching you received” as 
highly influential in shaping one’s view of morality. She was not thinking 
particularly of the “biblical” lessons she was given, but more broadly the “life” 
lessons that teach one how to live.  
 
Duncan also saw upbringing as a key influence on the kind of character one pursues: 
“Your parents, [while you’re] growing up, teach you how to … live your life. And 
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that kind of … defines who you are, … who you’re going to be, and … the character 
that you [will] have.” While Duncan understood such upbringing to include one’s 
family, he also believed that formal education played a significant role in shaping the 
kind of character one aspired to achieve: “Teachers try to teach you … right and 
wrong.”  
 
The participants’ insight into the importance of one’s upbringing in moral education 
reflects another Aristotelian view. Aristotle opens his argument by claiming, in II 
3§1, that the way one responds to pleasure and pain is a sign of one’s character. He 
explains that the capacity to enjoy something pleasurable appropriately (e.g. eating) 
or not to avoid something important because it is painful (e.g. physical exercise) are 
both related to moral virtue: “for virtue of character is about pleasures and pains” (II 
3§1). Aristotle continues: “that is why we need to have an appropriate upbringing – 
right from early youth, as Plato says – to make us find enjoyment or pain in the right 
things; for this is the correct education” (II 3§2). 
5.3.3.2 Indirect Influence on the Character One Pursues: Observed Examples 
An indirect way in which others influenced participants’ perception of good 
character was through the moral observation of others’ lives. “Respecting” others 
seems to have been the defining characteristic of participants’ desire to emulate the 
character of the observed.  
 
For example, Thomas spoke of people for whom others have “a great deal of 
respect.” He cited his grandfather, describing him as “selfless, the most honest, 
upright, integrity” filled person Thomas knew. Similarly, Esther said, that those who 
have impacted her character the most are “the people that I have the most respect 
for.” She elaborated, “I see how they act, I see their character, and I really admire 
that.” Using only slightly different language, Duncan said that it was “seeing other 
people, … looking at other people and being like, ‘They are a good person, I want to 
be like them.” For Iris, it was “watching people interact with other people” that she 
found morally valuable. It was through watching these interactions and the “certain 
character traits” demonstrated within them that Iris claimed to discover “people that I 
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respect greatly.” Claire went as far as to describe a sense of conviction when she 
encountered “a character aspect in someone else that you really respect.” Finally, 
Samantha, described another’s moral influence as “seeing things you like in their 
character and almost adding it to yours, or trying to bring it into yours.”  
 
In II 6§15 Aristotle says that virtue is “defined by reference to reason,” specifically 
“reason by reference to which the prudent person [phronimos] would define it.” The 
moral examples to which participants refer, could be thought of as phronimai, people 
with practical wisdom that they have encountered throughout their lives. These 
phronimai provide the example of moral character that in turn inspires the character 
sought by the participants.  
 
Before turning to the next theme, it is important to mention Esther’s somewhat 
differing perspective. She restricted the role of others, mentioned in this theme, when 
she reminded herself that others’ influence is powerful, but limited. Speaking about 
character, she admitted that “to some extent you gain it from [those] around you,” 
but she also felt it was her decision to develop the truths discovered from their 
example, and incorporate them into her life. Although essential, others “can only do 
so much.” 
 
While references to others in subsection 5.3.3 were to “real-life” examples, others’ 
influence on character, as the participants noted, can also come through the arts.  
5.3.4 The Arts’ Influence on the Character One Pursues 
When asked about her sources for knowing what character traits to pursue, Gwen 
suggested “entertainment, like, the arts, music and television.” She then mentioned 
her passion for fantasy novels, and referred to how she is often challenged by the 
morality of the characters. Such examples came through “ seeing how the writer has 
different characters act, and how characters respond to different situations.” She said, 




Olivia was more specific in her reference to literature. Jane Austen’s novels had 
particularly influenced her. Referring to Pride and Prejudice, she said, “I do find a 
lot of inspiration in Elizabeth Bennett’s strengths, …. and [in] Mr. Bennett’s patience 
with his girls.” Referring to Brontë’s Jane Eyre, she said of Jane: “she can’t find a 
fault in anyone, which I have a hard time” emulating. Olivia said you could relate 
“so well to their” lives: it is as if “you’re almost learning through their experience.” 
Olivia’s reference to Pride and Prejudice is significant, because Austen has been 
observed to employ a virtue ethical framework throughout her novels (MacIntyre, 
1984, pp. 181-187, 239-243). As mentioned earlier in subsection 2.4.3, Aristotle 
himself cited mimesis (III 1§8) as a vehicle for exemplification of moral qualities. 
Emphasising the important role of story in moral formation, MacIntyre says:  
Deprive children of stories and you leave them unscripted, anxious stutterers in 
their actions as in their words. Hence there is no way to give us an understanding of 
any society, including our own, except through the stock of stories which constitute 
its initial dramatic resources. (1984, p. 216) 
Rather than the fiction cited by Gwen and Olivia, Saul suggested the genre of 
biography. He described how lessons of character have already been “lived out by 
many people.” Therefore, he continued, reading about such lives, whether through 
history books, biographies, or personal journals, may be a source of understanding 
character traits worth following. Not limiting these moral lessons to literature, he 
referred to a film about St. Patrick saying, “sometimes it’s good to watch certain 
movies … , [because] you can discuss it. It can end up being a great sounding board 
to having better … morals.” Carr (2006) has also suggested the value of cinema in 
moral education. Citing two films with classical roots – The Fisher King and O 
Brother Where Art Thou – as examples, Carr asks, “might it not be that modern 
cinema has as much to offer by way of moral and spiritual insight as traditional 
literary sources provided for pre-cinematic generations” (p. 321)? For “seldom if 
ever” does “great art – cinema included” – stray “from its roots in the deepest moral 
and spiritual themes of humankind” (p. 332).  
 
In this section, participants identified four different sources shaping their 
understanding of character. Most generally, they learned about character through 
experience. A major aspect of this experience was their Christian worldview, which 
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provided a moral narrative that influenced their understanding of character. Next, 
others were again found to be relevant to character formation, this time as direct and 
indirect examples of morality. Lastly, the arts were cited as a moral source 
contributing to their concept of character.  
 
This chapter has examined participants’ responses to three questions related to 
character. Participants explained their understanding of character, provided accounts 
of how it might be improved or undermined, and listed the sources contributing to 
their understanding of character.  
 
Before closing this chapter, I will draw some implications from its findings. 
Implications 
Just as the introduction identified several purposes for this chapter, now, in light of 
participant responses, there are implications for these purposes. As mentioned, the 
participants’ understandings of character, explored here, provide a context for 
interpretation of their claims to character change on the expedition, examined later in 
Chapter 9. Since the participants’ descriptions of character, as evidenced in the 
themes discussed in this chapter, can be broadly considered Aristotelian, any claims 
of character change (in Chapter 9) would thus be significant to this research. It will 
be helpful therefore to identify more clearly, in what ways participants’ responses 
can be said to represent an Aristotelian understanding of character. Further, in the 
introduction to the chapter, I suggested, following Dewey’s conviction that education 
must start with the learners’ understanding (Dewey, 1938/1997, p. 71), that the 
participants’ responses provided something of a base-line from which further moral 
education might be pursued. Thus, while evaluating the degree to which participants’ 
responses are Aristotelian, the following reflection also describes how I, from a 
virtue ethical perspective, might have approached the ongoing moral formation of the 
participants, should I have continued in my educational relationship with them.  
 
I would first emphasise that their understanding of character as something life-
pervading that is difficult to build, requiring discipline, dispositions and 
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intentionality can all be found within the Ethics. I would similarly celebrate that they 
understood the development of character to include both thinking (intellectual 
virtues) and doing (moral virtues). I would continue to build on their commitment to 
care theory and affirm the grace they demonstrated by acknowledging one another’s 
moral luck. I would similarly affirm their insights into the direct influence of others – 
whether family, friends, or teachers – on their character, as well as the indirect role 
others play through the example of their lives, be that through life itself or some form 
of mimesis. 
 
Nevertheless, despite the generally Aristotelian nature of their moral understanding, 
there are several issues that I would wish to clarify. For instance, although as 
mentioned, many participants recognised the importance of thinking and reflection 
for good character, they appear to have predominantly understood the expression of 
character to be through action rather than thought. I would therefore further 
emphasise the deliberative process (see subsection 2.3.5) necessary for virtuous 
action, and the role of phron!sis in guiding the moral virtues.  
 
Within discussions of character, an associated difficulty in emphasising action over 
thought is a disregard of motivation and affect. Considerations of motivation and 
affect appear to be largely absent in the participants’ account of character, and I 
would thus stress their importance. By way of illustration, as mentioned in 
subsection 2.1.2.3, the motivation and affect required for virtue set Aristotle’s ethic 
apart from both deontic and utilitarian models. For example, virtue theory is unique 
in requiring an agent to act with the appropriate feeling, emotion, and desire (see II 
3§3 and II 5§2), unencumbered by unvirtuous temptations, thus distinguishing itself 
from a deontological ethic. This difference can be poignantly seen in Kant’s 
“sorrowful philanthropist,”  
clouded by sorrow of his own, extinguishing all sympathy with the lot of others … 
is not touched by their trouble; [but] … now suppose that he tears himself out of 
this dead insensibility, and performs the action without any inclination to it, but 
simply from duty, then first has his action its genuine moral worth. (Kant, trans. 
1898, pp. 14-15) 
Foot’s (1997) critique (see subsection 2.3.7.3) notwithstanding, Aristotle would 
probably challenge Kant’s interpretation, noting that the philanthropist’s 
 
 218 
preocupation with his own concerns may be revealing a self-indulgent disposition 
short of virtue. For Aristotle, character development is implicitly affective 
development (Carr, 2005, p. 148).  
 
Having now examined the participants’ intuitive perspectives on character, and 
explored some implications, both for the thesis and for moral education more 
generally, I now turn to the responses they gave to the Aristotelian questions of how, 





Aristotle’s Conditions for Virtue 
This chapter examines participants’ responses to three questions. Whereas the 
previous chapter’s questions about character may be thought of as broad, open, and 
non-theoretically guided, this chapter’s questions are motivated by virtue theory. 
Using three of Aristotle’s conditions for the growth of virtue, as identified by 
Sherman (1991), the roles of reflection, practice, and the influence of others in 
character development are explored. Similar to Chapter 5, all of the responses 
discussed here, unless otherwise noted, are from the first interview. Using the 
categories described in Figure 4.1, the questions investigated here are non-expedition 
dependent, but virtue ethically specific. 
 
The purposes of this chapter are almost identical to the previous one. The questions 
examined here from the first interview (the role of Aristotle’s conditions for virtue in 
character development) provide an interpretive context for questions examined in 
Chapter 8 from the second interview (whether the expedition afforded opportunity to 
exercise Aristotle’s conditions for the growth of virtue). Further, because participants 
were asked about Aristotle’s conditions for virtue in both the first and second 
interviews, the responses explored here serve as a form of source triangulation 




More broadly, however, beyond the interpretive needs of the thesis, the contents of 
this chapter again (like the previous one) serve as a moral educational example. For 
the moral educator interested in virtue, these theoretically focused questions reveal to 
what degree the participants’ perspectives might be called virtue ethical, and thus 
demonstrate a kind of dialogue (An act of moral education itself?) that might be 
helpful to an instructor interested in virtue development. Additionally, the 
participants’ perspectives, discussed here, become testimonios (Beverly, 2005; 
Chase, 2005, p. 668) of their experience, and, despite being only one case study and 
thus limited in generalisability, do contribute to the greater knowledge accumulation, 
thereby making them relevant to the discipline of OAE and beyond (Barrett & 
Greenaway, 1995, pp. 53-54; Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 242). Outdoor adventure educators, 
Aristotelians, and character educationalists alike may therefore find the themes 
discussed here of interest. 
6.1 Reflection and Character 
The importance of reflection in moral development has been recognised at least since 
Socrates’ claim that the unexamined life is not worth living (Plato, trans. 2002, 
Apology 38a). As seen in subsection 2.4.1, reflection is an integral part of Aristotle’s 
understanding of character formation. This section explores four themes that 
surfaced from participants’ responses regarding the role of reflection in character 
development. The participants described reflection as a means of gaining moral 
perspective. They then outlined the reflective process, and connected it to character 
development. Last, the participants identified two means that greatly assisted their 
reflective efforts: written reflection; and reflecting with others.  
6.1.1 Reflection: An Aid To Gain Moral Perspective 
“When you’re aware of something it’s so much easier to address it.” This comment, 
made by Claire, provides a helpful introduction to this theme: the participants 




Olivia, speaking of reflection, said “It’s really hard … to step out of yourself and to 
look at the big picture, and to look at where you are [morally] …. I think the ability 
to do that … is an important virtue in character.”  
 
Iris highlighted the importance of gaining this perspective when she said of 
reflection’s relation to character: “You have to be able to see what is and what was in 
order to work toward what will be.” Without reflection, she continued, “it’s so easy 
to overlook things,” since “with a lot of things there’s so much more going on than 
[at the] surface level, … and it takes time to actually realise … what motivates my 
action, my reaction.” It was through reflection, she believed, that one gets “to the 
root of the problem.” Similarly, Saul, after claiming that reflection is “the self-
examination of where you are,” said, “if you don’t know yourself, and you can’t 
reflect on yourself, you’re never going to become a better person or defeat any sort 
of immorality or any sort of bad character that might be there and lingering.” Saul, 
whose education is classically based, purposely used the term “know yourself.” 
“Know Thyself” was the inscription on the temple in Delphi, Greece, and it implies 
that reflecting on oneself is a necessary component of any kind of development, but 
especially that of moral growth (Blackburn, 1996, p. 158).  
 
Esther’s comments elucidated the moral importance of knowing oneself when she 
rhetorically asked, how one could know what aspect of one’s character needed 
growth, if “you didn’t even know what was happening in your character?” She 
explained, “when you are reflecting, you are reflecting on your experiences, and 
that’s when you’re going to realise ... what you want to change, or the changes that 
have already taken place …. [in your] character.”  
 
Duncan highlighted the cost of not gaining a moral perspective on one’s life through 
reflection. He said, if you don’t “look back and see ... the same mistakes [being 
made] over and over again, .… you’ll just keep making them in the future.” 
 
As Chapter 8’s discussion of the solo will reveal, moral reflection is often associated 
with a quieting of oneself and one’s surroundings. For this reason, monastic 
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communities have written extensively on the role of reflection and moral growth. For 
example, Nouwen (1981) writes of the risks involved in living a life without 
reflection: “it is the danger of living the whole of our life as one long defense against 
the reality of our condition, one restless effort to convince ourselves of our 
virtuousness” (p. 28). Nouwen’s comment echoes the sentiments of the participants, 
that without reflection, one largely remains unaware of one’s moral status. Norris 
(1996, p. 295) makes a similar point, but addresses it to herself: “What would I find 
in my own heart if the noise of the world were silenced?” As the participants 
attested, reflection can, in a sense, quiet the “noise of the world,” and bring one’s 
moral condition into view.  
 
Considered from an Aristotelian position, reflection’s capacity to provide perspective 
on one’s moral status is related to the discussion of the"ria in subsection 2.4.1.1. 
There, two kinds of reflection were discussed: a general reflection utilised in 
practical matters, and a more specific kind of contemplative reflection (the"ria) used 
in discerning truths. It is this second more restricted form of reflection, the"ria, that 
Aristotle suddenly introduces, late in the Ethics, as the activity which leads to 
“complete happiness” (X 7§1). This late interjection of a different, more complete 
happiness has confounded scholars for centuries. However, recent scholarship has 
suggested broadening the province of the"ria, which has traditionally been thought 
of as applying only to the contemplation of “supreme truths about the universe” 
(Jones, 1970, p. 285). Roochnik (2009, p. 73), citing VI 1§8, notes that Aristotle does 
imply that the"ria is to be employed in the contemplation of more practical matters 
as well. By way of illustration, Aristotle, referring to the life of Pericles, notes that 
such practically wise people (phronimai) “are able to study [the"rein] what is good 
for themselves and for human beings” in general (VI 5§5). By expanding the scope 
of the"ria to include practical matters, as Roochnik (2009, p. 73) suggests, the form 
of contemplation described in X 7-8, which leads to a complete happiness, “may not 
be as radically separate from ordinary forms of thinking and knowing as 
commentators” have tended to believe (ibid., p. 75). Therefore, when understood in 
this broader sense, the participants’ references to “the big picture,” stepping “out of 
yourself,” and “knowing yourself,” might be seen as examples that employ the"ria, 
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and thus suggest an even stronger link between moral reflection and one’s happiness 
(eudaimonia). 
6.1.2 The Reflective Process and Character 
Whereas the previous theme associated the participants’ responses with the"ria, their 
comments on the reflective process, examined here, may be related to the general 
reflective method described by Aristotle in III 1-5, and discussed in section 2.3.5.2. 
This method of reflection concerns itself with the particulars of context. 
 
A number of participants described the reflective process and its relationship to 
character. William described the process succinctly: “You reflect upon things that 
happened, and how you reacted to them, and whether it was a good or bad outcome.” 
He continued, if the outcome “was good, then that’s how you want to be…. And if it 
was bad, then you have to change.”  
 
Using only slightly different language, Samantha personalised the reflective process 
saying that when she looks back at the things she did in high school, “I’ll realise that 
maybe I shouldn’t have done [this or] that, or maybe [this or] that was really good 
and I should have … done that more.” She explained the process further, referring to 
no specific example: although “I didn’t really think about it at the time [it happened], 
… reflecting back on it [now], … I can learn from my past experiences that I didn’t 
learn from at the time.”  
 
Gwen spoke of her attempts to reflect on her more recent past. She said “I ... think of 
everything that has happened to me, ... the day before or the week before, and ... 
remember ... how I reacted to certain situations, and what the effect was, and if that 
[effect] is something I want to pursue … [and] continue.” She further clarified that if 
through this reflection she found a respect in which her character “could use some 
improvement,” she said she would “need to work on that and make a conscious 
decision to try to tweak that a little bit … next time, if that ever comes up again.” 
 
Reminiscent of Gwen’s description, Duncan said of reflection:  
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I think if you ... look back and reflect ... on what’s gone on, you can ... see ... highs 
and lows, like that was a good thing, [or] that was a bad thing, and you learn from 
your mistakes…. You learn from life as you go on. And so you can be like, ... ‘I did 
that and it probably wasn’t the best thing.’ So if you ... come to a similar situation, 
you can think back and be like, ‘I should probably do something different [this 
time] ….’ Reflecting really helps who you are, and I think it’s ... a big part of 
character. 
Although Esther also identified the significance of the reflective process in character 
formation, unlike the others, she differentiated reflecting on one’s character from 
actually forming it. She stated that “I don’t really see a character change happening 
… while you’re sitting there reflecting.” She explained that through reflection one 
comes to “realise what has happened already” to his or her character, and it is what 
one does with this insight that will determine character growth. Esther’s insight is 
related to a theme more thoroughly examined in Chapters 7 and 9, where the 
participants believed their character to be revealed rather than developed per se.  
 
The participants’ responses can be likened to the inductive and deductive reasoning 
described in 2.3.5.2. By reflecting on the outcomes of morally salient actions, an 
agent begins to cultivate the moral judgement needed to assess appropriately virtuous 
future actions. Beyond Aristotle’s description (VI 6) of this kind of reflection, similar 
understandings can be seen in literature more directly related to OAE, thereby 
supporting the trustworthiness of this interpretation. For example, Dewey (1938, p. 
87), the philosopher of education most often associated with OAE, has a similar view 
on the role of reflection:  
to reflect is to look back over what has been done so as to extract the next meanings 
which are the capital stock for intelligent dealing with further experiences. It is the 
heart of intellectual organization and of the disciplined mind. 
Hahn (1940b, p. 7) describes a similar reflective process. Arguing for experiences 
that train the young to become more compassionate by performing acts of 
compassion (compare with II 4§1), Hahn refers to the reflective process saying: “a 
man feeling himself rushed into vindictiveness, summons from his past emotional 
experiences unforgettable incidents steeped in the emotion of love,” which thus 
provide him with the motivation to act compassionately, rather than from his initial 
feelings of vindictiveness. And finally, in a publication by the National Outdoor 
Leadership School (Harvey & Simer, 1999), one of the foremost OAE programmes 
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in the US, the importance of reflection is similarly highlighted: “self-awareness gives 
us the necessary information to change bad habits and to reinforce good ones. Self-
awareness comes from reflection and the humility to admit and change your 
imperfections” (p. 168). 
6.1.3 Moral Written Reflection 
Interestingly, many participants noted that the act of reflecting was significantly 
enhanced when expressed through writing.  
 
Olivia described the benefits of written reflection, saying that “I reflect ... more 
thoroughly when I write.” She elaborated saying “It’s almost [as if] you have to work 
through those thoughts to really get to the … core of what you think.” She admitted: 
“I have a hard time thinking, because I … get distracted. [However,] when I write, I 
can only write one word at a time, one letter at time.” Hence, the act of writing 
forced her to think “in sentences.” She noted the moral significance of this technique 
explaining that working “through those thoughts.... may actually get you to ... a point 
of direction that would guide you to a better character.”  
 
Iris also understood writing to be instrumental in her reflection on character, saying, 
“for me personally, it’s writing it down, … putting down on paper … what I’m 
thinking, what I’m feeling.” She developed the idea further saying that reflection 
“can’t just be thoughts whizzing through my head.” She clarified that the act of 
writing such thoughts down “solidifies them” for her. However, Iris noted that she 
wrote down her thoughts for a different reason as well: “I need to put them down so 
that I can look back at them if I need to.” In this way, reading back through her 
journal became a reflective tool in her own moral education.  
 
Esther provided a slightly different reason for her commitment to written reflection. 
She first used her journal as a way to piece together her experience, and then only 
after composing these events would she later realise their moral significance: “I 





Gwen’s perspective on journaling offers a variant to this theme. She said, “I’ve never 
been able to journal.” Explaining why, she described how “I’ll sit down to do it, and 
I’m like, ‘This is just taking too long, I could [have] already … [thought] this all out 
[by now] ... without putting it down on paper.’”  
 
Although, to my knowledge, the Ethics does not address written reflection, a number 
of publications within the OAE literature do. For example, in accordance with the 
participant’s responses, a prominent US OAE textbook claims that journaling can 
help students “take time to think about their experience, contemplate its significance, 
and make connections and judgments for use in future situations” (Drury, Bonney, 
Berman, & Wagstaff, 2005, pp. 18-19). Also in support of the participants’ 
responses, Raffan and Barrett (1989), who conducted research “into journals as a 
reflective tool on an expedition” (p. 29), noted that “expressions of feeling, emotion, 
reaction to events, and projection into the future constituted the bulk of most” journal 
entries (p. 32).  
 
However, some research into written reflection has not produced as favourable an 
outlook on the reflective potential of student journaling. O’Connell and Dyment 
(2004) tested the influence of a journaling workshop on students’ journal content. 
Using Bloom’s Taxonomy of Learning to analyse the journals’ content, the authors 
(ibid., p. 169) compared their own analysis of the journals to the participants’ self-
assessment of their journal entries. They found that the students “believed they were 
writing at very advanced levels” (ibid., p. 169). However, the authors reported that 
these “self-assessments by the participants … directly conflict with our findings in 
the content analysis phase of the research” (ibid., p. 169). Their results indicated that 
“irrespective of the impact of the workshop, the journals of the entire sample [59 
post-secondary students] demonstrate little critical reflection on the students’ lived 
experience” (ibid., p. 168). They conclude their study saying that although the 
“association between theory and experience has been anecdotally cited as one of the 
primary benefits of journal writing,” little “empirical evidence has supported this 
contention” (ibid., p. 168). A possible explanation of this discrepancy between the 
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researchers and participants’ perception of the journal’s critical content, may be a 
journal’s capacity to jog the memory and synthesise the thinking of the journaler, 
despite only a portion of what is thought and connected being actually written down. 
In line with the students studied in O’Connell and Dyment’s research, Chapter 8 will 
reveal that the participants of this present research also reported journaling to be 
helpful in facilitating their reflection while on the expedition. However, unlike 
O’Connell and Dyment, I found that a significant number of their journal entries 
demonstrated critical reflection. For example, in an entry on August 19th, Iris wrote 
an extended reflection on what she was learning from the expedition members, and 
how she was being challenged by each of them. Potential reasons for this increased 
critical content are suggested in subsection 8.1.1.1. 
6.1.4 Morally Reflecting With Others 
In addition to the other subsections within this section, which have presupposed 
one’s reflection on oneself, many participants spoke of reflection with others as 
contributing to character development.  
 
Both Thomas and Claire mentioned their parents’ role in helping them reflect on 
their character. Thomas remembered a conversation regarding his parents’ concern 
for his seeming “self-centeredness.” He then explained the reflective process these 
kinds of conversations initiate: “after they have ... pointed that [self-centeredness] 
out to me, I’ll go and think about it, ... and now I’m sitting her … telling you I want 
to change it.” Similarly, “talking through things with people” was a source of 
reflection on character for Claire. As an example, she described how helpful it was 
when she and her father would reflect on the “weaknesses … and strengths” of her 
character. These responses reiterate comments made in subsection 2.4.3, which 
highlighted the importance of upbringing and friendship for becoming virtuous. 
Thomas and Claire appear to be benefiting now from an upbringing that has prepared 
them to recognise virtue. In II 3§2, Aristotle refers to a comment made in The 
Republic regarding the education of children: “what is ugly he would rightly hate and 
despise while still young, before he is able to grasp the reason. When reason comes, 
a man so nurtured would welcome it” (Plato, trans. 2006, 402a). Having been 
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educated in ethically appropriate “pleasures and pains” (II 3§3; see also X 1§1), long 
before they were able to reason morally, as such reason slowly developed, Claire and 
Thomas were increasingly able to recognise the wisdom their parents tried to instil 
within them.  
 
Many participants spoke of others, beyond the family, contributing to their reflection 
on character. For instance, both William and Esther alluded to others identifying 
what might be called moral blindspots. As William said of character-related 
reflection, it is “possible with a group too.... If you don’t think of something, 
someone else does.” 
 
Esther also thought reflection on character happened through speaking with others. 
She said, referring to no specific example, “I’ll be telling someone about something 
that happened and they’ll say, ‘Oh, so it seems like [X]... ,’ and they’ll say something 
and I’m like, ‘Oh ya!,’ and I didn’t really realise it before,” until they articulated it 
that way. She explained the process further saying, “The more you talk about it the 
more concrete it becomes in your own mind. So it’s still an internal process, but for 
me it helps to do it externally” with others. Such responses may recall Aristotle’s 
comments on friendship as “another yourself” (IX 9§1). He suggests that since “we 
are able to view our” neighbour’s morality “more than our own,” our neighbour or 
friend then becomes a source for understanding our own morality, and Aristotle, in 
this sense, calls the friend “another yourself” (IX 9§5; see also IX 9§1). Friends, 
then, morally “supply what your own efforts cannot supply” (IX 9§1). Pakaluk 
(2005, p. 283), referring to this same passage in the Ethics, says that it is as if one 
shares in the friend’s understanding of what is good and noble (kalon).  
 
Whether in the form of William’s reflection “with a group,” Claire’s “talking 
through things with people,” or Esther’s “telling someone” about a moral experience, 
such responses all seem to be alluding to Aristotle’s insight that when two morally 
intentioned people spend time together, “they seem to become still better from their 
activities and their mutual correction” (IX 12§3; see also VIII 1§2). It is for these 
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reasons that Aristotle considers choice of one’s friends to be a moral one 
(prohairesis) (Aristotle, trans. 1952, 1236b30-36; see also Sherman, 1991, p. 131). 
 
In this section, the first of Aristotle’s conditions for virtue, reflection, was discussed. 
Four themes surfaced from the participants’ responses. They reported reflection to be 
an aid towards gaining moral perspective. Subsequently, they discussed their various 
understandings of the reflective process. The section then closed with the participants 
indicating two means to their reflection: written reflection; and reflecting with others. 
Next, I will consider the second of Aristotle’s conditions, practice.  
6.2 Practice and Character 
Duncan provides a segue between the previous question on reflection, and this 
current section on practice. He said that, after “looking at your flaws. … it takes time 
to get something right.” He expanded, “you have to take time and think and process 
before you just do.” 
 
This section examines participant responses to the question: What role, if any, does 
practice play in the development of character? Two main themes emerged from this 
question: that of the gradual refinement of character through practice; and that of 
practice as a movement towards virtue.  
6.2.1 Practice and the Refinement of Character 
“Practice makes perfect,” Samantha exclaimed when I asked if she saw any 
relationship between character formation and practice. She elaborated saying, “I 
think that we’re always trying to work to improve our characters, and ... everybody 
wants to be perfect, so improving our character is almost practising what we view as 
perfect.” Similarly, Duncan said, “Nobody’s born perfect…. There’s always 
something to be worked on.” Nearly all participants said something to this effect. For 
instance, Olivia, referring to efforts to become more moral, said, “Sometimes you 
don’t make it the first time you do things…. Sometimes things don’t come easily and 
you have to work at them.” Comparably, noting the need for practice in character 
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development, Thomas exclaimed, “Well of course practising [is important], ... you 
don’t get stuff on your first try.... I think you have to absolutely practise…. It 
certainly doesn’t just happen overnight.” In a similar fashion, apologising for her 
metaphor, Iris said for character to develop, “You definitely have to practise.” “I 
think character changes [slowly], ... it transitions, ... and it’s not instant.... A 
caterpillar isn’t instantly a butterfly.”  
 
Duncan used a sports analogy to make a connection between practice and character: 
“With basketball, you can’t just step on the court and be … the best shooter in the 
world…. You have to work at it….. You can’t just show up” and expect to have 
improved. 
 
Sherman (1991, p. 178), a virtue ethicist, might suggest that these responses, as 
articulated, are Aristotelian in only a limited way. She claims that the little phrase, 
“practice makes perfect,” can be misleading, for in the Aristotelian sense of practice, 
one is not mindlessly repeating, but refining. Hughes (2001) concurs: “moral training 
is not merely a quasi-Pavlovian conditioning of knee-jerk responses” (p. 73). Any 
suggestion of automated habituation in an Aristotelian understanding of virtuous 
action, comes only from a phronimos who has so thoroughly cultivated moral 
judgement, through years of painstaking reflection, that his or her moral actions, 
could be said to be nearly unconscious.  
 
Consistent with Sherman, Gwen believed “refinement” to be “pretty much the 
perfect word” to describe practice’s influence on character. Uniquely amongst the 
participants, Gwen connected practice not only with physical actions, but also with 
the reflective process noted in subsection 6.1.2. In a long quotation, she described 
this process of refinement in a way that is reminiscent of the intentional reflection 
required for habits to become virtuous (II 4§3). She said,  
Character development has to be a conscious decision. And if it’s a conscious 
decision, you need to think about the situation that you’re in. You can’t just kind of 
float along.… You have to think about everything you’re doing ... and how you feel 
about what you’re doing, and try to catch yourself if you notice yourself doing 
something that you don’t agree with, and then try to correct that on the spot, and 
just continuously keep working on that [cyclical process].  
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While the other participants seem to be thinking about practice’s relevance to 
character in terms of their physical actions (e.g. the basketball analogy), Gwen 
insightfully suggested that moral practice was something “you can practise by 
yourself, [in your head].” She clarified that by “envisioning different situations that 
might come up and how you’d like yourself to react to those situations,” one can 
exercise moral practice. Struggling to understand, I asked if what she was describing 
could be called “mental or theoretical practice,” and she quickly assented.  
 
Before closing this theme, Claire’s differing understanding of practice should be 
noted. She understood moral practice to come principally through trials: “I guess it 
wouldn’t be so much practice, but trials.” She continued, saying that she thought 
trials are what “makes character.” Claire then explained that she thought God 
allowed “trials to come into our lives” in order to “stretch us beyond who we are,” 
thereby allowing God “to create us into something more refined.” She used an 
analogy from pottery to make her point: to make a pot, a potter has to “fire it in the 
kiln first, and it has to go through this period of fire and being refined, before it 
actually comes out to be this beautiful thing.” Claire’s understanding of character 
refinement may reflect several specific scripture verses. James 1:2-3 reads 
“whenever you face trials of any kind, consider it nothing but joy, because you know 
that the testing of your faith produces endurance” (New Revised Standard Version). 
Or, Romans 5:3-4, which says “we also boast in our sufferings, knowing that 
suffering produces endurance, and endurance produces character.” Although neither 
biblical reference cites God as author of these trials, Claire, with other Christians, 
appears to understand God as orchestrating such trials to refine character.  
 
In closing, it may be said that such refinement of character is ultimately a matter of 
habit (hexis) formation (and breaking) through practice (X 9§8). Through practice, 
with respect to any given virtue, an agent increasingly develops the judgement 
(phron!sis) to strike the mean, no matter the circumstance. Participants’ responses in 
the next subsection may also affirm this movement towards virtue through practice.  
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6.2.2 From Continence to Virtue 
While unbeknownst to them, many participants conceived moral practice as a 
movement from continence to virtue (see section 2.3.7). William suggested that 
consistent practice is the key element in a trait becoming part of one’s character. He 
said, “If you regularly practice something, and do it consistently, … [it will become 
part of] your character.” Saul also made reference to the process of building 
consistency in any given area related to character: “I think it really takes a lot of 
effort and a lot of application …, but I think as you work at it, it becomes more and 
more a part of you.” Esther said something similar regarding the need for “practising 
the kind of character you want.” She explained that “With behaviour and actions, it’s 
not just going to come naturally when you first start trying to change.... You have to 
willfully tell yourself to do ... [something] everyday.... It’s not just going to happen 
naturally, if it wasn’t natural before.” She continued, an action becomes part of one’s 
character when it “becomes [so] natural for you, that you don’t even think... how you 
should be acting, or … what you should be doing.... It’s not even a question of am I 
going to do it or not.”  
 
From an Aristotelian position, the participants’ responses could be construed as 
referring to the differences between continence and virtue. While William and Saul 
seemed to be emphasising the development of continence in an agent who with 
increasing consistency is able to follow reason despite the lure of wayward appetites 
(VII 1§6), Esther appeared to be describing the virtuous agent, who as Aristotle says, 
“is the sort to find nothing pleasant against reason” (VII 10§6). Although the 
participants seem to have recognised the role of effort in the continent and virtuous 
agent, they are again (see Chapter 5’s Implications section) silent on the issues of 
motivation and affect. For Aristotle, an action can only be considered virtuous: if the 
agent knows the action to be virtuous (II 4§3); if the agent is acting from an 
established disposition (II 4§3); if the agents acts with appropriate sentiment (II 
6§10-11); if the agent does the action for the sake of what is noble and good (IV 
2§7); and if the reasoning leading to the action was unencumbered by a temptation to 
act otherwise (VII 10§6). While seemingly pedantic, these finer points of virtue 
theory are relevant to this analysis. For Esther, later, likened the automatic action that 
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comes from repeated practice to “brushing your teeth, you just do it because that’s 
what your parents taught you to do.” Esther, and presumably the others, appear to be 
associating character traits with effortless unconscious action, thus missing the moral 
aspects of motivation and affect, so distinctive of virtue theory.  
 
In sum, the participants’ responses to the question, “What is the role (if any) of 
practice in character development?,” yielded two themes. They identified practice as 
the refinement of character and noted that practice facilitates movement towards 
automated and spontaneously moral action. I now turn to Aristotle’s third condition 
for inculcating virtue, the influence of others.  
6.3 Others and One’s Character 
Near the end of the first interview, I asked a question specifically about others’ 
influence on the participants’ character. However, as the themes already presented 
(e.g. subsections 5.2.4, 5.3.3, and 6.1.4) attest, the participants, without my 
prompting, by this late point in the interview, had already made a strong connection 
between the role of others and the development of character. Although aware that 
participants had already spoken a great deal on the significance of others, I decided 
to ask the question anyway, in hope of drawing out deeper perspectives and 
understandings. Additionally, asking this question at a later stage of the interview, 
allowed me to check the consistency of the participants’ responses, thus again acting 
as a type of source triangulation (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, pp. 305-306). Consistency 
can be seen in the similarities between the themes generated for this question and 
those already mentioned that highlighted the role of others. In view of this similarity, 
I have tried not merely to reiterate the participants’ responses, but instead, have 
attempted to include only responses that furthered participants’ understanding.  
 
William summed up participants’ responses when he said, “anybody,” has the 
potential to influence one’s character. Similarly, Claire showed how others were 
inextricably linked to her understanding of character when she asked, “If you are a 
hermit, what character would you develop?” Like the participants, Aristotle also 
highlights the need of a social context for moral virtue (X 7§4): “the just person 
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needs other people as partners and recipients of his just actions; and the same is true 
of the temperate person, the brave person, and each of the others.”  
 
Interestingly, this question about the role of others in one’s character formation, 
although asked near the end of the interview when one might expect the interviewees 
to be tiring, yielded the lengthiest responses. Participants’ emphatic and extensive 
comments on the moral significance of others again highlights their primarily 
relational, as opposed to individual and physical (e.g. one’s own development of 
athletic endurance), understanding of character development. A comment by 
Samantha demonstrates this relational emphasis, for she said, “I think that without 
other people, it’s almost impossible to develop your character, because …. all the 
choices that you make to improve your character are because of other people” and 
their influence. 
 
Two themes emerged from the data. First, participants spoke of a variety of ways that 
others directly influence their moral development. Second, they referred to others’ 
indirect impact on their character. 
6.3.1 The Direct Influence of Others 
The direct influence of others on character was noted in two different respects. 
Participants identified friends and family as playing a significant role in their 
character development. Participants then highlighted the value of others’ critique of 
their character. 
6.3.1.1 Influential Shapers of Character: Friends and Family 
Gwen described the influence of friends on her character when she said that friends 
“play a huge role. I’ve noticed just among my friends, how much I’ve changed over 
the last four years, just because of who I’ve been around.” This change was not 
always for the better however. For Gwen spoke of a particular friend, who in 
hindsight, had had a negative influence on her character: “When she graduated, I 
realised when I wasn’t around her at all anymore” that “I’m not the person I was the 
year before, and I need to really get back on track.” Aristotle reserves his comments 
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on friends’ influence on one another for “character friends” who “seem to become 
still better from their activities and their mutual correction” (IX 12§3). For the two 
figuratively become “singleness of mind” (Aristotle, trans. 1952, 1240b2, 9-10; see 
also Sherman, 1991, pp. 135-137), partnering in the journey to complete their moral 
ends together. Presumably, such singleness of mind can also develop in friendships 
whose ends are not noble (kalon). If this is the case, the undermining of Gwen’s 
character could, in part, be explained by her entering into a friendship whose “shared 
conception of eudaimonia” (Sherman, 1991, p. 133) was compromised.  
 
Esther spoke at great length regarding the influence of friends on her character. Like 
the other participants, she saw her “friends” as making a large impact on her 
character development. More particularly, like Gwen, she saw this influence as 
potentially positive or negative. However, unlike Gwen, Esther suggested that the 
influence of friends on her character was confined more to the “behaviour” she 
exhibited, and “not so much the values” she formed. Esther was unique in 
understanding her value formation to be independent of her friends’ influence. Her 
understanding is at some odds with Aristotle, who claims that character friendship 
refines its members’ values (VIII 1§2).  
 
Esther explained her position saying that “peer pressure … can cause you to 
compromise your values, or not [to compromise them] and stand up for them. So that 
could be either building your character, by standing up for your values, or, 
diminishing it if you give in.” She provided a reason as to why one might give into 
peer pressure when she said that friends “have such an influence because people just 
want to be accepted so badly.” She continued, if people believe their values may not 
be accepted by their friends, they are not necessarily “going to be themselves around 
their friends. They’re just going to change to be what everyone else wants,” and by 
so doing, not show “their true character.” She proceeded saying whether friends’ 
influence is positive or negative  
depends a lot on the friends’ character, because if the friends are accepting of you 
no matter how you are, then it doesn’t matter, you can just be yourself. But if 
they’re not [accepting], then that’s going to have a negative impact.  
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Due to this influence, Esther thought it crucial when choosing friends “to find people 
who are going to support” her. That Esther would refer to those who pressure her to 
compromise her values as “friends,” reveals a different sense of the term than 
Aristotle uses to describe character friendship (IX 1§3). Since Esther provides a 
desire to “be accepted so badly” as the motivation behind these friendships, the 
friendships she speaks of might fit better into Aristotle’s alternate category of utility-
based friendship (VIII 3§1-3). Utility-based friendships, for Aristotle, form because 
potential friends see something useful that the other could provide, in Esther’s case, 
acceptance.  
 
Family was again identified as an influential shaper of character. Esther further 
commented that, “your family has a big part to do with” character development. She 
added, “I think parents have an influence just because they are really the only people 
that you have a relationship with when you are so young.” Hence, in “those very 
early stages, the only examples you’ll have … are from … your home life.” She 
further explained,  
your parents really instil values in you, when you are young, and I think they tend 
to stay with you for a long time, so those values as they come out in your 
behaviour, are going to play a big part in your character. 
Claire also saw family playing a significant role in character formation. She claimed 
that “part of your character is given to you by your parents”; it is “developed under 
parental supervision.” She expanded saying, parents “kind of give you the foundation 
you go off of for the rest of your life.” Thus, “if you have really supportive parents, 
who are … willing to discipline you and willing to … correct you in where you are 
doing wrong, then you’ll have a really strong character.” Because she saw parental 
influence as so significant, Claire thought that character was largely “dependant on 
our parents’ parenting.”  
 
Although the moral significance of upbringing has already been mentioned in several 
places, for reasons that will become evident in the Implications section of this 
chapter, a few further comments will be helpful. In Book X Chapter 9 of the Ethics, 
Aristotle explores more fully the importance of early moral education. He starts by 
noting that “if arguments were sufficient by themselves to make people decent,” then 
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society as a whole would be far more virtuous than it is (X 9§3). Instead, it is by 
“their feelings” that the masses live, pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain with no 
regard for what is noble (kalon) (X 9§4). He then asks, “what argument, then, could 
reform people like these? For it is impossible, or not easy, to alter by argument what 
has long been absorbed as a result of one’s habits” (X 9§4). Aristotle continues by 
saying that those who live by feelings alone are unable to “listen to” or 
“comprehend” a cogent argument defending a life of moral virtue (X 9§7). Aristotle 
notes that while feelings do not respond to argument, they do so to force and law, 
and “that is why law must” be prescribed in one’s upbringing (X 9 §8). For “a 
father’s words and habits have influence,” and “his children are already fond of him 
and naturally ready to obey” (X 9§14). Thus, an upbringing that cultivates moral 
habits (including feelings) and exhorts the child to aim at what is noble (kalon), will 
allow the young, as they gradually become able, “to listen” and “comprehend” 
arguments for the virtuous life (X 9§10). That is, having experienced, during one’s 
upbringing, a life in accordance with eudaimonia, the appeal of pleasurable feelings 
that would detract from the good, may be resisted. However, without having 
experienced the happiness of a virtuous life, argument alone may not convince a 
person to live virtuously.  
6.3.1.2 Helping Us See Our Moral Selves 
Many participants spoke of the role of others in helping them see their moral selves 
more clearly. Olivia provided two examples, one specific, and one more general. She 
first spoke of her mentor:  
She’s ten years older than me … , so she’s old enough to be somebody who can 
look … [at] me and point out things in my character…. I trust her … to point those 
things out, and I work at them.  
Olivia later gave another example saying that, “if you have a sense of who you are 
and who you want to be,” and while making a deliberate attempt to be this moral 
person, “you totally offend someone in conversation,” then this offence might 
highlight “something that you might want to change.”  
 
Like Olivia, Iris saw others’ responses to her actions as significant. She said, “how 
my … words and action affect” “the people I love and respect” “is important to me,” 
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“so their response to me is very important.” She clarified her thoughts with an 
example: “If something about me was very hurtful to someone else, I’d say I’d be 
very inclined to change” it. She added the proviso, “not necessarily always, because, 
obviously, not everything” that hurts is morally inappropriate. She continued, saying 
that because she trusted those in her life who were “willing to call me out on 
something,” at the very least, she would “have some sort of conversation” with them 
about “whatever it is that they are sensing.”  
 
William also said that others “can help address situations where you might need to 
change.” Or, “they can also encourage you,” and “help you see what you’ve done 
well.” He continued by saying that sometimes “you are kind of blind to … what’s 
going on within yourself, and the things that you do, so it’s very helpful to have 
others to help you see what you can’t see.” 
 
The common theme in these quotations is that of others helping participants to see 
their moral lives more clearly. I emphasise the word “see” because a number of 
virtue ethicists (e.g. Crisp, 2000, p. xxiv; McDowell, 1997, p. 157; Sherman, 1991, p. 
40) claim that the development of phron!sis, and therefore character, is largely a 
matter of coming to see with greater moral clarity. As IX 9§5 attests, “we are able to 
observe our neighbour more than ourselves, and to observe their actions more than 
our own.” Presumably, then, it is also true that our neighbors are better able to see 
our strengths and weaknesses, and provide a helpful moral perspective that we are 
unable to apprehend on our own.  
6.3.2 The Indirect Influence of Others 
The indirect influence of others on character was noted in two different respects. 
First, participants described how observing others’ character provided inspiration and 
motivation for their own moral progress. Second, participants provided several 




6.3.2.1 Looking to Others As Moral Examples 
Many participants spoke of others serving indirectly as examples of good (and bad) 
character. Here, others are not making an overt effort to influence. However, through 
their example (moral and immoral), they do influence those who observe.  
 
Samantha described this observational process saying that one might “see someone 
else’s character that they liked ... and learn from that.” One could, she continued, 
“mimic them, or ... try and ... think in the same way as them.” Gwen, citing the moral 
example of her pastor, followed this mimicking theme by saying, “Just being around 
him and seeing how he talked to people, and how he related to people, was 
something that was really special, and [I] was just able to kind of almost mimic how 
he did it.” By imitating the moral lessons observed in others’ character, Samantha 
and Gwen might be described, from an Aristotelian perspective, as “borrowing” the 
phron!sis developed through experience in the lives of the observed (VI 11§6). 
Although merely mimicking behaviour does not yet constitute virtuous activity (see 
II 4§3), using the phron!sis of those who “see correctly because experience has 
given them their eye” is, for Aristotle, a necessary component of moral growth.  
 
In like fashion, Thomas, imagining a person whose character he wanted to emulate, 
said, “you see the example [of another’s character], and it causes you to say ... , 
‘There’s a human being right there who ... has ... the same struggles I do, and they’re 
doing more with ... their life.’” He continued, seeing “such a great character,” 
provides “motivation” to become better: “It gives you ... a goal, ... something to 
aspire to. It’s encouraging.” However Thomas also saw the power of the negative 
example that others can present: “You see a schmuck, and you say, ‘I don’t want to 
be like him!’” He said, this negative example can equally be a “motivation to try to 
improve your character.”  
 
Several participants spoke of others inspiring them to live at a higher moral level. 
For instance, Duncan said the example of others was instrumental in him “wanting to 
change” his character. He added that because of the inspiration of others it is easier 
“to work” on character-based issues when “in a group,” rather “than to do it on your 
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own.” Similarly, Thomas alluded to the motivation of moral community: when “you 
have a bunch of people working towards the same thing, ... it makes it that much 
easier – like La Vida,” for example. Duncan and Thomas appear to be saying that a 
group, whose members share similar moral ends, encourages and facilitates the 
moral development of its members. This insight recalls comments made by Aristotle 
on friendship: “for each molds the other in what they approve of, so that ‘[each will 
learn] what is noble from noble people’” (IX 12§3). 
6.3.2.2 The Arts and Morality 
Although a lesser theme with regard to this question, and also a theme mentioned in 
section 5.3.4, Saul, Gwen, and Olivia made some significant statements regarding the 
arts and moral formation. Saul felt that “literature” could influence one’s morality. 
As personal favourites, he mentioned the works of J. R. R. Tolkien and C. S. Lewis. 
For Saul, artistic influences were not always positive, however. He said that when 
listening to certain kinds of music, “you can kind of feel certain morals slipping 
away almost as you listen to it.” Saul’s reference to music, corroborates with 
comments I overheard while on the expedition. Students were discussing the music 
group “Limp Bizkit” (whose name is a reference to a male masturbation game), and 
seemed in general agreement that the band had negative moral impact on its listeners.  
 
Gwen also said that “poetry and reading” had been influential on her character. As an 
example she cited “Thoreau,” and people like him who “went out in the woods on 
their own,” and wrote about “their perspectives on life.” Gwen appears to be 
referring to a quotation from Thoreau’s Walden, “I went to the woods because I 
wished to live deliberately, to front only the essential facts of life, and see if I could 
not learn what it had to teach, and not, when I came to die, discover that I had not 
lived” (1854/1995, p. 59).  
 
For Olivia, moral inspiration came from the “people that I’ve learned about in my 
history classes.” As an example from her historical reading, she cited the life of John 
Adams and his friendship with his wife Abigail. Through their letters to one another, 
in which they regularly referred to each others’ goodness and wisdom, Olivia was 
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able to “learn from their experience” and glean moral lessons from their lives. Olivia 
then moved from history to fiction providing yet another example “in the Odyssey,” 
where “Odysseus wasn’t as perfect as one might have hoped he would be, especially 
with the temptations that he fell into, but that’s human nature for you.” She spoke of 
“how Penelope was virtuous in … her devotion to her husband,” despite “so many 
suitors offering her so many things.” She continued, referring to Telemachus’ 
“stepping up, and becoming a man, and looking out for his mother,” in his father’s 
absence.  
 
As mentioned already, Bohlin’s (2005) book, Teaching Character Education 
Through Literature, builds a case for using fiction as a source of moral education. 
The following encapsulates her rationale. 
Instead of providing a list of precepts or a set of definitions, instead of presenting 
students with a benefits-consequences analysis, or invoking a sense of moral duty, I 
am inviting students and teachers alike to examine what we can learn from the 
moral development of characters in literature. (ibid., p. 9) 
She believes that by reading about the experiences of such literary characters, a 
student receives a “schooling in desire” (ibid., p. 6). By this term she means “that 
internal world of moral motivation and aspiration that gives rise to a character’s 
moral choices” (ibid., p. 19), which ultimately form his or her character. To 
appreciate better just what is required in schooling one’s desire, she mentions 
Socrates’ “pioneering analysis of human motivation (ibid., p. 15),” as found in 
Plato’s The Republic (435d-445e). There, Socrates provides “three seats of human 
motivation” (ibid., p. 15-16): reason, which tries to morally understand; spirit, which 
houses emotion, ambition, and desires both love and achievement; and the appetites, 
which seek satisfaction. Through examining a protagonist’s reason, spirit, and 
appetites, Bohlin (ibid., p. 6) aims “to help students become more adept at ethical 
reflection.” She regards fiction as a helpful teaching medium because of “fictional 
characters’ ability to recognise and choose what is best for their lives overall,” which 
is, in turn, “largely dependent on the goals they desire and embrace” (ibid., p. 23). As 
an example she refers to Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina, an extraordinary woman who 
“gradually becomes a shrew, full of self-loathing and regret, because of her fateful 
choices” (Bohlin, 2005, p. 23). Bohlin’s belief in the moral educational value of 
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reading is echoed by Olivia’s ethical references to Homer’s Odyssey, described in 
the previous paragraph.  
 
This section produced two main themes: the direct and indirect ways in which others 
impact one’s character development.  
 
This chapter has examined participants’ responses to three questions about 
Aristotle’s conditions for virtue: the role of reflection in character development; the 
role of practice in character development; and the role of others in character 
development. The implications of the participants’ responses to these questions will 
be examined next.  
Implications 
Before closing this chapter, some summary comments, from an Aristotelian 
perspective, may be helpful. With regard to the role of reflection in character, 
participants’ responses could be said to be in harmony with Aristotle’s 
understanding. Although participants may benefit from a deeper understanding of the 
role of reflection in character formation, as described in Chapter 2, nothing in their 
responses appears to be overtly antithetical to Aristotelian ideas.  
 
There are, however, several further implications that could be drawn from the 
participants’ perspectives. If moral self-perception depends on reflection to the 
degree claimed by participants and Aristotle, reflection should then be placed at the 
centre of any moral educational curriculum. As this thesis progresses, it will become 
increasingly evident that “solitude,” or what Hahn calls “aloneness” (1940b), is a 
crucial curricular element in creating such reflective space, space that expeditions are 
particularly well-suited to provide (see subsection 8.1.1.2). However, in tension with 
this need for solitude, participants shrewdly noted another crucial element that 
facilitates moral reflection: the presence of others. Despite long-standing claims to 
the contrary (see James, 1980), as O’Connell and Dyment’s (2004) research 
appreciated, many students struggle to reflect on their own. The guided reflection so 
often associated with OAE (e.g. Greenaway, 1993), as participants’ note later in this 
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thesis, helps facilitate such moral reflection (see subsection 8.1.1.3). Participants’ 
responses then, reveal that reflection requires both time apart and time together.  
 
Regarding practice, participant perspectives appear to have less in common with an 
Aristotelian understanding. Noted exceptions notwithstanding, participants did not 
connect their understanding of practice with their carefully articulated understanding 
of the reflective process. By not connecting practice with reflection, participants 
often described practice in solely behavioural terms, neglecting the insight (provided 
by Gwen) that while certainly reinforcing physical acts of moral virtue, practice also 
refines one’s moral judgement. A consequence of this omission was a rather 
underdeveloped conception of practice as largely a matter of habituation. 
Understanding practice in this limited sense resulted in one further oversight already 
mentioned in the implications of Chapter 5: the motivation for and affect towards an 
action. Although participants identified the importance of repetition in the 
development of moral dispositions, they appear to have missed the equally important 
elements of motivation and affect, which are distinguishing traits of virtue theory.  
 
Such omissions and oversights have significant import for the moral educator. For 
the participants’ grasp of moral practice seems to be somewhat redolent of the 
expertise model critiqued by Dunne in subsection 3.6.3.1. There, the varied and 
unpredictable circumstances of moral action were found to require a more relational, 
flexible, and experiential kind of knowing. Such knowing is less formulaic than 
techne (skill), and may only be developed through the “resourcefulness of mind” 
(Dunne, 1993, p. 273) characteristic of phron!sis. Moral practice then, cannot be 
merely a matter of behavioural repetition (e.g. Duncan’s basketball analogy). For 
practice to be moral in the Aristotelian sense, it must be informed by phron!sis, 
which is ultimately an expression of whom one has morally become (Dunne, 1993, p. 
244). 
 
Turning finally to the role of others in character formation, again exceptions 
notwithstanding, participants’ perspectives can be seen to be largely Aristotelian. 
Their understanding character not as an individual pursuit of martial virtues (e.g. 
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bravery and endurance), but more as a relational and communal activity, dovetails 
well with Aristotle’s emphasis on friendship, and beyond the Ethics, with Swanton’s 
(2003, pp. 115-127) understanding moral motivation as essentially unconditional 
love. Similarly, their insight that the example of others, in addition to the more direct 
relationships of family and friends, can indirectly influence one’s moral perception, 
sits well with Aristotelian emphasis on phronimai (people with phron!sis) as 
exemplars. One further similarity to Aristotle’s account is the participants’ emphasis 
on mimesis, a connection developed in Bohlin’s (2005) references to literature, 
virtue theory, and character development. For such reasons, participants’ 
understanding of the role of others in character formation may be considered broadly 
Aristotelian. Their esteem of others’ role in character’s development suggests a 
number of moral educational implications.  
 
One such implication concerns the importance of upbringing, an Aristotelian 
emphasis that participants’ made several times through the study. As noted in 
subsection 3.6.1, a majority of character education efforts have been directed towards 
schools. However, as Arthur (2003, p. 8) has noted, the moral influence of the home 
“greatly surpasses” all others. Moral educationalists, then, might consider extending 
their character education programmes to the families from which the students come. 
 
Another implication concerns the importance of friendship. If the moral influence of 
others, particularly in the form of friendship, is as profound as Aristotle and the 
participants have claimed, then the topic of friendship may also deserve significant 
attention in moral education curriculum. Perhaps if students considered friendship 
more carefully, they would take their moral roles as friends more seriously. This was 
certainly Mark Vernon’s hope when he published The Philosophy of Friendship 
(2005), in which he searched “through philosophy for the things that may thwart 
friendship and for the conditions within which it may best thrive” (p. 7). In his 
manifesto on friendship, Vernon (2007, para.,1), like Aristotle, says that friendship 
“cultivates the virtues that allow children to grow into the adults who can flourish in 
society.” For this reason, Vernon (2007) believes friendship to be a matter of 
“education” (para, 1). The importance of such education is highlighted by Esther’s 
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observations on friendship. Had she been given a more philosophical understanding 
of friendship, she may have been more able to resist the negative influences of her 
so-called “friends.”  
 
One further implication relates to the previous two. Since one’s character greatly 
depends upon one’s upbringing, and one’s character similarly determines the quality 
of one’s friendships, what can be done for those unfortunate youngsters, who through 
poor moral luck, did not receive a moral upbringing, and thus are limited in character 
and the friendships that might encourage its growth? The participants’ recognition of 
the moral role of literature may be one solution. An educator’s selection of a well-
chosen story, in the appropriate medium, at the right time, may provide a moral 
narrative that the student is otherwise lacking. While it may be no substitute for a 
proper moral upbringing, mimesis may yet help such students begin to feel, think, 
and act rightly towards pleasure and pain (II 3§2).  
 
Having now discussed participants’ responses to questions of character in general 
(Chapter 5), and questions concerning Aristotle’s conditions for virtue in particular 
(this present chapter), I now turn to participants’ expectations regarding the 






Expected Influences of the Expedition on Character 
This chapter examines responses to a question asked in the first interview regarding 
what influences, if any, participants expected the expedition to have on their 
character. Using the categories described in Figure 4.1, this question is expedition 
dependent, but not virtue ethically specific. 
 
I had a number of motives for exploring these expectations. Much like Chapters 5 
and 6, the participants’ responses given here, from the first interview, serve as an 
interpretive context for their perspectives offered later in the second interview. The 
importance of this context can be seen in Gordon, Houghton, and Edwards’ (1999) 
article, How People Change, where they draw on an address given by Giges and note 
that the process of change is dependant on participants’ “willingness” to change (p. 
16). They explain that change requires “a willingness to experience discomfort and 
‘the unfamiliar,’ and for those wishing to avoid such emotional discomfort, change 
will likely be difficult” (ibid., p. 16). Thus, participants’ expectations, to a large 
degree, determine their readiness for change. This chapter reveals that the 
participants were unanimous in expecting that their character would in some way be 
impacted by the expedition. Consequently, their expectations for character change 
created an ideal research context for inquiring as to whether they did indeed believe 
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their character to have been impacted by the expedition: the question examined in 
Chapter 9.  
 
Another motive for seeking participants’ moral expectations was related to 
expedition curriculum. I wanted to know what elements of the expedition 
participants perceived to be morally salient. Since the La Vida course was an 
“Outward Bound-type wilderness expedition” (Daniel, Bobilya, & Kalisch, 2006, p. 
12; see discussion of this term in subsection 4.6.3), thus making its curricular 
activities (e.g. solo, rock climbing, etc.) similar to many US expedition-based 
programmes, I reasoned that the participants’ insights might be generalisable beyond 
the case (Schofield, 1993, 98-99). For the expedition leader interested in a virtue 
ethical perspective, such potential generalisations seem all the more warranted, since 
as demonstrated in Chapters 5-6, the participants’ understanding of character was 
largely Aristotelian, thereby making their assessment of pertinent expeditionary 
elements to character, all the more significant. Accordingly, by identifying these 
ethically relevant elements of an expedition, educators with an interest in character 
formation can focus on such components, and thus capitalise on an expedition’s 
potential to morally educate the participants.  
 
When asked whether they thought the expedition would have impact on their 
character, comments by Claire and Esther were representative of many others. Claire 
said, “I think it’s going to have a really good influence on my character, because it’s 
… helped me in a few ways already…. It’s helped me be more open to people … , 
because a lot of times I’m kind of shy.” Noting a different aspect of the expedition, 
Esther, answering whether she expected the expedition to impact her character, said, 
“I think it will definitely. Even today, I found myself hiking, just realising that ‘OK, 
we’re only going a half mile and this is so hard!” Claire’s emphasis on social 
demands and Esther’s focus on physical challenges highlight two complimentary 
means that participants repeatedly identified as morally significant aspects of 




By way of introduction to the themes discussed in this chapter, the participants’ 
intuitive associations of moral growth with expeditions may be seen as a derivation 
from a much older connection between wilderness and moral refinement. In 
Wilderness and the American Mind, Nash (2001) describes a number of sources 
which have led to a belief that wilderness facilitates moral growth. One such source 
is Christian monasticism, which began with the Egyptian desert fathers of the third 
century CE, who fled the moral decay of urban life, for the solitude of the desert 
(Nouwen, 1981, p. 24). This monastic tradition continued in the West, where monks 
“found the solitude of the wilderness conducive to meditation, spiritual insight, and 
moral perfection” (Nash, 2001, p. 18). Much later, spiritual zealots of a different 
kind, namely puritans emigrating from Europe to the wilderness of the New World, 
found the “frontier virtues” (e.g. hardihood and perseverance) required by the life of 
a pioneer (Roosevelt, 1923, Vol. 18, p. 23) to have a salutary effect on their morality. 
Yet another spiritual tradition claiming the moral influence of wilderness was that of 
the American Transcendentalists, who believed that “one’s chances of attaining 
moral perfection and knowing God were maximized by entering wilderness” (Nash, 
2001, p. 86). While such traditions convinced their followers of the moral 
significance of wilderness, it was only after the American West was closed that a 
broader section of the population began to conceive of wilderness as a “moral 
resource” (ibid., p. 67). For, as seen in Upton Sinclair’s 1906 novel, The Jungle, the 
industrialising effects of “business values and urban living were felt to be 
undermining character, taste, and morality” (Nash, 2001, p. 144). Further, this 
growing sentiment for the moral value of wild places was central to the wilderness 
preservation movement (ibid., p. 198).  
 
A more recent association of moral growth with expeditions in particular, can be 
found in Victor Turner’s (1969/1995) work on liminality. Drawing on Van Gennep’s 
1909 Rites de Passage, Turner used the word “liminal” – from the Latin limen, 
meaning threshold, beginning or entry point – to describe rites of passage he was 
researching in Africa. For Turner, rites of passage are ambiguous events, having no 
clear connections to past or future activity, and are thus “liminal entities,” “neither 
here nor there,” but “betwixt and between” (Turner, 1969/1995, pp. 94-95). He 
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continues by saying that for participants in a rite of passage, “it is as though they are 
being reduced or ground down to a uniform condition to be fashioned anew and 
endowed with additional powers to enable them to cope with their new station in 
life” (ibid., p. 95). Turner describes this liminal period as a transitional experience, 
whereby the wisdom gained in the liminal state “has ontological value, it refashions 
the very being” of the participant (ibid., p. 103). The language that Turner employs 
to describe liminal experiences – equality, anonymity, absence of property, absence 
of status, absence of rank, humility, disregard for personal appearance, no 
distinctions of wealth, unselfishness, sacredness, silence, simplicity, acceptance of 
pain and suffering (ibid., pp. 106-107) – has led to some authors likening an 
expedition to a liminal experience (Andrews, 1999; Beames, 2004c, p. 32). Andrews 
(1999), for example, claims that the liminal quality of expeditions often results in 
“noticeably altered behaviours and dispositions” towards “the latter part of the 
expedition and in the participants’ lives when they return to their regular 
surroundings” (p. 36). Similarly, while noting that the analogy between expeditions 
and the classical rites of passage model breaks down upon the participants’ return 
home, where the expedition participant often returns to a community unaware of his 
or her experience and change (see subsection 1.3.1), Bell (2003) also notes that 
“adventure programs structurally mimic a liminal/transitional phase” (p. 44). 
 
The comments of Nash, Turner, Andrews, and Bell provide a context for the four 
themes discussed in this chapter. The first theme focuses on character revealed and 
character built. The second theme suggests a reason why one’s character might be 
built, the challenge of the expedition. The third theme describes how the successes 
met with on the expedition might serve as reference points for future challenges. The 
fourth theme identifies an expedition’s capacity to provide sanctuary as an element 
conducive to moral self-perception. 
7. 1 Revealing and Building Character 
This section examines participants’ anticipations that the expedition would both 
reveal and build their character.  
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7.1.1 Revealing Character 
An early entry (August 15th) in an aside within my fieldnotes supports the legitimacy 
of this present theme. I noted there that the participants kept mentioning that 
“character is revealed on these trips.” Similarly, within their first interview, many 
participants expected the expedition to reveal their character, but not necessarily to 
build it. Thomas, for example, said that “I think it’s really going to show [it]…. 
When we start to actually get challenged, I think it’s going to show my character.” 
He continued, still speaking of his character, “Once I see what it is, I’m sure it’s 
going to have an effect on how I go about my life…. It will be like a reality check.”  
 
Claire thought that through the challenges of expeditionary travel, “other people 
really get to see your character, because you’re … being really open to everyone, 
[which] you kind of have to be” living in such close quarters. Referring to the role of 
wilderness in revealing character, Claire said, “the wilderness brings out the good 
and the bad, so it lets you sort through it better … than you would … be able to at 
home or in an environment … [where] you wouldn’t really have to stretch yourself.” 
Trying to understanding, I said, “So the wilderness helps you discover … ,” and 
Claire finished my sentence: “who you are.”  
 
Iris also commented, in both the interview and in casual conversation (Fieldnotes, 
August 20th), on the uniqueness of the setting. She felt she understood why La Vida 
would be using a wilderness expedition to develop character saying, “you are not in a 
normal environment, and … very different things [from this atypical environment] 
can evoke … characteristics about a person.” Speaking of insight into her own 
character, just two days into the expedition she said, “I’ve already noticed … not 
necessarily … a change, but …things like, ‘Oh, at home I might not have thought 
about that.’” Although Duncan too believed the expedition would reveal his 
character, he clarified that it would reveal only a part of it. He explained, “Character 
is you as … a whole…. I don’t think just one event can define your character. I think 




As the second interview will attest (see subsection 9.4), the participants’ 
expectations, noted here, that the expedition would reveal their character appear to 
have been fulfilled. An expedition’s capacity to facilitate self-discovery, moral or 
otherwise, is a finding well supported by the OAE literature. For instance, Walsh and 
Golins (1976, p. 5), in their classic account of the Outward Bound process, suggest 
that the “ten-group,” a phrase used to represent an interdependent peer group of 7-15 
expedition members, provides significant occasion for self-discovery. This self-
discovery most often comes through one’s relationships within the group, which 
provide a medium for moral expression, a claim demonstrated throughout the themes 
of Chapters 8-9. Walsh and Golins (1976, p. 5) further suggest that the ten-group is 
large enough for genuine conflict to arise, yet small enough for each member to own 
his or her contribution to the conflict, thus allowing the conflict to be authentically 
resolved. Johnson and Fredrickson (2000, p. 46) put it aptly: 
[On an expedition], a harsh word can mean a conflict everyone sees and an 
occasion for self-examination one can’t avoid. The reverberations could last for 
days. The potential of any action to affect ones own happiness, and that of others, 
becomes undeniable. And undeniable too is the need for emotional intelligence and 
skill, not just in avoiding such conflicts, but also in dealing with them when they 
occur.  
The above comments made by Claire and Iris call attention to another aspect of 
expeditioning highlighted by Walsh and Golins (1976, p. 4), namely the contrast 
between one’s normal physical location and the wilderness environment. This 
“contrast is used to see generality which tends to be overlooked by human beings in 
a familiar environment, or to gain a new perspective on the old, familiar environment 
from which the learner comes” (ibid. p. 4).  
 
While participants’ expectations of moral-self discovery are significant, their 
distinction between character revealed and character built is highly relevant to a 
virtue ethical understanding of character. Within OAE, this “subtle semantic 
difference” (Richards, 1981, p. 158) was noted as early as 1969, when Nold claimed 
that the purpose of Outward Bound was to discover character, not necessarily to train 
and develop it (see hints of this also in Hahn, 1965b, p. 9). Although the reasoning 
behind Nold’s statement is not entirely clear, his comment fits well with an 
Aristotelian perspective on character. For just as “one swallow does not make a 
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spring,” nor do committing virtuous actions for “one day, or a short time” make a 
character (I 7§16). Given the shortness of the expedition, and the rigorous demands 
of Aristotelian virtue, it may be more accurate to speak of character revealed than a 
character built. That said, many participants, to whose views I now turn, did believe 
their character would be impacted by the expedition. 
7.1.2 Building Character 
Participants distinguished two different areas where they anticipated that their 
character would be built. As I had expected, in the spirit of James’ MEW, they 
recognised the expedition’s physical dimensions of character development (e.g. 
endurance). However, reminiscent of the findings in subsection 5.1.2, I was again 
surprised to learn that it was through the primarily social or relational aspects of the 
expedition that the participants expected their character to be built. An expedition’s 
potential to address both the social/relational and physical aspects of one’s character 
is a consistent theme that resurfaces throughout the remainder of this thesis.  
7.1.2.1 Social Aspects of Character 
By “social aspects of character” I mean that the participants’ principal context for 
describing character growth, on the expedition or otherwise, was that of social 
connection. Whether through reflecting on moral responses offered and received, or 
through observing the moral example of another, participants consistently referred to 
character development through relationship with others.  
 
Iris’ comments provide a helpful introduction to this social understanding of 
character development. She said, “you can’t really disappear in a group like this.” 
Elucidating, she described the expedition as a “microscope” over one’s life. “Not 
only do you have to see yourself, but there are 11 other people that are spending time 
with you as well.” She continued by saying that because of the close proximity of the 
group: “we’re all influenced by each other, so, you know, my words, my actions 
etcetera, have an effect on the way this trip goes.” Iris seems to be suggesting that 




Harvey and Simer (1999, p. 166) affirm Iris’ comments, observing that expeditionary 
life requires living in close quarters for long periods of time without the option of 
retreat. They note that at the end of the day, instead of withdrawing into the privacy 
of one’s own space and letting a quiet evening mitigate any strained relationships, 
the end of a day on expedition means making camp, cooking dinner, and organising 
the inside of the tent – all with other people (ibid., p. 166). If this unavoidable social 
interaction has moral saliency, as Swanton’s (2003) pluralistic account of virtue 
theory contends (see subsection 2.7.1.5), then it suggests a significant reason why 
expeditions lend themselves so well to moral growth.  
 
Iris’ awareness that one cannot disappear on an expedition and that one’s actions are 
on display for all to view can be further compared to yet another similarity between 
expeditionary life and monastic communities. Monks in the Benedictine tradition are 
asked to make a vow of stability (stabilitas) – a commitment to remain with the same 
community for the remainder of one’s life. By remaining in the same community, 
one stays “long enough for the mask to slip a bit. Only when we stay in relationships 
long enough can we be known in such a way that we are confronted with the reality 
of ourselves and are challenged to” change (Okholm, 2007, p. 95). That is, living 
closely with others quickly shatters any delusional self-grandeur one might have. 
More personally, Jonathon Wilson-Hartgrove (2010), who has experienced such 
stabilitas, employs raw honest language to describe stability: it is seeing “one 
another’s junk” and being able to “talk about it” (p. 2). “In short,” he concludes, it is 
“learning to love one another” (ibid., p. 2). An expedition, even if only in an 
ephemeral way, can provide this stability, and has potential to reveal one’s moral 
self.  
 
Comments made by William and Gwen similarly refer to the morally refining social 
nature of the expedition, but in a very different way. They both identified their 
shyness as a moral liability, for it often prevented them from interacting with others. 
William consequently thought the nearly constant social demands of the expedition 
would have significant affects on participants’ character. He said, “This experience 
could change your character…. [because] on La Vida, you have to … learn to work 
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with everybody, … to make things go as smoothly as possible, so there’s no big 
problems.” As will be noted in section 8.2, such social interaction on the expedition 
provides many opportunities for moral practice. William identified “coming out of 
myself, out of my shell, and enjoying the company of others,” as a character issue he 
hoped the expedition might help him with. For he seemed to believe that his shyness 
often crippled him from appropriately caring for others. Although his interview took 
place in the early stages of the expedition, he claimed to see a change happening 
within himself: “I’m starting already to open up a lot more than I usually would in 
other situations.” Gwen, like William, said,  
I’ve always been kind of shy, and have had a hard time opening up. And to be put 
in a situation with 11 other people …. [provides] a great opportunity to actually 
open myself up and get more used to talking with people. 
 She noticed that  
being able to present yourself to other people …. , learning how to … talk with 
other people, and learning to interact with other people … , kind of forces you to 
think about the different methods for talking to people and just being around 
people. 
 As a moral example of such communication, she suggested “being able to have 
patience, … [with] something that someone does that … rubs you the wrong way.”  
 
Aristotle would agree with the moral emphasis that William and Gwen have placed 
on appropriately conversing with others. In IV 8 he discusses the virtue of “wit.” He 
notes that with regard to excess, people will do anything for a laugh, even at other’s 
expense (IV 8§3). At the other end of the spectrum are those who don’t laugh 
enough, appearing “boorish and stiff” (IV 8§3). The goal, he says, is to “say and 
listen to the right things and in the right way” (IV 8§1). Aristotle appears to be 
referring to the kind of “social skills” that several studies (e.g. Barrett & Greenaway, 
1995, p. 42; Stott & Hall, 2003, p. 164) claim to be developed through OAE 
programmes. Due to the high degree of social interaction, an expedition, perhaps 
more than many other contexts, provides moral opportunity to see the consequences 
of communication.  
 
Another reference to an expedition’s social nature affecting character formation 
occurred when Saul and Gwen spoke of the moral example of others. Saul spoke of 
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the positive example of others’ character impacting his own. He noted how the 
inspiration of others coping with the difficulties of the expedition “can help improve 
your character when you come to something that might be hard for you.” Speaking 
of the Christian values and moral convictions of those he had just met on the 
expedition, he said he was already aware of their positive moral influence on him. 
Similarly, Gwen also saw the close social contact of the expedition as “an 
opportunity to observe” others in morally salient circumstances. By looking at a 
given situation and noting, “I like how that happened, and I don’t like how that 
happened,” she expected to develop her moral understanding. 
 
Further, in comments that foreshadowed a theme developed in subsection 8.2.2, 
Esther, Gwen, and Thomas anticipated opportunities to care for their teammates 
while on expedition, and expected such compassionate acts to affect their character. 
Esther thought her character would be influenced by the expedition, through 
“respecting others …. and just realising … how you can help others have the best 
time they can.” Similarly, Gwen thought her character would be morally influenced, 
while on the expedition, by her “learning how to help others, and to be there for 
others, and support other people that might be struggling.” Thomas also expressed a 
desire to care for others, but for a different moral reason. He said he was concerned 
about “not being able to get outside myself and see other people’s needs.” He was 
worried that he might catch himself thinking: “How is La Vida going to be fun for 
me? … What’s it going to do for me?” He continued, confessing his struggle with 
self-preoccupation, saying that “I think that is a big character flaw [of mine] …. I’m 
hoping ... my desire to change that will come out in La Vida.” 
 
Interestingly, William echoed Esther, Gwen, and Thomas’ emphasis on care, but in 
the opposite direction. William said of the the expedition, “I expect it to just make 
me more … able [to] … to readily accept help from others.” He identified his 
tendency towards isolating himself as “something I’ve had trouble with over the 
years. I’ve just … kept to myself a lot.” As subsection 8.2.2.1 will reveal however, 
both the selfless wish to serve, as noted in Esther, Gwen, and Thomas’ comments, 
and William’s willingness to be served, may conflict with Aristotle’s epitome of the 
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virtuous being, the magnanimous “great-souled” (megalopsuchia) man (IV 3). 
Hauerwas and Pinches (1997, p. 46) critique Aristotle’s magnanimous man for his 
unwillingness to accept others’ help (IV 3§24). Instead, they suggest the “kenotic” 
man, from the Greek kén"sis, meaning “emptying,” as the paragon of virtue. This 
reference to kén"sis comes from a biblical passage, Philippians 2:5-11, where Christ 
is said to have emptied himself and become the servant of all. Blackburn (1996), 
noting this change in conceiving virtue says that the “humility, charity, patience, and 
chastity of Christianity would have been unintelligible as ethical virtues to classical 
Greeks, whereas the ‘magnanimity’ of the great-souled man of Aristotle is hard for 
us to view as an unqualified good” (p. 394). Although Blackburn (ibid., p. 394) 
explains these different concepts of virtue as merely reflecting the “central 
preoccupations” and “needs of the culture” of the time, other scholars, Hursthouse 
(2001, p. 8) for example, are more willing to admit that Aristotle was simply wrong 
on a number of issues. For the participants in this study, Hauerwas and Pinches’ 
(1997, p. 46) “kenotic” man (persona), the embodiment of Christ’s agapic ethic (see 
also Swanton, 2003, pp. 151-152), appears to be the exemplar they aspired to 
emulate.  
 
Since James’ MEW is the primary character construct within the OAE literature, I 
rather naively had expected participants, who in all likelihood as college freshmen 
had no familiarity with said literature, to emphasise the individualistic martial virtues 
of character (e.g. endurance, courage, etc.). Thus, their consistent references to the 
formation of character within care-based relationship was an unexpected finding of 
this study. However, it is important to recognise that participants were not altogether 
silent on the more physical expressions of character associated with James’ MEW. 
Although a less prominent theme, participants also expected moral change through 
the physically arduous expedition.  
7.1.2.2 Physical Aspects of Character 
Olivia thought the expedition would affect her “tolerance for hardship.” Although 
just days into the expedition, Olivia told Iris that “It’s the hardest thing that I think I 
have ever done in my entire life.” Hardship has been long held hallmark of many 
 
 257 
OAE programmes and expeditions in particular. Cook (1999) notes that the White 
Hall Centre for Open Country Pursuits, which opened in England in 1950, 
encouraged the teaching of “hardship and physical challenges” (p. 169). In like 
fashion, Nicol (2002b) notes that “placing pupils in positions where they would 
experience adventure, fear, physical hardship and discomfort” was a commonplace 
value of many OAE programmes (p. 87). Futher, Wurdinger (1997) notes that many 
within OAE believe that the development of participants’ endurance through 
adventure pushes them “physically, which will push them mentally and enhance their 
ability to overcome the stresses of life” (p. 8). 
 
Comparably, Gwen said that she expected her character to be impacted through the 
expedition’s requiring “physical endurance, and just learning to push yourself.” 
Claire said something similar, claiming that “the expedition gives you a chance to 
become better, because it gives you a chance to push yourself harder than you’ve 
ever” done before.  
 
Saul also referred to the physical aspects of character development. However, his 
conception of character seemed far narrower here than it had been in his previous 
descriptions. In what he described as “my problem with character development,” he 
seemed to be limiting the moral relevance of the expedition to the “frightening” 
aspects of the course. He said that 
part of my problem with character growth is that a lot of times things that drive 
other people forward, really don’t do so much for me. I really don’t get nervous 
about a lot of things. I know a lot of people are talking about the 12 mile run at the 
end. They are nervous about that or they are nervous about the ropes course … , 
and for me it is not as frightening. 
Saul’s comments are of interest to this study, for while at variance with both other 
participants’ perspectives and his previous observations, this perspective raises an 
important question. If the moral benefits of an expedition are most often associated 
with physical demands, as much of the cited literature suggests, do those who are 
more physically capable stand to gain less moral value from an expedition? A 
relational understanding of character development, grounded in agapicly motivated 
virtue (see Swanton, 2003, p. 121), vastly broadens the moral purview of an 




Participants’ expectations that the physical demands of the expedition would affect 
their character can be related to the development of moral virtue. As discussed in 
subsection 2.3.2.1, moral virtue is governed by the intermediate part of the soul that 
“both listens to reason and obeys it” (I 13§18). However, while the intermediate part 
of the soul can listen to reason, it must also be taught to do so. To achieve the mean, 
for any moral virtue is to have one’s appetites, desires, and implulses obey the edicts 
of reason. Gradually, as one becomes more capable of listening to and obeying one’s 
reason, with regard to a given virtue, one develops a disposition (hexis) to be 
virtuous within that moral area. Understanding moral virtue development as a 
gradual process may be in tension with participants’ expectations to grow in the 
moral virtue of endurance within a mere two-week period. Unfortunately, for reasons 
already articulated throughout Chapter 4, it was empircally unfeasible to determine 
the degree of dispositional development within the participants’ character. How then 
can one actually determine whether participants’ character was impacted, changed, 
or developed? For as Chapter 9 will reveal, participants did believe their character to 
be influenced by the expedition. Although already hinted at in subsection 5.2.2, this 
question will be given careful consideration in subsection 9.1.1.1.  
 
The themes examined in this section point to a finding discussed in Chapter 10, 
which claims that OAE expeditions aim for their fullest potential when they 
emphasise both the social and physical (albeit to a lesser degree) aspects of the 
journey.  
 
Moving now to the next theme, one reason why participants’ expected to develop 
physically demanding moral virtue was their anticipation of the constant challenges 
presented by an expedition.  
7.2 A Challenging Expedition 
In subsection 5.2.2, participants mentioned the role of struggle in character 
formation. Consistent with this observation, when asked if they expected their 
 
 259 
character to be impacted by the expedition, many anticipated the challenges of the 
expedition, and responded in the affirmative.  
 
For example, Duncan thought the challenges of the expedition would be pertinent to 
his character development. He said, “I think it will be really good for ... my 
character, because ... it’s way outside my comfort zone, and so I’m going to be … 
challenged to do things that I …definitely wouldn’t do at home.” Although attending 
a La Vida course is an expectation for the students, this requirement can also be met 
by electing to take a ropes course class called, Discovery, on Gordon College’s 
campus. Duncan recognised that he could have “just done Discovery and gone the 
easier way,” but thought the expedition “was a good challenge, … [that would] really 
… help” his character.  
 
When asked if she expected the expedition to influence her character, Olivia said 
yes, “I think my endurance for challenge is [already] being built.” She provided an 
example of this challenge in having to face her “fears.” She said, “I think fear can 
really affect your character in dramatic ways. That might even be one way that it 
worsens your character if you let that fear rule you.” She continued saying that 
facing one’s fears can be “some of the hardest things you’ve ever done, but the most 
rewarding.” The two fears she was struggling with were the dark and being alone: 
two significant elements of the 48-hour solo. Likewise, Iris faced the fear of 
overcoming the challenge of the solo, and thought “surviving the night” would be 
relevant to her character development. Speaking of the solo, she said, “I think just … 
finishing that, spending two days alone will be huge for me…. I can’t spend [time in] 
darkness alone…. It’s been a struggle all my life.”  
 
Samantha too appeared to expect the challenges of the expedition to shape her 
character. She referenced a cartoon strip, Calvin and Hobbs, saying “If Calvin 
doesn’t want to do something … , [his dad] will be like, ‘Oh [you should do it 
because] it builds character.’ So I feel like, the really hard parts of this [expedition] 
are ... building my character and showing myself that I can do it.” Likewise, Claire 
said that “out here in the wilderness” one’s character is impacted. She expanded 
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saying, “It just pushes you to your limit ... and that’s really where your character 
comes out.… At your limit you realise the good and the bad…. You can’t be lazy out 
here … you have to work.” 
 
The educational role of challenge is central to the philosophy of OAE. Richards 
(1981, p. 19) notes that Hahn (cf. Hahn, 1960b, p. 5) believed that expeditions could 
stretch boys, and through challenge give them the opportunity to grow. Hahn (1965a, 
p. 5) frequently quoted a paragraph from Conrad’s (1900/2004) Lord Jim to explain 
how expeditions test and “reveal the quality” of its members:  
he became chief mate of a fine ship, without ever having been tested by those 
events of the sea that show in the light of day the inner worth of a man, the edge of 
his temper, and the fibre of his stuff; that reveal the quality of his resistance and the 
secret truth of his pretences, not only to others but also to himself. (Conrad, 
1900/2004, p. 7) 
For Hahn, the challenges of an expedition assess one’s “moral fibre” (see Loynes, 
2002 p. 119), better acquainting one with any needs for change.  
 
Related to challenge, Berman and Davis-Berman (2005, p. 19) suggest that Luckner 
and Nadler’s (1997) theory of personal growth is the predominant educational model 
of OAE programmes. Luckner and Nadler are convinced that growth requires 
struggle and challenge. They view this struggle as the “edge” between one’s comfort 
zone (the areas of one’s life in which one is comfortable) and the unknown, 
unpredictable, and unfamiliar areas outside of one’s comfort zone (ibid., p. 29). 
Growth is moving outside one’s comfort zone with increasing ease (ibid., p. 30). By 
persevering through the disequilibrium encountered outside of one’s comfort zone, 
the comfort zone actually expands and a “new territory” of comfort is claimed (ibid., 
p. 30). Although I was unable to find any sources directly linking Luckner and 
Nadler’s theory with character development, the common emphasis on challenge and 
struggle may have resulted in a tacit conflation within OAE. That is, Lucker and 
Nadler’s conception of growth as the process of struggling through disequilibrium to 
one’s new territory, may have (perhaps unconsciously) been taken by many to be an 
explanation for character development (moral growth) as well. Given that Lucker 
and Nadler’s theory is still predominant in American conceptions of OAE (Berman 
& Davis-Berman, 2005, p. 19; see also Gassner & Russell, 2008, p. 140), the 
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conflation between increased comfort zones and greater character development could 
explain why, as Brookes (2003c) suggests, “the idea of character building persists,” 
“in the face of strong evidence that outdoor experiences cannot change personal 
traits” (119). Further, this possible conflation of Lucker and Nadler’s account with 
character development may explain why their theory has also, like character itself 
(see section 1.3) attracted critique, a critique examined in subsection 8.2.2. 
 
This theme of challenge is directly related to the next theme where participants claim 
that any success in overcoming the difficulties of the expedition, could lead to a 
greater belief in their own capabilities when faced with challenges in the future.  
7.3 Expedition As a Future Reference Point 
When asked what influence, if any, she expected the expedition to have on her 
character, Samantha said she thought “it was … going to change my view of my 
limits. So like maybe something that I wouldn’t try before, I’ll try now.” Using one’s 
achievement on an expedition as a reference point for one’s capability in future 
actions has to do with discovering one’s potential. Hopkins and Putnam (1993, p. 12) 
believe self-discovery to be a prime goal of OAE programmes. This appears to be a 
plausible claim since self-discovery through OAE can be traced back to Hahn’s own 
discovery of an inscription on a Belgian church: plus est en vous. Hahn took this 
phrase to mean: “there is more strength, more courage and more compassion in a 
person than he [or she] ever imagined” (Stetson, n.d., p. 3). The participants’ 
responses to this theme appear to attest to their expectation of finding plus est en 
vous.  
 
Duncan suggested that the expedition would be  
a good challenge, and it will really help ... , because ... once you finish it ... , you’re 
like, ‘Wow, that was tough, but I was able to get through it!’, and you feel ... real 
good about yourself.... When I come upon a struggle back home [after the 
expedition], I can be like, ‘Well, this isn’t as bad as ... a 15 mile hike.’ 
Like Olivia and Iris in the previous theme, Duncan too noted the challenge of the 
solo. He said, 
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I think the solo is going to be a real good thing.... It’s one of those things I’ve never 
done. And so, by getting through it, ... it will be ... another thing that when I go 
back home ... I’ll be able to be like, ‘I lived alone in the woods for however long…. 
It’s just another confidence booster when I face the struggles of everyday life. 
Olivia also thought the expedition would serve as a future reference point when she 
said that “perseverance is a very important virtue,” which expeditionary conditions 
demand. She thought that if one could persevere through the expedition, then “when 
you look back on it, [it] will motivate you in the future…. You [will] remember that 
experience, and you [will] know how rewarding or gratifying it was to finish.” 
 
Participants’ expectations of finding a future reference point in the expedition appear 
to be reasonable. Daniel (2007, p. 388; see also Daniel, Bobilya, and Kalisch, 2006) 
found, in his research on a similar college orientation wilderness programme, that the 
expedition experience “served as a reference point, a reservoir of life lessons, and/or 
a life metaphor,” for many participants (p. 12). However, it is interesting that 
participants associated these new reference points with development of their 
character, since the relationship between reference points and character is not 
obvious. Since this theme will resurface in Chapter 9, I will leave interpretation of it 
until then.  
 
The themes discussed in this chapter represent participants’ moral expectations of the 
expedition. If any themes discussed here were to emerge during the expedition, 
participants would need the reflective space to contemplate and discover how the 
expedition had affected their character. This need for reflective space may be a 
reason why the participants anticipated finding “sanctuary” on the expedition.  
7.4 Expedition As Sanctuary  
By way of introduction to this theme, Nash (2001), referring to an essay by 
Bodsworth, speaks of wilderness as providing “sanctuaries of reorientation” (p. 255). 
Conceiving of wilderness as a sanctuary is a rich metaphor with many nuances. The 
word itself has a double meaning. In its perhaps more common usage, sanctuary 
refers to a sanctified or holy (sanctus) place, often marked by a church. However, it 
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has long been recognised that the land itself can engender a sense of the holy, and 
thus also be a sanctuary in this more common usage.  
 
Unsoeld, a philosopher and mountaineer, (1978/1999), captures this association in an 
article called, Wilderness and the Sacred, where he employs Otto’s theological work, 
The Idea of the Holy (Trans., 1936), to describe his experience of wild places. Otto 
(ibid.), through extensive research, claims that an experience of the holy, which he 
describes as the “numinous” (from the Latin numen meaning supernatural or divine 
power), is universal to all cultures and religions (pp. xiii-xiv). Although recognising 
the ineffable nature of the numinous, he suggests the following definition: “It is the 
emotion of a creature, submerged and overwhelmed by its own nothingness in 
contrast to that which is supreme above all creatures” (ibid., p. 10). Further 
elucidating the numinous, Otto suggests the term mysterium tremendum, and then 
proceeds to analyse each word. Mysterium, for Otto, conjures a sense of “wholly 
other,” or “that which is quite beyond the sphere of the usual, the intelligible, and the 
familiar, which therefore falls quite outside the limits of” (ibid., p. 26) what can be 
rationally known. Otto maintains that a “fascination” (ibid., p. 31) accompanies this 
sense of “wholly other.” For in the mysterium one finds a “peace that passes 
understanding” (ibid., p. 34), a “strange and mighty propulsion toward an ideal 
good” (ibid., p. 36). Tremendum is manifested in feelings of “awe” (ibid., pp. 13-20), 
“overpoweringness” (ibid., pp. 20-22) and an “energy” that is at once “urgent, 
compelling, active and alive” (ibid., p. 24).  
 
Unsoeld (1978/1999), referring to Otto’s work, believes that “the bare austerities of 
Earth’s high places” (para. 2) often offer numinous experiences. Whether through the 
mystery apparent in the “progression from the acorn to the oak” (ibid., para. 8), or 
the tremendous power of a “storm,” an “avalanche,” or “the sea,” wilderness presents 
the traveler with the mysterium tremendum. However, it is the response to the 
numinous that is of particular interest to this thesis. This response is related to the 




Participants in this study expected the expedition to offer sanctuary, a quiet place of 
refuge where they might gain perspective on their moral lives – “a sanctuary of 
reorientation” as Bodsworth (see Nash, 2001, p. 255) put it. While some have 
speculated that this reorientation simply requires time and freedom (e.g. see Stringer 
& MacAvoy, 1992), elements that any (non-wilderness) environment could 
potentially provide, others believe that a deeper reorientation comes from places that 
an individual finds sacred. Knowles (1992), for example, referring to geographer Yi 
Fu Tuan’s (1974) theories of “geopiety” and “topophilia,” believes that sacred places 
in the “out-of-doors” uniquely provide “an opportunity to come face to face with the 
realities of life and the very essence of life’s meaning” (p. 10). Further comments by 
Unsoeld (1978/1999), reminiscent of Hauerwas and Pinches’ (1997, p. 46) “kenotic 
man,” bolster this perspective. Unsoeld (1978/1999) believes that the most natural 
response to encounters with the numinous, encounters that very frequently occur in 
the wilderness, is humility; and “humility might be seen as at least the first step to be 
taken upon this arduous path” (ibid., para. 14) of “self-abnegation” (ibid., para.15), 
the moral journey common to us all. Unsoeld’s explanation connects wilderness with 
numinous experiences that often result in a sense of humility, and, as Otto noted, a 
“strange and mighty propulsion toward an ideal good” (1936, p. 36). This 
explanation may provide a tacit reason for the participants’ expectation that a 
wilderness expedition could provide sanctuary for moral reflection.  
  
This desire for sanctuary, in its secondary sense, can be seen in Iris’ expectation that 
the expedition would be a “good time” for character growth, since “you’re away, so 
there is a lot less to concern yourself with, ... [it’s just] you and these other people.... 
There is a lot less distraction.” Kalisch (1979) concurs, noting that the lack of 
distractions in a “wilderness setting” is difficult to create “to the same degree in other 
environments” (p. 19). 
 
Esther was concerned about distractions of a different kind. In Chapter 5, she was 
quoted as believing that a key to character improvement was removing any negative 
influences on one’s character. As a remedy for those struggling with these negative 
influences, she suggested that “they need to put themselves in a different situation, 
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like in different surroundings, like in wilderness.” Kaplan (1995) has also noted the 
“restorative benefits” of natural settings (see pp. 172-175). He asserts that a 
fundamental condition of human functioning is the capacity to direct one’s attention 
for extended periods of time. Highlighting the importance of this “directed 
attention,” he lists the many functions that depend on it: maintaining focus, resisting 
distractions, making informed judgements, controlling emotions, perceiving 
accurately, and thought itself (pp. 170-172). The problem, however, is that ability to 
direct attention can become fatigued through the rigours and demands of our busy 
lives. Kaplan’s research proposes four elements, constitutive of restorative 
environments, which reduce attention fatigue. These elements, he claims, are 
particularly prevalent in natural settings (see ibid., pp. 173-174). First, he mentions 
“being away” (ibid., p. 173), a change, conceptually or physically, in one’s everyday 
environment. He cites fascination (ibid., p. 172) second, as a type of attention that 
requires very little effort. As an example he provides “natural settings,” which have 
the added benefit of allowing for reflection, further restoring one’s ability to direct 
attention. The third restorative element is the environment’s “extent” (ibid., p. 173), 
which must be large enough to hold “an endless stream of stimuli both fascinating 
and different from the usual” (p. 173). The final element is “compatibility” (ibid., p. 
173). Here the environment should develop the “purposes and inclinations” of the 
individual. Others have noted the relevance of Kaplan’s restorative theory to OAE 
(e.g. see Heintzman, 2008, p. 314), which suggests that Esther is not alone in 
anticipating the restorative qualities of the expedition.  
 
Saul provided a specific example of the kind of reflection that he hoped the 
sanctuary, found on the expedition, would promote. As mentioned earlier, Saul 
claimed that “A lot of times I find my hardships and character growth to be 
somewhat philosophical.” He felt that “being alone in the wilderness, [was] a great 
opportunity” to work on some of these difficulties: “I think God uses nature to help 
you look inside and examine yourself.” Saul’s anticipation that the expedition would 
provide sanctuary for his philosophical ruminations appears to be warranted, since 
participants in another qualitative inquiry (Fredrickson & Anderson, 1999) into two 
wilderness expeditions celebrated the existential contemplation afforded by their 
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journey’s “periods of solitude.” This contemplation included asking many of “life’s 
deepest questions,” such as, “What is the purpose of my life?” and “What really 
matters in life?” (ibid., p. 31).  
 
Self-examination was also something that Duncan anticipated. He said that he 
expected the expedition to provide “a lot of time to … think and reflect on things ... 
that [have] … been going on in my life … for the past year. And [also to] think about 
what’s to come in the future.” He concluded saying, “I think … having quiet times is 
really good to … help people grow.” Duncan’s comments are evocative of Drasdo’s 
(1973/1998) understanding of wilderness: 
this sense of freedom is treated then, on the one hand as allowing us a sanctuary or 
a neutral country from which we can look back at the state and society more 
objectively … ; and on the other enable us to inspect in this isolation aspects of 
ourselves beyond our physical, intellectual, social and even aesthetic needs. (p. 18) 
Regarding this theme of sanctuary, it is important to remember that at this point in 
interview one (see interview schedules in Appendix 3), I had yet to ask my question 
on reflection’s relationship to character. That is, participants’ responses connecting 
sanctuary, reflection, and character were their own associations, without prompting 
from the present researcher. This again confirms the roughly Aristotelian nature of 
the students’ perspectives. 
 
In closing, the reflective space that participants sought through the sanctuary 
afforded by the wilderness expedition, implies that a significant moral contribution 
of an expedition is simply providing space for this reflection, a topic examined 
shortly in subsection 8.1.4. 
 
This chapter explored four themes. Participants expected their character to be both 
revealed and built. Anticipated challenges during the expedition were found to be a 
significant means to such character building. Provided that the participants were 
successful in meeting the challenges of the expedition, they expected such successes 
to become reference points for the future challenges they might encounter. Finally, 
participants identified a need for sanctuary to ensure adequate space for moral 




Before examining the participants’ perceived opportunities to exercise Aristotle’s 
conditions for virtue (subsections 8.1, 8.2, 8.3) on the expedition, I will first identify 
some implications from the current chapter.  
Implications 
Since the first three themes of this chapter are reaffirmed in Chapter 9, once more 
demonstrating a source triangulation (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, pp. 305-306) that 
suggests the trustworthiness of the participants’ interviews, I will defer commenting 
on the implications of these themes until later. 
 
One implication I will now examine, however, is the assumption undergirding all of 
the participants’ expeditionary expectations mentioned throughout this chapter. This 
assumption is that any personal change, especially of a moral kind, that the 
participants experience while on the expedition, will be transferable to their lives 
back home. This belief in the transfer of learning (see Gass 1985/2008), a concept 
Hunt (1988, p. 10) claims to be central in OAE, is trenchantly criticised, by Brookes 
(2003b, p. 53; see subsection 1.3.4.2). Brookes contests that any such personal 
development (ibid., p. 51) occurs, instead invoking a situationist explanation (ibid., 
p. 57) for any presumed change in an OAE participant. Consequently, by rejecting a 
trait-based understanding of human development, the situationist critique denies the 
possibility of developmental transfer. According to this critique, personal or 
character development does not exist. More recently, Brown (2010) has described 
this assumption of transfer as “Outdoor Adventure Education’s Achilles Heal.” 
Although conceding that a transfer of skill can and does happen, he claims that 
transfer’s effectiveness in experimental conditions has been ambiguous (ibid., p. 14), 
and “measuring transfer has proven to be a highly contested topic of research” (ibid., 
p. 15). Noting that the assumption of general transfer is rooted in the cognitivist 
perspective of knowledge being a discreet entity that can be transported (context 
free) from situation to situation, he critiques this model complaining that it does not 
account for how the learning environment (including human interaction) contributes 
to the learning process. That is, this cognitivist position pays little attention to how 
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intervention and social interaction play a part in learning. Given the difficulties 
surrounding the idea of transfer, Brown, like Brookes, invokes a situationist 
perspective, “which focuses on practices of participation and interaction rather than 
the acquisition of transportable knowledge” (ibid, p. 17). For learning, he continues, 
is dependent on one’s “ability to successfully interact in society” (ibid, p. 17), thus 
making the conditions that enable this participation the needed research focus.  
 
While in sympathy with Brookes and Brown concerning the paucity of evidence 
supporting the transfer of learning, with regard to moral matters, a virtue ethical 
perspective (rather than the situationist view) may offer a more tenable explanation 
for this dearth. Although the detailed philosophical account of virtue ethics, provided 
in Chapter 2, makes a trait-based understanding of character plausible, this thesis has 
yet to examine just how transferable a trait developed in one context, such as an 
expedition, is to another. For example, does the courage that Olivia might develop by 
persevering, despite her fears, through the dark nights of the expedition’s solo 
experience, make her more likely to have the moral courage to stand against racial 
discrimination when she returns home? Swanton’s (2003, p. 20) reference to the 
“field” of a virtue, the sphere of concern relevant to any given virtue (e.g. courage), 
may be helpful here (see subsection 2.7.1.5). Within the field of a given virtue, a 
seemingly endless array of circumstances may make moral demands on an agent. For 
each of these circumstances, a different response will be required. These diverse 
responses make up what Swanton (2003, p. 21) calls the “modes of moral 
responsiveness” for a virtue. Together, all these modes of moral response combine to 
form what she names a virtue’s “profile” (ibid., p. 22). For Swanton, each of the 
modes of moral responsiveness that make up a profile for a virtue, has its own “fine 
inner state” (ibid., p. 26), or disposition (hexis). Thus, instead of one hexis for each 
virtue, as is suggested in the Ethics, Swanton is proposing a “pluralistic” 
understanding, where one virtue’s field and profile will encompass any number of 
hexei. That is, the full profile of any virtue will include a plethora of established 
dispositions within a moral agent. Swanton’s interpretation helps to explain why 
participants of an expedition might claim to have developed in a given moral area, 
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say courage, and yet still find, upon their arrival home, areas of their lives where 
courage is not yet fully attained.  
 
Swanton’s insight is at once both liberating and discouraging for OAE. It is 
liberating because it suggests that elements from the fields of virtues that solicit 
moral responses from the participants throughout the expedition, may indeed lead to 
growth within these aspects of the virtues’ profiles. It is discouraging because these 
aspects of the virtues’ profiles represent only a small proportion of the profiles of 
these virtues. The transfer, then, would be limited to circumstances back home that 
demanded a moral response in a location of a virtue’s profile that was exercised on 
the expedition. Similarly, the extent of the transfer would be limited to the degree of 
change manifest in the fine inner states (hexei) of the agent during the expedition – 
presumably a modest change given the life-time extent of Aristotle’s concept of 
character (I 10§11).  
 
While the moral change that occurs through OAE programmes may only be modest, 
it is change nonetheless. As this thesis now turns to the participants’ moral claims 
regarding their experience on the expedition, it is hard to imagine any other 
educational medium providing better opportunities for moral growth, however small, 
within such a short period of time. As the fourth theme of this chapter intimated, a 
significant occasion for this growth may be the reflective space and content 
(mysterium tremendum) provided by the sanctuary of the wilderness experience. 
Jamison, an abbot, in Finding Sanctuary (2006), more explicitly connects sanctuary 
with virtue. He believes that busyness and competition, driven by consumerism, have 
led to widespread social unhappiness (see pp. 13-19). Jamison asserts (ibid., p. 37) 
that what many of us seek is peace for ourselves and others (certainly a major 
element of Aristotle’s eudaimonia). As his book title suggests, sanctuary is a crucial 
component in finding such peace. While he certainly advocates for the reflective 
refuge provided by sacred and holy (sanctus) spaces (he is after all the abbot of a 
monastery), he has a broader vision of sanctuary in mind. He claims that “the way 
you lead your daily life is a key part of finding sanctuary” (2006, p. 25). For 
Jamison, “virtue” (see ibid., pp. 25-29) is the path that leads to the daily “sanctuary 
 
 270 
of peace” (p. 27). Virtue is what may enable us “to lead a unified life with the same 
values at home and at work, a life that is transparent and has nothing to hide” (ibid., 
p. 27). In this way, the abbot concludes, “the sanctuary-dweller is also the sanctuary-
builder” (ibid., p. 29). Said another way, by dwelling in sanctuary – both as a sacred 
place and a refuge – one begins to build the virtue that will ultimately lead to a 
greater sanctuary, the sanctuary of perpetual peace.  
 
Having considered participants’ expectations regarding the impact of the expedition 
on their character, I now turn to the next chapter, which discusses participants’ 





Aristotle’s Conditions for Virtue on the Expedition 
This chapter examines whether participants felt they had opportunity, while on the 
expedition, to exercise Aristotle’s conditions for the development of virtue: 
reflection; practice; and the shared life. Their responses are taken from the second 
interview, which occurred near the end of the expedition. Using the categories 
described in Figure 4.1, these questions are expedition dependant and virtue ethically 
specific.  
 
This chapter may be of particular interest to those expedition leaders committed to 
the moral development of their participants and persuaded by a virtue ethical 
understanding of character. For if participants claim that they were indeed provided 
these opportunities to exercise Aristotle’s conditions for virtue, then OAE 
expeditions, for the generalising reasons suggested in subsection 4.6.3, could be used 
as a form of moral education relevant to character.  
8.1 Moral Reflection on the Expedition 
A comment by Claire serves as a helpful introduction to this section. When asked if 
the expedition had provided opportunities to reflect on her character, Claire quickly 
replied: “Definitely, many times ... in the group setting, and alone setting ... and ... 
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one-on-one setting. It was a great time for reflection.” Claire’s response outlines the 
many themes that surfaced with regard to reflection on the expedition. In sum, all of 
the participants claimed to have reflected on their character, with a majority simply 
responding, “Definitely!”, and then following this affirmation with a specific 
example from their solo or journaling time (see below).  
 
The role of reflection in development of any kind is well documented within the 
OAE literature. For example, Loynes (1999, p. 106) states that reflection is necessary 
for growth and development to occur on OAE programmes. More forcefully, Drury 
et al. (2005, p. ix), authors of a prominent OAE textbook, claim that unprocessed 
experience teaches very little. They therefore suggest, in a quotation reminiscent of 
phron!sis, that “it is experience processed in the mill of reflection and feedback that 
yields refined insight - the kind of insight that satisfies our hunger for understanding, 
develops our body of knowledge, and strengthens our capacity for sound judgment” 
(ibid., p. ix). Hopkins and Putnam (1993, p. 104) concur, claiming that it is reflection 
that enables the knowledge gained during an OAE course to be transferred to the 
participants’ home context.  
 
There were many reasons to anticipate that the expedition would be a fertile 
environment for reflection. Drasdo (1973/1998), for instance, calling nature a 
“theatre for contemplation,” states that “thinkers in perplexity” have been retreating 
to the wilderness from time immemorial (p. 18). Abbey (1985) further suggests a 
reason for this tendency to reflect in wild places, noting that in wilderness we 
“confront, immediately and directly, … the bare bones of existence, the elemental 
and fundamental” (p. 7). More practically, Price (1970) notes that “life in the hills” 
tends “to show a boy the unromanticised truth about himself and his world” (pp. 86-
85).  
 
While other examples of the reflective opportunities afforded by expeditions could 
be given (e.g. Mortlock, 1984, p. 82; Drury et al., 2005, pp. 18-19), the following 




The condition of moral reflection was reflected in four main themes. Participants 
identified both formal and informal opportunities for reflection on the expedition. In 
a theme that runs throughout the rest of the analysis chapters, participants’ moral 
experience on the expedition, here examined with regard to reflection, were each 
unique and individually colored by the narratives they brought with them. The final 
theme encapsulates practical suggestions, gleaned from the participants’ comments, 
for conducting expeditions that prioritise reflection.  
8.1.1 Formal Moral Reflection 
Participants called attention to a number of activities, within the established 
expeditionary curriculum, that were particularly suited to moral reflection. After 
identifying these activities – journaling, solo experience, group review – I later read 
work by Kalisch (1979, p. 67; see also Drury et al., 2005, pp. 18-19) in which he 
similarly praises the reflective potential of: journals, solo time, and group 
discussions.  
8.1.1.1 Moral Reflection Through the Journal 
In subsection 6.1.3, participants identified journaling as a helpful way to reflect on 
their moral lives. In the second interview, at the end of the expedition, they 
unanimously identified their expedition journal as a source for reflecting on their 
character. Within the OAE literature, there is a precedent for such association 
between journaling and moral reflection. Bennion and Olson (2002) for example, 
suggest that reflective writing is a way for participants to “explore themselves and 
define their values” (p. 240). Similarly, in a passage calling to mind phron!sis, 
Hammond (2005) describes journaling as an “insightful record of one’s feelings, 
thoughts, insights, actions, dreams, plans, wishes, values, and philosophy” (p. 59). 
 
Esther also thought the journaling sessions were relevant to understanding her 
character. However, she further clarified the relationship between the two:  
It’s not like … [any] one journaling session ... changed my character, it’s going to 
be a conscious battle to get there, but it definitely helped me. And ... a lot of the 
things I realised ... [through journaling] I wouldn’t have realised if I hadn’t taken 
the time to stop and think about them and write about them. 
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Duncan also thought journaling was relevant to understanding his character. 
Highlighting the difference between a diary and a journal, he said that  
You ... reflect on the day and life in general and you take note of it. You don’t ... 
just go, ‘We got up, we had breakfast, hiked, and were done.’ You put thought and 
meaning into the journals, ... or at least I tried to. 
Iris thought she was given plenty of opportunities to reflect on her character. 
Although she identified “journaling times throughout the expedition” as significant 
and formative, she “thought the solo was the best time for reflection.” She brought 
two themes – journaling and the solo (discussed next) – together, when she noted 
that on her solo, “I chose to write about each person’s effect on me…. And through 
that I … saw a lot about myself in what I had ... felt about [my] relationships with the 
other people.” 
 
The deep and deliberate reflection found in Esther, Duncan, and Iris’ journals 
contrasts with the findings of O’Connell and Dyment (2004, p. 168) discussed 
earlier. A possible explanation for this contrast is that La Vida’s journal, rather than 
merely containing blank pages, provides quotes, short readings, and questions to help 
facilitate reflection. Schoel and Stratton (1990) claim that short readings “that grab 
the attention, the imagination, the heart and spirit, are helpful teaching tools” that can 
assist the participant in gaining insight (p. vii). Similarly Gookin (2003, p. iv), in a 
compendium of quotations called Wilderness Wisdom, says that while we may be 
aware that a certain experience was significant or profound, it is often difficult to 
articulate its importance. A quotation that captures “what we are feeling” may 
provide insight into the experience, and “take our initial feelings and turn them into” 
a concept relevant to our “life philosophy” (ibid., p. iv).  
8.1.1.2 Moral Reflection Through the Solo 
When the wanderer comes away from the much–traveled noisy highway into places 
of quiet, then it seems to him (for stillness is impressive) as if he must examine 
himself, as if he must speak out what lies hidden in the depths of his soul. 
(Kierkegaard, trans. 1961, p. 42) 
Like this passage from Kierkegaard’s, Purity of Heart, Esther recognised the 
potential for moral reflection on her solo experience. She said, “You could choose to 
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just waste the time, like not do anything with it, but for me … I tried to take that time 
to examine where I was at [morally] …. So that was definitely targeted at character.”  
 
Using slightly different language, this time reminiscent of the Scottish-American 
naturalist John Muir, Saul felt that the solo “really provided a chance to look inside 
and … remove some of the … distractions … and … focus on you[rself].” (In Saul’s 
journal, I later discovered that he had been fearful of what he might find inside 
during the solo experience (Fieldnotes, August 22nd)). Referring to the inwardly 
reflective nature of the solo, Smith (2005), paraphrasing a quote by Muir (1938, p. 
419), says that a solo experience is like “going outside to go inside” (p.3).  
 
Interestingly, Samantha, also employed language used by an American naturalist, 
Thoreau, to describe her 48-hour solo experience. She said that “the solo was all 
about … exploring yourself, and … discovering your character.” She explained that 
“because we were forced to be by ourselves for such a long amount of time, we 
realised stuff about ourselves.” Thoreau would have applauded this time alone, for he 
calls (1854/1995) humanity to lead reflective lives, and gives the imperative to 
“explore thyself!” (p. 208). Owen-Towle (2005) justifies Thoreau’s use of the verb 
“explore” claiming that “explore is the correct term for soul-work, since it denotes a 
vigorous and thorough, yet open-ended, search” (p. 230). 
 
Thomas also said that on the “solo I had plenty of opportunity to reflect on my 
character and reflect on where I was headed and what my ultimate goals are.” 
Thomas’ comment is relevant to Aristotle’s discussion of boul!sis (wish or desire) in 
III 4. What one wishes for or desires is directly related to one’s concept of what is 
good and noble (kalos) (III 4§5). By examining “where he was headed” and what his 
“ultimate goals” were, Thomas was ultimately reflecting on his boul!sis, and 
determining if he thought it morally acceptable.  
 
Referring to his solo, Duncan said, “I spent the majority of my time reflecting on 
different aspects of my life.” Speaking of this reflection time he said that “really 
opened things up to me that I probably wouldn’t have seen if I’d spent the last two 
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weeks just hanging out at home.” He looked to the future saying “now that I’ve sat 
down and looked at things in my life, … I’ll work to change or become a better 
person because of it.”  
 
Similar to their journal discussed above, all the participants identified the solo as an 
exercise of reflection relevant to their character. Others have also connected the solo 
experience with moral reflection. Richards (1981) claims that the genesis of the solo 
experience was by design to encourage “introspection, self-examination, 
contemplation, and development of ‘philosophic tone’” (p. 126). Owen-Towle 
(2005) provides an explanation as to why aloneness leads to reflection: “we seldom 
stop talking and producing long enough to find out what we truly believe and 
cherish” (p. 231). Bacon (1983) expresses similar sentiments by saying that in 
solitude “parts of ourselves are available for inspection there that are not available 
elsewhere” (p. 70). 
 
Although more fully developed in the final chapter, a strength of expeditionary life is 
its balance between time alone and time together. From participants’ responses, it 
appears that both individual reflection and group reflection were relevant to their 
character refinement.  
8.1.1.3 Moral Reflection Through Group Reviews: Instructor Questions and 
ACES 
By the term “reviewing,” I mean literally re-viewing an experience. As Greenaway 
(1990) notes, “people may have ‘viewed’ their experience in just one way, but there 
are many ‘views’ that are possible,” and a group helps the individual to explore these 
(p. 44). In its simplest form, group reviewing usually occurs at the end of the day, 
often around a campfire, and provides an opportunity to discuss any events or 
challenges encountered. However, more than just recounting facts (Knapp, 2005, p. 
22), the group review often leads to reflection on inner discoveries, “changing 
attitudes” (Gordon, Houghton, and Edwards, 1999, p. 17), and areas of personal 
growth in general. Specifically relevant to this thesis, Johnson and Fredrickson 
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(2000) believe the group review to be a useful medium to discuss “ethical matters” 
(p. 47).  
 
Remembering a particularly challenging day as navigator, Gwen recalled the 
emotional tension building within the group. She said that “all of us got to the point 
where we were … all snapping at each other.” Recognising this relational strain, the 
co-instructor and I called a group review, during which we facilitated a discussion of 
the group’s communication. Looking back on that group review, Gwen said, “to 
actually sit down and talk it out was” really helpful. She continued, “since we had 
that conversation we haven’t had any [major] problems…. So that kind of group 
reflection was really good.”  
 
Claire also referred to reviews in “the group setting, [where] we had a lot of time 
talking … and reflecting on the day, and [noting] what could have gone better and 
what went wrong.” Seeking to clarify, I asked if she was referring to the many 
discussions that resulted from questions that the co-instructor and I posed throughout 
the expedition? She replied affirmatively. Samantha identified instructor questions as 
well. She said that the questions offered a reflective “chance to sit for a moment and 
… stop joking around and having fun and … think about what we had done, and … 
share with each other how we felt about” it. Duncan also considered the instructor 
questions to be significant. Referring to the group discussions, he said that some of 
the questions really made “you think about different things. They weren’t just … 
questions to pass the time, they were actual thoughtful questions.” Many of the 
instructor questions the participants refer to were related to the moral code they 
created and committed to near the beginning of the expedition. Within many US 
OAE programmes, it is common for instructors to assign a group the task of creating 
a “Full Value Contract” (see Prouty, 2001, p. 10), a contract that outlines the group’s 
values and communication commitments to one another. On many occasions, often 
around the campfire, the co-instructor and I would pose questions regarding the 
group’s performance relative to their created contract. The participants used the 
acronym SHERPPA to describe their commitments. The letters stood for: servant’s 
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heart, honesty/openness, encouraging, respectful, patience/prayer and positive 
attitude. 
 
As I have mentioned elsewhere (Stonehouse, Allison, & Carr, 2011), this art of 
asking questions to elicit moral growth is nowhere better exemplified than in the 
example of Socrates’ elenctic method. In the Apology, 21c-e and 23a, Plato (Trans. 
2002) refers to the Socratic method as elenchus, meaning a way of asking questions 
that helps the interlocutor know what they know and do not know (Long, 2002, p. 
55). Here, the skilful leader only facilitates learning, thoughtfully assessing the 
participant’s needs and prompting his or her own discovery. While disappointed that 
participants did not recall more specific morally relevant examples, they did identify 
the group process activities as helping them to reflect on their character.  
 
In addition to instructors’ questions, participants referred to ACES, a group 
reviewing activity whose acronym stands for: Affirmation/Appreciation, Challenge, 
and Exhortation. One by one, spread out during August 22-24, each member of the 
group received an ACE from every other member of the expedition. For example, if 
Saul was giving an ACE to Gwen, then Saul would: speak of something he 
appreciated in Gwen; note something that Gwen did well that challenged him; and 
suggest an area in which Gwen might benefit from further growth.  
 
Claire found the ACES activity very meaningful, because “being able to commend 
other people’s character, ... and ... their strengths was really ... encouraging.” 
Likewise, she continued, receiving ACES from others was “very helpful … because 
… you felt like you’ve … grown on this trip because of what they’ve said [in their 
ACES towards you].” Thomas also found that ACES “were a good way to reflect.” 
He explained that they “provided … insight to … what other people think, and you 
can [then] … match it up with what you’ve been thinking.”  
 
Interestingly, for Iris, it was the giving of ACES that she found most relevant to her 
character. For in giving ACES, she had to think of what others had done that she 
admired. She explained that giving ACES “actually requires you to look at … 
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situations” on the expedition and to see “how someone’s character has affected that” 
situation. Similarly, Esther also identified ACES as an opportunity for reflection with 
moral significance, saying she learned a lot from “seeing what people really admired 
in other people’s character.” When she heard what was respected in others’ 
character, she thought “Oh that’s cool that they noticed it in them; I wonder if that’s 
an aspect I have”? 
 
This strong emphasis on the moral significance of ACES could, in part, be explained 
by their chronological proximity to the second interview. However, I believe there is 
a more sound interpretation. In their meta-analysis of 96 different OAE studies, 
Hattie et al. (1997, p. 75) identify personal feedback as one of the four significant 
areas affecting change in OAE course participants. They refer to a quote from 
Richards (1976, p. 11) saying that: “one of the fundamental requirements for the 
development of a person’s self-awareness is to receive feedback from others as to 
how they see his or her behaviors.” Richards continues by noting that beyond OAE 
programmes, few places in life provide the “trust, acceptance and concern” for this 
kind of sensitive feedback. 
 
The moral importance of direct feedback, from an Aristotelian perspective, is clearly 
seen in the significant amount of space devoted in the Ethics to an examination of 
friendship. As articulated in subsection 6.1.4, friends act as “another self,” helping us 
see what is noble (kalon) through the examples of their character. Friends also gently 
redirect us towards the noble in our own struggle for character. Interestingly, 
Aristotle reserves this ethically refining type of friendship for character friendship 
(IX 1§3), expecting that the time and emotion necessary to foster such friendships 
limits them to a few over a lifetime (VIII 6§2; IX 10§3-4, 6). However, on the 
expedition, such ethical refinement appears to have occurred between participants 
who had known each other for a mere two weeks. If, then, it is unlikely, by 
Aristotle’s standards, that any of the friendships formed on the expedition would 
qualify as character friendships, what then might explain participants’ willingness to 
give and receive moral feedback with those they had just recently met? One way to 
explain this phenomenon is by reference to the concept of liminality described in 
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Chapter 7. Andrews’ (1999) notion of an expedition as a liminal experience and 
Turner’s (1969/1995, pp. 94-95) definition of liminality as a place of equality, 
anonymity, absence of status and rank, and unselfishness, suggests a context in 
which such moral feedback might be more likely to arise.  
 
Despite this positive regard for facilitating participants’ experience, it should be 
noted that the value of reviewing is a somewhat contentious topic within OAE. In 
1980, Thomas James wrote an article asking, Can the Mountains Speak for 
Themselves? Within the article he sketched both sides of the argument: those who 
advocated reviewing exercises; and those who felt that participants should be left to 
their own reflections. Scholars remain divided on this issue. Gassner and Russell 
(2008), for example, studied the long-term impacts of a 21-day Singapore Outward 
Bound course. After examining over 300 past participant questionnaires, they found 
that group reviews “significantly contributed to long-term course impact” (p. 148). 
Woodcock (2006, p. 6) however, thinks the mountains can speak for themselves. He 
claims that there is little evidence that facilitation techniques, such as group reviews, 
greatly assist in achieving programme outcomes. More skeptically, Brown (2003) 
contends that much leader-led facilitation results in the leader paraphrasing students 
responses, which can “inadvertently or unknowingly, alter the students’ reply with 
the consequence of favouring particular knowledge(s)” (p. 25).  
 
While participants appeared to benefit from the deliberate reviews conducted during 
the expedition, scholars such as Woodcock and Brown might be pleased to find that 
participants also found many informal opportunities to reflect on their character.  
8.1.2 Informal Moral Reflection 
Asking if the expedition had provided opportunity to reflect on character, Thomas’ 
response that he often reflected “on the trail, [while] by myself, behind somebody, or 
[when I] just didn’t feel like talking,” came as no surprise. There is a long 
established relationship between walking, thinking, and philosophy. The peripatetics, 
followers of Aristotle, derived their name from the covered colonnades at the 
Lyceum, under which Aristotle walked and lectured (Blackburn, 1996, p. 282). The 
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stoics too derived their name from a painted walkway (ibid., p. 363). An interest in 
walking appears to be something many philosophers have in common. Rousseau 
(Trans., 1782/1953) claimed that, “I can only meditate when I am walking. When I 
stop, I cease to think; my mind only works with my legs” (p. 382). Further, Kant, 
Hegel, and Kierkegaard all have walks named after their constitutional routes. 
Noting this relationship between thinking and walking, Solnit (2000), in her history 
of walking, suspects that “the mind, like the feet, works at about three miles an hour. 
If this is so, then modern life is moving faster than the speed of thought” (p. 10). 
 
What did surprise me, however, was the significant role that others played in these 
informal opportunities for moral reflection. By again mentioning others, the 
participants’ comments re-emphasised their relational understanding of character 
development. For instance, while Saul remembered reflecting while walking, it was 
reflection stimulated by his social interaction: 
You had time to talk with other people. I know I talked with William a lot, because 
we were in the back [of the hiking group]. And so I got to know him better, but also 
just some things he would say would help you start thinking, and then when there 
was some quiet, when you were walking [alone], you could start working through 
what he said. 
Duncan also experienced moral reflection with others on the expedition. He said in 
“conversations, … different things that people say make you … compare yourself to 
[other] people.” He clarified his comment saying, “When someone says something 
… you think about yourself, and you … reflect … on who are, because of what 
someone else has said.” Sherman (1991), referring to Aristotle, agrees that 
conversation plays a significant role in our ethical development: “We need ‘to live 
together with friends and share in argument and thought’ in order to be fully 
conscious of the sorts of lives we are leading (NE 1170b11-12)” (p. 27). “Normal 
conversation with people” was also significant for Gwen’s moral reflection. For 
example, while “waiting for the food to cook,” she found “listening” to others and 
“hearing other people’s reaction to what” she had to say very meaningful. Gwen’s 
insight accords with Drury et al.’s (2005) comments on reflective opportunities on an 
expedition: “the slow, patient pace associated with rising dough and baking bread 
allows for moments of contemplative solitude or quiet group conversation unhurried 
by the demands of the daily itinerary” (p. 248). Finally, Claire mentioned reflective 
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conversation as well. On the expedition, the girls rotated between a two and four-
person tent. She said, “when you got in the two-man [tent] you really had time to talk 
personally with that other person.” Remembering such an instance, she said, “I was 
talking with Gwen, and ... was able to pour my heart out to her, and tell her a lot of 
different things about myself.” 
 
That participants on this expedition continued to reflect outside of the formal 
reviewing activities is consistent with the findings of Rea (2006), who conducted 
interviews on a six-week expedition in Iceland. He says that reflection, “amongst the 
participants,” took place throughout the expedition, even though it was not being 
“actively encouraged by leaders” (2006, p. 130). While Rea admits that facilitated 
reviewing is not a “necessary precursor to reflection,” he, like myself, believes that 
facilitated reflection may result in “more, or deeper reflection” (2006, p. 131-132).  
 
A regret from the second interviews is that I did not receive more specific examples 
of the content of participants’ reflections. Although the private nature of reflection 
discouraged me from asking outright, in re-listening to the interviews, I do think I 
could have probed further without offence. Even so, participants did volunteer some 
specifics of their inner journeys. The diversity of their reflection shows the 
individuality of each participant’s experience, and the particularity of each members’ 
moral narrative. 
8.1.3 Unique Moral Reflection Within Individual Narratives 
During the analysis, I tried without success to find a common theme in the 
participants’ individual reflective narratives. It finally occurred to me that 
individuality was a theme itself. Esther reflected on this moral individuality within 
the group noting that the ACES were “different for everyone. No one really had the 
same” combination of traits. The ACES implied that we all had particular strengths 
and weakness of character. Others have recognised the significance and impact of 
personal narratives on OAE experiences. For instance, Leberman and Martin (2003) 
acknowledge “that each activity does not occur in isolation and that each participant 
 
 283 
brings their own unique background to outdoor education programs” (p. 17). The 
following responses exemplify the individuality of participants’ moral reflections.  
 
Thomas’ moral reflection centred around pride and selfishness. As an example, he 
cited how when he had “just barely climbed Chimney,” a challenging rock route, he 
watched, in horror, as Iris, a girl (!), climbed Chimney. Thomas’ competitive nature 
prevented him from celebrating Iris’ success. Thomas claimed that this event caused 
him to reflect on his prideful nature. He remembered the co-instructor saying that 
difficult challenges often bring up issues of pride, and the rock climb had done this 
for him. Thomas also reflected on his struggle with selfishness. He recalled an 
incident where he was challenged to not “be greedy” by an expedition member, when 
taking too much of everyone’s favourite spread: “Freako Butter” (a peanut butter, 
honey, and chocolate mixture).  
  
Duncan reflected on the paucity of gratitude in his character. He was concerned that 
he might have been taking his family for granted, and wanted to work at “being more 
appreciative” and more “thankful for everything.” He noted that time to reflect, on 
the expedition, enabled him to notice his ingratitude more quickly than if he had just 
“been at home.”  
 
Echoing Duncan’s comments, a theme in Samantha’s reflection was the importance 
of relationship. “Being on the solo and being alone for so long made me realise … 
just how much you take for granted the people around you.” She also came to 
understand just how much she benefited from these relationships with others. She 
claimed to spend her free time often “reflecting on what I had learned from other 
people.” 
 
Olivia also reflected on relationship, specifically on the topic of friendship: “I did 
spend a lot of time reflecting on my relationships with the other people on the team.” 
This reflection allowed Olivia to realise her longing for a deep and meaningful 
friendship. She said, “Iris and Samantha have an amazing friendship, and they’ve 
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come together so quickly, and I told them that I envy that…. So I spent a lot of time 
reflecting on … a friendship like” theirs. 
 
Interpreted in the light of Swanton’s (2003) pluralistic virtue theory, explained in 
Chapter 2, each instance here – whether Thomas’ pride, or Duncan’s ingratitude, or 
Samantha and Olivia’s contemplation of friendship – can be seen as acting in a mode 
of moral responsiveness (ibid., p. 21) to some aspect within the field of their 
respective virtue. Similarly, each participant’s mode of moral response reflects a 
different base of moral acknowledgment (ibid., p. 23). For Thomas, it may be the 
base of status, in the form of his disrespect for others’ success that motivates his 
struggle for virtue. For Duncan, the base of bond, as a son and brother, appears to 
motivate his desire to become a more grateful person. For Samantha and Olivia, it 
may be the base of value or the good that motivates their appreciation of friendship. 
Seen through Swanton’s (2003) lens, the participants are clearly engaged in moral 
reflection relevant to their character.  
  
Given the rich moral narratives described in this section on reflection, one might 
expect expedition leaders to be interested in how best to facilitate such ethical 
contemplation. If this is the case, then the participants’ responses in the next theme, 
regarding the impact (positive and negative) of the expedition’s (US Outward 
Bound-type (see discussion in subsection 4.6.3)) curriculum on their opportunities to 
reflect, should be of moral educational relevance.  
8.1.4 Implications for Expeditionary Moral Reflection 
When asked about moral reflection on the expedition, participants provided a number 
of comments with curricular implications. For example, Samantha said that during 
the “first part” of the expedition “before the solo, we were going so non-stop, … we 
didn’t even have time to think.” Once she got to the solo, she began to reflect on 
what she had “been doing for the past few days.” She claimed that it was only then 




Gwen expressed a similar sentiment when she said: “The solo, I needed that 
desperately, because we were just going so fast for the rest of it, there wasn’t really a 
lot of time to think.” I was surprised by these comments, for both the co-instructor 
and I (personal communication, February, 11, 2007) feel that the expedition was 
conducted in a calm and relaxed manner. Other instructors also appear to have 
misjudged the pace of their expeditions. Examining data regarding the life 
significance of the solo experience, from two multi-year studies of college 
orientation expeditions, Daniel, Bobilya and Kalisch (2006 pp. 15-16) found that a 
significant number of the participants wished they had had more time to reflect. 
More graphically, Nicol (2002b), referring to Loynes’ comments from a conference 
report, likens “much outdoor education practice to an ‘express train’ where groups 
are racing through the countryside” (p. 93). Perhaps it is for these reasons that 
Johnson and Frederickson (2000, p. 47), whose aim is the ethical development of 
expedition participants, limit hiking to only six hours a day, thus leaving logistical 
space for more formal periods of reflection.  
 
Claire also complained about the busyness of the expedition, lamenting how little 
time alone she had: “You’re almost always around somebody…. It’s very close 
quarters all the time: sleeping in tents with other people or doing dishes with other 
people, cooking or ... just always doing tasks with everyone else.”  
 
With regard to another expeditionary implication for reflection, Iris’s comments 
suggest how important it is to interject variety into the daily routine. Iris complained 
that the time set aside for journaling was nearly always in the morning. She said, 
“It’s hard for me to journal in the morning.... I’m a night journaler. At the end of a 
day I like to ... get it all out on paper.” Her comments imply that participant 
reflection would have been better served by staggering the journaling sessions. 
Variety was also important for Duncan. Although he enjoyed reflecting with others, 
journaling came easier than verbal expression. Speaking of his journal entries, he 
said, “I opened up a little bit more, because it’s easier for me … to express” through 
a written medium. Duncan appreciated these varying means to reflection, and felt 




A number of students noted the profound opportunity for moral reflection afforded 
by the journal session atop the summit of Hurricane Mountain (August 19th). By way 
of illustration, Saul said that being on top of Hurricane helped him reflect because 
“you’re up there and everything’s so much bigger than you, and you just feel very 
small when you’re up there.” He reflected, “it’s a lot easier to be egotistical when 
you’re sitting in a stream” and “ looking at little rocks, than when you’re looking at a 
huge mountain” range. He continued, “I almost wish I had had my solo up there.” “I 
think just sitting up on top of a summit really would have helped put things even 
more in perspective.” The humility implied in Saul’s account is reminiscent of the 
“self-abnegation” that Unsoeld (1978/1999, para. 15) suggests is inspired by time 
spent in “earth’s high places” (para. 2; see section 7.4). Saul is not alone in 
identifying the significance of his summit experience. Daniel, Bobilya, and Kalisch 
(2006) note that for one of the programmes they studied, many participants 
recognised the “perspective provided by being atop mountain peaks” (p. 248).  
 
Claire raised another implication for reflection, this time regarding terrain. While she 
thought the expedition provided many opportunities to reflect on her character, not 
many of them happened “during the day [while hiking], because you are working so 
hard that you can only think of the next step.” She continued by saying that hiking 
seems to almost deter reflection because: “if you let your mind wander too much and 
you’re too tired you’ll” not be able to keep up with the group. She then contrasted 
the amount of reflection that took place on trail versus off trail: “I think you get to 
reflect on trail more” than off trail. Bushwhacking is “much more mentally 
exhausting,” because you have “to think about a lot” of things, such as navigation 
and safety. Claire’s comments raise several important issues. Whereas subsection 
7.1.2.2 asked whether those who are more physically capable stand to gain less moral 
value from the physical demands of an expedition, here one might ask the inverse. 
That is, might those who are more physically capable, because they are not as 
fatigued by the struggles of expeditionary travel, be afforded more time for moral 
reflection? Also of importance is Claire’s “off-trail” insight, which may delimit 
Thomas’ claims of moral reflection “on the trail.” Given these comments, expedition 
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leaders might do well to consider the ramifications of their chosen route on 
participants’ ability to reflect.  
 
In closing, a comment by Esther summarises nearly all the themes of this section on 
reflection. She noted that it was during her opportunities to reflect on the expedition, 
namely through “journaling, and on the solo, and the summit experiences” that she 
“realised what I want to change about myself.” With this desired change in mind, she 
added “Now it’s going to take time … to implement those changes into my life.” One 
explanation of the “time” required to implement the changes to which Esther refers is 
that change requires practice. This will be examined in the next section.  
8.2 Moral Practice on the Expedition 
The moral significance of expedition life comes into its own in this section on 
practice. Hunt (1999, p. 120), presumably referring to II 4§1 within the Ethics, notes 
that in order for virtues to be acquired, they must be lived. Experiential learning, the 
philosophy of education undergirding OAE, privileges learning through experience. 
For this reason, scholars have suggested that OAE expeditions are a helpful place to 
practise virtuous living (e.g. Allison, 2002, pp. 30-31). Johnson and Fredrickson 
(2000), in a section of their article called “Practicing Ethical Virtues,” actually 
declare a purpose of their expedition to be “to offer an opportunity for students (and 
faculty!) to practice virtues” (p. 46). As examples of the relevance of expeditionary 
life to moral growth, they suggest that living together under field conditions calls 
“for such virtues as patience, perseverance, cheerfulness, and courage in adversity, 
generosity and forgiveness toward others” (ibid., p. 46). Importantly, they note that 
even the absence of such virtues is morally educative, because the inevitable conflict 
that results “provides opportunity for group discussion or individual reflection” 
(ibid., p. 46). Perhaps it is these many opportunities for moral practice and 
refinement that encouraged Prouty (2001) to claim that OAE “is one of the most 





Consistent with the OAE literature, when asked if the expedition afforded 
opportunity to practise actions related to character, participants’ replies were 
emphatically positive. As seen in the next few responses, participants appear to have 
considered the expedition to be one long moral practice, highly relevant to improving 
character. Iris said, “I think that … everyday was an opportunity” for practice 
relevant to character. Even more pervasively, Gwen said, “I practised every single 
second of the day,” the “whole thing was an opportunity to work on character.” 
Comparably, when Thomas was asked if he had had opportunity to practise actions 
relevant to this character, he quipped, “Oh, yes, yes, every second!”  
 
This section has two main themes. First, although the participants identified physical 
or athletic elements of the expedition to be opportunities for moral practice, their 
emphasis on these curricular features was minimal. Consistent with the relational 
understanding of character development running throughout this analysis, in the 
second theme, participants instead emphasised opportunities to care as forms of 
practice relevant to their character.  
8.2.1 Physically-Related Moral Practice 
Participants noted two athletic components of the expedition that they deemed 
relevant to moral practice: rocks and ropes; and bushwhacking.  
8.2.1.1 Rocks and Ropes As Moral Practice  
Many participants felt that both rock climbing and the ropes course offered an 
opportunity to practise overcoming their fear of heights. One such participant was 
Duncan who claimed that the expedition helped in “overcoming fears.” He said, 
“The high ropes course and the rock climbing, because I’m afraid of heights, was … 
a big thing for me” to complete. Similarly Claire, speaking of the abseil, said, 
“standing on top of a rock about to rappel was pretty frightening,” and so “being able 




William shrewdly remarked that the rocks and ropes required courage in two ways: 
the acrophobic courage already mentioned, but also the trust one must have in their 
belayer.  
 
These comments bring to mind Aristotle’s account of the brave person: 
A brave person is unperturbed, as far as a human being can be. Hence, though he 
will fear even the sorts of things that are not irresistible, he will stand firm against 
them, in the right way, as reason prescribes, for the sake of the fine [kalon], since 
this is the end aimed at by virtue. (III 6§2) 
As participants attested, despite their fears, they were able to “stand firm against 
them.” Whether these acts were truly virtuous, on Aristotle’s account, depends on 
whether participants met with his already discussed requirements of virtue (II 4§3). 
Swanton’s (2003, pp. 20-22) pluralistic understanding of a virtue’s profile, recently 
discussed in the implications section of Chapter 7, is again relevant here. In 
courageously overcoming their acrophobia on the ropes and rocks, the participants 
made a contribution to the development of the disposition(s) requisite for this aspect 
of courage.  
 
For Thomas, the moral significance of the rock climb wasn’t in its height, but in the 
“perseverance” needed to stick with the climb, despite his extreme fatigue. He said 
of his climb: “Chimney was a bear! It was [total] perseverance.” This trait of 
perseverance was often referred to when participants spoke of the bushwhack, 
discussed next.  
8.2.1.2 The Bushwhack As Moral Practice  
On August 17th, our expedition made a particularly difficult bushwhack through 
dense, trailless boreal forest. Since we began hiking at 8am and finished near 10pm, 
and encountered a long waterless stretch, the day stands out as the most physically 
demanding aspect of the expedition.  
 
Referring to the suffering she encountered on the interminable bushwhack, Claire 
said, “I’d definitely say that would be developing character, because it was so hard 
for us, and we really had to just get all through it.” Similarly, Saul and Olivia both 
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used the word “endurance” to describe the bushwhack’s relevance to moral practice. 
However, it was Gwen who fully unpacked the moral significance of this physical 
challenge. 
 
When asked about opportunities to practise elements related to character, Gwen 
mentioned, “The bushwhack, I’m sure everyone’s been saying that.” For Gwen, the 
bushwhack was the point in the expedition at which she really began to believe in 
herself. She recalled writing in her journal that she couldn’t “wait for the pain and 
agony and … arduousness of the next day,” so that she could prove to herself again 
that “I can get through this; it’s going to be horrible, but I can do it!” She continued,  
When things get … difficult it makes you really look at yourself and how you’re 
dealing with it, and that forced me to say, ... ‘I’m not going to let myself start 
complaining…. I’m not going to bring other people down, I’m just going to do 
what I have to do to get through it.’ I ... used to let myself just say, ‘This is too 
hard…. I’ve pushed myself, I’m done.’ But when you’re with a group of other 
people who are still chugging along, you can’t let yourself do that, ... so it’s ... like 
the constant practice of just ... keeping going.... I know I can change this about 
myself if I just keep working at it. 
In noting that she might become a persevering person through persevering (II 4§1), 
Gwen demonstrates an Aristotelian understanding of how a disposition (hexis) is 
formed. While it is impossible to make any definitive claim regarding her character 
improvement, it can surely be said that in backpacking nearly half her body weight 
for two-weeks, without complaint or resignation, she now knows she is capable of 
virtue in this section of perseverance’s profile (see Swanton again), and need only, as 
she says, keep “working at it” for it to become an established disposition in her life.  
 
This finding, that the physical aspects of the expedition related to the students’ moral 
growth, appears consistent with other scholars who have noted how these physically 
demanding aspects of expeditions positively affect participant outcomes (e.g. 
Beames, 2004b, p. 164; McKenzie, 2003, p. 13) and help develop resilience (Ewert 
& Yoshino, 2007, p. 264, 2011, p. 41; Gassner & Russell, 2008, p. 148; Neill and 
Dias, 2001, p. 35). Such physical contributions notwithstanding, the OAE literature 
appears to indicate an increasing interest in the social and interpersonal aspects of 




A variety of reasons may be contributing to this social/relational emphasis. Berman 
and Davis-Berman (2005, p. 17), for example, have critiqued the traditional model of 
development, espoused by Luckner and Nadler (1997; see discussion of this model in 
subsection 7.2), which depends on the creation of disequilibrium in the participants. 
Within OAE programmes, such disequilibrium is often brought about by 
participants’ perception of threats to their security and safety. This perception arises 
through activities that are purposely utilised to create hardship and stress (Mitten, 
1999, p. 254). The problem with this traditional model is that scholarship 
increasingly suggests that a high perception of risk does not necessarily generate an 
effective learning environment (e.g. Leberman & Martin, 2003, p. 10). In their study 
of two OAE programmes, Leberman and Martin (2003) asked participants which 
activities took them out of their comfort zone and in which activities they learned the 
most. They found that “whilst it was the physical activities that took participants out 
of their ‘comfort zones’ … it was other parts of the course from which they had 
learnt the most” (2003, p. 17). Similarly, both Wurdinger (1997, p. 51) and Barrett 
and Greenaway (1995, p. 25) question the assumption that challenging physical 
activity yields the greatest personal development.  
 
Such disenchantment with the physical elements of OAE, has led to practitioners and 
scholars to look for “a less macho and adrenaline-dependent approach” (Beames, 
2006, p. 7). Using recent findings from the field of positive psychology, Berman and 
Davis-Berman (2005) reassess the requirements for personal and social growth, 
suggesting that the “greatest amount of change and growth comes from a place of 
comfort, security and acceptance,” not fear, risk and anxiety (p. 22). They claim that 
these more “positive” attributes – attributes associated with expeditions (Allison, 
2002, p. 212) – create a “context of friendship and support” (Berman & Davis-
Berman, 2005, p. 23).  
 
In an attempt to explore the philosophical and theoretical foundation of this new 
approach, several OAE scholars have noted the similarities between its emphases – 
comfort, security, acceptance, safety, support, and friendship – and care theory (e.g. 
McKenzie & Blenkinsop 2006; Noddings, 2003). This link to care theory is 
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significant to this thesis because, as noted in subsection 3.4.3, certain elements of 
care theory are common to a virtue ethical perspective. Futhermore, in line with this 
thesis’ desire to offer a moral re-appraisal of Hahn’s original vision (see subsection 
1.4.2), McKenzie and Blenkinsop (2006) connect care theory with a cornerstone of 
OAE, Hahn’s belief that the “foremost task of education is to ensure the survival of 
compassion” (p. 91). Appealing to Noddings’ work, they suggest that it is time for 
OAE to revive its “commitment to compassion and care” (ibid., p. 91).  
 
Expeditions can provide an excellent venue for the development of such care and 
compassion. Potter (1997, p. 255) provides a reason for this, claiming that a 
successful wilderness journey depends on healthy human interactions. Potter is 
referring to “expedition behaviour,” a term used within OAE to describe “the way in 
which group members’ behaviour affects others on the trip” (ibid., p. 256). 
Expedition behaviour is essentially “respect for one another” (ibid., p. 256), and 
conflicts are prone to arise when such respect is lost. By offering participants 
opportunities to respect one another, expeditions can be seen as sites for moral 
practice. For in Swanton’s (2003) pluralistic virtue ethic, respect is a precursor to 
universal love (agapé), which is the basic mode of moral responsiveness, featured 
“in all the virtues” (p. 99). 
 
This rather lengthy discussion of the relative dearth of participant responses linking 
the physical elements of the expedition to moral growth, provides a context for the 
next theme.  
8.2.2 Care 
Participants identified opportunities to care as opportunities for development of 
character. A comment made by Claire reveals the breadth of such opportunities. She 
said, “just being a friend … to people [on the expedition],” was a form of practice 
relevant to her character. She clarified what she meant, stating that such friendship 
required  
Not just … asking …, ‘How are you doing?,’ … but really being willing to … listen 
to people…. Being there for them to lean on you, when they need you, and having 
them there to lean on when you need them.  
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In a remark reminiscent of the Ethic’s II 4§1, Noddings observes that if we want 
people to care, “we must provide opportunities for them to gain skills in caregiving” 
(2005, pp. 23-24). McKenzie and Blenkinsop (2006) note that OAE programmes, 
because of their “experiential nature,” offer a “multitude of ways” for “students to 
practice caring” (p. 102). Naming just a few examples, they cite learning how to 
communicate effectively, group decision-making, environmental stewardship, 
service projects, and the development of a community-code (ibid., p. 93). These 
examples provide a helpful introduction to the discussion within this subsection. For 
the three means to care examined here encompass aspects of character related to 
friendship and community: service, encouragement and graciousness. The subsection 
closes with an extended narrative from Esther, who provided a detailed account of 
her desire to universally love – which is the basic mode of moral responsiveness 
found in the profile of every virtue (Swanton, 2003, p. 99) – the other expedition 
members.  
8.2.2.1 Service As Moral Practice 
Thomas’ comments about service provide a helpful introduction to this theme. 
Service was an emphasis for Thomas throughout the expedition. He said, “Your 
whole attitude, your whole style of life changes … when you’re being a servant.” He 
spoke of waking up in the morning and thinking: “I’m not going to look today to 
how I can really please myself, and have a good time myself.” Instead, he said he 
would “just look to … serve somebody else.” Admittedly he added, “I didn’t do it all 
the time, but I tried.”  
 
Claire said that she had opportunities to practise good character by: “Helping others 
on the trail, not just thinking about yourself and how you’re going to survive.” 
Likewise, William, when he said, “helping people on the trail, assisting them … , 
that’s … service,” was recognising the moral opportunity in serving others. More 
specifically, Samantha said, “we definitely pulled our good character out and used it” 
when hiking on the trail. As examples, she said, we “kept branches from slapping 
each other in the face,” warned each other “about a hole, or root, or loose rocks,” and 
often gave “someone a hand … over a fallen tree.” Saul, like others, referred to the 
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many opportunities he had to provide service while on the trail. He remembered, 
during the bushwhack, hopping down from a small ledge and “sticking out his knee 
so that the rest of the team was able to step down onto it.” Indicating why he thought 
that this was a moral act, he said that it may not seem like “a big deal, but … I could 
have easily just walked on ... and not even thought about” the others. Thinking of 
other examples, he said, “there were probably thousands of opportunities like” this. 
Opportunities to serve, he went on to say, were “just constantly around all the time.”  
 
In addition to acts of service on the trail, the participants mentioned service within 
the camp. William, for example, felt that the expedition offered numerous 
opportunities to practise character-related actions and attitudes. He mentioned 
“service … [through] just random things [like] getting water for somebody … [or] 
packing up the tent.” These are both excellent examples of service, because they are 
two of the most dreaded tasks of camp life. They are the very activities that people 
often avoid, hoping that others will take the initiative. Saul mentioned another camp 
activity, cooking, that afforded him an opportunity to serve others. He said, “cooking 
dinner” and afterwards, “cleaning up all the junk that’s in the [cook] pot,” were just 
two of the opportunities for moral practice that “constantly” presented themselves on 
the expedition. He claimed that keeping the expedition going required a “servant’s 
attitude: everyone pitching in.” McKenzie and Blenkinsop (2006) affirm 
participants’ responses, recognising “travelling,” “cooking,” and “tenting” as 
expeditionary instances of caring for others (p. 100). 
 
One final example of service comes from my fieldnotes. On August 15th, William 
experienced significant cramping in his quadriceps. The co-instructor and I watched 
as the expedition members divided his pack weight and physically supported him 
until the day’s end. “Attention to the needs of others” and the “sharing” of others’ 
“burdens” are two examples Johnson and Fredrickson (2000, p. 46) give of 
“practicing ethical virtue” on expeditions.  
 
As mentioned in section 1.4.2, Hahn’s sole educational interest in what became 
OAE, was the development of compassion (see James, 1990, p. 12). He envisioned 
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service as the means to foster such compassion in OAE participants (Richards, 1981, 
p. 23). Hahn (1940b) went so far as to say: “without such service the passion of Love 
cannot grow” (p. 7). Service’s connection with character can then be seen in its 
fostering of love, the “mode of moral responsiveness” found within the profile of all 
the virtues (Swanton, 2003, p. 99).  
 
It should be noted that while genuine, meaningful, and commendable, the acts of 
service described by the participants of this current research, are probably not what 
Hahn had in mind. By service, he was speaking of the sacrifice needed to “drill,” and 
train in life-saving, all for the sake of being ready to rescue a neighbor in life-
threatening need (Hahn, 1965b, p. 8). Whether manning a lighthouse, training as a 
lifeguard, or running mountain rescue drills, Hahn was convinced that (literal) life-
saving would engender compassion. Such belief in compassion through service led 
Hahn (1943, p. 5) to consider service to be more than a moral equivalent to war: 
“James in fact, is wrong when he says that war shows human nature at its highest 
dynamics; ‘reverence for life’ [through service] can release higher dynamics.” 
Hahn’s reference to “reverence for life,” is most likely an allusion to the biocentric 
ethic of Schweitzer, who argued for the intrinsic value of all living things (Trans., 
1990, p. 130; see also DesJardins, 2006, pp. 132-134).  
 
Richards (1981) laments the decline of service within the Outward Bound tradition, 
noting that what was once service through the high-ethic of “life-saving,” has now 
become merely service through “life-improving” (p. 157). That is, the “service 
project,” typical of many Outward Bound-type programmes, has degenerated into 
“contrived projects” with little meaning for the participants (ibid., p. 157). This 
degeneration has apparently continued to the point of extinction with the publication 
of the Strategic Framework for the Growth and Development of the Outward Bound 
Trust (n.d.). Ironically titling this report, Arriving Where We Started, the Trust makes 
no mention of the role of service (n.d.). This loss of commitment to service, typical 
within many OAE programmes, may, in part, be the reason why McKenzie and 
Blenkinsop (2006, p. 91) call for a “re-imagining” of OAE as “centrally concerned 
with compassion and care.”  
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8.2.2.2 Encouragement As Moral Practice 
While acts of service are often physical expressions of care, encouragement might be 
thought of as a verbal form of care. William thought that “trying to be encouraging to 
people” on the expedition was relevant to character, and Saul claimed that the 
expedition offered many opportunities “to practise encouragement.” 
 
More specifically, Samantha said that as the community developed, “people would 
share things that they were worried about and …. you could … give them some 
comfort and … encouragement.” She provided more detail saying, “I know that in 
the girls’ tent at least, before we went to bed, we would all ... talk about ... what we 
were worried about.” As one example, she remembered that Olivia had shared that 
she “was anxious about the solo,” which then resulted in the other girls encouraging 
her by saying that she was strong enough to make it through.  
 
For Gwen, “the ropes course” was a lesson in “encouragement.” Since the ropes 
course event occurred on the last full day of the expedition, when participants’ 
thoughts often drift towards home, she said, “I didn’t think we were going to be 
anywhere near as supportive as we were.” She named some of the lessons she 
learned from that experience – “it ain’t over ‘til it’s over,” and the importance of 
“pushing through and not letting yourself quit and just being there for other people” 
– and said, “I want to remember … to work on” these things in the future. 
 
This theme of encouragement runs throughout my fieldnotes as well. For example, in 
an entry on August 21st, I quoted from Saul’s academic paper, which described 
friendship as not just something for one’s own comfort, but also a “contract for the 
encouragement of others.” As another example, on August 20th, I noted that early in 
the expedition participants had created a moral code for the expedition (sometimes 
referred to as a Full Value Contract (see Prouty, 2001, p. 10)). One of the 
commitments within this contract was to be an encouragement to one another 




Others have described the significant role of encouragement in personal and social 
development. Gordon et al. (1999), for instance, in an article entitled How People 
Change, note the necessity of “support” in the form of “what is said and what is done 
to encourage individuals to persevere with the change process” (p. 17). Similarly, 
Mitten (1995), although primarily speaking of encouragement from leader to 
participants, notes that “affirmations encourage people of all ages to use their skills 
and capabilities to contribute to their – and the group’s – well-being” (p. 87).  
 
Iris similarly noted the significance of encouragement for character development 
when she claimed that “Other people’s … encouragment can … have such an effect 
on what parts of yourself you develop.” As already explored in Aristotle’s discussion 
of friendship (see Book IX of the Ethics; see subsection 2.4.3.1), others, as 
subsection 9.4.2 will reaffirm, offer a moral perspective on one’s life.  
8.2.2.3 Graciousness As Moral Practice 
Swanton (2003) suggests that the source for all the virtues, including service and 
encouragement, is agapic love, or “Universal Love” (p. 99). Agapé “does not love in 
virtue of properties of the beloved which then provide justifying grounds or reasons 
for the love” (2003, p. 121); universal love is instead given unconditionally. 
Swanton’s definition of universal love is inspired by a quotation from Schopenhauer, 
which has relevance to this next theme of graciousness: 
Boundless compassion for all living beings is the firmest and surest guarantee of 
pure moral conduct…. Whoever is inspired with it will assuredly injure no one, will 
wrong no one, will encroach on no one’s rights; on the contrary, he will be lenient 
and patient with everyone, will forgive everyone, will help everyone as much as he 
can, and all his actions will bear the stamp of justice, philanthropy, and loving 
kindness. (Trans., 1995, p. 172) 
I have deliberately chosen the word “graciousness” for its range of meaning. In one 
sense, it can mean being courteous and kind. Yet, in another sense, drawing on its 
theological roots, roots closely related with agapic love, it can mean freely giving 
unmerited favour (Brown, 1979, p. 115).  
 
Thomas provided an example of graciousness as courteousness. He mentioned that 
when there was just “one more piece of pepperoni, instead of just taking it,” he tried 
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to consider others’ needs as well. While this example may seem trite, it relates 
directly to controlling appetite, and therefore to the moral virtue of temperance (see 
III 10-11, discussed later). With a fixed amount of food to be shared amongst the 
group, self-control and consideration for others was a constant challenge to many 
participants. Thomas also provided an example of graciousness in the more 
theological sense of the word: “If some one asks you for your bug spray” (an item 
each participant was expected to bring), “instead of being like, ‘Get your own!,’ just 
give it to him” graciously.  
 
Claire, thinking of particular participants “you kind of get frustrated with,” said that 
the expedition “taught me to have tolerance with other peoples’ character.” She 
admitted that in the past she would have been very “frustrated” with them, but on the 
expedition she said, “I was able to be more tolerant of these people, and also gain 
more of a respect for them.” During the interview, I asked if she would describe her 
behaviour as gracious, and she agreed.  
 
Iris’s comments were much the same. She said that since “you’re with these people 
all the time,” you’re “going to be ‘bumping’ into each other.” She continued, saying 
that “there were times where I had to choose to not say something, and to not turn 
something into an issue.” She clarified that she did this “Not [in order] to avoid 
conflict, but just to avoid creating … unnecessary … conflict.” By exercising such 
self-control, she thought she was avoiding “unnecessary” confrontation.  
 
Gwen’s response resembles those of others. She claimed that her roles as navigator 
and leader of the day, were “big” opportunities to practise character-related actions. 
She confessed that “in the navigation, my character was really tested when at points 
… I got really frustrated” with the disrespect of some expedition members. She 
described how she wanted to “just yell at these people, and just give them an earful.” 
However, she shrugged, “I know I can’t do that, so I have to figure out how to say 
this tactfully, in a way that they’ll actually listen to me and not get offended.” She 
summarised such learning by saying: “So that really made me look at how I was 




Olivia’s comments also reflected graciousness. Referring to the expedition, she said,  
There are certain people that I get along with really well, and there … [are] others 
that I normally wouldn’t get along with, but I think good character would be to ... 
look at them as my brothers and sisters in Christ.... As my fellow team members, ... 
they are in the same position I am [on the expedition] and it’s difficult for them too. 
And so we may not always agree, but ... I should still learn to appreciate and 
encourage them.... That was a challenge for me, because ... I tend to judge very 
easily. So to overcome judgement, and really push myself to ... look deeper was a 
big thing. 
Others have also associated opportunities for graciousness, in the two senses used 
here, with OAE programmes. For example, Harvey and Simer (1999) suggest that 
opportunities “to practice courtesy on an expedition can be found at every turn in the 
trail and at every camp” (p. 168). Similarly, Kennedy (1992) has also recognised an 
increase in “a spirit of ‘agape’” on expeditions (p. 41). Likewise, Graham (1997) 
again speaking of expeditionary life, notes that “being tolerant of the weaknesses and 
shortcomings of others” is part of providing care (p. 41).  
 
From an Aristotelian perspective, participants’ gracious responses can be seen as acts 
of self-restraint, whereby they resisted the (justified) temptation to respond angrily to 
the injustices of other expedition members. Aristotle discusses the virtue of self-
restraint (or temperance) in III 11-12, and in VI 5§5 he explains the relationship 
between phron!sis and temperance. Etymologically, temperance (s"phrosun!) means 
to preserve phron!sis (s"zousan t!n phron!sin).  
 
While participants of this study reported opportunities to exercise self-restraint, 
participants from another study (Stott & Hall, 2003) claimed that through their 
experience on a six-week expedition they improved in their ability “to control their 
emotions” (p. 164). Since Aristotle considers emotional control (see II 3§3, 6§10-12, 
9§1) and self-restraint (III 11-12) to be issues of moral virtue, such findings suggest 
that expeditions can indeed provide opportunities for moral practice.  
 
A point of clarification may be helpful here. Although other authors have noted the 
opportunities for practising care provided by an expedition, the motivation for that 
care is seldom clarified. For example, Harvey and Simer (1999, p. 168), after 
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mentioning a number of care-oriented opportunities on any given expedition, note 
that kindnesses given are often returned. As I have mentioned elsewhere (Beames & 
Stonehouse, 2007), virtuous action is for its own sake (II 4§3), and not for some 
other gain. Such virtuous motivation can be seen in Esther’s desire to express 
universal love towards the other expedition members.  
8.2.2.4 Esther’s Agapic Narrative  
The depth of Esther’s account of moral practice on the expedition was unique. Other 
participants provided examples of moral practice largely from the practical concerns 
of expedition life or their frustration with other expedition members. While such 
examples were certainly significant, Esther’s confessional account reveals a much 
deeper inner struggle to embody love for all her teammates. Although one 
participant’s account has little generalising significance, I have included Esther’s 
narrative because it is the best exemplification within the interviews of what might 
be thought of as the pursuit of virtue.  
 
Speaking of moral practice and her character, Esther said: “One thing that hasn’t 
changed yet, but that I thought about a lot, especially on the solo … was loving 
others and how important it is to just love each other.” She noted how building this 
capacity to love “is a constant battle. I have to be constantly reminding myself.” She 
said, “if I realise I’m judging someone, … I have to stop” judging them immediately. 
“It’s an internal thought process,” that requires continuously “checking myself.” She 
expected this process to require lifetime effort: it is “something that I can always see 
myself improving in – a lifetime journey of love.”  
 
Esther claimed that her inspiration to love in an agapic sense came from a variety of 
biblical passages that emphasised “community and how you should be treating others 
in a community.” She added: “most of them were about loving each other and 
accepting each other. I realised that even if I’m not happy with what is going on in a 




She then noted that the expedition provided plenty of occasions for her to try to 
replace her judgemental spirit with a loving one: “after I realised … what I wanted to 
change, then I had opportunity in … everyday conversation … to change my 
judgemental thoughts, or [to change] how I felt about what someone was saying to 
me.”  
 
Esther provided many examples of how she tried to love her other expedition 
members. For instance, she said, if someone asked “for something, I would help 
them instead of being hesitant.” She also “realised what an impact” she could have 
by “really listening to people when they share.” Encouraged by her moral progress, 
Esther was pleased to note that during her ACES, others had noticed these efforts as 
well, thus persuading her that she had “got somewhere” in her desire to develop her 
character.  
 
Esther claimed that through her efforts to love, she was “in general trying to be a 
good example of Christ,” meaning that “every single action should reflect …his 
love.” Her allusion to Christ is significant for Jesus exhorts his followers to love in 
an agapic sense (see Matthew 5:43-46). Viewed from Swanton’s (2003, p. 99) 
pluralistic perspective on virtue, Esther can be seen as desiring and practising the 
basic mode of moral responsiveness, universal love. 
 
As a more general response to this section on care as moral practice, some mention 
of Slote’s (e.g. 1997, 2001, 2007, 2010a, 2010b) agent-based virtue ethics seems 
necessary. Slote is troubled by what he calls a deep “problem with Aristotle’s (own) 
ethical views”: 
Although Aristotle mentions the fact that we tend to praise lovers of humankind, his 
theory of morality doesn’t seem to require a concern for human beings generally, 
and for any moral philosophy seeking to deal with the increasingly connected world 
we live in, this lack is very telling. (2001, p. vii) 
Slote, then, seeks to develop a theory of virtue that provides a rationale for one’s care 
for others (2001, p. vii). In order to develop such an account, Slote feels he must 
differentiate between agent-focused and agent-based ethical theories. Traditional 
virtue ethics, he claims, have been agent-focused where “the focus is on the virtuous 
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individual and on those inner traits, dispositions, and motives that qualify her as 
being virtuous” (ibid., p. 4). He clarifies, however, that on this traditional account, 
what makes the virtuous individual’s actions right or fine is not exclusively these 
inner traits, disposition, and motives. For  
Aristotle also allows that nonvirtuous individuals can perform good or virtuous acts 
under the direction of others, and, in addition, he characterizes the virtuous 
individual as someone who sees or perceives what is good or fine or right to do in 
any given situation. (ibid., p. 5) 
Slote’s point is that for Aristotle, what makes the actions “right or fine … is not that 
they have been chosen in a certain way by a certain sort of individual,” but that “their 
status as right or fine or noble is treated as in some measure independent of agent-
evaluations” (ibid., p. 5). By appealing to such standards of virtue outside of the 
individual, Slote believes that “agent-focused virtue-ethical theories … are in danger 
of being reabsorbed by their deontic counterparts” (Ransome, 2010, p. 42), and thus 
are similarly at risk of becoming vulnerable to their weaknesses (described in 
subsection 2.1.2). Instead, Slote suggests a more “radical” and “pure” virtue ethics, 
where the assessment of an action’s morality is based exclusively in “aretaic” 
(virtuous) facts about the agent’s “motives, dispositions, or inner life” (Slote, 1997, 
p. 240; see also Crisp & Slote, 1997, p. 22). As a result, Slote’s virtue theory is not 
merely agent-focused, but agent-based.  
 
Slote, thus, believes that the motives, disposition, and the inner life of the agent “can 
wholly ground moral actions” (Ransome, 2010, p. 43). To justify this claim, Slote 
rests his theory on “an overarching master virtue” (ibid., p. 43), a virtue that is the 
“touchstone of all good human action” (Slote, 2001, p. 20), “the highest of secular 
motives,” a virtue that needs no further defence beyond itself (ibid., pp. 20-21): 
universal benevolence or care. While Slote recongises that this agent-based virtue 
ethics has much in common with the care ethics of “Noddings and others,” he also 
notes that such care theory “leaves a great many philosophical issues and questions 
unaccounted for” (ibid., pp. 53-64). He therefore contends that an agent-based virtue 
theory philosophically provides “the overall structure of a plausible ethic of caring” 




To provide this philosophical foundation, Slote takes inspiration from 18th century 
British sentimentalism, “for both Hume and Hutcheson speak about and defend 
generalized forms of benevolence” (2001, p. viii). Such sentimentalists assume that 
“human beings have a basic capacity for empathy and sympathy with others” (Slote, 
2001, p. 47). For Slote, feelings and motivations based in this capacity to empathise, 
provide a “reliable guide to acting morally’ (2010a, p. 8). He explains, “the best or 
most obvious explanation of why our empathic tendencies correspond so well with 
our normative thinking about what is (more or less) obligatory would be that our 
very notions of right and wrong are based in empathy” (2010b, p. 128). An agent-
based virtue ethic, then, distinguishes “right” from “wrong” by determining which 
actions better express “fully developed human empathic caring” (Slote, 2003, p. 7). 
Slote is quick to note, however, that although an empathic response may be based in 
feeling, it does not preclude more cognitive elements. To the contrary, “more highly 
developed forms of empathy actually depend on a good deal of intellectual/cognitive 
sophistication” (2010b, p. 128). Determining a morally acceptable empathetic 
response, for example, requires knowing facts about who is in need, to what degree 
they are in need, and what exactly would mitigate this need (Slote, 2001, p. 18).  
 
With this “sentimentalist [agent-based] virtue ethics” (Slote, 2001, p. 134) 
philosophically undergirding care theory, Slote believes an ethics of care, which has 
often been considered a mere corrective to other varieties of moral thinking, may 
now be considered “a self-standing view of the whole of morality (2007, p. xiii). In 
fact, agent-based virtue ethics significantly expands the purview of care, which under 
Noddings (e.g. Noddings, 2005, pp. 115-116) interpretation primarily focused on 
those near and dear, to include “all human beings (and/or sentient creatures)” (Slote, 
2001, p. 116). For Slote, an ethics of care must balance “intimate caring” with 
“humanitarian caring” (ibid., p. 66).  
 
While Slote (2007) believes that an ethics of care “has the potential to function in a 
comprehensive and satisfying way as a truly human morality” (p. 8), he recognises 
that for it to do so, it will need “to show how the morality it considers valid can 
develop within individuals” (Slote, 2010b, p. 128). It is here, in his Sentimentalist 
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Moral Education (2010b), that the relevance of Slote’s theory to the La Vida 
expedition becomes more obvious. Drawing on the work of Hoffman (2000), Slote 
describes a process called “empathetic identification,” which involves an agent 
developing “feelings or thoughts that are in some sense more ‘appropriate’ to the 
situation of the person(s) empathized with than to the situation of the person 
empathizing” (2010b, p. 132). “Making someone vividly aware of the effects of 
certain kinds of actions (or attitudes) on people’s welfare can change the way that 
person feels about those actions (or attitudes) and make a difference, for good, to her 
act-effecting motives” (Slote, 2001, p. 47). As an agent gains life experience and 
further develops in cognitive ability, he or she “becomes capable of more and more 
impressive ‘feats’ of empathy” (ibid., p. 132). Eventually, as this empathetic ability 
matures, it becomes possible to empathise not merely with what the empathised is 
feeling, but with his or her condition, circumstance, or station more broadly (ibid., p. 
132).  
 
Participant responses within the themes of this subsection – service, encouragement, 
graciousness, and particularly Esther’s agapic narrative – could also be interpreted 
through Slote’s sentimentalist agent-based virtue ethics. The many instances of care 
expressed on the expedition, could then be seen as acts of empathetic identification. 
By offering a seemingly endless number of opportunities for such empathetic 
expression, the expedition might be considered a useful means to sentimentalist 
agent-based virtue ethical moral education. However certain difficulties within 
Slote’s theory suggest that Swanton’s (2003) pluralistic account of virtue, which I 
have employed throughout the analysis chapters, serves as a more cogent explanation 
of the moral occurrences on the expedition.  
 
Ransome (2010) flags one such difficulty, claiming that agent-based virtue ethics is 
“self-undermining.” His concern is that genuinely benevolent actions require acting 
for the sake of the one in need, whereas an action’s value in Slote’s agent-based 
theory exclusively rests on the purity of the agent’s own motivation for the action. In 
Ransome’s (2010) words, the recipient of Slote’s “benevolent” action, the one in 
need, is nothing but a “a prop or instrument upon which the benevolent agent is 
 
 305 
morally obliged to sharpen and maintain what is of real value: her own benevolent 
motives” (p. 53). The agent’s motivation is ultimately self-interested, and thereby by 
definition, “no longer benevolently motivated, but … inappropriately self-
concerned” (ibid., p. 53).  
 
Van Zyl (2011) raises another concern with Slote’s theory. Amongst other 
difficulties, she notes while Slote claims to provide an agent-based approach to 
virtue ethics, which “treats the moral or ethical status of acts as entirely derivative 
from independent and fundamental aretaic (as opposed to deontic) ethical 
characterizations” (Slote, 2001, p. 5), he often blurs the aretaic with the deontic (Van 
Zyl, 2011, p. 104). Van Zyl (ibid.) explains: “although Slote sometimes flirts with 
the idea of eliminating deontic notions altogether, it seems clear enough that he 
thinks of agent-based virtue ethics as an attempt to derive the deontic from the 
aretaic” (p. 106) Van Zyl claims that this attempt fails because Slote’s theory too 
closely identifies “wrongness and blameworthiness” (p. 111), and thus does not 
adequately provide an understanding of wrong action, a concept common to deontic 
ethics. For Slote, an action is wrong only if the agent’s motivation was less than 
appropriately benevolent for the situation. Van Zyl insists that this explanation does 
not adequately account for frequent cases where an agent’s actions, although purely 
motivated, may turn out to have been wrong. In such cases, if the agent cannot be 
expected to have foreseen this wrongness, he or she, Van Zyl claims, should not be 
held blameworthy. Since Slote’s theory does not differentiate such cases, Van Zyl 
expects that “those who take ‘wrong action’ to mean ‘an act that ought not to be 
done’ will find agent-based virtue ethics deeply counterintuitive” (p. 112). Referring 
to Anscombe’s (1958/1997) influential article, Modern Moral Philosophy, which 
was discussed in subsection 2.1.2.3, Van Zyl (ibid.) concludes her article suggesting 
that Slote’s theory would work better as an “eliminativist virtue ethics” (p. 112), 
where no attempt is made to describe moral actions in deontic terms. This 
recommendation seems sensible since it was this distinction between the aretaic and 




Ransome (2010) and Van Zyl’s (2011) criticisms of Slote’s agent-based ethics, 
affirm the interpretive course taken in this thesis. Ransome (2010), noting the 
limitations of Slote’s monist, one-virtue theory, suggests that Swanton’s “robust 
virtue ethics,” which recognises the complex profiles of each virtue, provides 
perhaps a better “overarching theory” (pp. 57-58). Van Zyl (2011), recognising the 
difficulty of speaking of virtue in deontic terms, suggests an eliminativist virtue 
ethics, more along the lines of the ethical naturalism described by Anscombe 
(1958/1997). While Slote’s agent-based virtue ethics may help to illuminate 
participants’ empathetic actions within this research, it would appear that the 
interpretive lenses I have chosen – ethical naturalism, augmented by Swanton’s 
pluralist account of virtue – provide a more defensible explanation of their moral 
conduct throughout the expedition.  
 
Before closing this section, a comment on the two forms of moral practice discussed 
– the physical and the care-based – seems warranted. While this thesis has focused, 
in the light of participants responses, on a “morality grounded in relationship” 
(Mitten, 1999, p. 255), this need not imply that more physical aspects of character 
development are unimportant. The OAE literature appears to recognise both aspects 
of human development. Neill and Dias (2001), for example, tested the growth of 
psychological resilience in young adults participating in a 22-day OAE programme. 
Their findings suggest that resilience is best cultivated under the “double-edge” of 
“challenge” and “social support” (ibid., p. 35, 41). Similarly, in their OAE meta-
analysis already mentioned, Hattie et al. (1997) noted that “challenge” and “support” 
were two central determinants of positive outcomes (p. 77). Consistent with these 
studies, this research’s findings affirm both challenge and care in the context of 
character formation. As participants’ responses attest, the expedition provided ample 
opportunity for both physical and relational moral practice. From an Aristotelian 
perspective, the ability of an expedition to address such a wide range of virtuous 
action – from physical endurance to social graciousness – confirms its value as a 




Having described the participants’ noted opportunities to exercise ethical reflection 
and practice on the expedition, I now turn to the last of Aristotle’s conditions for 
virtue, the moral effects of a shared life with others.  
8.3 The Moral Contributions of Others on the Expedition 
Participants saw the development of community as morally significant for the 
development of character. Such community development appears consistent with the 
aims of other expedition programmes. As Breunig et al. (2007) note, “the 
development of positive interpersonal relationships and group experiences that lead 
to enhanced sense of community,” are a “primary purpose of many wilderness trip 
programs” (p. 258).  
8.3.1 The Moral Contribution of Community 
Participants noted the moral role of community in two principal ways. They 
identified the group experience, afforded by the expedition, as relevant to their moral 
growth. Subsequently, they also identified the community formed through such 
group experience as instrumental to enabling them to see with greater moral clarity.  
 
By way of introduction to these themes, the connection between communal living 
and moral self-awareness has already been introduced in subsection 7.1.2.1’s 
reference to Benedictine stabilitas. However, this monastic vow to remain with one’s 
community is of little moral use unless the monk also pledges a vow of obedience: 
for, “obedience is the action we take when we exercise ... stability” (Tomaine, 2005, 
p. 61). Derived from the Latin root obaudire, to hear or listen, obedience (obedienta) 
requires both listening and responding (Derkse, 2003, p. 27; Okholm, 2007, p. 60). 
The monk “listens” for the sake of his own development, moral or otherwise. Such 
listening may come through others’ unsolicited constructive critique, or the monk 
may directly consult others’ advice (Derkse, 2003, p. 28; Okholm, 2007, p. 57). Once 
the monk has received such admonitions and exhortations, obedienta requires him to 
respond in love and implement the suggested changes to the best of his ability 
(Tomaine, 2005, p. 63). Such moral discovery and change, attested to in the 
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following themes, suggest that participants practised a sort of obedience within their 
expeditionary community. This interpretation seems consistent with Tomaine’s 
(2005) conviction that “obedience needs to be part of any healthy, caring relationship 
or community where we strive to be honest and open ... with one another” (p. 63). 
That is, “relational virtues such as obedience and humility can only be learned in 
community” (Okholm, 2007, p. 60).  
8.3.1.1 Community: Morality Within the Group Experience 
The educational significance of group experience is strongly reinforced within the 
OAE literature (e.g. Allison, 1998; Loynes, 1999, pp. 106-107). It has even been 
suggested that “group influence” is of more educational significance than either the 
“outdoor” or “adventure” aspects of OAE (Barrett & Greenaway, 1995, p. 19; see 
also p. 16).  
 
One reason for the moral and educational value of group or residential learning is the 
opportunity to observe others. Iris said that “in dealing with other people” one sees 
“different aspects of their character.” Once observed, one can then compare these 
aspects to his or her own values. She continued by saying that if “there is a conflict” 
between the values, questions will then be raised. Using the example of how one 
ought to treat another, she said she might ask, “Why do I not appreciate the way this 
person is treating me? Or, … why would I do this differently?” Thomas also saw the 
observation of others as key to his moral learning on the expedition. He said, “I 
could see that certain people have … more character than others.” He observed these 
moral differences through seeing what people choose to “talk about, or think about, 
or just how they viewed people, or how their attitude … [was] on the trail.” Iris and 
Thomas’ assertion that they learned through observing others is a finding 
corroborated by Sibthorp’s (2003) research on transferable skills. He studied 18 
individuals from 14 different three-week long OAE programmes, and found that one 
notable way in which participants learned, was by watching others perform a variety 
of life skills, such as how they resolve conflict, and extend tolerance for others (ibid., 
pp. 150, 151). Kennedy (1992) also recognises the moral significance of seeing the 
good in others on an expedition: “the most powerful means of developing moral 
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standards is observing them amongst others” (p. 36). The next few paragraphs 
provide a number of moral examples that the participants observed in one another.  
 
Thomas found several of the female expedition members to be morally inspirational. 
Naming Iris and Esther, he noted that their example came not through telling him, 
“Oh, you should be this way, but … by the way they” acted. They were “solid” and 
“steadfast,” people of good character. Thomas remarked that it was as though “They 
almost don’t even have to watch what they say…. It just … flows naturally. Good 
stuff [just] comes out.” Thomas seems to be observing Iris and Esther’s hard won 
virtue of controlled moral speech. From an Aristotelian perspective, such virtue only 
appears effortless because they have so thoroughly cultivated the disposition that 
“nothing pleasant against reason” presents itself (VII 9§6).  
 
Duncan found a moral example in Thomas’ authenticity. Duncan remembered how 
“Thomas’ openness really ... helped me.” Duncan noted that “very early into the 
trip,” Thomas presented himself in an honest fashion, admitting in front of the group 
that there were aspects of himself that he was working hard to improve. Duncan said 
such openness and transparency “Helped me … get over ... the ... social barrier of 
shyness.” When Duncan saw that Thomas had “nothing to hide” from the group, he 
thought: “I shouldn’t have anything to hide from these people” either. Thomas’ 
honest and authentic nature inspired Duncan to remove his own masks.  
 
Olivia claimed to have taken courage from Gwen’s ability to overcome both her fear 
of heights and her paralysing fear of failure:  
I learned a lot from Gwen about facing my fears. Gwen talked a lot about being 
extremely afraid of heights, and she rappelled off a really really high rock face, and 
she did the ropes course today without hardly any problems.  
Olivia concluded by saying that Gwen has “inspired me to look at my fears and face 
them head on.”  
 
Not all character lessons came from positive examples however. “There were some 
things that I saw that I didn’t really think were that great,” Gwen said. Gwen 
remembered observing some leadership traits that she didn’t respect in her fellow 
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students and thinking to herself: “When it is my turn to be leader of the day, I’m 
going to make sure I don’t do that.” Gwen’s reflective efforts recall Aristotle’s 
theoretical and practical nous, discussed in 2.3.5.2. Whether it was learning from an 
incident in which someone “reacted to things” someone else did (theoretical nous see 
VI 8§9), or through refining her own leadership skills by applying “comments I 
heard other people make,” (practical nous see VI 11§3) she was always concerned to 
“remember to work on that when it’s my turn to be leader of the day.” 
 
Moral learning within the group also occurred through experiencing the 
consequences of one’s own actions. Thomas, for instance, saw more clearly how his 
actions (such as coarse joking) negatively affected others. Potter (1997) has noticed 
something similar on expeditions, claiming that “the conduct of group members can 
have a profound and often immediate effect on others’ emotions and well-being” (p. 
256). Johnson and Fredrickson (2000, p. 46) contrast this tendency of an expedition 
to register the impact (positive or negative) of one’s actions with modern society, 
where one can quickly retreat to a private space, and avoid confronting the hurtful 
effects of his or her actions. In this way, the expedition community more 
immediately makes each participant responsible for the consequences of his or her 
behaviour (Skillen, 1997, p. 385). By bringing awareness to the consequences of 
such actions, one may be able to act with greater sensitivity in similar future 
instances (Allison, 1998, pp. 36-37).  
 
Interestingly, Duncan attributed the increased moral awareness of participants to the 
“length of the trip.” Duncan explained that the expedition had to be “a long enough 
time where you get comfortable with people…. People put up fronts at the beginning 
of social situations, because they want to be accepted.” He continued that it takes 
time for such fronts to drop, but that once they do, “you really see … what 
everyone’s about … , good and bad. So I think that you see [their] character through 
that.” He added that if the expedition had been any shorter, “you’d miss things about 
people.” Other studies have also recognised the importance of programme duration. 
For instance, in their meta-analysis of OAE research, Hattie et al. (1997, pp. 69-70) 
found that course length was a key variable affecting outcomes: courses longer than 
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20 days were found to have better outcomes (see also Gassner & Russell, 2008, p. 
136).  
 
Saul noted a further implication of longer trips. He said, “I think ... a lot of the group 
time, like cooking, really helped character.” Living and working with each other, he 
continued, “allows you to see them a lot better, a lot clearer. It helps you see their 
character ... and helps you reflect on what you need to” work on. He added, “If 
everyone in a group, especially when you get to know them, is really a shining 
example of character, then it will drive you harder,” to become better. Gwen, 
similarly noted that the extensive time together had developed an intimacy within the 
group. She said, “just watching the group support each other … almost moved me to 
tears a couple of times.” She continued, “I can’t believe how giving this group of [– 
what was not long ago –] complete strangers is being to each other.” Mitten (1999, p. 
255) has also recognised the “safe” and “supportive” expedition atmosphere that can 
be created through participants’ care. Furthermore, Campbell, Liebowitz, Mednick, 
and Rugen (1998, p. 3) have noticed that expeditions tend to foster compassion 
through the mutual care of its members. 
 
What such participants and scholars appear to be describing is the formation of 
community on the expedition. Andrews (1999, pp. 37-38), drawing on the work of 
Turner (1969/1995) mentioned in the introduction to Chapter 7, suggests that the 
liminal state of an expedition is ideal for the development of community, or 
communitas as Turner calls it (1969/1995, p. 112). Since the liminal state tends to 
erode rank, class and “social hierarchies of power and prestige” (ibid., p. 109), 
comradeship and egalitarianism tend to form (ibid., p. 95). Like the participants of 
this research, Andrews similarly found that this liminal communitas was “a central 
characteristic of the expedition expressed over and over again by participants” 
(Andrews, 1999, p. 38). The development of such community is significant to the 
moral interests of this research. For once this sense of community had formed, as the 
next theme reveals, more deliberate moral work, amongst participants, began.  
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8.3.1.2 Community: A Path to Moral Self-Perception 
The formation of community amongst participants appears to have resulted in a deep 
trust between them. Once this trust was established, and participants became 
confident in one another’s commitment, they more freely began to exhort and 
admonish one another. For example, Saul reflected on several interactions with Iris, 
remembering that “she was able to challenge me on a couple of things about [my] 
character.” She had kindly and respectfully suggested that Saul should not be “so 
pushy” or “complain as much” as he did. He noted that Iris had also spoken to 
Thomas about the “language and words” he used around others. Saul thought that 
“all of us” approached each other with moral concerns at one time or another during 
the expedition. He further noted that the timing of such confrontation was critical. He 
explained, “I don’t think it would have been as well accepted, and received, and 
applied,” if “it had occurred in the first couple of days.” However, by the end of the 
expedition, he thought that if he were to “tell anyone in the group, just something 
about them that” might make “them better,” he believed that “they would really try 
to actually improve … and apply it.”  
 
Similarly, Iris spoke of the constructive admonishment she received from the 
expedition members during the ACES. She said: “I really saw how incredibly 
important it is for other people to speak truth into your life.” In a comment, 
suggestive of IX 9§5 in the Ethics, she explained that others “can be so much more 
honest with you than you can sometimes … [be] with yourself.” During Iris’ ACES, 
many group members identified her unwillingness to open up and be vulnerable to 
the group. Reflecting on this she said: “I knew prior to this trip that that’s something 
I struggled with,” but …. what really struck me was [that] more than one person” 
noticed it. Iris claimed to have then thought to herself: “OK, there is a theme [here].” 
She added, “I felt like I could trust … [their] assessment … , because they had lived 
with me.”  
 
As Gwen noted in the previous theme, the participants’ openness to give and receive 
critique, appears to have come through the level of care they provided one another. 
These care-based admonitions may recall Noddings’ (2005) “confirmation” 
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technique, which is used to “spot a better self [in others] and encourage its 
development” (p. 25). She cautions (ibid.), however, that “we can do this only if we 
know the other well enough to see what he or she is trying to become” (p. 25). Such 
“confirmation” appears to have happened on this expedition, and provides testimony 
to the depth of trust and care experienced amongst participants. This level of 
relational intimacy on an expedition is not unique to this research, for Quay, 
Dickinson, and Nettleton (2000, pp. 9-10) have also suggested that OAE 
programmes are fitting loci for the development of Noddings’ “confirmation.”  
 
Beyond admonishments, such “confirmations” took the more positive form of 
affirmations. William, for example, said that the affirmations he received in his 
ACES “helped me see that I was going in the … right” moral direction. Similarly, 
Gwen stated that the affirmations she received during her ACES confirmed “the 
things that I thought I had changed in my character.” She smiled, saying that “to hear 
other people say some of those things, [was] like, ‘OK, so it’s not just me,’ … other 
people have noticed the change too.” Although Iris, like William and Gwen, also 
mentioned the value of moral affirmations, she did so for a different reason. She 
admitted that when “looking at myself, I see so much … [that is] wrong.” That others 
could look at her and not just see “the ugly stuff,” gave her a moral “boost.” 
 
However, such challenge and encouragement towards moral growth came not only 
through receiving admonitions and affirmations, but in giving them as well. William, 
for instance, noted that when he gave ACES to others, the affirmations of the good 
he saw in others, became exhortations to live that good himself. More broadly, 
beyond his own giving of ACES, William recognised the moral wisdom in all the 
affirmation that were given: “All the good things that were said about people are the 
things that you… want to emulate.”  
 
While this theme attests to the many confirmations (Noddings, 2005, p. 25) that took 
place on the expedition, such confirmations could be said to have been unsolicited by 
each participant. In contrast, comments made by Esther demonstrate that one may 
also solicit such confirmations directly from one’s community. She described how 
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she told other people about the values by which she was trying to live. By sharing 
such values with others, particularly her moral goal of being a loving person, she was 
essentially asking “them to let me know if my actions aren’t … going along with my 
goal.”  
 
Interpreted from an Aristotelian perspective, participants naturally found that those 
within one’s community play a significant role in bringing moral self-awareness. The 
moral “confirmations,” exemplified throughout this theme, are necessary for moral 
growth because as Aristotle suggests, “we are able to observe our neighbors more 
than ourselves, and to observe their actions more than our own” (IV, 9§5).  
 
In closing, Greenaway (1990) might refer to this theme of community as “the other 
side of adventure,” acknowledging OAE programmes’ less emphasised capacity for 
“developing greater awareness of self and others, making relationships, learning to 
co-operate, learning to express feelings, and the development of many attitudes and 
skills other than ‘adventurous-looking’ ones” (p. 60). These elements of community, 
so prevalent throughout participants’ responses, have great moral import. For as 
MacIntyre (1984) notes, loss of community (p. 263) was a significant reason for the 
rise in emotivism, the belief that “all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of 
preference” (pp. 10-11). Drawing on the Aristotelian concept of virtue, MacIntyre 
claims that communities provide a moral narrative that identifies what is right, good 
and virtuous (ibid., p. 212). Interpreted, from MacIntyre’s perspective, the 
community developed on this expedition may have reinforced or refined participants’ 
conception of what is right, good and virtuous. Such learning may have relevance 
beyond the expedition, for Mitten (1999, p. 254) suggests that the group experience 
can “serve as a model” for conduct upon participants’ return home.  
 
If Aristotle, MacIntyre, and the participants are correct in placing such emphasis on 
the moral significance of community, this may be why Kennedy (1992), who is also 
interested in moral formation on expeditions, suggests that a successful expedition is 




This section identified two themes from participants’ responses regarding others’ 
impact on their character. The group experience created a moral transparency 
through which to observe the actions of others, and confront the consequences of 
one’s own behaviour. The development of community cultivated an atmosphere of 
trust in which receiving, giving, and hearing affirmations and admonitions were 
found to have a profound effect on one’s moral awareness.  
 
Having now examined participants’ responses regarding the opportunity for 
exercising Aristotle’s conditions for virtue on the expedition, I now turn to some 
implications of their responses.  
Implications 
Many implications may be drawn from participants’ engagement with Aristotle’s 
“conditions” while on the expedition. Although participants have already noted 
several implications specific to reflection (see section 8.1.4), a few more comments 
may be appropriate.  
 
As participants suggested, a more modest expedition itinerary would have afforded 
further space for moral reflection, and thus perhaps come closer to supporting La 
Vida’s core goal of character development. As noted, Loynes (2002, pp. 113-114) is 
similarly concerned by the hectic pace of many OAE programmes, noting that they 
are dominated by activity, and often move through the backcountry like an express 
locomotive (1984, p. 17). Referring to Ringer (1999), Loynes (2002) further 
complains that such programmes unreflectively repeat the same activities, course 
after course, in “algorithmic” fashion (p. 113), and elsewhere likens such pedagogy 
to Adventure in a Bun (Loynes 1999). In order to counteract and remedy concerns 
raised by Loynes and the participants, expedition planners might more deliberately 
attempt to create “balance” with regard to pace, terrain, and activities, so as to better 
support moral growth. 
 
Yet again the time-tested insights of (Western) monastic communities, which 
emphasise “a balance between body, mind, and soul” (Okholm, 2007, p. 101) have 
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relevance to expeditionary education. As Benedictine abbot Jamison’s (see 2006, pp. 
25-29) comments on virtue in the previous chapter affirmed, it is such communities, 
perhaps more than any others, that have tried to construct their daily lives to 
encourage moral growth. In order to facilitate such growth, St. Benedict (480 – 547 
CE) created a “Rule” (Trans., 1998), a term derived from the Greek word canon, 
which meant “trellis” (Tomaine, 2005, p. 5). A “trellis” is an apt analogy, for the rule 
provides (it is still in common use today) a diurnal structure intended to bring about, 
in virtue ethical fashion, a “favourable environment in which the balanced life may 
flourish” (De Waal, 1984/2001, p. 86). Due to its broad eudaimonistic purpose, 
others, beyond the monastery, have found this Rule to have great moral significance. 
One such significance, relevant to present concerns, is the “Benedictine idea of 
balance” (De Waal, 1984/2001, p. 92). On the one hand, Benedict realised, again 
with Aristotelian resonance (see X 8§6-9), that we are ultimately “communal 
creatures” (McQuiston, 1996, p. 3) and that “life in its fullness” can only be attained 
through community (Steindl-Rast, 1998, p. 23). It was the challenges and rewards of 
community, Benedict believed, that most efficiently created agapic love “in all our 
relationships” (Tomaine, 2005, p. 5). On the other hand, seeking moderation and 
harmony (De Waal, 1984/2001, pp. 85-86, 90), Benedict similarly recognised that 
time alone, in study, meditation, and reflection, were equally necessary for such 
moral growth. Benedict’s Rule therefore strikes a balance between what Bonhoeffer 
(Tran., 1954) called, “the day with others,” and “the day alone” (pp. 40, 76). 
Throughout the Rule one finds a rhythm between the personal and the communal, the 
active and the contemplative (De Waal, 1984/2001, p. 95). The result of such balance 
is a life that is “totally filled, but … never busy” (Derkse, 2003, p. 71). Monks refer 
to this state as Otium Sanctum, a holy leisure: “an ability to be at peace through the 
activities of the day, an ability to rest and take time to enjoy beauty, an ability to 
pace ourselves” (Foster, 1998, p. 27). 
 
Such balance may promote moral reflection on expeditions. For example, while 
subsection 8.2.2 noted that expeditions can provide a helpful context to practise 
caring, certain expeditionary elements, such as reflection in solitude, might also 
engender caring. Although seemingly paradoxical, spiritual masters have long-
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associated the reflective time spent in solitude with an increased capacity to love. For 
example, Thomas Merton (1958/1993), a Trappist monk, says that the further he 
advanced into solitude, the more clearly he could see “the goodness in all things” (p. 
138). Elsewhere, in a chapter called, “Solitude is not Separation,” Merton 
(1961/2007) claims that solitude provides the “capacity to love – … a radical ability 
to care for all beings” (p. 53). Similarly Nouwen (1981), a priest/psychologist, says, 
“compassion is the fruit of solitude” (p. 24). He later asserts that “solitude molds 
self-righteous people into gentle, caring, forgiving persons” (ibid., p. 27). I am 
suggesting that the diurnal rhythms of an expedition, where communal life is 
balanced with episodes of solitude, create an ideal locus for moral formation. The 
frequent retreats into solitude, in part, provide the participants with “the capacity to 
care for others” (Owen-Towle, 2005 p. 236), while their life in community gives 
opportunity to practise this care. This cycle – community, solitude, community, 
solitude, etc – may facilitate the development of phron!sis in so far as participants, 
while in solitude, often reflect on their practice within the expedition community, 
and return from solitude with greater moral judgment and an increased capacity to 
care.  
 
In sum, just as monastic communities deliberately structure times for “work, silence, 
study, friendship, [and] leisure” (De Waal, 1984/2001, p. 94), all in order to create a 
balanced life that facilitates moral growth, so too expedition leaders interested in the 
formation of character might benefit from such deliberate planning of their course 
schedules. 
 
This implication of balance is also related to Aristotle’s second condition for the 
development of virtue: practice. Although participants overwhelmingly described the 
expedition’s relevance to their character as arising primarily through its social 
aspects, they were without question also influenced by the physical dimensions of 
expeditionary experience. However, such impact appears to have come from just two 
noteworthy days of the two-week experience. Nearly all their physically-based 
character development references were to the long day of bushwhacking and the day 
spent on “rocks and ropes.” This suggests that for participants, the moral lessons 
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gleaned (e.g. plus est en vous) from the more physically demanding aspects of an 
expedition, were achieved over a very brief period, thus questioning the common 
belief within OAE that physical demands, to be of moral benefit, must be prolonged. 
While such sustained physical activity may further encourage dispositions (hexis) 
such as endurance and perseverance, too much physical activity may grind down 
participants, exhausting them so that little energy (and time) is left for reflection, a 
requisite for ethical development. Thus, the participants’ responses appear to suggest 
that an optimal context for character development would pair a modest amount of 
physical challenge with a greater emphasis on the social and relational aspects of 
expeditionary life.  
 
The major implication of participants’ responses to others’ impact on their character, 
Aristotle’s third condition for virtue, involves the development of community. While 
participants seem to have considered nearly all aspects of the expedition to be 
morally relevant to their character, their predominant emphasis was on moral lessons 
learned once community was established. Vanier (1989), a virtue ethicist, poignantly 
describes how community creates moral self-awareness:  
Community is the place where our limitations, our fears and our egoism are 
revealed to us. We discover our poverty and our weaknesses, our inability to get on 
with some people, our mental and emotional blocks, our affective or sexual 
disturbances, our seemingly insatiable desires, our frustrations and jealousies, our 
hatred and our wish to destroy. While we are alone, we could believe we loved 
everyone. Now that we are with others, living with them all the time, we realize 
how incapable we are of loving, how much we deny to others, how closed in on 
ourselves we are. (p. 26) 
However, while – or perhaps because – community reveals moral qualities, it also 
creates opportunities to care for one another. Much like the participants of this study, 
Vanier (1992) believes that community is ultimately about “caring for people” (p. 
35). For Vanier (compare Swanton, 2003, pp. 99-127), such care is principally 
expressed through agapic love:  
In community we are called to love people just as they are with their wounds and 
their gifts, not as we would want them to be. Community means giving them space, 
helping them to grow. It means also receiving from them so that we too can grow. It 
is … confirming but also challenging each other. (1992, p. 35)  
Implicit in these two quotations are many of the participants’ moral insights 
mentioned throughout section 8.3. The morally refining capacity of community, to 
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which Vanier and participants attest, suggests that OAE programmes interested in 
character development, would do well to consider how best to facilitate community 
throughout an expedition. It would appear that La Vida has already gone some way 
towards this. Several times during the expedition (e.g. Fieldnotes, August 18th), the 
co-instructor and I reflected on the inefficiency of many of La Vida’s protocols and 
procedures (e.g. cooking together as a whole group, rather than in smaller units of 
three and four). Curious about this, I asked the co-instructor, who had worked for La 
Vida for many years, if he knew of any reasoning behind these practices. Without 
pause, he answered that they were in place to maximise social interaction and to 
develop community. Participants appear to have morally benefited from La Vida’s 
attempt to create a “holy inefficiency” (Yancy, 1996, p. 80) through community on 
the expedition that privileged relationship and thereby served to promote mutual 
care.  
 
Regarding participants’ actual character development, for theoretical limitations 
already explained (see subsection 4.2.2), I am unable to determine the actual level of 
improvement of each participants’ character. However, from an Aristotelian 
perspective, it may be said that a significant amount of moral reflection, practice, and 
social interaction appeared to take place on this expedition. Hence, as participants 
themselves seem to confirm in the next chapter, it may be methodologically safer to 
speak of the expedition’s contribution to their character rather than to claim character 
change or development as such.  
 
This chapter has examined participants’ responses to questions concerning 
opportunities to exercise Aristotle’s conditions for virtue – reflection, practice, and 
the shared life – while on the expedition. The next chapter will explore their 






Perceived Influences of the Expedition on Character 
This chapter examines participants’ responses to the interview question: Do you 
think this expedition has had any impact on your character? Their responses are 
taken from the second interview. Using the categories described in Figure 4.1, this 
question is expedition dependant, but not virtue ethically specific.  
 
The question generated four main themes. The first theme, Prospective Character 
Development: New Ways of Seeing, could be considered the overarching 
philosophical and empirical finding of this research as it frames and delimits the 
other themes of this chapter and the rest of the thesis. The second theme examines 
the uniqueness of each person’s moral journey and the moral relevance of the 
expedition to each participant’s moral narrative. The third discusses the social and 
physical ways in which participants believed their character to have been shaped by 
the expedition. The fourth and final theme explores the participants’ claim that 
contribution rather than change would better describe the character growth they 
experienced on the expedition.  
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9.1 Prospective Character Development: New Ways of Seeing  
Whether their character was impacted, refined, contributed to, or changed, the 
themes of this chapter attest to participants’ awareness of their own moral growth on 
the expedition. At times, participants appeared reticent in claiming that their 
character was developed per se. Many of them noted that they had yet fully to 
understand and implement within their lives, the learning that had occurred on the 
expedition. Although they were aware that the expedition had morally provided 
“New Ways of Seeing,” just how these new ways of seeing would influence their 
moral lives was “Yet to be Determined.”  
9.1.1 New Ways of Seeing Morally  
When asked if the expedition had influenced her character, Samantha said, “Ya, I 
think it changed the way look at things. Therefore, it changed me and my character.” 
Iris thought that the expedition encouraged self-examination: “I think it has required 
... looking at my own character and my own strengths and weaknesses.” Gwen said 
that this expedition redefined how she looked at herself. Soon after the expedition 
began, she realised she would “need to do some major revamping here on just my 
entire outlook.” Duncan said: “We definitely did a lot in the 11-12 days that … 
revealed a lot about each other.” He added that now, because of the expedition: “You 
definitely have things to look at [within yourself] because of what we did.”  
 
Participants’ references to new ways of seeing themselves are consistent with Prouty 
et al.’s (2007) belief that OAE programmes have “potential to make participants 
view themselves differently” (pp. 28-29). Iris, in her paper, suggested the moral 
significance of these new ways of seeing oneself. For her, the greater self-awareness 
that accompanied these new ways of seeing oneself could initiate either the breaking 
of bad moral habits or the formation of good ones.  
 
Participants identified two specific ways in which these new self-perceptions, gained 
on the expedition, were relevant to character. Consistent with their expectations in 
subsection 7.3, participants saw their successes on the expedition as serving as 
reference points for future challenges. Comparably, they claimed that the self-
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confidence gained through the successful expedition yielded firmer commitment to 
moral values.  
9.1.1.1 Future Reference Point: Plus Est en Vous 
Samantha noted that “The way I see challenges” has changed. She continued, “I feel 
like I accomplished so much on this trip, and I can do anything now, almost.” She 
explained that in the past, she remembered how she used to find challenges so 
daunting. Now, however, when she faces future challenges, she can take inspiration 
from the success she had on the expedition.  
 
In like manner, Gwen said that she will use her ability to emotionally and physically 
cope with the challenges of La Vida as future reference points. When she faces 
future challenges, she’ll look back on the successes of the expedition and say to 
herself: “You know what, I did it then [on Lavida], I can get through this situation 
[now], because I know that ... I’ve done it before and I can do it again.”  
 
Saul used words like “refined,” “sharpened” and “strengthened” to describe the 
expedition’s influence on his character. As an example of such refinement and 
sharpening within his character, he noted how the expedition required “the 
determination to finish something, … like on the ropes course today. You’re … up 
there and … to … get to the end, …. just … takes a lot of will [power].” He believed 
that the cultivation of such character traits would “translate … into something else in 
[his] life.” He continued, saying that such determination will help in difficult future 
challenges like taking “Mandarin in college.” He clarified what he meant by saying, 
“I think Mandarin’s going to be … tough, but I think … I can translate [and utilise] 
what I’ve done here [on the expedition] to Mandarin when I get to it [next 
semester].”  
 
What the participants appear to be describing is a “transfer of learning” from the 
context of the expedition, to their lives back home. Belief in this transfer has been a 
fundamental conviction of much OAE (Brown, 2010). For example, Priest and Gass 
(2005, pp. 185-186; see also Gass, 1985/2008) refer to a “metaphoric transfer” of 
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learning in which similarities between differing environments allow one to relate 
truths discovered in one context to another. Thus, metaphoric transfer may provide 
an explanation for the participants’ anticipation of the expedition’s relevance to 
future challenges. However, the concept of transfer, as discussed in the implications 
section of Chapter 7, has been recently critiqued by Brown (2010). It may, therefore, 
be helpful to offer a deeper and more philosophical account of the participants’ 
perspectives by employing a virtue ethical understanding of boul!sis (wish or desire), 
bouleusis (deliberation) and prohairesis (moral conclusions). Such an account would 
recognise that the participants’ “new ways of seeing” appear to have changed the 
their values and self-perception. Saul, for example, seems to have a renewed respect 
and commitment to the value of “determination,” and Samantha and Gwen now feel 
capable of “almost anything.” The relevance of such changes to character is subtle, 
but significant, and relates to the deliberative process discussed in subsection 2.3.5. 
Any changes in values and self-perception may affect one’s deliberative process, 
which ultimately ends in a moral conclusion (prohairesis) or action. Saul’s revived 
commitment to the value of determination, then, may now influence his deliberations 
on future moral matters, and possibly alter the moral conclusions he comes to. 
Similarly, since Samantha and Gwen now understand themselves to be capable of far 
more than they had previously conceived, their future deliberations, regarding what 
they are morally accountable for or responsible to, may now be different.  
 
This interpretation leads back to an unanswered question raised in subsection 5.2.1: 
“What kind of moral change must occur for an individual reasonably to claim that a 
‘development’ has taken place in his or her character?” Answering this question is 
difficult because virtue ethical character development, as Chapter 2 indicated, is a 
long and complicated process. The process begins with changes similar to those 
found in participant responses within this current theme: changes within the 
deliberative process. However, as noted in subsection 2.3.6.2, virtue, for Aristotle, 
requires more than deliberating to appropriate moral conclusions; for if actions are to 
be virtuous, they must come from established dispositions (hexei) and be conducted 
with appropriate motivation (see subsection 2.3.3.3). In one sense, the entire process 
is character development. With increasing ability, one learns: to desire what is noble 
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(boul!sis), to perceive with increasing accuracy, to deliberate (bouleusis) well (with 
the help of theoretical and practical nous), to decide on the appropriate moral 
conclusions (prohairesis) – all under the orchestration of phron!sis – and then to 
follow phron!sis’ prescription(s) by so consistently striking the mean that 
dispositions are formed with regard to this or that virtue. Yet, in another sense, any 
development in the course of this process could be considered a development, 
however minute, of one’s character.  
 
Thus, “character development,” may be conceived in two ways. First, as just 
mentioned, character development could be any growth in the long process (from 
boul!sis to hexis) towards virtue’s formation. Second, using Aristotle’s qualifiers 
(see X 8§1 and X 7§1), character development, in a secondary and more complete 
sense, can be understood as established virtue since, for Aristotle, character is the 
sum of virtue (or vice) over a lifetime (1 10§11). To describe character development 
in the first sense, I will use the term “qualified.” Qualified character development 
includes any moral change, no matter how small (or large), up to and short of the full 
attainment of virtuous dispositions. To describe character development in the second 
sense, I will use the term “complete.” Complete character development is the full 
cultivation of a disposition (hexis) for a given virtue. Understood in the complete 
sense, character development, on OAE expeditions, as noted in the implications 
section of Chapter 7, is modestly confined to those specific aspects of a virtue’s 
profile that were exercised on the expedition and the degree to which the expedition 
fostered such dispositions as required for Aristotelian virtue. However, understood in 
the qualified sense, as the participants of this research attest, an expedition can 
facilitate noteworthy change. To substantiate this claim, I look to Brookes (2003b) 
whose ardent criticism of character and its development on OAE programmes “does 
not rule out the possibility that OAE may offer particularly effective ways to develop 
certain skills or knowledge, or to change beliefs” (p. 53). Although Brookes, and the 
social psychological literature on which he draws, may recognise OAE’s potential to 
develop knowledge and change beliefs, he would not accept that such developments 
are in any way relevant to character, since he rejects a trait-based understanding of 
character in its entirety (see subsection 1.3.4.2). However, Aristotle’s sophisticated 
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exposition of character development – as seen in his account of the deliberative 
process – does consider changes to one’s knowledge and belief to be of moral 
significance.  
 
While certainly not satisfying the situationist perspective that Brookes (2003b, 
2003c) and more recently Brown and Fraser (2009) employ, this qualifed 
understanding of character development does appear to take seriously many of their 
concerns. For a virtue ethical account of character recognises the context dependant 
nature of learning, the contribution of others and the environment to such learning, 
and the problems this situated-learning presents for transfer (see Brown’s discussion 
of these matters in Brown, 2010; Brown & Fraser, 2009).  
 
In closing, the use of expeditionary successes as future reference points brings 
additional (see discussion in 7.3) meaning to Hahn’s phrase: plus est en vous. For as 
the analysis of this theme reveals, participants’ new ways of seeing their values and 
themselves – their discovery that plus est en vous – may well affect future actions. 
Moving to the next theme, one result of the participants finding plus est en vous, was 
an increase in their self-confidence.  
9.1.1.2 Confidence and Character 
Due to her achievements on the expedition, Samantha said that in the future: 
“something that I wouldn’t try before, I’ll try now.” This comment alludes to an 
increase in self-confidence, an increase claimed more explicitly by Olivia. She said, 
“the challenge [of the expedition] was more difficult than anything I have 
experienced before.” By meeting such challenges, she added: “I feel so much more 
strength in myself, and much more confidence in myself.” She continued, as “I look 
back on myself before the expedition, … I know that I had confidence in who I am, 
but it’s a much more pure and refined confidence [now].” She concluded by saying: 
“So my character, it seems, has really taken a new shape.” 
 
Although Claire correspondingly thought that the expedition increased her self-
confidence, she more directly connected such increase to character. She claimed that 
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confidence “is part of your character.” She explained, “The more confident you are, 
the more of your character you can portray ... to other people.” Comments by Esther, 
who also claimed an increase in self-confidence, make this association clearer. She 
said that  
I think increased self-confidence will do something to your character. It could be 
good or bad, ... hopefully it’s good. If you have increased self-confidence, that 
probably means that you are going to be more apt to stick to your values, and be 
willing to stand up for them, whether or not other people agree with you. 
Increasing participants’ self-confidence through OAE has been a longstanding goal 
within the broader field of Outdoor Education. The 1975 Dartington conference 
report on Outdoor Education, which has, in hindsight, had tremendous influence on 
the field’s development, identified the following as a core aim of Outdoor Education: 
to “heighten awareness of and foster respect for” oneself (p. 1). Within this report, 
“self-confidence” (ibid. p. 2) is one of the anticipated outcomes of such heightened 
awareness. Other influential publications, such as Mortlock’s Adventure Alternative 
(1984, pp. 18-19) and Hopkins and Putnam’s Personal Growth through Adventure 
(1993, pp. 9-10) have similarly affirmed OAE’s capacity to increase self-confidence. 
More recently, empirical research into the effects of a 20-day OAE course for 
women offenders reported that most participants claimed an increased in their self-
confidence (Leberman, 2007, pp. 120-121, 126). 
 
However, I was unable to find any OAE literature that overtly connected increased 
levels of self-confidence with character development. Considering this association 
more carefully, I think that Esther’s explanation is sound: an increase in one’s self-
confidence makes one “more apt to stick to” one’s values. Such moral confidence 
may, as Esther suggests, provide the courage to act on one’s convictions, even if it 
means suffering the ridicule of others. Similarly, it may develop a confidence in 
one’s deliberative capacity (bouleusis) or moral conclusions (prohairesis), and lead 
an agent to act on his or her convictions. Thus, like the reference points in the 
previous theme, if character development is conceived in a qualified sense, an 





Participants’ appear to have recognised that their “new ways of seeing” had yet to 
develop fully within their character. For when asked what impact, if any, the 
expedition had had on their character, many replied in words similar to Samantha’s: 
“I don’t know yet.”  
9.1.2 Yet To Be Determined 
Samantha’s multifaceted answer to the question of how the expedition impacted her 
character, introduces the last theme of this section. Only time will tell the 
significance of the learning that occurred on the expedition. Speaking of what she 
had learned on the expedition, Samantha said, “There are some things that I know I 
can apply … [in my] everyday life.” However, she also acknowledged the choice 
that lay before her: “There is a question as to whether I will [apply what I have 
learned].... I want to. I ... hope to. I think I probably will .... use my experiences out 
in the wild to make me a stronger person.” Beyond what she knew she could apply, 
Samantha anticipated discovering other things that she had learned on the expedition, 
for which she had not yet realised the significance. This anticipation for continual 
discovery seems consistent with Gassner and Russell’s (2008) claim that “time may 
be needed for the importance of an experience to be realized by participants” (p. 
150). Their study, introduced in subsection 8.1.1.3, further claims that “individuals 
themselves are capable of making meaning out of their experience as time goes on, 
without the assistance of ongoing facilitation” (ibid., p. 150).  
 
In a slightly different way, Duncan remarked that the expedition had revealed many 
areas within his character that needed growth. With this need now known, Duncan 
seemed to feel the weight of the choices he must make. He said, “you either accept or 
make changes for the better, or you could make changes for the worse.” Noting that 
characterological changes were “happening” as a result of the expedition, Duncan 
likened the situation to “the snowball effect: I’ve started to build the snowball and 
now I just need to … send it down the mountain to get it larger.” He continued to say 
that the moral lessons learned are now “there, and the ball is in my court to either 




Early in the second interview, Gwen confessed to a life-long struggle of 
perfectionism. Anytime she fell short of her high expectations, she considered her 
efforts a complete failure. She claimed that her experience on the La Vida expedition 
had allowed her the “freedom to fail,” and this new insight had given her victory 
over this destructive pattern in her life. However, she later delimited this statement, 
more modestly saying, “I think … in the situation [or context] of La Vida … it’s 
[now] licked.” She then suggested that when this struggle with failure “comes up 
again in other situations,” it will “be a matter of … comparing it to what I did in La 
Vida,” and extending this insight to such situations.  
 
Such thoughtful comments appear implicitly to recognise the distinction between 
character development in its qualified and complete senses. This distinction can be 
seen with particular clarity in Duncan’s image of the “snowball effect.” Although at 
a simpler level, it is as though participants recognise that moral knowledge is not 
enough: that before this understanding can become part of their character, it must be 
practised and developed into a disposition (hexis). Similarly, Gwen’s comment about 
needing to extend her learning to different situations and contexts might be 
understood as more broadly establishing the profile (Swanton, 2003, p. 22) of the 
virtue of perseverance in her life.  
 
Samantha, Duncan, and Gwen appear to be recognising the need for a sustained 
moral effort within their lives. In what is becoming a theme in its own right, the third 
Benedictine vow, conversatio morum, which translated means a turning around of 
one’s habitual moral character, is a commitment to this very effort. It is a permanent 
daily commitment to moral growth (Derkse, 2003, p. 12, 26), where through “modest 
discipline” (ibid., p. 27), the monk exacts “microlevel” (ibid., p. 26) change, and in 
making “a habit of these small improvements” (ibid., p. 26), gradually transforms his 
character (ibid., p. 57; see also p. 39).  
 
While participant responses in this subsection are tremendously insightful, they do 
raise a concern that is related to conversatio morum. For whether the moral learning 
gleaned through the expedition is sustained is largely dependant on post-expedition 
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decisions and actions. Unfortunately, as subsection 1.3.1 indicated, OAE 
programmes have tended to offer very little post-expedition support. Without such 
support – support that participants experienced through the stability of the expedition 
– conversatio morum is difficult to maintain, and any moral growth experienced on 
the expedition may soon begin to fade (Okholm, 2007, p. 97).  
 
Since the ultimate effects of the expedition on the participants’ character will only be 
determined by subsequent activity, one might wonder why I did not continue data 
collection after the expedition. As subsection 4.2.2.2 explained, isolating an 
expedition’s contribution to a participant’s character, in any “completed” sense, is 
epistemologically problematic. To again name only one problem, how could a 
researcher access, with adequate detail, the intra-subjective experience of a 
participant and determine to what extent the expedition alone had affected his or her 
phron!sis, the orchestrator of all the virtues, and thus the sine qua non of character 
and its development? While a researcher might be able to provide instances where 
participants exercise or even appear to have developed with regard to phron!sis or 
the preconditions of virtue, as I have done, isolating in what particular ways the 
(mere) two-week expedition, and it alone, wrought lasting changes is simply beyond 
the scope of possible investigation. The complexity of phron!sis, as Dunne (1993) 
was shown to suggest in subsection 3.6.3, cannot be empirically accessed. 
Attempting to identify lasting effects of the expedition on participants’ character, in 
any completed sense, further runs the risk of attributing direct causality to OAE 
programmes, when a variety of variables, including the unique narrative each 
participant brings with them (discussed next), may also be at play (see Nichols, 2000, 
pp. 23-24). Such complications, in addition to time constraints, deterred me from 
collecting post-expedition data. To conclude this section, expeditionary character 
development in the qualified sense appears to be the appropriate “degree of 
exactness” for the ethical “subject matter” (I 3§1) examined in this thesis.  
9.2 The Uniqueness of Character Development 
Barrett and Greenaway (1995, p. 11), referring to an Outward Bound marketing 
article (Williams, 1977), state that every student will take something different from a 
 
 330 
course, and that each student should be treated as an individual. Similarly, Johnson 
and Fredrickson (2000), also interested in the development of virtue on expeditions, 
recognise the individuality of each participant’s moral narrative: “beyond those 
virtues necessary for a successful backcountry trip, the particular virtues practised is 
a choice left to the student” (p. 46). Polkinghorne (1988) helps to explain such 
individual choice through the concept of narrative knowing: “Narrative is a scheme 
by means of which human beings give meaning to their experience of temporality 
and personal actions .... It provides a framework for understanding the past events of 
one’s life and for planning future actions” (ibid., p. 11). This study also found 
individual differences in the way participants’ moral narratives shaped their 
experience of the expedition. 
 
Claire provided a helpful introduction to this theme when speaking of character 
development she said, “It’s really personal…. You can’t just say … [the same 
thing’s] going to happen to all these people.” She continued, character development 
depends “very much [on] where a person is in their life, and in their character 
growth.” 
 
Iris said something similar, noticing that character development did happen on the 
expedition, but “on different levels for different people.” Iris further felt that whether 
or not a person’s character was affected by the expedition would largely be 
determined by “what they choose to get out of it.” These choices can be seen in the 
following accounts of the expedition’s moral relevance to each member’s character 
growth. 
 
For Saul, it was difficult to describe just what had happened to his character. He 
described character development as “one of those sort of nebulous things that you 
can’t really touch, but you know you’ve grown in.” He did think that his character 
was influenced, but couldn’t identify exactly where: “There were just tons of little 
things that are really hard to put your finger on, but that I know I’ve gotten a lot 
better at, a lot stronger in.” These changes were subtle, however, because he didn’t 




As mentioned, the moral relevance of the expedition for Gwen, centred on her life-
long struggle with the issue of failure. In her first interview, she admitted that she 
had “big issues with taking failure a bit too seriously.” Whenever she experienced 
failure, she was very hard on herself. She recalled how, on the first day of the 
expedition, “[I] was the one in back of the whole line,” and because of this she said, 
“[I] was absolutely tearing myself apart.” However, at the end of that first day, 
although last in line and exhausted, she had made it, she had survived. Realising that 
while she might not have been able to hike as well as she would have liked, she did 
not fail. This allowed her to say, yes, “I was in the back, but I did it!” Whereas she 
had, in the past, considered anything short of her expectations a complete failure, 
success on the expedition had given her a better perspective on what failure actually 
means. Now, she maintained, when she does not meet some expectation, she may 
view such supposed “failure” as merely “a chance to re-evaluate and try something 
new.” Referring to a reading in the student journal, she now claimed to feel a 
“freedom to fail” (Peterson, 1988, pp. 95-106). Peterson writes: “those who are free 
to fail are the most free. Fear of failure inhibits freedom; the freedom to fail 
encourages it” (ibid., p. 96). Although later in the interview she modified her 
remarks (as mentioned in subsection 9.1.2), the moral significance of this new 
freedom was that Gwen no longer expected to be paralysed by her fear of failure. 
Understood virtue ethically, Gwen might be thought to have made some progress 
with regard to the virtue of courage. While this progress, as noted in subsection 
9.1.2, pertained largely to physical challenges on the expedition, now, upon her 
return home, Gwen seemingly hoped to continue expanding the profile of this virtue 
within her life, so as to be “free to fail” more broadly. 
 
For Olivia, who considered herself to be rather “high maintenance,” the rigours of 
expeditionary travel prevented her from caring for her external self “the way that you 
normally do as far as cleanliness goes.” She reflected that there was “no make-up to 
put on, no paint to cover things up.” Without these facades, she said, one is forced to 
discover “the core of who you are.” As a result, she said, “I feel like I understand 
what it’s like to be more true to who I am.” Part of this self-discovery for Olivia was 
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realising that “I have always run away from challenge. I’ve always been extremely 
stressed … [by] challenge.” Now, however, after meeting with success on the 
expedition (e.g. surviving the solo experience she feared so much), she said, “I feel 
excited about challenge…. I want it, I crave it!”  
 
For Thomas, the expedition more deeply revealed the importance of service, which 
for him resulted in “a shift into … a more humble character.” 
 
While on the expedition, Iris, a competent varsity athlete, encountered, in a rock 
climb, the hardest physical challenge of her life. Due to her physical competence, she 
rarely encountered physical challenge, so in meeting the trial of the climb, she 
“almost quit.” She explained, “Part of me would rather quit than try something I 
can’t do,” and know for sure “that I couldn’t do it.” She described herself as feeling a 
physical “helplessness” for the first time in her life. She said, “there was nothing I 
could do, I was just stuck.” She continued: “I’ve never experienced a feeling like that 
before,” whereby “physically, there is nothing I can do.” Reflectively she said: “now 
I see what it is to” reach “my limit.” The moral significance of this event was that 
Iris claimed to have found greater compassion for others’ physical limitations, and a 
humbler spirit within herself.  
 
The expedition’s moral relevance for William largely revolved around his deep-
seated social anxieties. He said: “just having to be around people was a little 
challenging for me, but I tried to make the best of it.” Related to such anxiety was a 
struggle with claustrophobia in the crowded tent. William saw such struggles as 
morally relevant to character for two reasons. First, in overcoming and coping with 
such anxieties on the expedition, he exercised courage. Second, in revealing his 
social anxieties to the other expedition members, he had to “trust” that their care and 
interest in him was genuine, that they would not ridicule or reject him. The 
relationship of trust to virtue ethical considerations is not immediately obvious. Since 
Aristotle’s account privileges self-sufficiency, as seen in the great-souled man (IV 
3), he would probably not have considered dependent trust on others to be morally 
virtuous. However, as Hursthouse notes (2001, p. 8), neo-Aristotelians need not 
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confine themselves to Aristotle’s list of virtues. Thus, as our understanding of 
friendship, so dear to Aristotle, has evolved to value the interdependence of friends, 
so trust may be considered an indispensible element within genuine friendship. As 
Irwin (1999, p. xxiii) notes, character friendship requires making decisions with 
other’s eudaimonia in mind. Thus, part of such friendship is, presumably, trusting 
our friend to make his or her decisions, in part, with our eudaimonia in mind (see 
discussion in 2.4.3.1). 
 
Esther, referring again to her desire to love unconditionally, said that her moral 
journey on the expedition was about: “realising how judgemental I can be towards 
people sometimes.” She said that she had been dealing with this judgemental 
tendency over the “last year, but really just needed to see it again in such close 
quarters where” she was “with the same people for so long.” She said she recognised 
her judgementalism: “early on in the trip; so most of the time I was really working on 
… not acting that way.” Since I had not witnessed this judgemental spirit in Esther, I 
probed further. She said her judgemental tone “is definitely internal.” She continued, 
“I’ll have trouble when people make comments, or just [do] stuff that I don’t really 
… approve of.” She admitted that in such situations, she would often think: “Oh, 
they’re a hypocrite!” However, she quickly added that judging other people in this 
way created hypocrisy of her own.  
 
That participants each found the expedition to be morally relevant in unique and 
differing ways is consistent with a comment made by Olivia in a journal entry on 
August 20th: “La Vida finds a way of dealing with all of us where we need it. Some 
can’t stand the life together, others the life alone.” This individuality of participant 
experiences is also consistent with other studies within the OAE literature. Beames 
(2004b; see also Beames, 2004a, p. 145), for example, similarly conducted 
qualitative research on an expedition, and found that “there cannot be one 
measurement of what a person gains from such an experience. Each participant has 
their own personal expedition experience” (p. 80). While such individuality certainly 
appears to be the rule, as Johnston and Fredrickson (2000) noted above, a “successful 
backcountry trip” (p. 46) may also require virtues that are common to all expedition 
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members. Many of these virtues were alluded to in the next theme, to be examined 
now.  
9.3 Physical and Social Influences on Character 
Consistent with their expectations, expressed in subsection 7.1.2, participants 
believed that their character was influenced by both the physical and social 
dimensions of the expedition.  
9.3.1 The Physical Influence of the Expedition on Character 
As mentioned in Chapter 7, Olivia hoped that the expedition would build her ability 
to suffer hardship. As it turned out, she said of the expedition: “I think it is the 
hardest thing I’ve ever done in my entire life.” She went on, “I think … I [now] have 
a larger tolerance for … hard work.” She saw this newfound tolerance for hardship 
as “something that will really serve me well in the future.”  
 
William, citing examples of the bushwhack and hiking up a trail, also noted that the 
expedition’s many trials built perseverance, and therefore contributed to his character 
development. He explained that physical challenge “helps you persevere and … 
builds up mental endurance.” He said, the most demanding point in the expedition, 
requiring the most perseverance, was on the long bushwhack, when “I got really 
frustrated, … because I had no idea … when we were going to stop, [or] how long 
we were going to keep on going.”  
 
For Saul, the expedition required “determination and endurance.” His distinction 
between the two is reminiscent of Aristotle’s differentiation between intellectual and 
moral virtue (see I 13§19 and subsections 2.3.3, and 2.3.4,). Saul said, 
“Determination is … the mental part of endurance. Your body … has to have 
endurance too, but determination is what drives [it].” For Saul, one such activity 
requiring determination and endurance was the ropes course. He acknowledged, “I 
… got freaked out when I was up there.” He remembered that while waiting to cross 
one of the elements, high off the ground, “my knees starting … shaking.” Through 
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this fearful experience, Saul realised that “you’re not necessarily as strong as [you 
think] you might be.” This observation was most likely a reference to his rather 
cavalier assumption made in the first interview regarding his own fearlessness – that 
although the other participants “are nervous about the ropes course, … for me it is 
not as frightening.”  
 
Esther said that “The really tough hikes … definitely got to me.” She explained that 
these hikes required “pushing myself, challenging myself, [and] it was really hard to 
keep going.” However, such perseverance paid off, for she claimed, “I found a new 
determination in myself.” She believed that this newfound determination would 
“carry over” to her life beyond the expedition. Since she now realised, “I can go 
farther than I” ever thought possible, she now recognised, “sometimes I just put too 
many limits on myself, and there’s no need to do that when you can always go a step 
further.” 
 
If Olivia now suffers hardship more easily, and William has greater perseverance, 
and Saul and Esther are more determined, what does this mean for their character? In 
many respects, observations in the implications section of Chapter 7, and above in 
subsection 9.1.1, have already answered this question. The answer again depends 
upon how one is using the term “character development.” If someone is inquiring to 
what degree the expedition established virtuous dispositions (hexei) that could be 
exercised beyond the expedition, then he or she is inquiring if character was 
developed in the complete sense. For epistemological reasons already indicated, I am 
unable to determine if such complete development occurred. While a virtue ethical 
understanding of complete character development makes even modest change within 
any two-week period doubtful, supposing that it did occur, it would necessarily be 
delimited by the fields, profiles, and fine inner states of the virtues employed on the 
expedition (Swanton, 2003, pp. 20-26). If, however, by this term, someone is more 
broadly inquiring into any possible contribution to virtue, or character development 




A seemingly contradictory response by Thomas serves as a transition to the next 
theme. At one point in the interview, Thomas identified the “the most extreme parts 
of the most extreme events” – “the toughest part of the bushwhack” and the 
“hungriest” part of the solo – as having the most impact on his character. Elsewhere, 
however, he claimed that the social aspects of the expedition had had more impact on 
his character than the physical ones. Perhaps any apparent conflict here arises from 
his recognition that both the physical and social elements of the expedition made a 
significant impact on his character?  
9.3.2 The Social Influence of the Expedition on Character 
When asked in what way (if any) their character was impacted by the expedition, 
most group members, interestingly, associated growth in character with an increase 
in social skills.  
 
Thomas claimed that it was the social and communal aspects of the expedition that 
had predominantly affected his character. He felt that perseverance was a trait that he 
already possessed, particularly with regard to physical challenge. He said that 
although there were “tons of physical challenges, … I’ve always been the kind of 
person who rises to challenges” of a physical nature. Thomas said it was “absolutely, 
definitely” the social and communal challenges of the expedition, “more … than the 
physical” ones that had shaped his character. 
 
Olivia recollected that “independence has always been really important to me.” 
However, now, at the end of the expedition, she said, “I realise that dependency is an 
important factor as well.” The difficulties of expeditionary travel had revealed to 
Olivia the interdependence of the expedition members: “I need them, and they need 
me.” She added that: “I’m realising there is a balance between fellowship and being 
independent.” Through coming to see her dependence on others, Olivia said that her 
sensitivity to “the well-being of others” had really developed while on the 
expedition. During the course, she had tried “really hard to be aware of other 
people’s needs.” As Olivia described her deepening desire to care for others, I 
detected no self-regarding motive; she appeared to care for care’s sake, not in order 
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to be cared for. As similarly noted in the previous chapter with regard to Esther, 
Olivia’s heightened sensitivity to the well-being (eudaimonia) of others could be 
construed as a development of what Swanton (2003, p. 99) calls the basic mode of 
moral responsiveness common to all the virtues, namely universal love (agapé).  
 
Duncan thought that his character was impacted through the social interaction 
required by the expedition. “I’m kind of shy and a home body, so that whole” social 
“side of me was definitely” developed. I suggested that this might be social skill 
development and he agreed. Claire also said that the expedition “helped me be more 
open to people, … because a lot of times I’m kind of shy.” William, too, felt that his 
character was strengthened in so far as he was “becoming more … comfortable” 
socially. The development of the participants’ social skills is consistent with the 
findings of many other OAE studies. Hattie et al. (1997), in their meta-analysis, 
found that “across all interpersonal dimensions, there are marked increases as a 
consequence of the adventure programs. This is particularly noted with social 
competence, cooperation, and interpersonal communication” (p. 69). If, using 
Swanton’s language (2003, pp. 21-23), one grants that many of the modes of moral 
response, within the profiles of each virtue, necessitate social communication of 
some sort, then an increase in social skills seems pertinent to one’s character and 
moral growth.  
 
Samantha said that through the expedition, “we’ve [all] … become stronger friends.” 
She thought this process had taught her a great deal about friendship: “now, I think I 
would be able to make friends better, or [at least now] … I know what to expect from 
other people.” She further provided a reason for such learning: “We all have different 
personalities and characters and … dealing with them and living in such [tight] 
quarters is… making us all grow.” Saul, too, claimed to have learned a lot about 
“friendship.” He clarified that he meant “true friendship, not [just] … knowing 
someone on the surface,” but really coming to know a person and placing a deep 
“trust” in him or her. Due to the expedition, Olivia also seemed to recognise that true 
“companionship” required mutual trusting. She explained, “it takes good character, 
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… a certain quality, to be willing to have companionship with others.” Saul and 
Olivia both appear to be speaking of friendships based on character (IX 1§3).  
 
Without being cynical, one might ask how deep and lasting such two-week old 
friendships could possibly be. A comment by Redford (2004) on friendship may be 
relevant here: “like many bonds formed in intimate situations against the backdrop of 
either fear, war, or sporting contest, seldom do they last” (p. ix). Similarly, writing of 
friendship and war, Hedges (2003), referring to Gray (1959), claims that friendship is 
often confused with comradeship, which develops through “shared danger, a 
common goal, and close proximity” (p. 119) – all elements of expedition. However, 
Gray further (1959) notes that an essential difference between the two is that a 
friendship brings “a heightened awareness of the self” (pp. 89-90) – exactly what 
appears to have happened to participants on the expedition. As suggested in 
subsection 8.1.1.3, a possible reason for such intimacy of relationship may be the 
liminal status of the expedition. For the participants appear to have gained, through 
the expedition, a much deeper understanding of character friendship, an 
understanding I claimed that they were unaware of in the implications section of 
Chapter 7. The moral significance of this finding is that participants learned more 
about what character friendship entails. While the friendships formed on expedition 
may be of an ephemeral nature, participants’ increased understanding of friendship 
may nevertheless be applied to their future more permanent relationships.  
 
The future application of lessons learned while on the expedition introduces the last 
section within this chapter. Although many participants spoke of significant physical 
and social impact on their character, most were more comfortable speaking of the 
expedition’s contribution to, rather than the transformation of, their character.  
9.4 Contribution to Rather Than Transformation of Character 
While William acknowledged that the La Vida expedition was “up there with one of 
the most challenging things I’ve had to do,” he also said, “I’ve had some very 
challenging times in my life” before the expedition as well. He felt that these pre-
expedition challenges had already influenced his character development and now 
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allowed him to “stay positive, and keep up mental endurance.” Thus, although 
meaningful and morally significant, La Vida was “just another” challenge in his life 
that contributed to his character.  
 
Referring to his character, Saul thought the expedition had “probably strengthened it, 
helped it form a little more.” He clarified, however, that “I don’t think core beliefs, 
or anything like that has changed.” It was more the “strength of the character” that he 
thought had changed. Speaking of his character, he said, “I think it would probably 
do better under a rigourous test of character now than it would have before” the 
expedition. He thought that “‘refined’ would be a really good word” to describe what 
had happened to his character on the expedition. He expanded by saying that: “The 
main thing is that it got sharpened; I don’t think it really changed necessarily, but I 
think it got refined a lot.” 
 
Thomas seemed reluctant to speak of any formal transformation within his character, 
referring instead to his previously established traits: “I’ve always been … pretty 
determined…. If I set a goal, I’ll do it.” He acknowledged that the expedition 
consolidated these already present dispositions. With regard to his desire to be less 
selfish and provide acts of service for others, he seemed similarly hesitant to claim 
change. While he did not think that the expedition had made “an instant change” 
within his character, he acknowledged that it  
got the ball rolling for me to really be thinking a lot more outside [of] my … own 
self, my own … needs, and my own wants. This was a catalyst for me to becom[e] 
… much more of a selfless person. 
Although Esther also thought her character to have been impacted by the expedition, 
she said: “I wouldn’t really say that it was [a] completely life changing” experience. 
She did, however, say, “I … [more deeply] realised some things about myself that I 
already knew.” The expedition apparently reminded her of such things, things she 
said, “I … needed to solidify … in my character.” She acknowledged that although 
this solidification process “is … going to take time …. , I feel that this trip definitely 




This final theme of the thesis brings a closure to this research. For, unbeknownst to 
the participants, they have affirmed an Aristotelian perspective on character growth, 
in the qualified sense of the term. Character is not built over a two-week period, but 
is rather constructed over many years (I 7§16), as an agent fills out the dispositional 
profiles of a variety of virtues (II 5).  
 
Concluding the analysis section of this thesis, Claire seems to have spoken for others 
when she wrote in her paper that she hoped to build on what she had learned on La 
Vida, and to continue the moral growth she experienced on the expedition.  
 
This chapter yielded four main themes. As a result of the expedition, participants 
discovered new ways of seeing their moral lives. The individuality of their moral 
narratives was then examined. Physical and social instances of the expedition’s 
impact on the participants’ character were next highlighted. Finally, it was observed 
that the expedition contributed to rather than changed participants’ character.  
 
Before concluding the thesis, I explore some implications of the current chapter.  
Implications 
Participants’ “new ways of seeing” suggest several implications. One such 
implication has to do with outcomes. Gordon et al. (1999) note that a vast amount of 
research is preoccupied with final outcomes, or “post course score” (p. 18). 
However, they suggest that this emphasis is misplaced, claiming that: “change tends 
to be in small increments and in a diversity of skills and behaviours” (p. 18). 
Referring to a 1995 conference presentation by Giges, Gordon et al. (1999) further 
claim that such change need not be limited to observable participant actions or 
behaviour. For change can also occur in one’s “awareness, expectations, … values, 
goals, viewpoints, attitudes, opinions, judgements, intentions, choices, decisions, 
beliefs, directions, and commitment”(p. 15). These comments, by implication, sum 
up the findings of this thesis. So many of the outcomes in the above quotations can 
be seen throughout the participants’ responses. A related implication has to do with 
the time required for such change. While character development, in the complete 
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sense, is a lifetime effort (I 7§16), it does appear that nearly all of changes suggested 
by Gordon et al. (1999, p. 15) could occur within a brief, two-week period. This then 
adds further credibility to the claim that through the expedition, participants’ 
character was developed in a qualified sense.  
 
However, it is this qualified sense that leads to the next implication. For “qualified,” 
as I am using this term, implies: in process; still developing; not yet finished. Since 
the change experienced on the expedition was still in a nascent state, how might 
participants have been encouraged to persevere in their growth beyond the 
programme? As subsection 1.3.1 noted, in words attributed to Outward Bound, OAE 
expeditions “can ignite - that is all - it is for others to keep the flame alive” (Hahn, 
1965b, p. 9). It is unfortunate, as mentioned above, that OAE has traditionally 
offered so little post-expedition support. Generalising beyond this thesis, if 
participants’ character development is to mature from a more qualified to a complete 
sense, OAE programmes will need to partner with educators in the participants’ 
home contexts, “to keep the flame alive.”  
 
The next implication relates to a comment made by Olivia. She said, “La Vida finds 
a way of dealing with all of us where we need it.” This power of expeditionary 
education to accommodate individual participant narratives is perhaps one of its 
greatest strengths. However, in light of such individuality, instructors must be alert to 
the moral needs of each participant. Recognising such responsibility and influence, 
in a book exclusively focused on the instructor’s role in expeditionary education, 
Kalisch (1979) states that “although other elements contribute to the total learning 
situation at Outward Bound, it is the instructor-to-student and instructor-to-group 
interaction which is central to the positive growth experience” (p. 3). He later 
concludes that “the instructors’ interventions significantly shape the nature of the 
educational experience” (ibid., p. 140). Iris’s difficult rock climb is an example of an 
opportunity to “shape” a participant’s experience. While other expedition members 
had been finding moral growth through the physical rigour of the journey, Iris, one of 
the fitter participants, had been feeling far less challenged. Thus, the co-instructor 
and I deliberately chose a rock climbing route that we believed to be far beyond her 
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ability. This decision proved successful. As Iris’ comments attest, her struggle on 
“Chimney” was the toughest physical challenge of her life. She had never felt so 
“helpless” or aware of her own physical limits. What is more, through this 
experience, she claimed to have gained humility and a newfound compassion for 
others’ physical struggles.  
 
Iris’s conviction that her character had been developed through this rock climbing 
experience, leads to the next implication of this chapter. In 1.4.4.2, I noted a tension 
within the OAE literature. On the one hand, several studies have found the effects of 
OAE programmes to be lasting (e.g. Lan, Sveen & Davidson, 2004, p. 37; Takano, 
2010, p. 91), while, on the other, similar studies have indicated these effects to be 
ephemeral (e.g. Durgin & McEwen, 1991). I believe that the virtue ethical account of 
character, put forth in this thesis, may account for this seeming contradiction. When 
character development is understood in a qualified sense, participants’ modest claims 
to change appear reasonable, for certainly some change has occurred. However, the 
qualified nature of such change implies that it has yet to take root fully within their 
lives. It seems intuitive that with some participants, the nascent change experienced 
on an expedition will continue to develop into character in a complete sense, while, 
for others, such change will ultimately make no lasting impression. This 
interpretation may help to explain the varying results found within the OAE 
literature. That is, it may explain why so many participants claim to have been 
changed by their OAE experience, and why some studies discover such change to be 
lasting, while others affirm that it is only short-lived. This virtue ethical 
interpretation further makes sense of the common finding that longer expeditions 
typically produce more lasting results (e.g. Gassner & Russell, 2008, pp. 137-138, 
141; Hattie et al., 1997, p. 63) – a finding consistent with Aristotle’s dispositional 
understanding of character.  
  
One last implication for the chapter remains. Throughout this thesis I have avoided 
claiming that the participants’ character was developed as a result of the La Vida 
expedition. For reasons given in subsection 4.2.2.2, the nature of the subject, ethics, 
precludes any definitive conclusions. However, I do think I can claim, “roughly and 
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in outline” (I 3§4), that participants’ character was developed, in the qualified sense. 
Although others may find this limited conclusion disapointing, I certainly do not 
view it this way. For a two-week expedition to have cultivated the depth of 
reflection, the quality of practice, and the value of relationship – Aristotle’s 
conditions for virtue – within the participants, is no small achievement. As Iris put it: 
“if someone … realises or … changes even one thing about themselves, then … [La 






The structure of this final chapter has been inspired by Silverman’s (2010) ideal of a 
thesis’ conclusion (pp. 352-360). He suggests that it should strike a balance between 
“confessing to your errors and proclaiming your achievements” (ibid., p. 353). In 
order to achieve such balance, he recommends that the conclusion should serve three 
principal functions. A conclusion must clearly: admit to the limitations of the 
research (ibid., p. 354); communicate the main implications of the research (ibid., p. 
356; and connect the findings to broader issues within the given discipline (ibid. p. 
353). In addition to these three purposes, again following Silverman’s (2010) 
recommendation for an “imaginative” and “stimulating” conclusion (p. 356), I close 
the thesis by way of an analogy between expeditions and monastic communities. The 
similarities between the two – namely their potential to address moral matters and 
encourage the growth of virtue within their members – have been noted throughout 
the analysis chapters, and thus it seems fitting to end this research suggesting that 
expeditions can be likened to “travelling monasteries.”  
10.1 Limitations of the Research 
The limitations of this research may be conceived in two broad categories: my own 
mistakes and errors; and the in-built limitations of the research design itself.  
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10.1.1 My Mistakes and Errors 
In hindsight, a number of my decisions may have weakened the impact of this thesis. 
One such decision was my choice of an exegetical approach to virtue ethics. The 
space required to articulate the whole of Aristotle’s argument, as found in the Ethics, 
could perhaps have been better used by specifically focusing the literature review on 
the concept of character in contemporary virtue ethical scholarship. Several concerns 
motivated the present exegetical approach. Although virtue ethics is often referred to 
as “character-ethics,” the concept of character lays buried beneath Aristotle’s 
complex arguments and requires significant interpretation to distil. Correspondingly, 
I hoped that the exegesis would provide a justification or defence of an Aristotelian 
understanding of character. I feared that without a detailed rationale, many might fail 
to see the validity and significance of a virtue ethical account of character for OAE 
programmes. While there may be grounds for such concerns, making an exegetical 
account of Aristotelian character appropriate, perhaps this account would have been 
better placed in a journal rather than a thesis. Since time restraints prevented me 
from reading further, it is difficult to predict how the research might have been 
different had I examined more contemporary virtue ethical scholarship on character. 
Examining such literature, and its relationship to OAE, is a way in which this 
research might be developed and extended in the future.  
 
Other mistakes I may have made pertain to the empirical part of the thesis. For 
example, I am convinced that had I piloted my methods and analysis more, the 
resultant quality of the interviews and observations would have been much higher. 
Although I piloted the methods (see subsection 4.3.2), I performed only a 
preliminary analysis – enough to make sure that I understood the process and its 
associated technology. Had I conducted a more rigorous analysis of the pilot study, I 
might have discovered, as I did in the analysis of the La Vida expedition, that I 
needed to be more creative in my prompting, more penetrating with my questions 
and more detailed in my observations. When re-listening to the interviews, I was 
occasionally puzzled as to why I did not clarify this or that meaning or more 




Another weakness lay in my poor communication with the Gordon College 
participants and faculty following the expedition. Although I faithfully answered all 
the correspondence I received, I do wish I had been more thoughtful in keeping 
participants and faculty abreast of the thesis’ developments and findings. Given the 
efforts of the Gordon community on my behalf, this omission now seems rather 
careless and ill-mannered. I consider this the one major breach in the rigorous ethic I 
attempted to uphold as a researcher (see subsection 4.3.4). I have since apologised 
for this lapse and re-established good relations with both the participants and faculty. 
 
One further circumstance that I fear may have negatively affected the thesis was my 
failure to avail myself sufficiently of my supervisors’ expertise. Wolcott (2009, p. 
23) breaks writers down into two principal types: “freewriters” and “bleeders.” I, 
unfortunately, am the latter. Bleeders are “methodological” (ibid., p. 23) writers who 
struggle to move on when a problem remains unsolved, or a piece of writing does not 
read as smoothly as he or she might wish. This tendency (ibid., p. 23), I believe, cost 
me much valuable input from my supervisors. For, respecting my autonomy, they 
placed the onus of consultation largely on me. Had I chosen to consult them more 
often, this thesis might well have been a better work.  
 
The limitations of this research are not confined to such errors of judgement, 
however. More broadly, the research design itself imposed a variety of limitations 
that affected its scope and potential for generalisability.  
10.1.2 Limitations Within the Research Design 
While I have tried to be honest concerning the limitations of this thesis (see sections 
2.6 and 4.2), a “broad disclaimer, in which” I “acknowledge the limitations” of my 
study may, as Wolcott (2009, p. 34) suggests, be appropriate. In a sense, there are 
actually two “broad” disclaimers I need to make: one regarding the philosophical 
section of the thesis, the other for the empirical one. Beginning with the empirical 
dimension, this research took place in the Adirondack mountains of New York, in 
the summer of 2006, with 10 Freshmen from Gordon College, a liberal arts 
institution in the Christian tradition. These particulars alone make grandly 
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generalising (Stake, 1995, p. 7) a doubtful proposition. Yet, as noted in subsection 
4.6.3, the case’s status as an “Outward Bound-type wilderness expedition” (Daniel et 
al., 2006, p. 12) suggests that its many similarities with other expeditions may 
increase its generalising potential. Further, since Aristotle’s virtue ethics – the theory 
used to analyse the case study – is conceived as generally applicable to human 
nature, the findings may again be broadened beyond the particular participants in this 
research.  
 
However, it is such virtue theory that also makes the thesis vulnerable to a far greater 
limitation. Like all ethical theories, virtue ethics depends on a particular normative 
perspective. While I had to take “a view from somewhere” (see section 4.2), if one 
were to reject the normative claim taken here, then much of this thesis might be 
rejected.  
 
While such empirical and philosophical limitations are significant, perhaps the 
greatest limitation relates to the qualitative researcher himself. As a white, Canadian-
born male, with particular experiences, education, and values, my narrative has 
coloured and shaped interpretation (empirical and philosophical) throughout this 
thesis. Although I have attempted to maintain a “perspectival subjectivity” (Kvale & 
Brinkmann, 2009, p. 179; see subsection 4.2.4), the uniqueness of my interpretive 
perspective is inevitably interwoven throughout the whole of this thesis.  
 
Despite such limitations, some conclusions can be drawn from this research.  
10.2 Conclusions 
Summarising the macro-structure of this thesis, Chapter 1 noted the long-held 
assumption of character development through OAE, while also identifying a number 
of critiques questioning this assumption. A virtue ethical account of character (see 
Chapters 2 and 3) was put forth as a possible resolution to such tension (see 
subsection 1.4). For while suggesting the tenability of a qualified (see below) 
character development through OAE, Aristotle’s virtue theory is also in sympathy 
with many of the critiques. Although a (purely) philosophical thesis may also have 
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been appropriate, given OAE’s strong commitment to practice, I was concerned that 
the full significance of Aristotle’s perspective on character might be lost without its 
contextualisation on an expedition. I therefore conducted qualitative research on a 
wilderness expedition (see Chapters 4-10).  
 
Thus, this thesis has had essentially two aims: 1) to provide, for the broad field of 
OAE, a detailed account of Aristotle’s virtue-based character ethics; and 2) to 
explore participants’ moral narratives on a wilderness expedition from a virtue 
ethical perspective. This section will examine the conclusions reached with regard to 
these philosophical and empirical aims. 
10.2.1 Philosophical Conclusions With Regard to Character 
Within the (Nicomachean) Ethics, Aristotle opens his systematic treatment of virtue 
noting that such ethical investigations must “be satisfied to indicate the truth roughly 
and in outline” (I 3§4). Similarly, I begin my discussion of this research’s 
philosophical conclusions regarding character with his caveat in mind. For Aristotle, 
character is the sum of virtue and vice over a lifetime (I 7§15-16; I 10§11). While 
section 2.3 provided a detailed account of how such virtue, and therefore character, is 
attained, here I will summarise this process in brief.  
 
Aristotle understands virtue to be of two kinds (I 13§19): intellectual and moral. The 
intellectual virtues aid an agent in making moral decisions. These decisions, or moral 
conclusions (prohairesis), are then acted upon by way of the moral virtues (VI 1§1, 
3). The Ethics provides a detailed account of the “preconditions” (Irwin, 1999, p. vi) 
necessary for an agent to deliberate virtuous moral conclusions (III 1-5). First, the 
agent must want, wish for, or rationally desire (boul!sis) the appropriate (virtuous) 
ends (III 4§1). Interestingly, what one considers a worthwhile end to pursue is 
ultimately dependant on the character he or she has. Similarly, such character also 
affects one’s moral perception (the second precondition) of any given circumstance 
(II 9§8). Once an agent perceives an instance with moral saliency, the third 
precondition, deliberation (bouleusis), is employed (III 3). Deliberation attempts to 
find the “golden mean” of virtue between extremes of excess and deficiency (II 8§1). 
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Finally, with the instance now deliberated, an agent makes a rational choice or moral 
conclusion (prohairesis) regarding how virtue could best be expressed in the given 
context (III 2). For this choice to be virtuous however, it must be made with the 
appropriate motivation: for the sake of what is noble (III 6§2). This entire reflective 
process, from wish to moral conclusions, is under the auspice of the intellectual 
virtue of phron!sis or practical wisdom (II 6§15). Phron!sis governs moral 
judgment, and concerns “what is just and what is fine … for a human being” (VI 
12§1). Ultimately an ability to think well regarding one’s moral decisions, phron!sis 
can mature through experience as one develops the sensitivity to discern how best to 
bring about a flourishing life for oneself and others. Indeed, the virtues themselves 
are determined through what practically wise people (phronimai) generally deem 
relevant to well-being (eudaimonia).  
 
For Aristotle, once a moral conclusion is reached, the appropriate moral virtue(s) 
must then carry it out. For example, if an agent determines (through intellectual 
virtue) that a situation requires acting courageously, it is the agent’s moral virtue of 
courage that will allow him or her to act on the moral conclusion. However, merely 
performing the act does not make it virtuous. Aristotelian virtue requires acting with 
appropriate feelings (II 3§3) and from an established disposition (hexis) (II 4§3). For 
Aristotle, a disposition or habit, with regard to a given virtue, is slowly created over 
time as an agent becomes increasingly able to discern and act upon the golden mean, 
no matter the particularities of the circumstances. However, instead of understanding 
each virtue to have only one disposition, as Aristotle seems to suggest, this thesis has 
followed the work of Swanton (2003), who proposes that any given virtue might 
have a constellation of dispositions making up a virtue’s “profile” (ibid., p. 22; see 
discussion in subsection 2.7.1.5). 
 
As mentioned in subsection 2.3.5.5, any effort to synthesise Aristotle’s ethical theory 
runs the risk of providing a rather mechanical account. In reality, his virtue ethic 
plays out far more organically, and the attempt to describe it here should not be taken 




Having described the virtue necessary for character’s formation, it seems sensible to 
ask how such virtue might be developed? Taking my inspiration from Sherman’s 
(1991) Fabric of Character, I identified three Aristotelian means to virtue: reflection; 
practice; and the shared life. These “conditions for virtue” informed the empirical 
part of thesis, which sought to ask the participants whether they thought the 
expedition had impacted their character and, more specifically, whether they thought 
the expedition had provided opportunity: to morally reflection; to practise moral 
actions; and to share in the moral lives of others? 
10.2.2 Empirical Conclusions  
This subsection will examine the principal findings under each of Aristotle’s 
conditions for virtue. Given these findings, I will then discuss what may be said of 
the participants’ character development on the expedition.  
10.2.2.1 Moral Reflection on the Expedition 
In describing the relevance of reflection to character, participants’ perspectives 
appeared to be reminiscent of Aristotle’ understanding described in subsection 
2.3.5.2. They explained that for character to be developed, one must deliberately 
reflect on one’s moral self, and then act on the results of such thinking (see 
subsection 5.2.2). For, as they noted in subsection 6.1.2, it is through reflecting on 
one’s past thoughts, experiences, and actions that one ultimately refines his or her 
future moral behaviour. In this way, as they suggested in subsection 6.1.1, reflection 
is a means to gaining a moral perspective on one’s life.  
 
Although participants noted (see subsection 8.1.2) many opportunities for informal 
moral reflection throughout the expedition (e.g. while hiking alone or together on the 
trail; while cooking or performing other camp chores), it was through more formal 
occasions to reflect that they claimed to have been impacted. For instance, they 
identified the moral importance of written reflection through their expedition 
journals (see subsections 6.1.3 and 8.1.1.1). They noted that writing allows one “to 
think in sentences” and make connections that would often otherwise have been 
missed. Similarly, the 48-hour solo experience was considered to be an extended 
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period of moral reflection on oneself (see subsection 8.1.1.2). In addition to such 
individual reflection, participants also recognised the importance of moral reflection 
with others. For example, several group-reviewing techniques were mentioned for 
their moral contributions to participant reflection (see 8.1.1.3). In particular, 
participants highlighted the moral importance of ACES – an activity where 
participants Affirm/Appreciate, Challenge, and Exhort one another – where each 
participant was able to learn how he or she had been perceived by others throughout 
the expedition. This emphasis on the importance of others to one’s moral journey 
was a theme that resurfaced again and again throughout the analysis chapters.  
 
While the above comments describe what the participants held in common regarding 
the role of reflection in character development and their opportunity to exercise such 
reflection on the expedition, the content of their moral reflection appeared unique 
and coloured by their individual narratives (see subsection 8.1.3). The distinctive 
nature of each participant’s experience reveals a strength of expeditionary education. 
For as one participant said, describing the moral relevance of the expedition and its 
particularising affect, “La Vida finds a way of dealing with all of us where we need 
it.”  
 
As mentioned earlier in this subsection, moral reflection allows one to learn from 
past experience and, in turn, affect one’s future actions. This cyclic process implies a 
gradual refinement through trial and error, a sort of moral practice, discussed next. 
10.2.2.2 Moral Practice on the Expedition 
In Aristotelian fashion, participants noted that character development, like most 
paths to improvement, necessitates frequent practice (see subsection 6.2.1). 
However, some of their responses compared such practice to rote repetition (e.g. 
shooting baskets). This understanding is at odds with Aristotle’s criteria for virtue 
(discussed in subsection 10.2.1), which far exceed an automated habitation.  
 
In an effort to explain the relationship between practice and character, the 
participants described how character is often developed through trials and challenges 
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(see subsection 5.2.2). A virtue ethical interpretation of their insight suggests that 
one’s responses to such challenges shape one’s character. For Aristotle, “we become 
just by doing just actions and become temperate by doing temperate actions” (II 
4§1). That is, over time, an agent’s moral responses to the thousands of decisions 
that present themselves begin to develop dispositions of character with regard to a 
variety of virtues. Given this connection between challenge and character, it is 
understandable why expeditions have long been considered a means to character 
development. Participants also made this connection, anticipating that the expedition, 
because of its inherent challenges, would impact their character (see section 7.2).  
 
True to their expectations, the expedition proffered a host of challenges that 
participants deemed morally relevant. Many participants described the expedition as 
one long act of moral practice (see section 8.2). Perhaps predictably, participants 
mentioned the moral relevance of many “martial-type” virtues made famous through 
James’ (1949, pp. 311-328) Moral Equivalent of War: the endurance required on the 
bushwhack; the perseverance needed to finish a rock climb; and the courage 
demanded by the abseil (see subsection 8.2.1). Since much of the literature 
(described in Chapter 1) on character development through OAE refers to such 
individual and physical traits (e.g. one’s own development of athletic endurance), I 
had expected participants to associate the moral relevance of the expedition to them. 
While they did make this association, their emphasis on it was minimal (see 
subsections 7.1.2.1, 8.2.1, and 9.3.1). Instead, to my surprise, they emphasised the 
moral relevance of the expedition’s social nature (see subsections 7.1.2.2, 8.2.2, and 
9.3.2). I consider the participants’ tendency to understand character and its 
development in primarily social and interpersonal ways to be the most important 
empirical finding in this research. It was, in fact, their more social understanding of 
character that shifted my focus from the traditional traits associated with OAE (e.g. 
hardihood and intrepidity), to a more relational understanding of character in the vein 
of Swanton’s (2003, pp. 115-127) pluralistic virtue theory, where the motivation for 
all ethical action is grounded in agapic, universal, and unconditional love (see 




Due to their understanding character as something developed in and expressed 
through relationship, participants described their moral practice on the expedition in 
terms of their care for others (see subsection 8.2.2). By way of illustration, they 
identified nearly constant opportunities to serve one another (see subsection 8.2.2.1). 
In addition to such tangible forms of care, participants also indicated a “verbal” form 
of care through encouragement of one another (see subsection 8.2.2.2). Care was 
further displayed through many acts of graciousness (see subsection 8.2.2.3), both in 
the courteousness required for good expedition behaviour (Harvey & Simer, 1999, p. 
168), and, drawing on the theological roots of the term, in offering grace (unmerited 
favour) by way of a patient tolerance towards others’ imperfections.  
 
Consistent with their emphasis on the social nature of character development, the 
participants highly valued the role of others in one’s ethical formation. This role, 
Aristotle’s third condition for virtue, is discussed next.  
10.2.2.3 Sharing in the Moral Lives of Others on the Expedition 
Participants noted that others can have a direct influence on one’s character. They 
particularly emphasised the impactful moral role of friends and family (see 
subsection 6.3.1.1). Describing this influence, participants claimed that it is through 
relationships with others that one comes to see his or her moral self more clearly (see 
subsection 6.3.1.2). However, through observing the moral examples of others, the 
participants also recognised the indirect influence of others on one’s character (see 
subsections 5.3.3.2 and 6.3.2.1).  
 
Interestingly, in addition to the “real-life” influences of others noted above, 
participants also claimed others’ influence on their character through the arts (see 
subsections 5.3.4 and 6.3.2.2). Mentioning a variety of mediums – music, film, and 
literature – the participants’ recognised the importance of memesis to moral 
formation, an importance Aristotle refers to throughout the Ethics (e.g. III 3§18) 
 
With regard to the moral role of others on the expedition, participants attributed their 
perceived moral growth to the development of community. In subsection 8.3.1.1, 
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they spoke of learning from one another’s (positive and negative) moral examples, 
and more immediately seeing the moral consequences of their actions on others. 
Many participants noted the deep sense of trust that developed throughout the 
expedition, and believed that such trust enabled the group members to exhort and 
admonish one another (see subsection 8.3.1.2). This openness to give and receive 
critique, appears to have come through the caring community established on the 
expedition, 
 
As evidenced in their comments above, participants emphasised the role of others in 
each of the conditions for virtue: reflection, practice, and the shared life. This 
emphasis is consistent with the Ethics, where an inordinate amount of the discussion 
is given to the topic of friendship (see Books VIII and IX). Speaking of such 
friendship, Aristotle says that when two morally intentioned people spend time 
together, “they seem to become still better from their activities and their mutual 
correction” (IX 12§3; see also VIII 1§2). For, since “we are able to view” other’s 
morality “more than our own,” others, then, become a source for understanding one’s 
own morality (IX 9§5; see also IX 9§1). 
 
Having now described the ways in which participants exercised Aristotle’s 
conditions for virtue on the expedition, what can be said regarding their development 
of character on it?  
10.2.3.4 Participants’ Character and the Expedition 
Participants claimed their character to have been influenced by the expedition in a 
variety of ways. In subsection 7.1.1, they noted how the physical and social 
challenges of the expedition could reveal one’s character. Since many participants 
experienced success with regard to such challenges, they now understood themselves 
to be capable of far more than they had previously conceived. They thus believed 
that their accomplishments throughout the expedition would serve as reference points 
when future challenges were met with (see section 7.3 and subsection 9.1.1.1). 
Further, they considered their increased self-confidence, as a result of such success, 
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to be morally significant (see subsection 9.1.1.2): a self-confident person is more 
likely to uphold his or her values and convictions.  
 
Consistent with their comments on moral practice made above, participants listed a 
number of ways in which their character was physically and socially influenced by 
the expedition. Many considered themselves to have grown in endurance and the 
ability to persevere in the face of hardship (see subsections 7.1.2.2 and 9.3.1). 
Similarly, whether through the inspiration of others’ moral examples, an increased 
comfort with one’s social skills, or a heightened awareness of one’s need to care for 
others, participants referred to a variety of ways in which the more social aspects of 
their character was influenced (see subsections 7.1.2.1 and 9.3.2).  
 
Despite citing these examples, participants were reluctant to claim that their 
character had been significantly developed on the expedition. Such reservation is 
consistent with their understanding that character is refined gradually (see subsection 
5.2.1). Participants resolved the apparent tension – between their conviction that their 
character had been physically and socially influenced by the expedition and their 
hesitation to claim character development as such – within their responses claiming 
that the expedition had contributed to rather than transformed their character (see 
subsection 9.4). By claiming that the expedition had refined, strengthened, or 
brought to light certain aspects of their character, but not transformed it per se, the 
participants affirmed a virtue ethical understanding of character.  
 
From an Aristotelian perspective, character development can be conceived in both 
complete and qualified senses. In the complete sense, the entire process (from 
boul!sis to hexis) outlined in subsection 10.2.1 could be considered character 
development. That is, with regard to a given virtue, (complete) character 
development could only be claimed when one had fully inculcated the disposition(s) 
necessary for such virtue. However, when understood in its qualified sense, any 
growth in the course of this process (from wishing for appropriate ends to more fully 
inculcating a virtuous disposition) could be considered character development (see 




For reasons discussed in subsection 4.2.2.2, the nature of this subject, ethics, 
precludes any definitive conclusions with regard to participants’ character 
development on the expedition. While a virtue ethical understanding of complete 
character development makes even modest change within any two-week period 
doubtful, I do think I can claim, “roughly and in outline” (I 3§4), that given the 
participants’ responses in Chapters 5-9, their character was developed, in the 
qualified sense (see the Implications section of Chapter 9 for a more detailed 
explanation of this claim). 
 
While some may find this conclusion anticlimactic, such disappointment seems 
unwarranted. An educator would do well to find another two-week experience that 
could equal the expedition’s capacity to cultivate the depth of reflection, the quality 
of practice, and the value of relationship – Aristotle’s conditions for virtue – within 
the participants. Although modest, these findings appear to reflect human experience. 
As Gordon et al. (1999) suggest, change tends to come in small increments (p. 18), 
and research that tries to find radical change over a short period is looking for the 
exception, not the rule. For just as “one swallow does not make a spring,” nor do 
committing virtuous actions for “one day, or a short time” make a character (I 7§16). 
 
Interestingly, the participants seemed to have reached a similar conclusion. They 
claimed that many of the effects of the expedition on their character were yet to be 
determined (see subsection 9.1.2). In a sense, time will tell the ultimate moral value 
of the expedition for the participants. This insight appears to accommodate the two 
senses of character development distinguished above. On the one hand, participants 
experienced moral growth, but on the other hand, they seemed to recognise that 
before such growth could become a dispositionally (hexis) permanent part of their 
character, it first had to be practised. 
 
This interpretation may also clarify a conundrum found within the OAE literature. 
As Brookes (2003c, pp. 122-123) notes, many participants within OAE studies report 
a change in their behaviour as a result of attending an OAE programme. However, 
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Brookes (2003c, pp. 123) contends that such studies merely report participant beliefs 
about their change, and not actual change itself. Since no other field of research 
claims such lasting change within such short durations, Brookes suggests that either 
OAE has found a “‘magic key’ for changing personal [character] traits” (2003b, p. 
51) or “such claims must cast serious doubts on the research projects that generated 
them” (2003b, p. 125). While Brookes, drawing on social psychological literature, 
employs a situationist perspective and the fundamental attribution error to critique 
such claims of change (see discussion in subsection 1.3.4.2), I believe a virtue ethical 
account may offer a more satisfying explanation. Although I offer this explanation 
through an analysis of my own research, for the reasons outlined in subsection 4.6.3, 
I believe this interpretation to have generalising merit.  
 
I suggest that participants within this current research justifiably recognised changes 
within themselves. For change need not be limited to outwardly observed behaviour. 
As Gordon et al. (1999) suggest, change may also occur in one’s “awareness, 
expectations, … values, goals, viewpoints, attitudes, opinions, judgements, 
intentions, choices, decisions, beliefs, directions, and commitment” (p. 15). Indeed, it 
is to many of these inward changes that the participants refer. Furthermore, it seems 
reasonable that such (smaller degrees of) change could occur within a brief, two-
week period. Understood in this sense, such change may represent a qualified 
development in character, where qualified character development includes any moral 
change (from boul!sis to hexis), no matter how small (or large), up to and short of 
the full attainment of virtuous dispositions. However, such character development is 
further qualified by its unstable nature. Since the changes participants attest to have 
yet to establish themselves dispositionally within their character, there is a question 
as to whether such change will be lasting. A related question that may additionally 
qualify their character development comes from the situationist perspective held by 
Brookes (2003b, p. 59) and Brown (2010, p. 17): to what degree is the learning and 
change experienced on the expedition situationally bound to the expedition context? 
That is, will the learning and change experienced by the participants on the 
expedition be sustainable or even relevant without the environmental and social 
contexts in which it was formed? For as Swanton’s (2003, pp. 20-26) pluralistic 
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account of virtue suggests, any change within the participants is delimited by the 
fields, profiles, and fine inner states of the virtues employed on the expedition.  
 
Given such questions, one might wish simply to conduct further post-expedition 
research and ultimately determine to what degree the participants’ character was 
developed in the complete sense. However, such research proves both problematic 
and controversial (Brown, 2010, p. 15). For while Brown (2010, p. 17) notes that “it 
is clear that we carry skills and knowledge with us from one context to another,” 
referring to Detterman (1993), he further claims that “there have been hundreds, if 
not thousands, of experiments reaffirming that transfer is very difficult to empirically 
demonstrate” (Brown, 2010, p. 15). For this reason, and others mentioned in 
subsection 9.1.2, I did not conduct post-expedition research. The epistemological 
difficulties in isolating long-term moral change within the participants as a result of 
their expedition experience (and it alone) simply preclude knowing with any kind of 
certitude. Instead, as Aristotle suggests, one must seek “the degree of exactness” 
appropriate to the subject matter, and with regard to ethical inquiry specifically, one 
must be “satisfied to indicate the truth roughly and in outline (I 3§1-4).  
 
With the philosophical and empirical conclusions now expressed, a number of 
recommendations can be drawn from them.  
10.3 Recommendations  
From the above conclusions, I suggest three main recommendations. First, I advise 
OAE to moderate its claims of character development through its programmes. 
Second, I propose several avenues for further character-related research. Third, I 
counsel expedition leaders interested in the moral formation of their participants to 
consider conducting more “balanced” expeditions.  
10.3.1 A Moderation in Moral Claims Within OAE 
Perhaps most obviously, a virtue ethical perspective suggests that OAE moderate its 
claims to develop character through its programmes. As the thesis has contended, 
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character development is a complex process of lifetime proportion (I 7§16), and any 
moral change experienced through OAE’s typically brief programmes is likely to be 
modest. The dispositional nature of virtue ethical character development makes 
moral growth a slow and arduous process, and thus, outdoor adventure educators 
interested in the character development of their participants may need to consider a 
post-course follow-up programme. For as Hahn (1965b) realised so many years ago, 
speaking specifically of Outward Bound, OAE “experiences can ignite – that is all – 
it is for others to keep the flame alive” (p. 9). Or, as he said elsewhere, again 
speaking of Outward Bound in particular, “to put it bluntly: the … [OAE] experience 
does not go deep enough. It is the beginning of a great promise – but this promise 
will not be fulfilled unless the follow-up problem is solved. It is not solved today” 
(Hahn, 1960b, p. 10). 
10.3.2 Further Research Into Character Development Within OAE 
While this research investigated the moral narratives of participants on a wilderness 
expedition, researchers interested in moral formation within other facets of OAE, 
may wish to use a similar methodology to explore such areas.  
 
Regarding such future research, for reasons already given, I remain unconvinced 
with respect to the value of trying to determine post-course moral effects. Instead, I 
recommend that researchers focus on the participants’ moral experience of an OAE 
course. As case studies begin to accrue, best practices may emerge concerning how 
best to enhance the moral educational experience of participants.  
 
With reference to future expeditionary research, I hope to give more individual 
attention to each of Aristotle’s conditions of virtue. Trying to survey all three 
conditions in one study necessarily prevented me from probing deeply into any one 
of them. For example, drawing on the rich philosophical sources of Nodding’s care 
theory (2002, 2003, 2005) and Slote’s agent-based sentimentalist virtue ethics (1999, 
2001, 2007, 2010), both discussed in section 8.2, I would like to explore themes of 
benevolence and care within an expedition with greater depth. Similarly, drawing on 
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Vanier’s virtue ethical work (2001), I would like to explore further (see section 8.3) 
the affect of community on participants’ moral experience of an expedition. 
10.3.2 Balanced Expeditions 
In reviewing participant responses, it would seem that they morally benefited from 
differing aspects of the expedition that appear to be in tension with one another. For 
instance, whether through their journal or on the solo experience, they celebrated the 
opportunity to reflect alone, while also stressing the moral value of the group reviews 
(see subsection 8.1.1). Similarly, they recognised the social contribution of the 
expedition to their character, principally through the practice of care and the 
development of community, but also highlighted the physical (e.g. increased 
endurance) benefits they individually received as a result of the journey (see 
subsection 7.1.2, 8.2.1, 8.2.2, 8.3.1, 9.3.1 and 9.2.2).  
 
Such comments suggest that the moral value of the expedition was enhanced through 
balancing these contrasting elements. However, in order to achieve such balance, 
other aspects of the expedition require balancing too: namely, the pace at which it is 
conducted and the terrain through which it travels. For example, as participant 
responses in subsection 8.1.4 imply, a more moderate itinerary would have afforded 
greater periods for moral reflection. Further, an inverse relationship was noted 
between the opportunity for moral reflection and the difficulty of navigating the 
terrain.  
 
These considerations suggest that expedition leaders interested in the moral 
formation of their participants may then want to more deliberately create such 
balance. It would appear that Gordon College’s La Vida expeditions have attempted 
to do this. Their expeditions are conducted with community, not efficiency, in mind. 
By way of illustration, rather than dividing the group into smaller cooking units of 
two or three, La Vida views meal preparation as an opportunity to build community 
as a whole. Although less efficient, this choice encourages social interaction, 
prompts consideration of one’s obligations to the group, and creates opportunities to 
help and care for others – features which Swanton’s pluralistic account of virtue 
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theory considers to have moral import (see subsection 7.1.2.1). Another example of 
La Vida’s effort to build community is seen is their commitment to long and 
emotionally intense reviewing activities, particularly “life stories” and “ACES.” The 
effects of these debriefs included: a patient tolerance with one another; increased 
moral self-awareness; moral admonishment from others; and guidance with regard to 
future moral actions (see subsections 5.2.5 and 8.1.1.3). Since the countless hours 
required for such debriefing often results in their being sacrificed to considerations of 
schedule and itinerary, it would appear that La Vida moderated our expedition 
itinerary to make such activities possible. With that said, our itinerary did include a 
rigourous multi-day bushwhack that a majority of participants noted for its moral 
significance (see subsections 8.2.1.2 and 9.3.1).  
 
This ability to address both social and physical aspects of one’s morality is a strength 
within expeditionary education and OAE more broadly. Thus it is with some concern 
that I see a growing dissatisfaction with “physically oriented” (Hogan, 1992, p. 27) 
OAE generally, and the devaluing of “hardship, endurance and discipline” (Young, 
1987, p. 4) in particular. For as the title of Sherman’s (1991) book – The Fabric of 
Character – implies, character is like a continuous thread that winds through every 
aspect of a person’s life. By de-emphasising the physical elements of its 
programmes, OAE runs the risk of ignoring a significant aspect of the participants’ 
moral lives. Subsections 1.3.2 and 8.2.1 suggested reasons for this decline, in the 
repudiation of militarily-imbued concepts of character and the critique of Luckner 
and Nadler’s (1997) theory of personal development respectively. Yet such 
rejections of the physical do not appear to be an abandonment of moral education 
altogether. To the contrary, the social and communal emphases that have replaced 
such physical de-emphasis (see cited literature in subsection 8.2.2) are nothing if not 
ethical in nature. Hence, as suggested in subsection 1.4.4.1, by providing a virtue 
ethical account of character development, stripped of any military connotations, and 
the machismo that often comes with it, this thesis has sought to reclaim the concept 
of character, and demonstrate its moral relevance to both relational and physical 
elements of expeditions in particular, and OAE more generally (see Implications 




Thus, I suggest that in the interest of moral growth, expeditionary course designers 
should deliberately incorporate physical challenge into their curriculum. However, as 
the implications section of Chapter 8 asserted, the level of challenge need neither be 
extreme nor lasting for change (in the qualified sense) to occur. By maintaining (with 
slight adaptation) the longstanding tradition of physically-oriented expeditions, and 
similarly supporting the now more recognised social, relational, and communal 
aspects of wilderness journeys (see subsection 8.2.2), OAE may more thoroughly 
strengthen the fabric of participants’ character. 
 
In sum, I am suggesting that expeditions can create an ideal locus for moral 
formation when they balance: episodes of solitude with life in community; individual 
reflection exercises with more intense group reviews; and the itinerary so as to 
privilege time for social interaction, while also (although to a lesser degree) 
providing ample physical challenge. 
  
Having made a number of recommendations in light of this research’s findings, I 
now suggest how the thesis may connect to broader issues within OAE. 
10.4 Connections to Broader Issues in OAE: A Need for Philosophy 
The analytical employment of Aristotle’s virtue theory within this research may have 
relevance to broader trends within OAE. For the philosophical emphases of this 
thesis may serve as a needed corrective to predominantly empirical approaches to 
OAE research.  
 
Subsection 1.4.1, cited a variety of scholars calling for more philosophical inquiry 
within the field of OAE. Further, subsection 4.6.3 identified a reason for such inquiry 
quoting Allison’s (2006) recognition that OAE “research has become synonymous 
with empirical research … thus leaving … theoretical inquiry homeless” (p. 11). To 
correct such bias, Allison (2006) suggests that researchers pay more “attention to 
philosophers who are often overlooked within the field of outdoor education but who 
have things to say that are very relevant indeed to our work” (p. 9). A comment 
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within the Ethics further reveals the need for philosophical sensitivity within OAE 
research. In I 3§4, Aristotle suggests that “the educated person seeks exactness in 
each area to the extent that the nature of the subject allows.” This insight advises that 
there are limits on what can be known through inquiry. While Aristotle is principally 
referring to ethical matters, one might extend his caveat more broadly to include 
other issues, such as the transfer of learning discussed above in subsection 10.2.3.4 
and the Implications section of Chapter 7. Although, as noted, Brown (2010) has 
recently indicated the complications associated with determining OAE programme’s 
long-term effects, there appears to be relatively little discussion, within the OAE 
literature, regarding such epistemological limitations. It is as though “the existence 
of the experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the 
problems which trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by” 
(Wittgenstein, trans. 1963, p. 232). This thesis then, through its attempt to be 
epistemologically sensitive to its ethical subject matter, may serve as a philosophical 
example to other researchers, thereby encouraging them to contemplate the 
limitations of their own area of inquiry. 
 
Beyond such service as an example however, the virtue theory explicated in Chapter 
2 may have a more direct relevance to other avenues of research. That is, while I 
have used Aristotle’s moral philosophy to examine character development within 
OAE expeditions, other areas within the broader field of Outdoor Education may 
similarly benefit from a virtue ethical approach. One such area is Environmental 
Education.  
 
Subsection 1.1.1 made use of a Venn diagram to conceptualise the field of Outdoor 
Education (Higgins et al., 1997, p. 6). Although the aim of character development is 
mainly located within the Venn circle, “Personal and Social Development,” I 
contend that a virtue ethical account of character, as espoused in this thesis, is also 
relevant to the Venn circle, “Environmental Education.” However, such wider 
relevance appears to have been “overlooked” (Allison, 2006, p. 9) by OAE scholars 
and practitioners alike (e.g. Nicol, 2002b, p. 95; Baker, 2005, p. 269). Such 
dissociation between Personal and Social Development and Environmental 
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Education is unfortunate. For if, as Higgins et al. attest (1997, pp. 8, 12), 
Environmental Education includes the development of opinions, attitudes, values, 
sensitivity to environmental issues, and commitment to sustainable practices, then it 
is part and parcel of one’s moral vision of a good life (eudaimonia) – a good life for 
humankind, and the rest of the biotic community (Leopold, 1966/1986, p. 239). 
Thus, if environmental educators wish their students to become caretakers of the 
land, then the “scientific” curriculum, often associated with Environmental 
Education, will not be “enough,” for “protecting habitat is inescapably a moral issue” 
(Louv, 2008, p. 303). Consequently, outdoor adventure educators interested in 
Environmental Education must recognise that much of their curriculum depends on 
the development of moral sensitivity within their students. Similarly, outdoor 
adventure educators interested in Personal and Social Development (which includes 
the development of character), must get beyond their anthropocentric understanding 
of such terms, and embrace a more eco-centric vision of human development (see 
DesJardins, 2006, p. 150).  
 
Orr (2004) connects this environmental sensitivity to Aristotle’s understanding of 
character, noting the “relationship between sustainability and the human qualities 
subsumed in the word virtue” (p. 60). Others, such as Sandler (2007), who entitled 
his book Character and the Environment: A Virtue-Oriented Approach to 
Environmental Ethics, have also seen this relationship. Sandler (2007) notes that 
with regard to the environment, “it is always people, with character traits, attitudes, 
and dispositions, who perform actions, promote policies, and lobby for laws” (p. 1). 
Ultimately, how we treat the environment and its inhabitants is a species of what 
kind of people we believe we should be (Sandler & Cafaro, 2005, p. 3; see also 
DesJardins, 2006, pp. 134-135) – the very question Aristotle’s account attempts to 
answer (see subsection 2.1.2.3).  
 
Although several OAE scholars have recognised that personal, social and 
environmental education are “inseparable” (Barrett & Greenaway, 1995, p. 3 
referencing Cooper, 1994), much work has yet to be done. For example, while 
Hogan (1992) identifies this complementary relationship between Personal and 
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Social Development and Environmental Education, he does not envisage “character 
building” (p. 30) as a possible bridge between the two. Instead, he considers efforts 
to build character to be adversarial towards the environment. Quoting Young (1987, 
p. 3), Hogan (1992) reduces character to “an ideology of conquest and mastery of 
nature and of self” (pp. 28-29), which distances a participant from his or her 
“ecological self” (Naess, 1988, p. 20; see also Hogan, 1992, p. 30). Even those 
willing to apply a virtue ethical understanding of character to Environmental 
Education (e.g. Martin et al., 2009), appear to have done so only superficially (see 
subsection 3.3.4), and in a fashion that might have troubled Aristotle (see I 3§1-4).  
 
For such reasons, I suggest that the account of character-based virtue ethics, 
espoused in this thesis, may have relevance beyond the context in which it is applied 
here. 
 
This chapter began by noting the limitations within the research. Next, conclusions 
were drawn, and recommendations made in light of them. The research’s 
connections to broader issues within OAE were then discussed. Turning now to the 
final section of the thesis, I conclude referring back to an aim outlined in the first 
chapter. There I noted my hope of providing a re-appraisal of Hahn’s Moral Vision 
for OAE (see subsection 1.4.2). The virtue-ethical explication of the qualified 
character development that seemed to occur in this research’s participants provides 
such re-evalution. The remaining section, then, celebrates the ethical value of 
expeditionary OAE, and its capacity to foster virtue within its members. Following 
Silverman’s (2010) recommendations for an “imaginative” and “stimulating” 
conclusion (p. 356), I employ the analogy of “travelling monasteries” to illustrate 
further this potential of expeditions to facilitate moral growth.  
10.5 Expeditions As Travelling Monasteries 
Gwen, in the paper (p. 1) she wrote near the end of the expedition, mused about her 
return to the “real word.” It was just the opposite, she claimed. The expedition had 
revealed reality to her in a more profound way than she had ever before experienced. 
A student of Okholm (2007), in his book, Monk Habits for Everyday People, reports 
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a similar story. After returning from an inspirational week of camp, she rather 
despondently confessed to her father that she had to “come down from the mountain 
top and enter back into the real world. Her father answered her, ‘You were in the real 
world!’” (pp. 31-32). Okholm (ibid.) interprets the father’s comment to mean that the 
“community” established through the camp, took the daughter “far deeper into the 
real world than most other avenues of experience” (p. 32). Interestingly, Okholm 
(2007) tells this story not to justify the value of OAE, but to refute the charge that a 
“monastery is not the ‘real world’” (p. 32). He seems to be suggesting that just as a 
camp provides the structure and relationships necessary for a profound and 
meaningful (eudaimonistic?) existence, so too do monastic communities. Previous 
chapters have already noted many of the similarities between an expedition and a 
monastic community. In the following paragraphs, I will briefly recount such 
likenesses and then further develop the analogy, identifying the common aspects that 
make them so conducive to character’s development.  
 
Taken in order within the thesis, subsection 6.1.1 spoke of how both monasteries and 
expeditions use solitude to encourage moral reflection. Then, the introduction to 
Chapter 7 highlighted how they both utilise the challenge of wilderness as a medium 
for moral growth. Shortly thereafter (see subsection 7.1.2.1), the constant and 
inescapable examination of one’s ethical conduct by others on an expedition was 
shown to be not unlike the vow of stability (stabilitas) taken by a monk towards his 
community. In two other places within the same chapter (see section 7.4 and also the 
Implications section that follows it), both expeditions and monastic communities 
were noted for seeking sanctuary – as a sacred place and as a reflective refuge – in an 
effort to facilitate the growth of virtue. Next, the care participants provided one 
another on the expedition was found to develop community (see subsection 8.3.1), 
which, in turn, created an intimate context in which participants entered into one 
another’s moral lives. By listening to each other and responding to the admonitions 
they received, participants practised something akin to the second Benedictine vow 
of obedience (obaudire). However, without the balanced life (body, mind, and spirit) 
so characteristic of Benedictine communities, it would be difficult to sustain any of 
the aforementioned conditions for moral growth. Thus, the Implications section of 
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Chapter 8, similarly celebrated an expedition’s ability to strike such balance, noting 
how its frequent retreats into solitude may engender compassion and encourage care 
for one another. Finally, the need for participants to develop their qualified character 
development, both during and after the expedition, was likened to the third 
Bendictine vow of conversatio morum, an ongoing daily commitment to moral 
growth (see subsection 9.1.2).  
 
There are other similarities however. Just as the Rule of St. Benedict tries to create a 
life that answers: “how do we … grow into wholeness?” (De Waal, 1984/2001, p. 
29), so too Johnson and Fredrickson (2000, pp. 45-46) have suggested wilderness 
expeditions as a way to illuminate such ethical questions as: “what’s in a good life” 
(p. 43). Further, both monks (Okholm, 2007, p. 33) and expeditionary educators 
(Neill, 2001, pp. 2-3) have, in part, answered these questions through lives of 
austerity that lead to moral growth. The monastic ideal of “asceticism” comes from 
the Greek word ascesis, “a word that was used in connection with the discipline an 
athlete engaged in to prepare for the … Olympic games” (Okholm, 2007, p. 33). 
Comparably, through the challenge (physical, social, emotional, moral, etc.) of an 
expedition a participant may be given the opportunity to practise (train for) virtue. 
Part of a monk’s ascesis, as required in Benedict’s Rule, is creating an organised and 
disciplined atmosphere, for the sake of the “growth of the individual” (De Waal, 
1984/2001, p. 116). This too is a value and outcome of expeditionary education. Hite 
(2009, p. 80), for example, recounts the ways in which an expedition helps build 
patterns – of organisation, preparedness, simplicity, balance, valuing and relationship 
– that may lead to post-expedition growth.  
 
Such analogy between the morally refining nature of monastic communities and 
expeditionary OAE is further strengthened when one looks at their origins. For it has 
been suggested that Benedict (circa. 480-547), “bred and shaped in the mountains” 
himself, likened spiritual and moral growth to “a quest, a pilgrimage set in the 
narrow mountain passes and the broad sweep of plains that will ultimately lead … to 
the mountain top” (De Waal, 1984/2001, p. 17). Benedict’s moral valuing of wild 
places was more than metaphorical, however. In search of his own development, he 
 
 368 
lived three years “in a cave, on a hillside, a mountain fastness surrounded by scenery 
formidable in its wilder beauty” (ibid., p. 16). Later, atop an “imposing mountain 
mass rising up in the central Apennines” (ibid., p. 16) of Italy, he founded the 
monastic community of Monte Cassino, for whom he wrote his famous Rule. Some 
1500 years later, Hahn, whom many regard as a key progenitor of expeditionary 
OAE (Miner, 1999, p. 55), founded his first school, Salem, in a German castle that 
Cistercian monks (following St. Benedict’s Rule) had used as a monastery (James, 
1990, p. 7). “Hahn studied the history of the Cistercians and developed the 
‘Cistercian model’: building a school community that makes itself helpful to the 
neighbourhood with, ‘the epic constancy of daily service such as the Cistercians had 
practised and preached’” (Van Oord, 2010, p. 261; Röhrs, 1970, p. 125). Thus, 
“emulating the Cistercian monks … , the students and teachers at Salem School 
helped the surrounding communities through various forms of service” (James, 1990, 
p. 7).  
 
Hahn (1940) believed that “without such service the passion of Love cannot grow” 
(p. 7). Thus, the development of love, expressed through compassion for humankind, 
was the very reason that Hahn established Outward Bound and the expeditionary 
tradition (James, 1990, p. 12). Similarly, Benedict, in his monastic efforts, sought to 
create a “community of love” (De Waal, 1984/2001, p. 19), his Rule being “a 
handbook on the practice of loving” (ibid., p. 145). That both Hahn and Benedict 
sought love as their principal outcome, connects their respective missions directly to 
character development. For as mentioned in subsection 8.2.2.3, Swanton (2003) also 
believes agapic or “Universal Love” (p. 99) to be the ultimate source of all the 
virtues. 
 
Such similarities between these expeditionary and monastic “schools of love” extend 
even to structural aspects. Both entities (see De Waal, 1984/2001, p. 19 for Benedict, 
and Walsh & Golins, 1976, p. 5 for OAE) have discovered that moral growth and 
refinement are ideally pursued within a community of around a dozen members. As 
subsection 7.1.1 discussed, this ideal size, the “ten-group” (Walsh & Golins, 1976, p. 




In conclusion, I am suggesting that just as a Benedictine monastery facilitates “a life 
of habits that, in turn, develop virtues (character traits)” (Okholm, 2007, p. 21), so 
too an expedition, for all the reasons mentioned throughout this thesis, fulfils a 
similar role, albeit in a qualified sense. An expedition, then, may be compared to a 
monastic community journeying through the wilderness, a “travelling monastery” of 
sorts. Such analogy becomes all the more apt in light of the last page of Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s After Virtue (1984, p. 263). There, having critiqued at length the state of 
moral discourse today, believing that it amounts to little more than emotivism (see 
pp. 11-12), MacIntyre (ibid.), referring to the medieval period, notes how 
monasticism provided “new forms of community within which the moral life could 
be sustained so that both morality and civility might survive the coming ages of 
barbarism and darkness” (p. 263). Now, fearing the “new [morally] dark ages, which 
are already upon us,” MacIntrye (ibid.) suggests that we again need “local forms of 
community within which … [the] moral life can be sustained” (p. 263). Given the 
urgent need for such communities of virtue, MacIntyre (ibid.) concludes his work by 
suggesting that what our world now requires, is “another – doubtless very different – 
St. Benedict” (p. 263). Although this new Benedict will surely have many guises, 
expeditions, in their likeness to travelling monasteries, may provide morally 
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The following diary gives an account of the research process that led to this thesis. 
At the end of each semester, I took a few minutes to reflect on my progress over the 
previous months. In addition to listing the work completed during a given period of 
time, the diary also provides a broader life context in which the research transpired, 
and thus notes many of the triumphs and challenges encountered along the way.  
September-December 2005 
We landed in Edinburgh with three years of belongings. I was scared stiff! I 
immediately began reading on character and OAE, qualitative research methodology, 
and Aristotle’s virtue ethics. By the end of the semester I had a draft of what became 
Chapter 1.  
 
During this time I also took a variety of graduate development skills trainings in: 
advanced Microsoft Word and Excel; Photoshop; basic web-design; Endnote 
bibliographic software; and mind-mapping. This period also presented an 
opportunity to teach on an Education One course, for first year students, which I plan 




Finally, after spending a considerable amount of time establishing my “research 
systems” (e.g. NoteBook for notes and Bookends for references), my colleagues 
asked me to present on these resources at a PhD student seminar. 
January-August 2006 
I continued to work on a virtue ethically relevant research methodology, and piloted 
and trialled several methods. A serendipitous opportunity as a researcher aboard a 
sail-training vessel further provided practice with the chosen methods. After 
searching for a case study site, I eventually found Gordon College’s La Vida 
program in Massachusetts, and conducted the research in August.  
 
I also attended several researcher-training seminars, including one on literature 
searching techniques, which allowed me to locate relevant databases and to create 
searches and scholar alerts within them. I further made use of university resources by 
auditing my supervisor’s Education and Ethics course.  
 
These months were also filled with conferences. I gave both a poster and 
presentation at the Association of Moral Education conference in Freiburg, 
Switzerland. I also attended a Scottish branch session of the Philosophy of Education 
Society of Great Britain. Additionally, I helped organise an experiential education 
workshop at the University of Edinburgh for visiting Professor Scott Wurdinger. 
These conferences provided several opportunities to share my research with eminent 
scholars, and receive their helpful critique.  
September-December 2006 
In early September, I successfully passed my board exam, becoming an official PhD 
candidate. I continued to read in Virtue Ethics, occasionally drawing on my Koine 
Greek skills, by dipping to the Ethics in its original. I established the chapter 
headings for the virtue chapter, and will spend the coming months filling in the 
outline. Regarding methodology, I separately met with three academics to discuss 
qualitative software options. Meetings with four further academics gave me the 
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confidence to attempt audio-coding the interviews. I continued to read extensively 
within the qualitative research literature, and by December had the chapter headings 
for the methodology chapter. Additionally, I developed my competence with 
ATLAS.tiTM, so as to soon start the analysis of the interviews. This was a good 
semester for my confidence. Several colleagues asked me to read their work, and, in 
giving constructive feedback, I’ve realised how much I’ve learned. I can see the 
thesis taking shape! 
 
For my development as a scholar, I also attended graduate transferable skills 
trainings on “speed” reading, and audited two graduate classes, The Nature of 
Inquiry and Philosophy of Education.  
 
Several teaching and presenting opportunities again presented themselves. I helped 
facilitate a 5-day residential program at Loch Eil Outward Bound. I also had the 
chance to lead and present in several class sessions for a number of different 
lecturers. I delivered formal presentations on my research to a group of new PhD 
students and also to my PhD colleagues.  
 
Despite it being such a busy semester, I managed to take a 5-day late fall hill walking 
trip into the Mamores and Grey Corries with my wife, Amanda.  
January-August 2007 
With the chapter headings already established, I wrote the first drafts of the virtue 
and methodology chapters. It felt great to start seeing some results! 
 
It was a busy semester for presentations and conferences. I locally attended an 
Outdoor Learning Conference and made some helpful social connections. I then flew 
to America where I presented on my research at the Wilderness Education 
Association conference in Colorado. I was astonished to see how well my work was 
received. I didn’t expect so many people to find it so interesting. In early spring, I 
travelled to New College, Oxford, for the national Philosophy of Education Society 
of Great Britain conference. While I was there, I met with Gerard Hughes, S. J., a 
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prominent scholar on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. I spoke to him about my 
research, and received some helpful feedback. He appeared genuinely interested, and 
was very supportive of my work.  
 
I attended two more graduate transferrable skills workshops, one on publishing, and 
the other on academic job searches. John Turner, the program direction for the 
graduate transferrable skills series, asked me to be a student representative on the 
transferrable skills steering committee. I also worked on some skills of a different 
kind, attending the postgraduate Outdoor Education Mountaineering class in the 
Cairngorms.  
 
The Australian Journal of Outdoor Education published an article I submitted on the 
recording technology I used in the field (Stonehouse, 2007). My supervisors and I 
also finished a first draft on a Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle publication for an 
experiential education textbook.  
 
Being an active person by nature, this concentrated intellectual effort, requiring such 
long periods of time in a chair within my office, left me feeling a little stir-crazy. I 
therefore decided that training for the Edinburgh Marathon might be a helpful 
balance to the sedentary life of a PhD student. Heavy mileage, in the out-of-doors, 
through the bleak winter months proved a helpful psychological distraction from the 
stress of the thesis. I successfully completed the 26.2 miles in May.  
 
One last item “bears” mentioning. In mid-May, Amanda and I were shocked to 
discover that she was pregnant. While excited, my dominant emotion was fear. How 
could we, in our graduate existence, afford a child? How would I finish the thesis? 
Would I have to interrupt my studies?  
September-December 2008 
Given Amanda’s pregnancy, I felt a tremendous amount of financial pressure. I 
therefore took nearly any work opportunity that presented itself. These included 
teaching on: a Personal and Social Outdoor Education module; an Outdoor 
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Education Postgraduate Diploma in Education course; and an Orienteering skills 
course within the Postgraduate Certificate in Outdoor Education program. 
Additionally, the Outdoor Education department provided some 180 hours of work. 
How I managed to get anything done on the thesis, I’m not quite sure. Yet, this 
period proved a productive time.  
 
I continued to work with the ATLAS.tiTM CAQDAS programme, conducting the 
thematic analysis of both the first and second interviews. As the analysis progressed, 
I performed further theme-specific literature searches. Concerned that the digital 
literature searching techniques I had employed might have missed some pertinent 
resources, I read through the abstracts for each of the three prominent OAE journals: 
Australian Journal of Outdoor Education; Journal of Adventure Education and 
Outdoor Learning; Journal of Experiential Education.  
 
Throughout this period, a PhD student colleague and I also co-planned an Outdoor 
Education Research Symposium, held at the University of Edinburgh. The 
symposium was a tremendous success, and my work was again well received.  
 
These months also saw several more drafts of the Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle 
paper, and a short publication with a colleague on ethics and expeditions.  
 
In the midst of this flurry of activity, I somehow managed to build a website, and 
conduct an academic job search.  
January-June 2008 
Findley Harris Jacoby Stonehouse was born on January 9th! In the midst of new 
paternal responsibilities, I continued the job search and worked on the thesis. Nearly 
every application I submitted prompted a response. Several phone interviews 
resulted in invitations to interview on US campuses. In early February I flew to 
Redding, CA, and interviewed at Simpson University. They later offered me a 





With regard to the thesis, I transcribed the relevant quotations from the results the 
thematic analysis, and began to read more about the “writing-up” process. 
Additionally, I created second drafts of the OAE, virtue, and methodology chapters, 
and first drafts of the character education chapter and the inter-chapter section.  
June – July 2009 
I had originally hoped to be able to work on the PhD part-time during my new 
professorship in the US. However, as a single faculty member in a new program, the 
extraordinary teaching and administrative demands prevented me from even looking 
at the thesis from July 2008 to May 2009. I was so frustrated, and wondered if I 
would ever finish, working only two full-time (summer) months per year on the 
thesis.  
 
After nearly a year’s break, it took a while to reorient myself to the research. I began 
by catching up and reading through the scholar alerts that had accumulated 
throughout the year. I then worked through my supervisors suggested edits, creating 
third drafts of the OAE, virtue, and methodology chapters, and second drafts of the 
character education chapter and the inter-chapter section.  
 
Once these edits were completed, I began to compose the analysis chapters. By the 
end of the summer, I had first drafts for what became Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8, and part of 
9.  
June – July 2010 
The second year of my professorship was actually busier than the first! Although I 
was unable to work on the thesis, I did manage to have a chapter published 
(Stonehouse, 2009), Virtue Ethics and Expeditions, in an edited book on educational 
expeditions. I was also asked to join the Research Committee for the Wilderness 





Once the school year was finished, I again started work on the thesis by catching up 
on the accumulated scholar alerts from the previous 10 months. I then proofread the 
OAE (Chapter 1), virtue (Chapter 2), character education (Chapter 3), and 
methodology (Chapter 4) chapters, and sent them to Kellian Klink, a research library 
at Minnesota State University, Mankato. Familiarised again with the thesis, I then 
tidied up Chapters 5-8 and finished a first draft of chapter 9, and then also sent them 
to Kellian. She commented on the chapters and sent them back to me throughout the 
summer. As they trickled in, I read through her comments, chapter by chapter, made 
appropriate changes, and then emailed the chapters to my supervisors. I managed to 
get part way through a first draft of the final chapter (10), before having to return to 
my teaching position at Simpson University.  
June – July 2011 
Much like the two previous academic years, this past one afforded little time on the 
thesis. I did manage to finish Chapter 10, send it off to Kellian, make appropriate 
changes from her comments, and mail it off to my supervisors. Although it felt good 
to have the main text of the thesis in a rough draft, I knew I’d have one more tough 
summer of editing before it was ready for submission.  
 
In addition to these small contributions to the thesis, I was also able to present on my 
research at an International Association of Outdoor Recreation and Education 
Conference in Keystone, CO. My presentation was very well received with several 
people following up with post-conference correspondence. I later submitted an 
abstract for the presentation and had it published in the Journal of Outdoor 
Recreation, Education, and Leadership (Stonehouse, 2011). Further professional 
developments included continued service on the Research Committee for the WEA, 
reviewing a number of presentation abstracts for the WEA’s annual International 
conference, and a book chapter publication for which I was lead author (Stonehouse, 
Allison, & Carr, 2011), Aristotle, Plato, and Socrates: Ancient Greek perspectives on 




Throughout the spring my supervisors commented on and sent back my analysis 
chapters (5-9). As soon as my professorial duties were finished, I began working 
through their feedback, chapter by chapter. Although I had already contacted the 
participants’ to ensure their approval of my interpretations, I re-examined their 
quotations used in the thesis, listening to each respective interview audio clip in 
ATLAS.tiTM, to confirm that I had faithfully captured their meanings. Once I finished 
with the re-write of Chapters 5-9, I began a 2nd draft of the conclusion chapter. When 
I needed a break from the more formal chapters of the thesis, I formulated the 
preface material and the appendices. 
 
While this revision process was taking place, I began formatting the thesis into its 
submitted form. I sought the advice of a colleague with a background in graphic 
design for several stylistic decisions, and painstakingly attempted to provide a 





As an act of appreciation for the developers, I have included a short description 
highlighting in which ways the following software programmes were indispensable 
to my research process. 
NoteBookTM (www.circusponies.com) 
NoteBookTM is a powerful note taking software. NoteBookTM allows the user to 
capture information in a variety of formats: typed text; web-based text; pictures; 
videos; documents, etc. Much like a digital notebook, this captured information can 
then be organised within the NoteBook’s user-specified tabs, and pages. Any content 
on these pages can be further organised into any number of outlining formats. While 
this ability to store a diverse array of information within one file makes NoteBookTM 
an excellent resource for research management, it is with its searching capabilities 
that this programme comes into its own. As data are entered into the Notebook, it is 
automatically catalogued under a selection of indices (e.g. text, capitalised words, 
numbers, web-addresses, attachment types, and creation dates). The user need only 
consult these indices to quickly find a specific item buried deep within the Notebook. 
Lastly, a NoteBook, or portions of it, can be easier shared with other users. For 
example, a navigable NoteBook can be instantly posted on-line in HTML format (see 
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URL in Appendix 9), or easily exported to a PDF. Incidentally, these sharing features 
also serve as a back-up method.  
 
I used one central PhD NoteBook throughout my thesis. Within it I stored: ALL the 
extensive notes I took on my readings; my journal of the PhD experience; notes from 
supervisor meetings; daily accomplishments; literature review lists; inspirational 
quotes; ideas on the thesis’ structure; future resources; and much more. This ability 
to have my entire project within one searchable file, greatly assisted the research 
process, and, I believe, increased the rigour of the final result. As the individual 
chapters of my thesis began to take shape, I created new NoteBooks for each chapter, 
and through a linking feature, connected ideas from the central NoteBook to each of 
them respectively. 
ATLAS.tiTM (www.atlasti.com)  
I used ATLAS.tiTM to code several transcribed interviews and the remaining 
interview audio files themselves. This ability to code directly onto the recorded 
interview locates the analysis one step closer to the original conversation. Once the 
initial round of open-coding is completed, thereby identifying all substantive 
interview sections, ATLAS.tiTM functions much like a pair of “electronic scissors” 
(Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, p. 198), allowing the researcher to move, group, and 
categorise data for emergent themes. As these crucial analytical decisions are being 
made, the researcher is able to click on any open-code and instantly hear the relevant 
section of the respective interview. Further programme strengths include the capacity 
to attach searchable comments and memos to the codes, and to export or tabulate the 
findings into a variety of formats (see Appendix 7).  
 
At the time of this research’s analysis, there were only a couple of programmes able 
to perform audio-coding. I believe that the sophistication of ATLAS.tiTM brought a 




BookendsTM is a bibliographic reference managing system. While it permits the user 
to manually input references, more powerfully, it allows the user to search countless 
databases for a particular resource(s). Once the resource is located, it can then be 
imported to the programme, already “tagged” by author, date, title, publisher, etc. 
Subsequently, individual references or entire bibliographies can be exported to a 
word processing document in the user’s chosen format (e.g. APA, MLA, etc.).  
 
BookendsTM allowed me to maintain and organise some 800 references throughout 
this project, and, I believe, assisted in achieving greater detail and accuracy than 





This appendix contains the interview schedules used in the first and second 
interviews. With the exception of small edits that were necessary to format them into 
the thesis, they are reproduced here as they were used in the field. The header – 
“Semi-Structured Interviews: Part I” or “Semi-Structured Interviews: Part II” – 
differentiates the first interview schedule from the second. The first interview 
schedule begins on the next page.  
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Name/Number:   Date:       Time:   
Informant: Student -  Instructor - Administrator (circle one) Age:   
Place of Interview:        Email:    
 
Preamble: 
 I’m doing a study regarding the relationship between character development 
and Wilderness Expeditions. Over the course of this interview, I’ll be asking you to 
reflect on a series of questions related to character. There are no right or wrong 
answers; I just want your perspective. Are you comfortable? Any questions? Ready 
to start? 
 
1. Biographical information: Tell me a little about how you came to be here. 
What are your expectations of the expedition? What do you hope to gain from 






2. “Character” can be a confusing word. Our culture uses it in several ways. I’m 
just wanting to make sure we’re clear on which use of the word we’re 
focusing on in this interview. Could we brain storm a few examples of the 
word “character” to identify the use we’re concentrating on here? 
Prompt: 
! “He’s a character.” 
! “She’s a character in the play.” 
! “By doing that he showed his character.” 






3. What is character?  
Prompt: 
!What is a person’s character? 
!Why are people assigned good or bad character? 
!Anything else? 
Probe: 
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4. Can character be improved? Undermined? How?  
Prompts: 
!Can it be changed?  
!Could you loose character? 
!Can you give examples of (develop, degradation, and how)? 
!Anything else? 
Probe: 






5. How do you know what kind of character you want to have?  
Prompts: 
!How do you decide what is good character for you? 
!Anything else? 
Probe: 






6. What influence, if any, do you expect this wilderness expedition to have on 
your character?  
Prompts: 
!Do you think it will have an effect on your character? 
!Why and how might it do this? 
!Anything else? 
Probe: 

















The next couple of questions are a little more abstract. I’m trying to learn about 
how character is developed. These questions try to address this issue: 
7. Do you think the act of reflection plays any role in the development of a 
person’s character? If so, how? Can you give some examples of what this 
reflection might look like, in what kinds of ways it might take place? 
Prompts: 
!Is there any relationship between reflection and character? 
!Anything else? 
Probe: 






8. What role, if any, does practice play in the development of character?  
Prompts: 
!Does repetition or habit play a role in your character development? 
!Anything else? 
Probe: 






9. What role do others play in your character development?  
Prompts: 
!Friends, authority, fiction? 
!Anything else? 
Probe: 






10. Do you think that feelings have any role to play in character development?  
Prompts: 
!Are they a part of your character development? 
!Anything else? 
Probe: 
!Confirm, Clarify, Connect, or Extend 
 
 









Extra question for instructors:  
11. Are there things you do on expeditions to develop the students’ character? 
Prompts: 
!Curriculum, questions, process? 
!Anything else? 
Probe: 






Extra question for Administrators: 




!Curriculum, questions, process? 
!Anything else? 
Probe: 






Thank them. Summarize main contributions. Are there any other questions?  












Name/Number:      Date:      Time:  
Informant: Student -  Instructor (circle one)       Age:   
Place of Interview:      Email: _   
 
Preamble: 
 We are coming to the end of our expedition. I’d like to ask you a couple 
questions about your experience and its relationship to your character. 
 
1. Well, you’re a bushwhacker now, how does that feel? 
Prompt: 






2. Do you think this expedition has had any impact on your character? 
Prompt: 
! What? How? 
! Examples?  
! Anything else? 
Probe: 






3. Did this expedition offer opportunities for reflection on your character? 
When? What did you reflect on? 
Prompt: 
!Formal? Informal? 
!What did you think about? 
!Anything else? 
Probe: 












4. Did this expedition offer opportunities to carry out actions related to 
character? 
Prompt:  
! Were you given a chance to practise “good character”? 
Probe: 






5. Did other people make any impact on your character during this expedition? 
Did you make any impact on others’ character? In what ways? 
Prompt:  
!Positive and negative? 
!Did you learn about character from others? 
Probe: 






6. Where there any “parts of the curriculum”, such as events or activities, that 
were particularly related to character formation during this expedition? 
Prompt:  
!What is their relationship to character formation? 
Probe: 
























Invitation to Participate Documents 
This appendix contains two documents that were sent to each participant in a general 
information packet, one month before the expedition. Appendix 4.1 is the Invitation 
to Participate Letter. Appendix 4.2 is the Informed Consent Document. With the 
exception of small edits that were necessary to format them into the thesis, they are 
reproduced here as they were used in the field. The Invitation to Participate Letter 
begins on the next page.  
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Appendix 4.1 Invitation to Participate Letter 





July 10, 2006 
 
Dear La Vida expedition member, I have been assigned as your instructor for our 
wilderness backpacking expedition this August.  
 
This letter introduces a great opportunity for your La Vida expedition. I’m working 
on a PhD in Moral Education and Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh, 
Scotland, and would like to draw on your insights as part of my research! My Thesis 
revolves around Character Development and wilderness expeditions.  
 
If you are willing, I think you’d find your contribution both enjoyable and 
educational. All I want to do is make some observations and have a few 
conversations with you near the beginning and end of the expedition. These 
interviews would involve questions regarding character. The dialogues will be 
recorded, then transcribed, and analyzed. To protect your privacy, your name will 
never appear in any publications. That’s it! All I would need from you is your 
willingness to talk. I wouldn’t expect your participation to take more than an hour 
and a half over the two weeks.  
 
I recently piloted my questions on expeditionary students similar to yourself, and 
received many compliments on the value of the exercise. These students appreciated 
the chance to: morally reflect, be listened to, learn about research, and make an 
academic contribution.  
 
This research has been approved by Gordon College’s Institutional Review Board. 
If you are willing to help in my research, please fill out the Informed Consent 
Document included in this packet and return it in the envelope provided.  
 
Also, know that you are welcome not to participate. If you’d rather not, simply return 
the enclosed envelope stating your desire. 
 
I wish I didn’t have to introduce myself in such a formal manner. I’ve travelled many 
thousands of miles through wilderness and been changed by it. These expeditions are 
a way to develop spiritually, and to learn about self, others, and the environment. I 
am very excited – I think it will be a great time and I look forward to meeting you 




If you have any questions, just send me an email: 
paul.stonehouse@education.ed.ac.uk. If you provide a phone number, I’d be happy 







Appendix 4.2 Informed Consent Document 
 
The University of Edinburgh 
Outdoor Education 
St. Leonard’s Land, Holyrood Road 






INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT 
 
Project Title:  
Character Formation on Wilderness Expeditions through a Virtue Ethical 
Lens. 
 
Principal Investigator:  




This is a research study. The purpose of this research study is to assess the 
opportunity for character development on wilderness expeditions. The results 
of this study will be used in the empirical section of a PhD dissertation. The 
purpose of this consent form is to give you the information you will need to 
help you decide whether you want to participate. Please read the form 
carefully. You may ask any questions about: the research, what you will be 
asked to do, the possible risks and benefits, your rights as a volunteer, and 
anything else about the research or this form that is not clear. When all of 
your questions have been answered, you can decide if you want to take part 
in this study or not. This process is called “informed consent.” You will be 
given a copy of this form for your records. 
 
I am inviting you to participate in this research study because of your 
involvement with the La Vida College Expedition programme. If you do 




Participants’ involvement will last for the duration of the expedition 




Throughout the expedition, I plan to collect data in two ways: 1) Semi-
structured interviews – I will ask you a series of questions related to 
character. These interviews will be voice recorded, and later made into 
transcripts for analysis*; 2) Observations – I will be making observations 
regarding all aspects of the expedition throughout the 14 days. 
 
Your time involved in these procedures will be brief. The initial interview, 
conducted in the first few days of the expedition, should take no more than 40 
mintues. A second interview, conducted near the end of the expedition should 
take no more than 30 minutes. My observations should take none of your 
time.  
 








The potential personal benefits that may occur as a result of your 
participation in this study are: assistance in your own moral reflection on 
your character; exposure to research methodology for those of you 
contemplating graduate education; contribution to the discipline of Outdoor 
Education by participating in a study that hopes to identify wilderness 
expeditions’ ability to provide opportunity for character development.  
 
 
Costs & Compensations: 
There is no cost for participating in this research.  
 




Records of participation in this research project will be kept confidential to 
the extent permitted by law. However, federal government regulatory 
agencies and the Gordon College Institutional Review Board (a committee 
that reviews and approves research studies) may inspect and copy records 
pertaining to this research. It is possible that these records could contain 
information that personally identifies you.  
 
If you choose to participate in this research project, any notes made in the 
field will use a number in place of your name (e.g. student 56), thereby 
securing confidentiality. Rigourous effort will be made to keep notes and 




If your ideas or comments are used in my dissertation or any published 
articles, a coded name (pseudonym) will be given in substitute of your own. 
This name will communicate your gender and I may also list your age. 
Simply, in the event of any report or publication from this study, your 
identity will not be disclosed.  
The data collected will be held in a secure building, within a secure office, 
within a secure filing cabinet, or on a secure computer. My supervisors, Peter 
Allison and David Carr, and I are the only people who will have access to the 
collected data.  
 
AUDIO RECORDING:  
The interviews will be recorded and transcribed for later analysis. By 
initialling in the space provided below, you verify that you have been 
told that audio recordings will be generated during the course of this 
study. 
 
A professional, recognized by the University of Edinburgh, may 
transcribe the recordings. Beyond the temporary contact of this 
potential transcriptionist, my supervisors and I will have sole access 
to the data.  
 
The interviews will be digitally recorded as .wav files (the exact same 
type of file that comes on any commercially available music CD), and 
stored on the hard drive of my secure personal computer with multiple 
layers of password protection. The computer is located in a locked 
building within a locked office. If the recordings are kept for future 
research, they will be stored digitally on CDs with password 
protection and kept under lock and key.  
 
To verify your awareness that the interviews will be recorded, please 
sign your initials below. 
 
         Participant’s initials  
 
   
Voluntary Participation: 
Taking part in this research study is voluntary. You may choose not to take 
part at all. If you agree to participate in this study, you may stop participating 
at any time. You are free to skip any interview question you prefer not to 
answer. If you decide not to take part, or if you stop participating at any time, 
your decision will not result in any penalty or loss of privileges. Any data you 
have provided before withdrawing may be used in the study unless you 




Questions are encouraged. If you have any questions about this research 





Outdoor Education – University of Edinburgh 
St. Leonard’s Land, Holyrood Road 
Edinburgh, EH8 8AQ 
Scotland 
paul.stonehouse@education.ed.ac.uk 
Tel. if calling from North America: 011-44-131-620-1498  
 
 
If you have questions about your rights as a participant, please contact the 
Gordon College Institutional Review Board (IRB) Chair by e-mail at 




Your signature indicates that this research study has been explained to you, that your 
questions have been answered, and that you agree to take part in this study. You will 
receive a copy of this form. 
 
Participant’s Name: (printed):        
 
            




I have discussed the above points with the participant or, where appropriate, with the 
participant’s legally authorized representative, using a translator when necessary. It 
is my opinion that the participant understands the risks, benefits, and procedures 
involved with participation in this research study. 
 
            










To fill out this form: 
 
1. Make sure you initial pg. 3 
2. Print & sign your name on pg. 4 




Example Fieldnote Entry 
This appendix contains an example fieldnote entry. The entry was taken from a more 
expansive excerpt written on August 22nd. The context for the entry is a group debrief 
that occurred shortly after the students returned from their solo experiences. Notice 
the rushed and unfinished style of the writing, and how the descriptive content is 
separated (by parentheses) from the more evaluative content: 
 
-Bryant had an interesting comment that he was fearful of going on solo because he 
was afraid of what he might find inside of himself 
-Anne mentioned that this trip has been a lot about portions for her. Issues of 
gluttony, and simplicity (e.g. sleep, possessions, food etc.). [Paul, this is all related to 
the appetitive life and temperance] 
-Jenna said that she has tackled so many fears on this trip that she is just looking 
forward to facing more in the fall [Paul, obvious courage] 
-Marielle expressed her desire to have the challenges continue in the fall as well 
[Paul, I know there is something here on challenge and character and I just haven’t 
had time to think of it] 
-All but Bryant have comfirmed tears. Emily shared a story of King David and his 
constant weeping. There has been a redefinition of appropriate emotion through the 
trip. There is an appropriate time to cry, share deeply, laugh etc. [Paul, this is good 
stuff for character and emotions. You could write a section on how they may not 
have realized it, but they were very much learning about appropriate emotional moral 
response throughout the expedition] 
-We haven’t processed rock and ropes yet. We’ll do that at lunch, but Molly said she 
had never experienced the feeling of being so at her end and pushing through the 
climb on Chimney. She claimed to be strong and confident and had never been 
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reduced to such physical and emotional mush before. She said she had never 
experienced the feeling of pushing through something like that and admitted she 
would have given up if I hadn’t encouraged her so much 
-The group actually named the rock “encouragement rock” [virtue] 
-This was another huge day for Jenna in her fear of heights with a rappel and a climb 
up corner 







This appendix contains two documents related to the transcription process. Appendix 
6.1 provides the transciption key used in the three transciptions made before audio-
coding began. Appendix 6.2 is a selection from a transcription made of Saul’s first 
interview. It demonstrates many of the techniques mentioned in the transcription key: 
inclusion of researcher’s clarifying comments; references to the time elapsed within 
the interview; example of the participant not finishing a phrase; overlapping speech; 
and tone. The Transcription Key begins on the next page. 
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Appendix 6.1 Transcription Key 
 
Basic Format: 
• Label transcript  
• Double space between exchanges 
• Questions in bold 
• R for researcher and S1 (S2, S3, etc.) for student 
• Time end of each page 
• (()) for transcriber’s comments 
• All words transcribed 
Overlapping speech: 
• “[“ and “]” at starting and ending points of overlapping speech  
• Use “[[“ and “]]” if overlapping speech occurs two different times in the 
same turn 
Paralinguistic impressions: 
• Tone issues – [angrily, emphasis, laughing] – include only if transcriber 
deems it important to the interpretation 
• Pauses estimated at: [short med, long] – include only if transcriber deems it 
important to the interpretation 
Didn’t include: 
• No Backchannel noises (e.g. “umm”) 
• Orthographic issues (e.g. “nuculer”) 
Deciphering 
• If participant does not finish a phrase or sentence, use “--”  
• If participant does not finish a word, use “-” 
• Use “X” for an unidentified speaker (group interview) 
• Use <X X> for unheard words – in between these X’s put the transcribers 
best guess  
o If transcriber is unable to even offer a guess, use an “X” for every 
undecipherable syllable  
 





Appendix 6.2 Example Transcript 
 
Transcript: S2 (Saul) 





How did you get to La Vida? 
 
P: ((Note that Saul and I had just gone for a walk and that I had gotten a lot of the 




Clarifying the “word” character. 
 
P: ((I went on about the word character and its different uses trying to imply that I 
was using it in a moral fashion.)) 
 





What is Character? ((1:55)) 
 
B: I think it’s something that’s based in your worldview, and it’s the decision’s that 
are based off of that worldview. So if I have a worldview that comes from an 
evolutionary standpoint of bigbang, then obviously everything that happens happens 
by mistake or ‘O my goodness now we’ve got life’ then there’s not necessary any 
moral undertones to any of our society. So, that means that your moral standings, 
getting drunk and going and doing whatever isn’t necessary a bad thing. It could 
have just been some cause-effect relationship just like the explosion caused this and I 
really don’t have any choice because certain types of brains reacted in my mind to do 
it this way. So, different types of worldviews are going to effect what type of moral--
. I think really, morals, characters especially, come from some sort of understanding 
of your worldview; it’s your worldview lived out. 
 
P: So, is it a just a matter of selecting your worldview then, or what you believe that 
some worldviews could be more ‘right’ than others? 
 
B: I think some of them definitively produce different results. I think the Christian is 
definitively going to bring out the best as far as--. For instance, a lot of countries that 
weren’t built on some sort of Christian foundation have had horrible atrocities, the 
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Aztecs killing 1000s of people at a time, whereas some of the more Christian 
foundings have been much more--, I guess, even by the Geneva convention, probably 
wouldn’t have been taken to the barn quite as often. So I think you’re definitely 
going have to some ((3:55)) that definitely are superior, or are going to create better 
moral, moral characters. I know (in) America there was one person that said that he 
didn’t necessary agree with Christianity, but that he thought that the moral character 
that it presented in people was worth putting up with. He didn’t necessarily believe 
in it, but the outcome    [                ] was much better 
than the alternative.  
 
P:    [But put up with what he didn’t like about it] 
 
P: Oh, very well said, very well said. So, if it’s, I don’t want to put words in your 
mouth, but it sounds like the decisions you make stem from worldview convictions, 
worldview values, so what kind of decisions would this encompass for character? 
 
B: A lot of times it can just be even the simple decisions, but a lot of times, just 
decisions such as: you’ve got the good of the many over the good of the few. Should 
we take, if we’ve got a problem were there’s 5 lives at stake or ten, which should you 
take. Just simple moral dilemmas like that. You obviously don’t want to leave the 5 
alone, but if you’ve got to choose, (and) which you choose is going to stem from 
which kind of worldview you have. If you’ve got the General of the US as one of the 
five, some people might say you should go for that, that would be the great good. 
But, others would say the extra five lives you could save going for the other person 
wouldn’t be that. It’s going to stem from your moral worldview. 
 
P: OK. That’s a fairly significant example in terms of the expenditure of life, is 
character involved in decisions that might be considered less poignant? 
 
B: Sure, sure. I think even simple things like choosing if you want to go play 
ultimate Frisbee, or laser tag with some of your friends can be some sort of moral 
standing. I’ve had that happen where (it’s like) sort of what do I need to do? What 
else could I be doing what now? How is it that I’m going to be hanging out with? 
And sometimes you choose the people that you’re going to hang out with playing 
laser tag is (are) not going to be as nearly helpful, nearly as good for you morally, or 
physically or whatever as it could be if you did something else. It really effects 
everything, every decision that get’s made has some basis in character and 
worldview.  
 
P: OK, so you see it as a fairly endemic feature of being human?  
 
B: I think it is. Basically anything that you do has some founding in, at least some in 
character. 
 
P: Amazing. I’m really appreciating your thoughtfulness. I don’t what to cut you off 
though. If you’re talking about this character based out of a worldview you said that 
you believe that, that Christianity offers the best worldview, is that a fair…so then 
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would that explain why a person could have good or bad character, it would be 
matched against the Christian worldview you are talking about? ((7:15)) 
 
B: Ya, I think a lot of times, you’ll find that Christian character presents a very solid 
line of what is good and what is bad, it presents a higher, a higher call that we have 
to be measured to; a lot of others don’t. It says that you are measured to that even if 
you don’t want to be necessarily. I think that presents a fine line that needs to be 
walked. I guess it presents a black and white—morally. There is still grey obviously, 
but--. 
 
P: Excellent man. Anything else generally, you’d like to say about character before I 
go to another questions?  
 
B: I don’t think so, but I might throw something in later.  
 




P: Ok, so you’ve given an incredibly articulate understanding of what character is…  
 
 
Can it [Character] be improved, can it be undermined. And if you believe either 
or both of those, how would that process come about. ((8:24)) 
 






ATLAS.tiTM CAQDAS Output Documents 
This appendix contains four outputted data files from ATLAS.tiTM. As such, a figure 
description can be found directly underneath each one. Apprendix 7.1 displays 
substantive sections from an interview, and the open codes associated with them. 
Appendix 7.2 demonstrates an axial code family, and Appendix 7. 3 shows a 
selective code family. Finally, Appendix 7.4 tabulates open codes for a given theme, 
across the participants’ interviews. Appendix 7.1 begins on the next page.  
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Appendix 7.1 ATLAS.tiTM Quotations Page 
 
All current quotations (388). Quotation-Filter: All (extended version) 
 
 
HU: Paul’s PhD Analysis Interview 2 
File:  [C:\Documents and Settings\computer support\My Documents\PhD Q...\Paul’s PhD Analysis Interview 2.hpr5] 
Edited by: Paul’s PhD 




P 1: 20060823 191443Thomas2.wav - 1:1 [20060823 191443Thomas2.wav]  (0:37 0:03)   (Paul’s PhD) 
Codes: [I2, Q1 begins here]  
No memos 
 
P 1: 20060823 191443Thomas2.wav - 1:2 [20060823 191443Thomas2.wav]  (0:40 0:08)   (Paul’s PhD) 
Codes: [Bushwhack was rewarding; everything on Lavida was rewarding] [I2, Q1]  
No memos 
 
P 1: 20060823 191443Thomas2.wav - 1:3 [20060823 191443Thomas2.wav]  (0:51 0:05)   (Paul’s PhD) 





[Abridged for Appendix demonstration purposes] 
 
 
P 1: 20060823 191443Thomas2.wav - 1:32 [20060823 191443Thomas2.wav]  (22:50 0:25)   (Paul’s PhD) 
Codes: [I2, Q4] [Putting others first (e.g letting others climb)] P-I2, Q4Service 
No memos 
 
P 1: 20060823 191443Thomas2.wav - 1:33 [20060823 191443Thomas2.wav]  (23:28 0:08)   (Paul’s PhD) 
Codes: [I2, Q5 begins here]  
No memos 
 
P 1: 20060823 191443Thomas2.wav - 1:34 [20060823 191443Thomas2.wav]  (23:43 2:01)   (Paul’s PhD) 
Codes: [Challenged by girls’ character and their continence with their language]P-I2, Q5PersonalExamples [I2, Q5] 
[Quotable with Edit]  
No memos 
Comment: 
Thomas struggles to articulate continence here. They have to think about it he says. He notes that it really impacts him. He 
has to control his tongue, they don’t! 
 
 
Appendix 7.1. ATLAS.tiTM Quotations Page. The above information format came from a data 
output feature in ATLAS.tiTM, the CAQDAS programme used for the analysis. In its entirety (I 
have displayed only one page here) it reveals all of the substantive sections deemed 
relevant in the second set of interviews. The following is an explanation of an individual 
substantive section, taken from this page:  
 
P 1: 20060823 191443Thomas2.wav - 1:32 [20060823 191443Thomas2.wav] (22:50 0:25) 





The designation “P1” represents “Primary Document 1.” In the case of this research, the 
primary documents were the individually recorded interviews themselves. The numbers and 
letters following P1, “20060823 191443Thomas2.wav,” communicate that this substantive 
section was created on August 23rd, 2006, at 7:14pm, and that this particular substance 
section came from Thomasʼ second interview. The “.wav” extension designates this file as an 
audio recording. The “1:32” indicates that that this is the 32nd substantive section in 
Thomasʼ second interview. The numbers “22:50 0:25” reveal that the substantive section 
occurred 22 minutes and 50 seconds into the interview, and that the audio clip lasts 25 
seconds. The designation “I2, Q4” is a code assigned to this substantive section, and means 
that it is relevant to question number four in the second interview. The phrase “Putting others 
first (e.g letting others climb)” is an open code (see discussion in subsection 4.5.1) attached 
to this substantive section. Once all of the open codes for the second interviewʼs fourth 
question (Did this expedition offer opportunities to carry out action related to character?) 
were collated through ATLAS.tiTM, they were broken down into axial and selective codes 
such as “P-I2, Q4Service.” This axial code, service, is discussed in subsection 8.2.2. Finally, 
the “No memos” tag indicates that I did not create any memo in association with this 
particular substantive section. 
 
 436 
Appendix 7.2 ATLAS.tiTM Axial Code Family 
 




HU: Paul’s PhD Analysis Interview 2 
File: [C:\Documents and Settings\computer support\My Documents\PhD Q...\Paul’s PhD Analysis 
Interview 2.hpr5] 
Edited by: Paul’s PhD 




Chance to respond graciously and with tolerance to other people’s (lame) character 
Difficult people provide opportunity for patience 
Extending graciousness to others by choosing not to unnecessarily conflict with 
group members (pick at them?) 
Havin patience with people requires mental endurance 
Leader of the Day and chance to work through frustration and be purposeful but 
gracious with others despite frustration 
Selflessness through sharing everything 
Social dynamics and getting on (or not) with people always presented opportunity to 
practise character (through caring for others) 
To find the good in others that she normally would struggle with; to cease her 
judgmental tendencies and look deeper into others’ value 
Usually would have been frustrated, but had gained a respect for each and therefore 
was able to be more respectful  
 
 
Appendix 7.2. Axial Code Family. The above information format came from a data output 
feature in ATLAS.tiTM, the CAQDAS programme used for the analysis. Once all of the open 
codes for the second interviewʼs fourth question (Did this expedition offer opportunities to 
carry out action related to character?) were collated through ATLAS.tiTM, they were sorted 
into axial codes. This page represents the open codes found within the axial code, 
graciousness, discussed in subsection 8.2.2.3. 
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Appendix 7.3 ATLAS.tiTM Selective Code Family 
 




HU: Paul’s PhD Analysis Interview 2 
File: [C:\Documents and Settings\computer support\My Documents\PhD Q...\Paul’s PhD Analysis 
Interview 2.hpr5] 
Edited by: Paul’s PhD 
Date\Time: 21/12/07 13:00:22 
 
 
“Be here now” as a form of character development 
Acts of service in camp life 
After she realized what she wanted change, she went about it through the expedition 
in conversations and thought (trying to now be judgmental for example) 
All the group contributed to William’s character through a supportive environment 
Assisting people on trials 
Be here now as a mental focus and staying on mission 
Be here now as way to stay committed on long bushwhack 
Beating her fear of feeling fear and anxiety on her solo and how that is now a 
reference point of future struggle 
Because becoming loving was on of Esther’s goals, she tried to do this through 
service to others (e.g. helping with their packs) 
Being a friend who listens and cares 
Big science project; everyday you got to try something different; intense close 
environment allowed more opportunity; “real world”, big world 
By listening to others she valued them, which in turn increased their self-esteem 
Chance to respond graciously and with tolerance to other people’s (lamb) character 
Chance to encourage others 
 
[Abridged for Appendix demonstration purposes] 
 
On solo she discovered (through bible reading, thinking and prayer) the high call to 
love others and she tried and tried through the expedition to do that 
Others’ leading by example 
Practise character every second - gives many examples 
Practise determination and endurance - asking why am I doing this and what am I 
learning from it (especially on bushwhack) 
Practise encouragement 
Practised character all the time out there 
Putting others first (e.g. letting others climb) 
Respect for others, leaders and nature - nature is not going bounce back if we keep 
abusing it  
Selflessness through sharing everything 
Service (e.g. cleaning pots), servants heart and the example that comes from that 
Service (e.g. getting water, packing tent) 
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Service in camp 
Social dynamics and getting on (or not) with people always presented opportunity to 
practise character (through caring for others) 
Sociability was practised because of his shyness 
Struggle to delegate because of issues of perfection; attempted to let go and trust 
others (with navigation for example) 
The need to trust on the rappel; need to trust yourself before you can trust others 
Thinking of others through encouragement 
Thousands of acts of service committed and missed (with examples clean-up, helping 
hand etc.) 
To find the good in others that she normally would struggle with; to cease her 
judgmental tendencies and look deeper into others’ value 
Trust was practised 
Trying to be Christ-like in EVERY action consistently 
Usually would have been frustrated, but had gained a respect for each and therefore 
was able to be more respectful 
Yes, the expedition stretched the character all the time out there 
 
 
Appendix 7.3. ATLAS.tiTM Selective Code Family. The above information format came from a 
data output feature in ATLAS.tiTM, the CAQDAS programme used for the analysis. Once all 
of the open codes for the second interviewʼs fourth question (Did this expedition offer 
opportunities to carry out action related to character?) were collated through ATLAS.tiTM, 
they were sorted into axial codes. This page represents some of the open codes within these 
axial codes. Through further analysis, it was found that these axial codes could more broadly 
be grouped under the selective code of “care,” discussed in subsection 8.2.2. 
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Appendix 7.4 ATLAS.tiTM Axial Code Primary Documents Table 
 
CODES-PRIMARY-DOCUMENTS-TABLE  (CELL=Q-FREQ) 
Report created by Paul’s PhD - 22/01/08  18:27:16 
HU: [C:\Documents and Settings \ computer support \ My Documents \ PhD 
q...\Paul’s PhD Analysis Interview 2.hpr5] 
 




             PRIMARY DOCS 
CODES            1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10  11   Totals 
 
 
Chance to respond gr  0   0   0   1   0   0   0   0   0    0    0       1 
Difficult people pro  0   0   0   1   0   0   0   0   0    0    0       1 
Extending graciousne  0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0    1    0       1 
Havin patience with  0   1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0    0    0       1 
Leader of the Day an  0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0    0    1       1 
Selflessness through  0   1   0   0   0   0   0   0   0    0    0       1 
Social dynamics and  0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0    1    0       1 
To find the good in  0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   1    0    0       1 
Usually would have b  0   0   0   1   0   0   0   0   0    0    0       1 
 
Totals              0   2   0   3   0   0   0   0   1    2    1       9 
 
Appendix 7.4. ATLAS.tiTM Axial Code Primary Documents Table. This table indicates how the 
open codes within this axial code, graciousness, were spread across the primary documents. 
It allowed me to see in a glance how many participants contributed to an axial or selective 
code, in this case, five. Notice that there are 11 primary documents, but only ten participants. 
While interviewing Esther, we were interrupted and had to stop the recording. Concerned 
that leaving the digital recorder on “pause” would waste the battery, I decided to save the 
audio file and turn the recorder off. Shortly thereafter we resumed the interview and began 
recording again under a new audio file. When all of the audio files for the second set of 
interviews were uploaded to ATLAS.tiTM, the programme treated Estherʼs two audio files as 
separate primary documents (numbers seven and eight), although they were in reality two 
audio files representing one interview. Since the primary document numbers (e.g. 1, 2, 3) 
ascribed by ATLAS.tiTM were permanently attached to the audio file names (e.g. “EstherI” 
and “EstherII”), I had no difficulty determining which primary document number (e.g. 1, 2, 3, 





Open Codes Within the Themes, Tabulated Across 
Participant Interviews 
This appendix tabulates the number of participants contributing to each theme 
discussed in the thesis. It is thus a more condensed form of the ATLAS.tiTM output 
document discussed in Appendix 7.4. Each analysis chapter receives its own table, 
which lists the themes therein. Appendix 8.1, which contains the tabulated themes 




Appendix 8.1 Tabulated themes from Chapter 5 
 
Tabulated Themes from Chapter 5 
Name of Theme Number of Participants 
Contributing to Theme 
5.1.1 Character as Identity 8 
5.1.2.1 Character as an Ability to Maintain Integrity 5 
5.1.2.2 Character as an Ability to Exercise Traits 5 
5.1.2.3 Character as a Deliberative Capacity 3 
5.1.3 Character Revealed 7 
5.2.1 The Gradual Nature of Character Change 7 
5.2.2 The Role of Struggle in Character Development 5 
5.2.3 The Process of Character Formation 9 
5.2.4 Others’ Influence on One’s Character 7 
5.2.5 “Moral Luck” and Character 5 
5.3.1 Learning About Character Through Experience 4 
5.3.2 Character and a Christian Worldview 9 
5.3.3.1 Others Direct Influence on the Character One Pursues 5 
5.3.3.2 Indirect Influence on the Character One Pursues 6 




Appendix 8.2 Tabulated themes from Chapter 6 
 
Tabulated Themes from Chapter 6 
Name of Theme Number of Participants 
Contributing to Theme 
6.1.1 Reflection: An Aid to Gain Moral Perspective 8 
6.1.2 The Reflective Process and Character 7 
6.1.3 Moral Written Reflection 6 
6.1.4 Morally Reflecting with Others 6 
6.2.1 Practice and the Refinement of Character 7 
6.2.2 From Continence to Virtue 4 
6.3.1.1 Influential Shapers of Character: Friends and Family 6 
6.3.1.2 Helping Us See Our Moral Selves 4 
6.3.2.1 Looking to Others as Moral Examples 8 




Appendix 8.3 Tabulated themes from Chapter 7 
 
Tabulated Themes from Chapter 7 
Name of Theme Number of Participants 
Contributing to Theme 
7. 1 Revealing and Building Character 5 
7.1.2.1 Social Aspects of Character 9 
7.1.2.2 Physical Aspects of Character 4 
7.2 A Challenging Expedition 7 
7.3 Expedition as a Future Reference Point 3 




Appendix 8.4 Tabulated themes from Chapter 8 
 
Tabulated Themes from Chapter 8 
Name of Theme Number of Participants 
Contributing to Theme 
8.1.1.1 Moral Reflection Through the Journal 9 
8.1.1.2 Moral Reflection Through the Solo 10 
8.1.1.3 Moral Reflection Through Group Reviews 4 
8.1.2 Informal Moral Reflection 7 
8.1.3 Unique Moral Reflection Within Individual Narratives 6 
8.1.4 Implications for Expeditionary Moral Reflection 6 
8.2.1.1 Rocks and Ropes as Moral Practice  4 
8.2.1.2 The Bushwhack as Moral Practice  6 
8.2.2.1 Service as Moral Practice 6 
8.2.2.2 Encouragement as Moral Practice 6 
8.2.2.3 Graciousness as Moral Practice 6 
8.2.2.4 Esther’s Agapic Narrative 1 
8.3.1.1 Community: Morality Within the Group Experience 8 




Appendix 8.5 Tabulated themes from Chapter 9 
 
Tabulated Themes from Chapter 9 
Name of Theme Number of Participants 
Contributing to Theme 
9.1.1.1 Future Reference Point: Plus Est en Vous 6 
9.1.1.2 Confidence and Character 3 
9.1.2 Yet to be Determined 3 
9.2 The Uniqueness of Character Development 7 
9.3.1 The Physical Influence of the Expedition on Character 5 
9.3.2 The Social Influence of the Expedition on Character 5 




PhD Research Journal 
As noted in subsection 4.6.2, I utilised NoteBookTM (n.d.) software to maintain an 
electronic research journal containing all the notes, ideas, reflections, difficulties and 
solutions throughout the research process. The following URL is linked to a 
navigable HTML version of the journal: 
 
http://web.me.com/paul.stonehouse/PhDResearchJournal/ 
